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Abstract 
This thesis examines the development of cluster policy and considers the extent to 
which difficulties in implementing cluster policy can be attributed to a lack of 
understanding of the concepts that underlie clusters. In order to move beyond the 
work of Michael Porter's (1990,1998) and to provide a conceptualisation of clusters 
that considers the notion that traded transactions may be more efficiently conducted 
when spatially concentrated, but also allows for an understanding that economic 
processes are path dependent, influenced by their institutional and cultural context and 
shaped by the motivations and behaviour of individual actors, this thesis uses 
Storper's (1997) `holy trinity' of `technologies-organisations-territories' as a 
framework to examine a wide range of concepts that underlie our understanding of 
clusters. The conclusion is that clusters are highly context dependent, and that multi- 
layered explanations for their existence and evolution are required. 
The way in which cluster policy has developed is also highly context dependent and 
each element of Storper's triumvirate has implications for cluster policy. Given a lack 
of agreement as to the definition and nature of cluster policy, this thesis proposes that 
cluster policy development be understood as a process and a five-stage cluster policy 
model is developed. This model is used both to consider the literature regarding 
cluster policy and also as a framework to examine the development of two cluster 
policy initiatives in the North East of England and their impact on actors within one 
particular cluster in the region. These case studies indicate that the level of 
understanding of cluster concepts amongst policy makers, and issues throughout the 
cluster policy making process, impacted on the development and the outcomes of the 
policy initiatives, but that the development and outcomes were also influenced by the 
nature of the particular cluster. The thesis concludes that a better understanding of the 
scale and boundaries of clusters and the distinct theoretical elements making up 
cluster concepts may lead to a better conceptualisation of clusters and cluster theory. 
A series of policy recommendations is then drawn. 
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I'll 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
There is no doubt that clusters are on the policy agenda. From Whitehall (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2001) to Warragul (Clusters Asia Pacific Inc, 2001) cluster 
based policies are being pursued. Since the 1990s, organisations as diverse as the 
World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the United Nations International Development Organisation (UNIDO); national 
governments of many political colours; state and regional authorities in many nations; 
and numerous local economic development agencies have adopted a diffuse range of 
cluster based economic development strategies, looking to develop localised 
economic specialisation as a source of competitive advantage. This research aims to 
analyse the development of two policies taking a cluster based approach to economic 
development in the North East of England and to consider the impact of both policies 
on firms and organisations within the marine and offshore technology industries in 
the region in order to draw out some conclusions about the conceptualisation of 
clusters and cluster policy and to provide some practical lessons for policymaking. 
What are clusters and how do we account for their existence and development? 
In order to consider the use of cluster concepts in policy it is necessary to examine the 
contentious literature around clusters that seeks to explain why, at a time of increasing 
globalisation (Ohmae, 1990), and the purported death of distance (Negroponte, 1995, 
Cairncross, 1997), localised concentrations of specialised activity are apparently 
achieving great economic success. Although exemplar concentrations of economic 
activity and their geographical environments, - Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1991; Scott 
1988), Baden-Württemberg (Cooke and Morgan, 1993), Third Italy (Bagnasco, 1977, 
Piore and Sabel, 1984) - have provided volumes of material for academics. and 
inspiration for policy makers, there is no consensus even as to the definition of a 
cluster. As Rosenfeld (1997) concludes, `criteria for clusters have proven 
exceedingly difficult to pin down, and there are as many definitions are there are 
types of organisations using the term' (ibid. p. 8). A common starting point is Michael 
Porter's 1998 book, On Competition, in which he defines clusters as `geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, 
firms in related industries, and associated institutions (for example. universities. 
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standards agencies, and trade associations) in particular fields that compete but also 
cooperate' (1998, p. 197). This definition highlights certain aspects of a cluster that 
are generally accepted, but the definition of clusters remains contentious. Clusters are 
economically specialised and geographically concentrated, although I will show that 
there is little agreement as to the scale at which such concentrations exist, the way in 
which boundaries can be drawn or the role which spatial proximity performs. There 
is a systemic element and a relational aspect to clusters, in that they encompass not 
only a range of firms, but also the wider environment in which those firms operate. 
The dynamics of performance are driven by the connections and links within the 
cluster although, once again, I will demonstrate that there is no consensus as to the 
components of a cluster, the nature of the linkages between firms or the processes by 
which clusters evolve and, in some cases, ultimately decline. 
Even if we can come closer to a definition of clusters, there is little agreement as to 
the explanation for the existence and evolution of such phenomena of localised 
concentrations of specialised activity. In order to provide a conceptualisation of 
clusters that considers the notion that traded transactions may be more efficiently 
conducted when spatially concentrated, but also allows for an understanding that 
economic processes are path dependent, influenced by their institutional and cultural 
context and shaped by the motivations and behaviour of individual actors, I take 
Michael Storper's (1997) `holy trinity' of regional economics - technologies- 
organisations-territories - as a framework to incorporate theories that have developed 
around transaction costs; social capital and relational assets; knowledge and learning, 
and innovation. From this analysis I conclude that, while there is not one cluster 
theory, a cluster approach permits a multi-layered explanation and rich understanding 
of such phenomena. 
Given the contentious literature around clusters it is not surprising that the range of 
policies to promote clusters and clustering behaviour is diffuse. However, I identify 
common features of a cluster approach to policy and show that, while much of the 
literature accounting for clusters does not give clear pointers theoretically, or 
practically, for policy intervention, theories from each element of Storper's holy 
trinity do have implications for policy, even if these implications are not taken into 
account in practice. However, the existence of a wide range of disparate policies 
raises a host of questions outlined below: 
Why have cluster concepts proved so appealing to policy makers? 
Inspired by the success of exemplar locations and regions, policy makers worldwide 
have sought to create and nurture clusters in their own localities. The publication in 
1990 of Porter's The Competitive Advantage of Nations, and the weaknesses of 
previous industrial, regional and technology policies, further encouraged many 
countries and regions to pursue a cluster based policy. However, it has been the 
ability of policy makers to `enrol' the concept for their own purposes that has ensured 
its popularity (Lagendijk and Cornford, 2000). Bergman and Feser (1999) point out 
that the availability of a new `policy hammer' has the tendency to make every issue 
look like a nail, and a cluster approach to policy has been implemented in many 
different forms at a range of geographical scales. However, I argue that, not only 
should policies be context dependent, but also the nature of policy should vary 
depending on the scale at which it is implemented, because the nature of relationships 
varies with scale. In addition, there has been little research into the way in which 
cluster policies undertaken at different scales within the same country are coordinated 
and it is apparent that this is an area meriting further research. 
How can we best understand a cluster-based approach to policy making? 
Through an analysis of the literature, which demonstrates a diversity in both academic 
conceptualisation of cluster policy and in approaches to cluster policy making in 
practice, I conclude that a cluster based approach to policy making can best be 
understood as a policy making process and I develop a model of the cluster policy 
making process comprising five stages: - the decision to take a cluster approach: 
identification, selection and analysis of clusters; participant mobilisation, relationship 
building and cluster animation; selection and implementation of policy instruments; 
and evaluation and policy learning. This model is important because I use it firstly, to 
analyse the literature around cluster policy and later, as an analytical framework for 
discussing and comparing the development and implementation of the cluster policy- 
initiatives in the North East of England that form the basis of the empirical work for 
this thesis. 
If policy makers follow a cluster policy making process similar to that outlined above. 
the result should be a tailor made, context specific policy that is differentiated firstly, 
by taking as its starting point the existing resource base of a territory, secondly, by- 
taking an approach which is holistic, inclusive and focused on synergies, and thirdly, 
by the intended outputs which are cluster specific assets available for exploitation by 
actors within the cluster. However, Enright (2000) points out the irony that cluster 
policies may become `one size fits all', with policy makers pursuing the same clusters 
with similar policies, and I highlight areas in the literature showing that there are 
substantial lessons to be learnt, and pitfalls to be avoided, in choosing to pursue 
cluster-based policies. 
1.2 Main Objective 
The main objective of this research is to analyse the development and impact of two 
policy initiatives that have taken a cluster based approach to economic development 
in the North East of England. I use a case study approach to firstly, examine the 
development of the two cluster policy initiatives, which operate at different 
geographical scales, and secondly, to consider their impact upon firms and 
organisations within a particular area of economic activity - marine and offshore 
technology and engineering. At the local level, the case study is that of the Regional 
Service for Clustering, an organisation which was initiated by North Tyneside 
Council and is the non-academic partner in the Economic and Social Research 
Council CASE collaborative studentship from which this thesis results. At the 
regional level, the research examines the cluster policy of the regional development 
agency for the North East of England, One NorthEast. 
The context in which the research came about, the methodological approach and the 
research design for the project are discussed further in Chapter 4. I aim to use the 
cluster policy process model, outlined above, to critically assess cluster based 
strategies both as they are developed and as they are implemented and I seek to 
answer three main research questions: 
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- How have two examples of cluster policy that impact upon the North East of 
England been developed? 
- How have those policies impacted on the marine and offshore engineering 
cluster in the North East of England? 
- What lessons can be learned? 
Given that the development of cluster policy and its subsequent outcomes are highly 
context dependent, I examine the cultural, social and economic context, and policy 
background, against which the policies were designed. I then describe the 
development of the policy using the cluster policy process model. Having described 
the development of each cluster policy, I consider the impact of those policies on 
firms and organisations within one particular `cluster' - the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster. Again it is important to understand the context in which the 
cluster policies are implemented and therefore background information on the 
industries, relationships and institutional framework is given. It is difficult to isolate 
the impact of the cluster policy from other influences, but the research emphasises the 
particular issues faced in developing a cluster policy for the marine and offshore 
industries in North East England, and also allows some general lessons to be drawn 
about the problems and challenges of adopting a cluster approach to economic 
development. The results highlight the relevance of viewing cluster policy as a 
process, the significance of the scale at which cluster policy is implemented and the 
role of cluster organisations, and raise further questions about the role of individual 
actors within the cluster policy process. 
1.3 Thesis Layout 
The structure of the thesis follows the composition of this chapter and is outlined in 
figure 1.1 below. Chapter 2 provides a review of cluster theory literature. Chapter 3 
is a review of the literature relating to the use of cluster concepts by policy makers. 
From this literature the cluster policy process model is developed and this model is 
subsequently used in Chapters 5-8 to analyse the development, implementation and 
outcomes of the two cluster policy initiatives. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research questions, detailed above, that have arisen from the 
literatures reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 and breaks them down into their constituent 
parts. It also outlines the context in which the research came about, and discusses the 
methodological approach and research design, before looking at the methods utilised 
to answer the research questions. The chapter concludes by outlining the limits of the 
study and the nature of the results that are set out in the following four chapters. 
Cluster policy in practice in the North East of England is the theme of Chapters 5 and 
7, which analyse the development of One NorthEast's cluster development 
programme and the Regional Service for Clustering initiative respectively. These two 
chapters draw strongly on the literature outlined in Chapter 3 and outline the cultural, 
social and economic context and policy background against which the policies were 
designed. Each policy initiative is analysed using the model of the cluster making 
process and the final section of both chapters draws out some generic lessons from 
each case study. 
The theme of Chapters 6 and 8 is the impact of the two cluster policy initiatives, from 
One NorthEast and the Regional Service for Clustering, on the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster in the North East of England. These two chapters draw on the 
literature discussed in Chapter 2 and provide some background to the marine and 
offshore industries in the North East, highlighting some of the relationships that exist 
between actors. The institutional framework and range of cluster organisations within 
the cluster is also outlined. The cluster policy process model is then used to analyse 
the impact of the two policies on firms, organisations and other actors within the 
cluster. 
Chapter 9 is a discussion chapter drawing together the experiences of both cluster 
policy initiatives and their varying impacts, particularly on the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster. This chapter considers the implications of this research both in 
theoretical terms, because through investigating individual clusters and the application 
of cluster policy, the usefulness and 'fit' of different concepts employed to explain 
clusters and cluster policy can be examined, and in practical terms, because lessons in 
respect of utilising the cluster approach in economic development policy can be 
identified. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and makes some suggestions for future 
research. 
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2 Theories of Clusters: Transactions, Territories and Technological Change 
2.1 Introduction 
Geographical concentrations of specialised economic activity are widely observed - 
the Dolomites account for half the world's production of ski boots (Rosenfeld, 1995), 
finance is concentrated in London, and Hollywood dominates film production. 
Historically, cutlery was associated with Sheffield and coal with Newcastle. There is 
an equally long academic tradition, stretching back to the economist Alfred Marshall, 
of seeking to explain why such patterns of economic specialisation are observed and 
why there are apparent benefits from operating within such concentrations - be they 
termed filieres (cf. Raikes et al., 2000), development blocks (Dahmen, 1988), neo- 
Marshallian agglomerations (Amin and Thrift, 1992), industrial districts (Becattini, 
1990, Brusco, 1990), innovative milieu (Maillat, 1995) or clusters (Porter, 1998). 
However, there is little agreement as to the processes that give rise to these 
phenomena or the processes by which they evolve. 
Clusters, in particular, have become the dominant, and increasingly contested, 
discourse in both economic geography and economic development policy during the 
past decade. As Bergman (1998) points out `it is difficult to identify another equally 
obscure concept that appeals to such a broad spectrum of academic disciplines, 
professions and even lay people' (ibid. p. 92). This appeal largely rests on the notion 
that clusters of firms and associated organisations, at various geographical scales, 
facilitate learning and innovation, which in turn are seen as the basis of 
competitiveness in the `new economy'. However, there is a suspicion that the concept 
of clusters, and especially the work of Porter, has `gate crashed' the debate about 
economic concentrations (Martin and Sunley, 2003), leading some to question 
whether a cluster approach adds anything to existing theories that seek to explain 
spatial agglomeration (Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2004). 
I would argue that the cluster approach is valuable in understanding spatial 
agglomeration. Those who use the term 'cluster' are not solely inspired and 
influenced by the work of Porter, but draw on much deeper and richer veins of 
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thought. Indeed the concept of clusters has a long career path that both pre-dates and 
runs concurrently with the popularity of Porter's work. In tracing the career path of 
the concept it becomes evident that a number of literatures from different academic 
traditions can usefully be drawn together to shed light on the processes that underlie 
clusters. This drawing together may be controversial - each approach has different 
theoretical foundations, with consequent implications for the methodologies used to 
study the phenomena. Each approach identifies different sources of advantage from 
operating within clusters (Newlands, 2003) and each approach leaves different issues 
unresolved. However, by tracing the development of these literatures, it is possible to 
gain a clearer understanding of the substance of clusters and the processes that give 
rise to them, even though these processes will give different outcomes at different 
times and places because of the highly context dependent nature of the phenomena. 
Benneworth and Henry (2004) advocate this approach, arguing: 
Each of these different theories might imply a different understanding of a 
cluster, an accepted methodological foundation and `rules of evidence and 
argument' [... ] We regard each of these approaches as a lens with which to 
look at the same situation to produce knowledge which contributes to how we 
understand both `that cluster' as well as `clusters' (ibid. p. 1019). 
Gordon and McCann (2000) identify four strands of literature relating to `localised 
spatial growth' or clusters. Firstly, there are those within neo-classical economics, 
most notably Paul Krugman, who have gained an interest in geographical issues 
through the application of modern trade theory. Secondly, within business and 
management literature, there are those with an interest in the optimal spatial 
relationship between producers, customers and suppliers. It is within this strand that 
Gordon and McCann place the work of Porter. Thirdly, there is an interest within 
geography and spatial planning literature in explaining so-called new industrial 
districts observed in areas such as northern Italy and California. Finally. and 
intertwined with the geography literature, there is a sociological dimension to the 
debate around clusters with concepts such as embeddedness (Granovetter. 1985). 
Gordon and McCann identify that each of these strands comes from a different 
academic background, but also. importantly, that each strand has a different research 
agenda. Gordon and McCann's article is valuable not only in setting out the 
different 
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literatures pertaining to the debate around clusters, but also in clarifying the types of 
processes occurring in clusters. However, it is the work of Michael Storper that I 
have chosen to provide a framework for considering the strands of literature relating 
to clusters. Storper, in The Regional World (1997), identifies three schools of thought 
participating in the debate regarding the rediscovery of the region as a fundamental 
basis of economic and social life. The first school of thought looks at institutions, the 
second examines industrial organisation and transactions, and the third emphasises 
technological change and learning. While Storper's focus of interest is the role of the 
region, rather than specifically the role of clusters, these literatures also form the 
background to much current thinking and debate around clusters. Storper 
(1995; 1997) identifies the emergence of a new heterodox paradigm in regional 
economics and economic geography that can be used to break down the issue of 
economic development and build up a multi-layered explanation for it. He terms this 
heterodox paradigm the `holy trinity' of regional economics, with the three elements 
being technologies-organisations-territories. 
Given the criticism of theorising with academic writing on clusters (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003; Benneworth and Henry, 2004) it is particularly important to choose a 
framework that permits the development of a clear notion of clusters and Storper's 
holy trinity serves as such a framework. Storper is undoubtedly a significant figure 
in economic geography. Bathelt and Glückler describe Storper's holy trinity as `[t]he 
most sophisticated attempt to reformulate the foundations and goals of economic 
geography' (2003, p. 129), Cumbers et al. identify Storper's work as `one of the most 
sophisticated and influential contributions to the development of institutional and 
evolutionary ideas in economic geography (2003b, p. 329) and Lovering (1999), an 
ardent critic' of the weak theorising of `New Regionalism', within which much 
Lovering (1999) describes New Regionalism as 'a set of stories about how parts of a regional 
economy might work, placed next to a set of policy ideas which might just be useful in some cases' 
(p. 384, italics in the original) and `a rather vague framework which licenses speculation on possible 
relationships between hypothetical actors at an imprecisely specified level of ideal-typical abstraction' 
(p. 392). 
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cluster theorising has taken place, sees the theorising of Storper in The Regional 
World (1997) as `particularly clear and careful' (Lovering, 1999, p. 385). 
Storper's `new heterodoxy', according to Pinch and Henry (1999), provides a new 
metaphor for regional economies as `sets of relations' as opposed to the old metaphor 
of `economic systems as machines with quantifiable inputs and outputs' (ibid.. p. 820). 
Storper's work enables us to give a conceptualisation of clusters that considers the 
notion that traded transactions may be more efficiently conducted when spatially 
concentrated, but also allows for an understanding that economic processes are path 
dependent, influenced by their institutional and cultural context and shaped by the 
motivations and behaviour of individual actors, and that the transmission and 
accumulation of knowledge are socially embedded processes. It is also important that 
any methodological approach taken is consistent with the theoretical basis of research 
and this conceptualisation enabled me to take a relational approach (cf. chapter 4). 
Storper (1997) concludes that clusters might be viewed as `stocks of relational assets' 
(ibid. p. 28) arising from untraded interdependencies within the cluster and I will 
return to the concept of relational assets in section 2.6, but for the time being, 
Storper's three fold schema of technologies (and processes of knowledge and 
learning), organisations (and associated transactions) and territories (and their 
associated institutions) form a useful framework for considering the career path of the 
cluster concept. 
Storper's holy trinity is not without critics. Bathelt and Glückler (2003) point out two 
areas where they believe Storper's work can be misinterpreted. Firstly, given that 
territory is identified as a distinct element of the triumvirate, they believe that there is 
a risk that, contrary to what they believe was Storper's intention, spatial processes 
could be treated in the same way as social and economic processes. This would run 
contrary to Massey' s (1995) caveat that '[t]here are no such things as purely spatial 
processes, there are only particular social processes operating over space' (ibid., p. 11, 
quoted in Bathelt and Glückler, 2003). Their second, related, criticism is that treating 
territory as a separate entity could lead to the other two entities (organisations and 
technologies) being viewed as non-spatially specific. In order to avoid these two 
misinterpretations, Bathelt and Glückler seek to analyse economic and social 
processes through a geographical lens, rather than treating territory as a separate 
entity. They go on to develop a framework around the 'concepts of organisation. 
evolution, innovation, and interaction' (ibid., p. 131, italics in the original). terming 
this conceptualisation `the four ions of a relational economic geography'. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms of Storper's `holy trinity' framework and suggested 
improvements, I decided to adopt it, taking into account, and attempting to avoid. the 
potential criticisms. 
Having asserted that cluster theorising runs much deeper than the work of Porter, I 
will, paradoxically, first look at the work of Porter because, although it is flawed, it is 
undoubtedly significant and particularly relevant to the popularity of the concept in 
policy circles. Then, in order to illustrate that cluster theorising does have deeper 
roots than Porter, I will consider the literatures that have sought explanations for 
concentrations of specialised economic activity and innovative behaviour in elements 
of Storper's `holy trinity' of technologies-organisations-territories. Each approach 
has merits and shortcomings, however, by considering both the claims made by each 
strand of theorising and the criticisms each strand has attracted, it is possible to obtain 
a better understanding of clusters and the unresolved issues in this area. 
To gain a clearer understanding of those locations with evidence of economic 
specialisation or `clusters' is an important research area in its own right, but its 
importance is heightened because, as mentioned above, clusters have been used not 
only as a tool to describe and explain concentrations of economic activity, but have 
also been seized upon by policy makers as a `new' approach to economic 
development. The literature pertaining to the use of clusters in policy is considered 
further in Chapter 3 and my empirical work looks at the way in which cluster 
concepts have been employed by policy makers in the North East of England and 
considers the impact of cluster policy, conceived and enacted at different geographical 
scales, on one particular cluster. These detailed case studies shed further light on the 
processes underlying clusters and on the use of cluster concepts by policy makers. 
2.2 Towards a Definition 
Before moving forward it is worth considering what is meant by the term 'cluster' 
This is not a straightforward task because, as Rosenfeld (1997) points out, `there are 
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as many definitions as there are types of organisations using the term' (ibid. p. 8). 
Others go further still, asserting, and accepting, that there is `no possible consensus on 
what is a cluster, because each application of the concept is specific in place and time, 
and the general term is defined through the act of investigating individual 
clusters' (Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, 1999, p. 2). For others, 
this is problematic and the concept has become `chaotic' (Martin and Sunley. 2003). 
2.2.1 Clusters: functional or geographical? 
For Malmberg (2003) the main confusion relates to whether clusters are a functional 
or spatial phenomenon and he seeks to distinguish functionally linked economic 
activity, which he terms `an industry cluster' and which he considers to be the subject 
of Porter's (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, from geographical 
concentrations of similar or related economic activity, which he terms a spatial or 
localised cluster and which he considers to be the subject of Porter's later works on 
clusters (Porter, 2000). 
However, in a similar way to the way in which Bathelt and Glückler (2003) seek to 
take a geographical perspective, rather than treating geography as a separate entity (cf. 
s. 2.1), Malmberg subsequently suggests that we take geography out of the definition 
of a cluster. I would argue that, if this were done, it would not be necessary to 
distinguish between industry clusters and spatial clusters. Geographical proximity 
becomes a variable attribute of a cluster rather than part of the definition. Clusters 
operate in geographical space, relationships within them may be strengthened by 
geographical proximity, but they are mainly defined by their function. 
Key geographical questions remain however. Is it the case that `[t]he geographic 
scope of a cluster can range from a single city or state to a country or even a group of 
neighboring countries' (Porter. 2000, p. 254), or does it follow that ` [if] the same 
externalities and networks that typify clusters do indeed operate at a whole variety of 
spatial scales, this surely weakens the empirical and analytical significance of the 
cluster concept' (Martin and Sunley. 2003, p. 12)? Over what geographical scales do 
these functionally defined clusters operate? If clusters do operate at differing 
geographical scales, are the processes fundamentally different depending on scale 
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and, crucially, what are the relationships between the scales? How does proximity 
(cultural, social, organisational, but specifically, geographical) influence the processes 
occurring within clusters? 
Malmberg and Maskell (2002) argue that the processes within clusters do vary with 
scale and conclude that `it seems reasonable to allow the scale to vary according to 
what type of phenomenon is emphasised in the analysis' (ibid. p. 443). They suggest 
that, if the focus is on formal institutions (for example, the legal system or cultural 
and linguistic norms), the national scale will be relevant; if the emphasis is on 
business transactions, a continuum of geographical scale will be under consideration; 
and, if the interest is in the mundane, every day exchange of information and ideas, 
the appropriate scale will be much more local. 
Asheim (1999) points out that we can distinguish between national clusters 
concentrated in a particular region, and regional branches of a national cluster, and 
regional clusters. Bunnell and Coe (2001) provide a useful summary of the 
geographical debate around the meaning of scale and conclude that scales are fluid, 
relative and socially constructed. Actors operate, and events occur, simultaneously 
across different scales. As Asheim (1999) points out, clusters at a regional level can 
be part of larger clusters at a national level. However, we do not need to presume that 
the nature of the linkages and relationships within the cluster will be the same at 
different scales. 
2.2.2 The Quandary of Boundaries 
An associated question is how geographical boundaries can be drawn around clusters. 
In policy terms, this has often been achieved artificially by beginning with a 
predefined territory and looking for clusters within those bounds. Bunnell and Coe 
(2001) challenge us to bound research, not by territorial boundaries, but to look at 
social networks embedded in particular places and to look at relationships operating 
between and across different scales. Such an approach necessitates a shift in focus 
from the different scales at which, in their case, innovation may be interpreted, to the 
key actors who construct and utilise the networks through which innovation is 
enacted. Porter's conceptual view is also to start with the firm and trace the linkages 
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and interactions outwards from there, although the practices of his consultancy firm. 
Monitor, tend to involve the identification of clusters within given territories. 
If we do start from key firms and trace their interactions, then drawing the boundary 
of the cluster is a subjective process - not least because, as The National Governor's 
Association (2001) point out, the geography of clusters is in part determined by the 
distances and times that people are willing to travel for work and meetings. Even 
within industries there can be different patterns within, and between, different 
countries. Research has shown that in the United States biotechnology clusters tended 
to be thought of as covering locations that could be visited in a business day, whereas 
in the United Kingdom they were thought of as covering areas that could be visited in 
around an hour (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999). In turn, these views are 
determined by cultural and social norms, transportation systems and personal 
preferences. Functional interactions inevitably have a tendency to tail off in intensity 
with distance and at some point, if a boundary is required for analytical purposes, a 
decision has to be made (by those examining the cluster) as to a boundary which 
encompasses the key actors. It is unlikely that the firms operating within and across 
clusters feel the same need to delineate boundaries. To some, this element of 
creativity and construct is a problem and is tied to the question of geographical scale 
(Martin and Sunley, 2003). However, if we accept that the boundaries of clusters are 
inevitably drawn by the geography of the interactions of those involved, and that an 
element of creativity is therefore required, and justified, in considering their 
boundaries, we can look separately at how different processes may work at different 
geographic scales and how sub national clusters may relate to clusters at a larger 
geographic scale. That is, we can accept that cluster boundaries are drawn by a 
creative process, without accepting that the same processes operate at a whole variety 
of geographical scales. 
We can conclude that the geographical scale of relationships varies between industries 
and between countries. A national cluster may be composed of regional clusters and 
regional clusters may contain smaller groupings. However, we should not necessarily 
expect to find evidence of the same type of relationships at different scales, and the 
nature of the relationships will vary at different geographical scales. 
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2.2.3 The Components and Linkages within Clusters 
Even when geographical boundaries have been drawn, taking into account the 
different scales at which clusters exist, there is disagreement as to the elements within 
a cluster. Some would restrict the term clusters to denoting concentrations of 
interconnected firms, preferring to use the concept of a regional innovation system to 
describe the wider notion of firms and supporting organisations (European 
Commission, 2002). I would agree with others who include many more elements 
within the cluster. Porter (1998, p. 199) includes `associated institutions' in his 
definition, and the OECD concludes that `in some cases, clusters also encompass 
strategic alliances with universities, research institutes, knowledge-intensive business 
services, bridging institutions (brokers, consultants) and customers' (OECD, 1999, 
p. 9). 
If we return to the functional nature of clusters, another key area is the nature of 
linkages in clusters and the level to which they involve economic specialisation. How 
economically specialised should clusters be? Are the linkages vertical, horizontal or 
both? Are clusters more than supply chains? What are the key linkages and drivers in 
the cluster? Some stress both horizontal and vertical dimensions, describing clusters 
as `[g]eographically proximate firms in vertical and horizontal relationships involving 
a localised enterprise support infrastructure with a shared developmental vision for 
business growth, based on competition and cooperation in a specific market field' 
(Cooke, 2002, p. 121). Others implicitly concentrate on the vertical aspect, 
characterising clusters as `networks of production of strongly interdependent firms 
(including specialised suppliers) linked to each other in a value-adding production 
chain' (OECD, 1999, p. 9). 
The nature of the linkages is fundamental to the distinction between a cluster and a 
sector. In the policy arena, former sector initiatives have often been relabelled cluster 
initiatives with little, if any, change in substance. However, clusters are a wider 
phenomenon. Clusters are to do with the linkages and interdependencies that arise 
when producing and marketing products and services, or creating innovations. These 
linkages can be horizontal or vertical and may be based around using the same skills 
sets, similar technologies or a similar supply chain, but are more likely to encompass 
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a group of sectors or industries, or an amalgam of parts of sectors or industries, than 
to comprise of a single sector or industry. 
Clusters can also be distinguished from networks. Cooke (2002) sees clusters as 
operating at a large scale, with networks operating at a smaller scale, but some of the 
other differences that he highlights are more significant. Clusters have open 
membership and, although individuals, firms and organisations exert a conscious 
choice to partake, or otherwise, in organised cluster activities, their very existence in a 
particular location may make them part of a given cluster. Formal business networks, 
on the other hand, require conscious action to obtain membership. Networks can, 
however, exist within clusters. Networks tend to work towards agreed objectives, 
whereas clusters encompass exchange relations and represent a shared identity, which 
may translate into economic value (Cooke, 2002, Rosenfeld, 1997). 
2.2.4 Stage and Age 
A further way of classifying clusters is by considering their stage of development. 
Enright (2000) identifies four categories of `cluster' - working, latent, potential and 
wishful-thinking. It should be noted at the outset that Enright dismisses wishful- 
thinking clusters as areas chosen for government support, rather than meaningful 
clusters. Working clusters are characterised by a critical mass of competitors, 
suppliers, customers and institutions, with dense interactions and interdependencies, 
where those interactions and interdependencies, along with agglomeration economies 
produce competitive advantage. In this category reside Silicon Valley and 
Hollywood. Latent clusters are characterised as having a critical mass of firms, but 
without the interactions and flows to truly function as a cluster. Potential clusters are 
those with some, but not all, elements of a critical mass of competitors, suppliers, 
customers and institutions. Potential clusters, like latent clusters, lack interaction and 
self-awareness. This might be seen as an attempt to encompass all territories and all 
firms within the cluster mantra, but a more careful reading shows that only working 
clusters are considered by Enright to actually be clusters. Other groupings have the 
possibility of becoming clusters, but only with intervention. Enright's main purpose 
in adopting the four-fold classification is to guide policy makers in deciding their 
focus for cluster development. 
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While Enright's classification mainly applies to the precursors of clusters and how 
they might become `working' clusters, others have focused on how clusters are likely 
to evolve once established. Pouder and St. John (1996) introduce a three-stage model 
for the evolution of clusters. The first phase is `origination' during which the cluster 
or `hot spot' identity emerges. This is followed by `convergence' and finally 'firm 
reorientation', during which the performance of the cluster declines. This 
evolutionary process takes place because agglomeration economies diminish and 
firms within the cluster become inward looking and ignore competition from outside 
the cluster, so that `hot spots' become `blind spots'. For each stage they identify three 
forces affecting competitive behaviour and innovation performance: resource 
conditions; institutional processes and management mental models. Interestingly, 
they model the performance of non-clustered firms as well as clustered firms and 
identify a different performance cycle for non-clustered firms. 
Tichy (1998) also develops a cluster life cycle. Drawing on theories of product life 
cycle, Tichy postulates that, at the early stage of its life, a product is produced within 
an agglomeration because of the flows of information that are required at an uncertain 
time of development. Economies of agglomeration then come into play, signalling 
the `growth phase'. Further specialisation occurs, because the cluster drives out non- 
cluster activities. However, as the product matures and processes are standardised, 
the cluster faces the `critical maturity phase' before cost pressures result in 
`declustering', as lower cost production locations are sought. Tichy anticipates that 
the cluster will have become inward looking and unable to respond, therefore causing 
serious difficulties for the region in which it is located. Tichy acknowledges that 
there are policy interventions to avoid such petrification, and Pouder and St John also 
call for further research in this area. However, as with many cycles, these models are 
too deterministic and stylised, and there is a tendency to ignore institutional 
differences between clusters and the actors involved (Tödtling and Trippl, 2004). 
A more nuanced model is developed in the work of Chapman et al. (2004). Cluster 
approaches to policy have often been attempted in lagging regions, but much of the 
literature focuses on dynamic and growing clusters. In focusing their research on the 
oil complex in Aberdeen, Chapman et al. have attempted to redress the balance by 
considering a more `mature' cluster and the processes occurring within it. Their 
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model of evolution and change within clusters considers both the micro (firm) level 
and the meso (cluster) level, accounting for the fact that change within both levels 
may range from incremental to radical and will be through different mechanisms of 
re-orientation. The mechanisms of reorientation range from cost-reduction and 
copying (associated with minor change) to innovation and diversification (associated 
with major change). This model of cluster evolution is less deterministic, because the 
prevalent mechanism will depend on firm responses, which are in turn influenced by 
conditions within the cluster. 
Theories regarding cluster life cycles and stages of development are therefore useful 
for understanding and describing individual clusters and depending on the stage of the 
cluster we will see different processes occurring. As will be seen in Chapter 3 this 
has implications for policy, as policy measures to influence the cluster policy cycle 
can be envisaged. 
2.2.5 Multiple Dimensions 
I have suggested that clusters be understood as a form of functionally linked 
economic activity. They embody relationships between firms and other related 
bodies, and I have suggested that those relationships will vary depending on the 
geographical scale at which they exist and the stage of the cluster. Clusters are highly 
individual and context dependent, but in an attempt to sharpen cluster terminology 
Enright, (2000) suggests that clusters can be characterised along different dimensions 
as set out in Table 2.1 below. 
Table 2-1 Dimensions of Clusters 
Cluster Dimensions Range 
Geographic Scope Localised Dispersed 
Density (number and economic weight of Dense Sparse 
firms) 
Breadth (range of horizontally related Broad Narrow 
industries) 
Depth (range of vertically-related Deep Shallow 
industries) 
19 
Activity Base Activity-rich Activity-poor 
Growth Potential 
Industry Sunrise Sunset 
Within Industry Competitive Non- 
competitive 
Innovative capacity High innovation Low innovation 
Industrial organisation Flat --- Hierarchical 
Coordination mechanisms Formal Spot Market 
relationships 
Source: Adapted from Enright 2000 
It is important not to characterise everything as a cluster. Iconic clusters, such as 
Silicon Valley, where a type of economic activity is overly represented in the region, 
and significant nationally and internationally, are rare. However, the ability to 
describe clusters along these lines is useful and is particularly significant when 
designing policy using a cluster approach. 
2.2.6 Closer to a Definition? 
Clusters are undoubtedly difficult to define, but it is possible to identify particular 
territories where groups of firms and industries are concentrated and in certain cases, 
as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, they have come to dominate world 
markets - finance in the City of London, film production in Hollywood, ski boots in 
the Dolomites. Such clusters comprise a pronounced and recognisable mass of firms 
and associated support organisations and research and education establishments, who, 
by their interactions, create cluster specific assets available for exploitation by actors 
within the cluster, depending on the actors' capabilities and strategies. Clusters are 
often associated with particular places, but there is no pre-determined geographical 
scale within which their boundaries are drawn, and clusters at a local level may exist 
within broader clusters at a regional, cross-regional or national scale. Clusters evolve 
over time, although this evolution is again context dependent. We therefore need to 
be able to describe and understand such groupings or `clusters', even if we cannot 
expect a common set of processes. measurable boundaries or comparable structures 
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(Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies, 2003). In describing such 
clusters it is useful to be able to categorise their dimensions and development stage 
using taxonomies such as those developed by Enright (2000). 
However, being able to describe these places and clusters does not explain how the 
interactions between actors and the specificities of place can create advantage, what 
processes contribute to these diverse outcomes, how the processes vary at different 
geographical scales, how these scales interact and how clusters can become more than 
the sum of their parts by creating additional assets. Therefore, as outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, I will look at the different literatures that shed light on 
these questions. First, I will consider the work of Porter and then, using Storper's 
holy trinity as an organising framework, I will consider how concepts developed in 
the literature can be applied to clusters to provide a multi-layered explanation for 
clusters that avoids being `chaotic', but provides for differing outcomes in differing 
places and gives a deeper understanding of the processes occurring within clusters. 
2.3 Porter: Clusters and the `Diamond' Model 
The publication in 1990 of Michael Porter's The Competitive Advantage of Nations 
and his subsequent work on clusters have undoubtedly been influential amongst 
policy makers and academics. According to Cooke (1995) some academics `have 
taken a snobbish view that here is yet another piece of corporate graffiti to emanate 
from Harvard Business School' (ibid. p. 9), but Porter's influence should not be 
ignored. Porter's background is clearly one of strategic management and his stated 
interest is in competitiveness. In The Competitive Advantage of Nations he sets out to 
understand the national attributes that foster competitive advantage in particular 
industries and illustrates his theories with detailed case studies of ten nations. 
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Clusters are not tightly defined in The Competitive Advantage of Nations, but the term 
is introduced 
a nation's competitive industries are not spread evenly through the economy 
but are connected in what I term clusters consisting of industries related by 
links of various kinds (1990, p. 131 italics in the original). 
2 Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States of America 
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The argument is that the wealth of a nation is governed by productivity. taken as the 
efficiency and value of output produced by a unit of labour or capital. Productivity is 
seen as being determined by the environment in which firms compete. That 
environment is the product of four main forces (firm strategy, structure and rivalry: 
factor input conditions; demand conditions; and related and supporting industries) 
depicted in a framework, see Figure 2-1 below, now commonly called 'Porter's 
diamond'. Two further influences are chance and government. 
Firm strategy, 
Chance "..... structure and 
rivalry 
Ale Demand Factor 
Conditions conditions 
Related and ,....... 
Government 
supporting 
industries 
Figure 2-1 Porter's Diamond Model 
The four attributes at the points of the diamond, individually and as a system, create 
the environment in which firms compete. 
Factor Conditions. A firm's ability to compete is affected by the availability of 
factors of production including skilled labour, capital, physical infrastructure, 
knowledge infrastructure and natural resources. Porter points out that it is not only 
the stock of these factors that is significant, but the rate at which they are created and 
ýý 
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upgraded, and the way in which they are deployed. The geographic specificity and 
immobility of these factors also varies, most obviously in terms of natural resources. 
However, sometimes it is the scarcity of a factor that spurs on competitiveness. Porter 
cites the example of the cut flower industry in Holland, which has had to innovate to 
make up for its lack of a warm, sunny climate. The significance of different factors 
varies according to the nature of the cluster and there is a distinction between basic 
and advanced factors of production, with the latter including highly trained personnel 
and advanced communications infrastructure. Generalised and specialised factors are 
also distinguished and Porter argues that it is the presence of specialised and advanced 
factors that is most likely to lead to lasting competitive advantage. 
Demand Conditions. The quantity of home demand is significant as it can lead to 
economies of scale. However, it is the quality of home demand that spurs productivity 
and innovation. If local customers are demanding customers, there is pressure to 
continually upgrade products to meet their exacting needs. Proximity heightens the 
process because of cultural similarities and the advantages of exchanging information 
over smaller distances. If home demand anticipates demand elsewhere, it is a source 
of competitive advantage because home firms will have already developed a product 
to meet sophisticated needs. 
Related and Supporting Industries. A local supply chain brings advantages in terms of 
responsiveness, with less need to hold stock while retaining flexibility. Local 
equipment suppliers offer early access to new models. Easier communications over 
shorter distances lead to improved trust, which is expected to lower transaction costs. 
Additionally, where suppliers and industry are based in close proximity the innovation 
process is enhanced. The presence of related industries is also beneficial as there are 
opportunities to jointly develop technologies and use shared marketing channels. 
Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry. Porter sees domestic rivalry as one of the most 
powerful determinants of competitive advantage. Different countries tend to have 
different managerial styles and different ownership structures, which favour 
performance in different industries, and the strategy of publicly listed companies 
depends on the goals of the nation's stock exchange markets. However, firms are 
spurred on to compete by the visibility of their local rivals and the inability to 
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attribute less successful performance to local conditions. As local firms compete with 
the same basic factor inputs, they have to seek to compete in more innovative ways. 
Firms are also able to learn from their local rivals, even without their rivals' explicit 
consent, as information leaks through observation of their rivals' actions, staff 
mobility and even gossip. Lundvall (1992) points out that this is akin to Marshall's 
notion that knowledge of an industry is `in the air'. Some authors highlight that many 
of Porter's case studies reveal the significance of cooperative relationships within 
clusters (Lazonick 1993; Cooke et al. 1997), but the importance of competition should 
not be ignored. If we ignore the role of competition, we fail to understand the 
operation of clusters. As my empirical work will show, this is a mistake that has been 
made by some policy makers. 
Chance. One of the additional variables in the `diamond' model is chance. Chance 
events are largely outside the influence of firms or governments, and include 
technological discontinuities, change in input prices, wars and other actions by 
foreign governments. Chance events disrupt the forces within the diamond and offer 
both opportunities and threats for firms. 
Government. Each of the diamond determinants is influenced by (and can influence) 
government. Government has a role as a significant purchaser, and influences other 
buyers' behaviour by its policies on product standards and regulations. Government 
influences factor conditions by its expenditure programmes. Firm strategy and rivalry 
are influenced by tax and competition policies. Government's influence can be 
positive or negative. 
It is significant that the diamond works as a system with the four factors, 
supplemented by the role of government and chance, mutually reinforcing each other. 
For example, factor conditions can influence demand - Denmark has a harsh climate, 
dependence on imported energy and government support for alternative energy. 
Therefore there was an early demand for wind turbines, resulting in Danish leadership 
in that market. Clusters are both a part of the diamond, in the form of related and 
supporting industries, and an outcome of the diamond due to the interplay of forces 
within the diamond. Porter (1998) makes it clear that he sees clusters as a framework 
for understanding the economy, as 'a distinct way of organizing economic data and 
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viewing the economy' (ibid. p. 204). Therefore clusters in Porter's work play two 
roles - clusters offer a lens through which to examine economies, and clusters are a 
source and location of jobs, income and export growth (Waits, 2000). 
2.3.1 Porter and Geography 
In Porter's early work geography plays a limited role. Spatial proximity is seen to 
strengthen the effects of the diamond factors and Porter observes that many national 
clusters are concentrated in specific regions or cities within that nation. However, 
clusters are defined by their economic function, as I have suggested they should be 
(cf. section 2.2.1). Geographical proximity is seen to heighten the interactions within 
the `diamond' - concentration promotes efficiencies through external economies, akin 
to those identified by Marshall at the turn of the twentieth century, such as a pool of 
skilled labour (one of Porter's factor conditions) and the supply of intermediate goods 
(part of Porter's related and supporting industries). However, much more 
importantly, geographical proximity drives innovation because customers and 
suppliers interact and competitors vigorously and visibly compete. Geographical 
concentration attracts new entrants, and spin-offs tend to locate near their original 
location. Porter identifies that, within the concentration, information flows freely, but 
it is slow to leak out of the concentration. As will be seen in section 2.7.3, this aspect 
is also explored by other authors. 
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter raises the possibility that the 
diamond could apply at smaller geographical scales than the national scale (1990, 
p. 158), but it is not until his later work that this idea is developed. In On Competition 
the geographical nature of the phenomena comes to the fore and clusters are defined 
as 
geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialised suppliers, 
service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions (for 
example, universities, standards agencies, and trade associations) in particular 
fields that compete but also cooperate (Porter 1998, p. 197). 
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The elevation of the geographical nature of a cluster to a more significant role than 
the economic functionality of the cluster is at the heart of the confusion in defining 
clusters highlighted by Malmberg (2003), and also relates to Martin and Sunley's 
(2003) concerns with regard to cluster boundaries, as discussed in section 2.2.2. 
Clusters should be identified by tracing the linkages between firms and between firms 
and other actors, not by searching for linkages within a predetermined territory. If the 
geographic element of the definition is placed ahead of the economic functionality of 
the cluster, as Porter appears to do in this definition, the concept becomes more 
problematic. 
2.3.2 Clusters and Competition 
In Porter's later work the process by which clusters are linked to competition is more 
clearly articulated. It is assumed that clusters increase productivity, increase 
innovation and increase new business formation. 
The processes are very mechanistic, however, the idea is that firms within a cluster 
have the opportunity to increase their static (current) productivity and to increase their 
capacity to innovate. Transaction costs are lower; trust is engendered, facilitating 
information flow; public and semi-public institutions arise, giving access to public 
goods such as training; new products can rapidly be developed with local suppliers, 
and rivalry generates the ability to benchmark and pressure to innovate. The cluster 
supports new business formation due to the better signalling of opportunities and 
lower barriers to entry (Porter, 2000). Porter also recognises a social dimension to the 
clustering process in that `social glue binds clusters together, contributing to the value 
creation process' (Porter, 1998, p. 225). However, this social dimension, which I will 
argue is fundamental to the operation of clusters, is not elucidated further. 
It is the benefits that clusters bring in terms of innovation that are significant to Porter. 
While Porter accepts that concentrations of firms have been evident historically, and 
that this phenomenon has been explained with recourse to `economies of 
agglomeration', he argues that the nature and focus of those economies of 
agglomeration have altered over time (Porter, 2000). Transport costs have fallen and 
most material goods can be sourced worldwide. However, `knowledge goods' are 
more significant and are arguably best sourced within clusters. 
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2.3.3 Placing and Evaluating Porter 
Porter's work is important not only because of its controversial popularity, but also 
because it does provide insights relevant to the study of specialised economic activity. 
Malmberg (2003) highlights that Porter's work provides a way to describe the 
systemic nature of an economy and also points out that elements within the diamond 
are novel, including the role of specialised factors and factor upgrading; the 
importance of factor disadvantages; demand as a qualitative, not solely quantitative, 
factor and the significance of local rivalry. 
The work of Porter has, however, been open to much criticism. Porter's diamond is 
very functional and mechanistic, and does not offer insights into the social processes 
occurring within clusters. Davies and Ellis (2000) highlight conceptual confusion 
over the terms `competitiveness', `nation' and competitive versus comparative 
advantage; concerns over methodology; and the existence of empirical work that 
refutes the main propositions set out in The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
However, it is Martin and Sunley (2001b, 2003) who, in offering a detailed critique of 
clusters, which they see as a `chaotic concept', provide the most detailed polemic 
against the cluster theorising of Porter. Martin and Sunley ascribe the popularity of 
the cluster concept to three main factors. First, that Porter equates clusters to 
competitiveness, which chimes well with the interests of policy makers. Second, that 
Porter has a reputation within business strategy and a style of presenting that is 
attractive, and third, that the very vague and generic nature of the concept makes it 
appealing, but problematic. The criticisms relating to the policy implications of the 
cluster concept are discussed further in section 3.7, but the critique mainly takes the 
form of a polemic against the work of Porter and the success of his cluster 'brand', 
although the criticism is broadened in places to include the work of economic 
geographers, even though Martin and Sunley maintain that Porter largely ignores that 
body of work. 3 In theoretical terms, Martin and Sunley's criticisms relate to some of 
the issues that I have addressed: the universalism of the cluster concept; the inability 
to define boundaries around clusters in both geographical and industrial terms: the 
vagueness of typologies used to classify clusters: and the tendency for clusters to be 
artificial constructs abstracted from the surrounding economic landscape. The article 
3 Although cf. Porter 1990, pp. 790-1 
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provides a useful exploration of some of the debates surrounding clusters and poses 
considerable challenges to those studying clusters, but weaknesses in Martin and 
Sunley's critique have been highlighted (cf. Malmberg, 2003; Benneworth and Henry, 
2004). 
Malmberg (2003) argues that Martin and Sunley's critique both overshoots the mark 
and ignores some the genuine advancements that have arisen from Porter's work as 
outlined at the beginning of this section, including the provision of a method of 
describing the systemic nature of economies and a novel acknowledgement of the role 
of specialised factors and factor upgrading; the importance of factor disadvantages; 
the understanding demand as a qualitative, not solely quantitative, factor and the 
significance of local rivalry. Benneworth and Henry (2004) agree with much of the 
critique offered by Martin and Sunley, but in deconstructing Martin and Sunley's 
deconstruction of the cluster concept they also highlight weaknesses in the critique. 
They highlight an ambiguity in Martin and Sunley's critique in that, on the one hand, 
clusters are treated as a `brand', solely associated with the work of Porter, but, on the 
other hand, the cluster concept is berated as chaotic due to the divergent range of 
theoretical perspectives it incorporates. Benneworth and Henry argue that Martin and 
Sunley are calling for a singular, universal, geographical theory of clusters from a 
perspective of `epistemological theorising', whereas hermeneutic theorising (cf. 
Benneworth and Henry, 2004 pp. 1011-1013), characterised by `the recognition that 
theory is a social practice engaged in by reflective and situated practitioners' (ibid., 
p. 1020), permits theoretical `conversations' between different theoretical frameworks 
(each associated with a suitably rigorous methodology) and a multiperspectival 
explanation for phenomena such as clusters. They also point out that Martin and 
Sunley's criticism that clusters only exist in the eye of the beholder could be applied 
to other research objects such as the `urban', the `region', `rural' and conclude that we 
should accept that all knowledge is both situated and partial. Finally, and I would 
argue most significantly, they criticise Martin and Sunley's tendency to centre the 
debate around Porter's cluster `brand' and recommend that cluster theory is rather 
seen as a series of multiple debates, which are not necessarily incoherent. 
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2.4 The Holy Trinity of Regional Development 
Porter's work is open to criticism but, like Benneworth and Henry (2004), I maintain 
that the cluster concept extends far beyond the work of Porter. To equate clusters 
solely with Porter ignores a much deeper range of perspectives that can contribute to 
our understanding of concentrations of specialised economic activity. We need to 
understand how the interactions between actors, and the specificities of place can 
create advantage; what processes are operating within clusters; how those processes 
operate at, and between, different geographical scales; and what it is that enables 
clusters to become more than the sum of their parts. Using the elements of Storper's 
holy trinity as an organising framework to consider other theoretical threads in the 
cluster debate, and applying his concept of relational assets and associated concepts 
such as untraded interdependencies, trust and social capital to the issue of clusters, 
moves us away from polemics against the Porter `brand' and deepens our 
understanding of clusters. If we consider different theories used to explain clusters 
and similar phenomena, we can see that they usually seek their explanation either in 
the firms and their transactions (organisations); or in the territorial and institutional 
context in which the firms operate (territories) or in the processes of knowledge and 
learning which lead to innovation (technologies). These approaches can be used as 
the lenses through which to study clusters. The ensuing results provide multi-layered 
explanations for clusters that can allow for different outcomes in different places, and 
different processes at different spatial scales, without being `chaotic'. 
2.5 Organisations 
Storper (1997) refers to organisations as `most importantly firms and groups or 
networks of firms tied together into production systems' (ibid. p. 26) and in this 
section I will concentrate on literatures that account for clusters with reference to 
transactions between atomistic firms and networks of firms within the market. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the economist Alfred Marshall (1907) identified 
three mechanisms within agglomerations that give rise to external economies of scale. 
Scale economies exist where the average cost of producing a commodity reduces with 
the numbers produced and they are therefore linked to the size of the productive unit. 
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External scale economies arise where it is the industry, rather than the firm per se, 
that is sizeable. 
The first mechanism promoting external economies of scale is a thick labour market 
that favours employers and employees. Employers benefit from having a larger 
supply of skilled labour, and specialist training can be provided efficiently to the 
whole pool. Employees benefit because there is demand for their skills from a large 
market and, as they gain qualifications, they can demand higher wages from 
competing employers. 
The second mechanism is the production of intermediate goods, which enables 
outsourcing because specialist suppliers spring up in the locality to meet the needs of 
the local industry. 
The third mechanism is information spillovers whereby research and development 
capacity exists because of concentrated demand; labour market movement leads to 
knowledge transfer and knowledge `leaks' through more informal exchanges. 
Although certain benefits arise somewhat ephemerally, '[t]he mysteries of the trade 
become no mystery; but are as it were in the air' (Marshall 1947, p. 271), businesses 
are still perceived as operating in an atomistic manner, interacting solely through the 
market. 
Malmberg and Maskell (1997) point out that the first mechanism, the thick local 
labour market, benefits horizontally linked firms as they have similar requirements for 
skilled employees. The second mechanism, the provision of specialised inputs and 
services, is more relevant to the vertical linkages in the agglomeration, and 
emphasises the role of a local supply chain in supporting superior performance, even 
though such linkages have been difficult to demonstrate empirically (Phelps 1992; 
Malmberg and Maskell 2002). The third mechanism, knowledge spillovers, is 
relevant to the horizontal and vertical linkages, and suggests it is the learning 
advantages of the agglomeration that promote superior performance. 
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Much subsequent theorising on clusters draws on Marshall's work (Becattini 1990; 
Krugman 1991) and, although his theorising is based on a very different industrial era, 
his insights into the significance of the labour market and concept of knowledge 
spillovers, without active collaboration between firms, are useful in considering the 
functioning of current clusters. 
2.5.1 Transaction Costs and the Californian School 
More recent approaches, particularly those associated with `the Californian School', 
have also sought to explain locational patterns and agglomeration in a way that 
concentrates on the market, and firms' actions, within a changing market. The 
assumption is that certain market conditions, including the recent rapid rise in new 
technology, give rise to uncertainty. To deal with that uncertainty, firms seek vertical 
disintegration of production, which in turn leads to increased traded 
interdependencies, with associated transaction costs. Transaction costs are `all the 
costs involved when a transfer of goods takes place from one unit to another' 
(Lundvall, 1993, p. 52). These costs, originally highlighted by Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975), range from transportation costs to information costs (for example, 
searching for suppliers, negotiating over the price and quality of items, and 
concluding contracts). These costs increase with the distance over which the 
transaction is conducted, especially where there are no economies of scale, where 
there is no standardisation or where there is need for face-to-face intermediation. 
Agglomeration of firms in a vertical production chain, and the subsequent 
agglomeration of like firms at a horizontal level to meet the requirements of the 
vertical production chain, is seen as an attempt to minimise these transaction costs. 
The greater the transaction costs, the more likely it is that producers will agglomerate 
to try to reduce them. 
Unlike the processes identified in the Industrial Districts literature (cf. section 2.6.1), 
these processes are not dependent on historical context. Indeed, new agglomerations 
can arise in 'windows of locational opportunity" and sustain themselves through a 
series of cumulative effects, particularly by the development of a local labour market 
(Scott, 1988). Drawing on the French Regulation School's notion of regimes of 
accumulation and modes of social regulation, the early Californian School. and 
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particularly Scott (1988), identified a series of new industrial spaces marked by social 
division of labour, the presence of SMEs and re-agglomeration of production. Scott 
argued that, in the 1970s and 1980s, a new dominant regime of production was 
emerging, characterised by flexible forms of production, fragmented units of 
economic activity, fluid labour markets and a dismantling of the Keynesian welfare 
state. This new regime of production was seen as a response to increasing 
uncertainty, as a result of changing markets and rapid technological development, 
which made a structure of vertical integration both more risky and less able to exploit 
internal economies of scale and scope. The production sectors involved were craft 
and design intensive, `high-tech', and business and financial services. They were 
springing up in new locations during, what Scott terms, `windows of locational 
opportunity', because the dominant Fordist mass production environment was hostile 
to such changes in production. 
Phelps (1992) adds clarity to this analysis by distinguishing external economies, 
which are created by the social division of labour, and are not an inherently spatial 
phenomenon, from agglomeration economies, which are a necessarily spatial 
phenomenon and which arise from the subsequent development of specialised labour 
markets and facilitating institutions. This means that `external economies are not 
necessarily locationally bounded whereas agglomeration economies are' (ibid. p. 39). 
Agglomeration economies are the cost savings to the firm resulting from the 
concentration of production at a given location (Parr, 2002), and are distinguished 
from the related concept of urbanisation economies, which arise from the 
concentration of unlike firms at a given location (cf. Harrison et al., 1996). 
2.5.2 Criticisms and Critiques of the Transaction Cost Approach 
The transaction cost approach rests on the assumption of vertical disintegration of 
production and re-agglomeration in vertical production chains. Storper (1995) 
himself admits that the Californian School approach was inadequate to explain 
agglomeration in industries without dense input-output relations, and several authors 
have pointed out the lack of empirical evidence of localised input-output linkages of a 
traded nature within clusters (Phelps 1992; Malmberg and Maskell 2002). Phelps also 
points out that, even if the flexible accumulation thesis of Scott and Storper correctly 
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identifies the externalisation of activities by firms, there is no reason why these should 
be undertaken by local suppliers, given that reducing transaction costs would not be 
the only consideration in externalisation. Others point out that, even where traded 
transactions could account for agglomeration, the Californian School was unable to 
distinguish between `good' and `bad' agglomerations (Newlands, 2003) and 'it 
provides a locational logic that is divorced from particular institutional contexts' 
(May et al. 2001, p. 365). 
Storper (1995) also acknowledges that transactions, which would normally be 
expected to operate within the market, can fail in the absence of institutions and 
therefore the role of institutions became important in his work, as it is in the work of 
other theorists, as will be seen below in section 2.6.3. Lundvall (1993) points out that, 
although transaction cost economics is an improvement on standard neo-classical 
economics, it does not go far enough as it continues to emphasise the exchange of 
commodities, rather than the processes of change that lead to new commodities. 
Camagni (1991) points out that the transaction cost approach looks at allocative 
efficiency and the design of organisational structures, rather than to the problems of 
dynamic efficiency and innovative behaviour. 
Therefore, while traded transactions should not be overlooked in explaining patterns 
of economic activity, the `rational economic premises and reasoning [of the 
transaction cost approach] proved too narrow' (Lagendijk, 2001, p. 5) to explain the 
formation and performance of clusters. The transaction cost approach does not 
adequately explain variations in patterns of economic concentration and performance, 
and it is therefore necessary to also consider the institutional context and innovative 
potential of clusters. However, before moving on to look at institutions and 
innovation, it is worth considering the work of another academic who has sought an 
explanation for agglomeration in the transactions between firms. 
2.5.3 Paul Krugman and `New Geographical Economics' 
Paul Krugman is one of a band of economists who has discovered geographical space. 
if not the specificity of place. and he also seeks to explain agglomeration by reference 
to external economies. Krugman merges ideas from 'new trade theory' with 
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traditional location theory (Lösch, 1954; Weber, 1929) to create the 'new geographical 
economics' (Martin and Sunley, 1996). At the heart of traditional Ricardian trade 
theory is the assertion that nations and regions trade in goods due to some natural 
comparative advantage. However, most trade actually occurs between trading 
partners with similar factor endowments. Porter (1990) ascribes competitive 
advantage to geographical concentration and specialisation and similarly Krugman 
asserts that we do not specialise in that at which we are good, but are good at that in 
which we specialise. Therefore, rather than taking the Ricardian assumptions of 
perfect competition, constant returns to scale and comparative advantage, Krugman, 
and other advocates of the new trade theory', ascribe importance to increasing returns, 
imperfect competition and economies of scale. 
Krugman is above all one who seeks to explain by way of mathematical models. He 
takes a real world issue and then builds a model, taking what he sees as the key 
variables and excluding variables that cannot be modelled. He therefore attributes 
lack of progress in explaining agglomeration satisfactorily, prior to his intervention, to 
inadequacies in modelling techniques, which meant that increasing returns could not, 
until now, be modelled. 
The model at the heart of his explanation of agglomeration is the core periphery 
model. This model is an interaction of increasing returns, transportation costs and 
demand. Krugman assumes that there are centripetal forces encouraging 
agglomeration, counter balanced by centrifugal forces. The former include market 
size effects (backward and forward linkages), thick labour markets, and pure external 
economies, which would include information spillovers. The latter include immobile 
factors, i. e. land, natural resources and labour, 4 land rents, and pure external 
diseconomies e. g. congestion. However, in the core periphery model Krugman 
chooses to focus on only one factor from each type of force, these being market size 
as a force for concentration, and immobile resources as a force for dispersal. 
4 Although Krugman has been criticised for underestimating the immobility of labour within Europe 
(Martin and Sunle\, 1996) 
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In this model there are two types of production, agriculture and manufacturing. The 
former is subject to constant returns to scale and relies on the use of land, which by its 
very nature is immobile. Manufacturing, on the other hand, is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale and is assumed to make modest use of land. Because of 
economies of scale, manufacturers will want to produce in a small number of large 
plants, but this does not explain why these plants will agglomerate. Krugman argues 
that activity will be geographically concentrated because of market size effects. In a 
process termed 'circular causation' (Myrdal, 1957) firms will choose to locate near a 
large market, which is large precisely because other firms have located production 
there. Transportation costs are key in this model because plants are agglomerating to 
minimise transport costs. Also, very high transport costs combined with a low level of 
industrialisation would preclude this model from operating, Krugman (1991) notes 
that these were the conditions prevailing in a pre-railroad, early nineteenth century 
America. 
From the core-periphery model Krugman develops a localization model. Krugman 
draws on the work of Marshall, as does the literature on Industrial Districts (Becattini, 
1990, Wilkinson and You, 1992), and he identifies the same three Marshallian 
elements, a thick local labour market that favours employers and employees, forward 
linkages (production and supply of intermediate goods) and information spillovers, as 
promoting external scale economies and ensuring the self-reinforcing nature of the 
process. 
Of the Marshallian trio only the first two externalities, the thick labour market and 
intermediate goods, which are pecuniary in nature, enter into Krugman's models. In 
his labour market pool model there are two firms who will produce at one of two 
locations. Labour market pooling is presumed to occur because of a combination of 
increasing returns and uncertainty. Increasing returns and economies of scale mean 
that it is beneficial for production to be concentrated in one location. Uncertainty in 
respect of the level of demand for labour means it is beneficial for the two firms to be 
at the same location because. while average demand equals supply. there will be some 
times when one firm's good times will be the other's bad times and the additional 
workforce will be available (Krugman, 1991). 
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The provision of a large supply of intermediate goods, Marshall's second externality. 
is also dependent on increasing returns. Provided that there are economies of scale it 
is beneficial for the suppliers of these goods to be near a large market to minimise 
transportation costs. This is operable unless the costs of transporting intermediate 
goods are particularly low compared with those of transporting final goods. 
The third externality is technology spillovers, or as more eloquently put by Marshall 
(1907), ` [t]he mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are as it were in the air'. 
However, Krugman discounts these as being impossible to model because they are 
invisible (Krugman, 1991), as tending to be international in nature and therefore 
irrelevant in a regional situation (Krugman, 1993), and as peripheral to agglomeration 
because clusters exist in low technology sectors too (Krugman, 1991). 
Notwithstanding that there is no such thing as a low-tech industry, but only low tech 
companies (Porter, 1998), in ignoring technology spillovers Krugman is ignoring an 
area which other researchers consider to be absolutely key. 
A type of history, the history of accident, matters to Krugman's theory. Such 
accidents, or chance events, include a girl in Dalton, Georgia making a quilt as a 
wedding present, which, according to Krugman, was the origin of the carpet- 
manufacturing cluster in that region (Krugman, 1991). However Krugman tends to 
ignore long-term structural processes in favour of playing `spot the accident' (Pinch 
and Henry, 1999). A region does require some initial advantage, but this is likely to 
be of a more structural nature than in Krugman's account. Once this advantage, 
however achieved, reaches a certain point a threshold is crossed and the process 
becomes self-reinforcing. 
2.5.4 Criticisms and critiques of Paul Krugman's New Geographical Economics 
The economic geography community has not embraced Krugman's work - his `new 
geographical economics' `represents a case of mistaken identity: it is not that new, 
and it most certainly is not geography' (Martin, 1999a, p. 67). While Martin and 
Sunley (1996) note that an exchange of ideas between Krugman's work and economic 
geography would be beneficial, there are many difficulties in drawing Krugman's 
work into contemporary economic geography, not least his disdain for the genre 
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which, according to Martin, he views as an `anti-model, anti-quantitative backlash' 
(Martin, 1999a, p. 82). Krugman rejects non-market linkages and therefore, although 
his policy prescriptions may be similar to those of the flexible specialisation school 
(Martin and Sunley, 1996) he is not interested in the interconnections and interactions 
between firms which is the main emphasis of that literature and much other literature 
regarding clusters. Therefore `messy social, cultural and institutional factors involved 
in spatial economic development are neglected' (Martin, 1999a, p. 75). Also, the 
intermediate goods argument, that firms in the supply chain locate near to each other 
to minimise costs, is weakened by the aforementioned lack of empirical evidence of 
traded links in some clusters. 
Krugman's theory is not truly tested empirically. He does calculate locational Gini 
coefficients which, allowing for weaknesses in the data, give an indication of 
geographical concentrations in manufacturing employment (Krugman, 1991). 
However, he ignores all other possible explanations for this observable effect other 
than the variables in his models. As Amin (1999) concludes, the New Geographical 
Economics gives solid economic reasons for local agglomeration in a globalising 
economy - reduced transaction costs, economies of specialisation, externalities - 
but it 
fails to properly investigate the sources of these factors. 
Krugman does acknowledge that his models are vastly oversimplified, but this is as a 
result of his ontological and epistemological background. His theory is driven by 
considerations of modelling strategy and he seeks universal factors applicable at all 
times and in all places (Pinch and Henry, 1999), whereas `new economic 
geographers' are concerned with context and specificity. Most importantly, Krugman 
fails to model the dynamic external economies relating to information spillovers, yet 
it was those that Marshall linked to learning and innovation. That said, Krugman' s 
focus on the labour market is of interest and the significance of the labour market is 
highlighted in other work, additionally his focus on market size effects should act as a 
reminder that trade and markets are important to clusters. 
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2.5.5 Organisations: Some Conclusions 
As with the transaction cost approach, Krugman's approach generates a limited set of 
simplistic factors that ignore the socially embedded character of local economic 
systems. Therefore, neither the. transaction cost approach nor Krugman's new 
geographical economics' offer a sufficient explanation for the formation and 
continuation of clusters. Both focus on transactions in the market rather than the 
processes of innovation, although it is processes of innovation that result in new and 
enhanced products and services being available in the market. Neither considers the 
differing institutional settings in which transactions take place. However, as Sayer 
(1997) points out `[e]conomic forces continue to dominate contemporary life, and 
thus, however unfashionable, economic analysis cannot be sidelined' (ibid. p. 16). 
Any analysis of a cluster should consider traded transactions and the functioning of 
the labour market, but should also consider the innovation process and the 
institutional setting of the cluster. In terms of Storper's holy trinity - organisations do 
matter, but it is not necessarily the traded transactions between them that cause and 
sustain clusters, other relationships between firms influence cluster performance and 
we can now turn to the other elements of Storper's triumvirate - technologies and 
territories. 
2.6 Territories (and their institutions) 
Storper (1997) points out that, traditionally, territory has been seen as the `outcome' 
of economic activity. With theories involving the `resurgence' of the region, territory 
is seen as contributing to economic outcomes as well as resulting from them. Two 
particular bodies of work are of relevance in this respect, that relating to Industrial 
Districts and that of the body of researchers known as Groupe de Recherche Europeen 
sur les Milieux Innovateurs or GREMI. From those works emerge concepts of 
particular relevance to understanding clusters, including notions of collective learning 
(Capello, 1999), institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995) and innovative milieu 
(Maillat, 1996). 
2.6.1 Industrial Districts 
During the 1980s there was an increasing interest in patterns of economic 
development that appeared to run contrary to historic patterns of economic success 
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and relative failure. While Baden Württemberg (Cooke and Morgan, 1998) and 
Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1991) were also studied, one of the areas most documented 
was North East Central Italy, often called `Third Italy'. Third Italy had undoubtedly 
seen some extraordinary successes. In 1970, Modena, one of the main provinces of 
the area, was ranked seventeenth in terms of per capita wealth of the Italian provinces, 
by 1979 it was second highest (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Third Italy is a region characterised by industrial districts. Brusco (1990) defines 
industrial districts as comprising `a cluster of firms producing something which is 
homogeneous in one way or another, positioning themselves differently on the 
market. Thus, the district could be defined as being a cluster, plus a peculiar 
relationship amongst firms' (ibid. p. 14). While the industrial districts have many 
differences, characteristics identified as common to all districts include the presence 
of many small, or very small, firms, the use of flexible production methods, a 
tendency towards technological dynamism, and relations between firms that are 
characterised as a mixture of competition and cooperation. Although the notion of 
industrial districts has been used to describe many areas outside of Italy, it should be 
noted that the original notion usually refers to very limited geographical area that is 
specifically characterised by a form of dominant production (Capecchi, 1990). 
Piore and Sabel (1984) saw industrial districts as a new paradigm of flexible 
specialisation, emerging as a viable alternative to crisis-hit mass production. While 
the move to a post-Fordist utopia of small firm production was undoubtedly over- 
stated, what was important was the recognition of the production system as being 
embedded within the `culture', `social structure' or `community' (Piore, 1990), and 
the notion of industrialisation as a territorial process (Asheim and Cooke, 1999). The 
Industrial District approach does involve an appreciation of the significance of traded 
transactions. Many small firms are involved in production along a value chain. and 
the success of districts has been partially ascribed to the Marshallian externalities 
resulting from a thick local labour market and the production and supply of 
intermediate goods. Industrial districts tend to be sectorally specific and benefits of 
proximity come from regularly repeated interaction at different stages on the supply 
chain. However, more sociological mechanisms, whereby knowledge of the local 
industry is 'in the air', are significant. Firms within industrial districts are not the 
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atomistic firms of Krugman or the early Californian School, as they actively 
collaborate. Collaboration is built upon high levels of trust, thought to emanate not 
only from close geographical proximity, but also from a specific social framework 
characterised by close political, religious and familial ties. 
The dynamism of the industrial districts is held to result from a balance of cooperation 
and competition. The cooperation takes two forms - first, the provision of collective 
goods, often provided through local trade and civic associations, and second, 
adherence to norms of reciprocity, such as subcontracting to less busy firms and 
refraining from labour poaching and wage competition (Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). 
Theses rules of behaviour are reinforced by the community - by family and social ties 
and by more formal aspects of the community such as the church and political parties 
(Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). Although these close networks can lead to 
technological dynamism and an ability for very small firms to play a role in global 
markets, Lawson and Lorenz (1999) point out that the industrial districts literature 
does not theorise how territorial clustering contributes to a firm's ability to learn or 
generate knowledge (ibid. p. 306). Also the closeness within the industrial district can 
foreshadow lock-in and decline (cf. section 2.7.6). 
2.6.2 Criticisms and Critiques of the Industrial District Approach 
Storper (1995) highlighted that generalising from experiences of the Italian industrial 
districts is problematic, because production systems so dominated by small firms are 
few and far between, and rarely as closed as the systems seen in Third Italy. It is 
highly unusual that a territory should be so wholly devoted to the production of one 
type of product. The production systems in Italy, and similar examples from 
Germany, have very deep historical roots, politically and socially, and are not easily 
transferable to elsewhere. Even where similar phenomena are observed in an Anglo- 
American setting, such as film production in Hollywood (Storper. 1989), they tend to 
be restricted to craft style production or the early stages of new industries. There has 
also been a tendency to concentrate on successful industrial districts, although this has 
to an extent been redressed in recent works (cf. Staber, 2001). Therefore the 
experiences of the Italian Industrial Districts may have restricted relevance in 
understanding clusters elsewhere. 
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Most importantly, Lawson and Lorenz (1999) point out that industrial district 
theorising does not account for how clustering contributes to processes of knowledge 
generation and learning, and therefore, does not explain the differentiation between a 
technologically dynamic industrial district and one displaying the same characteristics 
in terms of flexibility and specialisation, without the technological dynamism. As 
with the Californian School, with Industrial District theorising, we are unable to 
account for the difference between `good' and `bad' districts. 
2.6.3 Institutions and Institutional Thickness 
Industrial District theorising does, however, recognise the importance of socio- 
cultural factors in economic production. Martin (2000) notes that there has been an 
`institutional turn' throughout economic geography, through which there is an 
understanding that social institutions shape economic activity, rather than purely 
being shaped by economic activity, and during which terms including `institution' and 
`institutional thickness' have emerged in economic geography. Martin identifies an 
assumption within the institutional approach that institutions, `enable, constrain, and 
refract economic development in spatially differentiated ways' (2000, p. 79). 
Institutions are seen both as informal conventions, customs and norms, akin to 
untraded interdependencies (cf, section 2.6.8), which Martin terms the `institutional 
environment' and as the particular organisational forms which arise from that 
environment, which he terms the `institutional arrangements'. Institutions evolve 
incrementally, and in a path dependent way, and as will be seen in discussing the role 
of clusters in innovation, certain institutional frameworks are seen to be much more 
favourable to innovation and economic development. Martin (2000) goes on to 
outline a distinction between rational choice institutionalism, which views institutions 
as mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and increase economic efficiency; 
sociological institutionalism, which highlights the significance of the way firms are 
embedded in their environment and acknowledges that trust is significant in economic 
development and that it is fostered by networks and associations and historical 
institutionalism, which addresses issues of how institutions evolve and change, or 
alternatively how they fail to change and become characterised by `lock-in' 
(cf. 
section 2.7.6). 
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One element of institutional theorising, which draws on the sociological and historical 
notions of institutionalism, has been the notion of `institutional thickness' and the 
industrial districts are said to demonstrate many of the factors incorporated in this 
notion. According to Amin and Thrift (1995), `institutional thickness' 'amounts to a 
combination of features including: the presence of many institutions; interinstitutional 
interaction; a culture of collective representation; identification with a common 
industrial purpose; and shared norms and values which serve to constitute the `social 
atmosphere' of a particular locality' (ibid. p. 104). Institutions are again taken to 
include, on the one hand, formal organisations of varying kinds from trade unions to 
firms and clerical bodies (institutional arrangements) and, on the other hand, informal 
conventions, habits and routines (institutional environment). These informal 
conventions, habits and routines will be seen to be similar to the untraded 
interdependencies, which Storper (1995; 1997) considers to be highly significant to 
the performance of territories. Amin and Thrift (1995) see institutional thickness as 
supporting the local economic system by providing continuity of local institutions; 
ensuring an archive of commonly held knowledge; giving organisations the ability to 
learn and change; supporting a high level of innovation capacity; enabling the 
extension of trust and reciprocity and giving the sense of a common project which 
serves to mobilise the whole economic system. This final aspect, a sense of common 
purpose, is seen as particularly unique and will be seen to link to the work of GREMI, 
where the milieu is seen to `valorise' the players within the milieu (cf. section 2.6.6). 
The nature of institutions is however highly-context dependent. Raco (1999) points 
out that regions have developed successfully with different models of institutions 
from the Californian models of Silicon Valley and Hollywood, characterised by loose, 
informal co-ordination, to the more formalised model in Baden-Württemberg, where 
there is an innovation system comprising collaborating organisations with a strong 
regional government presence. 
2.6.4 Criticisms and Critiques of Institutional Thickness 
There are issues with the concept of `institutional thickness', not least that it ' lacks 
definitional and theoretical precision' (Martin, 2000. p. 88). Martin questions why 
institutional thickness arises in some locations and not others and also points out that 
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the link between institutional thickness and economic development is not clear. 
Indeed, Amin and Thrift, in citing the example of watch making in the Swiss Jura (cf. 
Glasmeier, 1994), recognise that, as well as `thick but works' (for example, the City 
of London), there is the possibility of `thick, but does not work'. Henry and Pinch 
(2001) raise the possibility, based on their observations of Motor Sport Valley, that it 
might equally be possible to have `thin but works', and by implication there is the 
possibility of `thin and does not work'. 
Martin (2000) also questions how, and by whom, the common purpose mobilising the 
economic system is decided upon and this echoes concerns from Raco (1998) that 
institutions are at times politically constituted and favour the elite rather than under- 
represented communities. 
Henry and Pinch (2001) concur with Amin and Thrift's observation that it is 
important to stress, not institutional thickness per se, but the process of 
institutionalisation. Equally, they draw attention to Amin and Thrift's point that it is 
not necessarily local institutional thickness that matters, but having access to 
institutional thickness. This once again raises questions for the geographical scale at 
which clusters operate and highlights the need to look at extra local relations rather 
than reifying local processes alone. Raco (1999) also cautions against focusing on 
characteristics internal to the region and viewing regions as isolated entities, arguing 
that, `[r]egional success must be seen as relational, constructed from a complex 
interaction of local and wider processes operating over space' (ibid., p. 963). He also 
points out the concern that institutional cohesion does not always lead to growth (cf. 
section 2.7.6) and also that spatial proximity does not necessarily lead to `mutual 
understanding, shared norms and values and collaborative agendas' (ibid., p. 964). 
Cumbers et al (2003b) also caution against neglecting issues of power, suggesting that 
regions should not be seen as unified and coherent, but instead that differences in 
power and ideology between different groups should be recognised. They also, like 
Raco, call for a recognition that regional economies are bound up in wider processes 
of uneven economic development. 
Therefore, while institutions are undoubtedly significant for the conduct of economic 
activity and for understanding the processes occurring within clusters, offering `both 
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opportunity and constraint' (Amin, 2001, p. 1238), local institutions alone cannot 
account for economic success5 and the concept of 'institutional thickness' is flawed. 
2.6.5 GREMI 
Since the 1980s a group of researchers with the collective title of GREMI, (Groupe de 
Recherche Europeen sur les Milieux Innovateurs) has sought to explain the role 
played by territory in fostering innovative development, and has introduced the 
concept of the `milieu' as an explanation. In a paper reviewing the origins of the 
concept, Maillat (1995) points out that, as with those studying Third Italy, GREMI 
researchers such as Aydalot, studying his native France, observed patterns of 
development inexplicable by existing theories. This led them to the assumption that 
there was some `autonomous dynamic', enabling certain territories to drive 
improvement from within. The starting point is that companies are not separate from 
their milieu, rather they are a product of it. Territory is not given a priori but is 
constructed from within and that process of construction influences the development 
of the territory. In the same way as the Californian School had found the mere 
presence of locational factors inadequate to explain economic development, 
particularly high tech development, Maillat (1995) concluded that `what is important 
is the grouping together of economic players and non-physical resources (training, 
research) which, by their interactions, develop specific skills, know-how, rules and so 
forth' (ibid. p. 159, italics added). 
Maillat identifies three different approaches to understanding the role of the milieu: 
the milieu and uncertainty; the milieu as process; and the milieu as system. There are 
overlaps between the approaches, but each has a different emphasis and I will look at 
each of the approaches in turn. 
The Milieu and Uncertainty - Between Market and Hierarchy 
Camagni (2002) argues that to deal with uncertainty, which is seen as ever increasing 
with the rapid pace of change in technologies and markets, firms develop the 
functions of search- signalling-selection-transcoding-transforming-control (SSSTTC 
5 Amin (2001) acknowledges that institutional thought should not be reduced to such normative 
assertions 
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functions) (cf. Camagni 1991, p. 126; Raines, 2002). Camagni challenges the 
assertion of Krugman and others that the concept of competitiveness is not applicable 
to territories by arguing that, while it is individual companies (or combinations of 
individual companies) that compete and act in markets: companies and entrepreneurs 
are influenced by their local context. The local environment or `milieu' is able to 
supplement, and therefore enhance the effectiveness of, the SSSTTC functions for the 
firm as outlined in Table 2.2 below. 
For Camagni, the `milieu' is `a collective operator reducing the degree of static and 
dynamic uncertainty for the firms by tacitly or explicitly organising the functional and 
informational interdependencies of local actors and informally performing the 
SSSTTC functions' (1991, p. 132). While this may appear to elevate the territory to 
having an agency role, Lawson (1997) points out that it is the interactions within the 
milieu that lead to benefits for the firms operating therein. The elements of the milieu 
include labour mobility in the local labour market, innovation imitation, inter-firm 
cooperation and linkages, common codes and conventions and a common sense of 
belonging (Camagni, 2002). The operation of the `milieu' is a localised process 
because of local labour markets, networks of contacts amongst local actors and 
synergy effects from common cultural roots. The role of the milieu in reducing 
uncertainty accords with Storper's (1997) notion that untraded interdependencies take 
`the form of conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate economic actors 
under conditions of uncertainty' (1997, p. 5, emphasis added). 
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Table 2-2 Uncertainty Reducing Functions at Firm and Milieu Level 
Uncertainty Reducing Operation within the Firm Contribution of the 'Milieu' 
Function 
Search/Screening Collection, monitoring and 
organisation of information. Need to 
be aware of characteristics, often 
hidden, of inputs and equipment 
Informal or formal interchange of 
information. `Memory' and repeat 
experience of information sources 
and markets and technologies 
Signalling Quality certification of outputs 
Selection Adoption of a decision-making 
process and firm-specific 
management style 
Transcoding 
Transforming 
Control 
Translating external information into 
firm specific language of use to that 
firm 
Matching of competencies with 
demand 
Reducing the complex environment in 
which the firm operates by increasing 
its power limits to overcome 
uncertainty over others' actions 
Product image or reputation, brand or 
cooperative advertising. Standards 
of quality certification 
Transfer of practices through 
managerial mobility, imitative 
decisions, cooperative decision 
making through formal organisations, 
complementary innovation processes 
The collective learning process 
achieved by labour mobility, 
observation and imitation, 
information 'leakage. The provision 
of specialised services and 
information services 
Channelling of generic production 
factors to meet actual and potential 
demands of the local structure. 
Interpersonal linkages reduce 
complexity, similar cultural 
backgrounds. Coordinated decision 
making 
Source: adapted from Camagni (1991) 
While the concept of reducing and dealing with uncertainty offers promise 
in terms of 
considering the beneficial role of clusters, which may be considered as an 
economically specialised milieu, it is again less clear why specific 
locations or 
46 
territories have been more amenable to assisting the SSSTTC functions of firms than 
others. 
The Milieu as Process: a Cognitive Approach 
Maillat identifies a second approach to the milieu, related to notions of learning, 
know-how and technical culture. There is a constant process in the milieu of 
perception, understanding and action. Information, while not necessarily emanating 
from the milieu, is quickly and easily exchanged. Knowledge, or the ability to absorb 
and use that information, is seen as being influenced by the local environment. 
Knowledge is exchanged through informal and formal links between firms; through 
the local labour market; through spin-offs from existing firms and research 
establishments, and through interactions between both suppliers and customers, and 
makers and users of capital equipment (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). The milieu 
therefore has a particular role in the exchange of knowledge and from this aspect of 
the milieu has come the notion of `collective learning' (cf. section 2.6.7). 
The Milieu as System: an Organisational Approach 
Within the third approach to the milieu, the main thrust of the approach is to identify 
the components of the milieu, which Maillat (1995) lists as 
-a collection of players with relative decision-making 
independence 
- physical elements (firms, hard infrastructure), non-physical elements 
(know 
how) and institutional elements (local authorities or organisations with 
authority to make decisions) 
- an interaction logic, whereby better use 
is made of resources through 
cooperation 
-a learning dynamic, whereby players 
learn to adapt to changes in their 
environment 
This 'system' aspect of milieu chimes with work on regional innovation systems 
(cf. Cooke et al. 1997; Braczyk et al. 1998) and is a significant, but less recognised, 
contribution of GREMI thinking. This concept of 'system' differs from Porter's 
diamond 'system' because it emphasises interaction and learning, both of Which may 
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be fostered by a milieu or cluster. This notion of `systemness' is explored further in 
section 2.7.9. 
The Innovative Milieu 
Maillat (1995) also distinguishes the innovative milieu, which focuses on the 
innovation process, from the general milieu, which relates to the efficient 
management of productive resources. The concept of `innovation networks' is 
introduced in the GREMI literature to describe how formal networks are developed, 
outside of the milieu, to further innovation. The innovative milieu is receptive and 
open to ideas from outside, and is characterised by the formation of formalised extra- 
local innovation networks. This appears to negate the role of the milieu, but Camagni 
(1991) sees the milieu and the innovation network as complementary, enabling firms 
to be linked into their local environment and into wider extra-local networks. Lawson 
(1997) concludes that there is an unanswered question as to whether the ability to 
develop linkages is a skill learnt in the milieu that can be put to good use in 
developing links elsewhere. Again this appears to be a useful insight into a possible 
similar role for clusters in linking local firms into much wider circuits and, as will be 
seen in section 2.7.4, this idea has been developed in the concepts of `local buzz' and 
`global pipelines' (Bathelt et al. 2004). 
2.6.6 Criticisms and Critiques of the GREMI Approach 
Although it appears to be regaining some popularity, the GREMI concept is often 
criticised as vague (Storper, 1997). Lawson (1997) questions whether the `milieu' is 
only relevant to early stages of a product cycle, where the needs for information and 
knowledge exchange are most significant. More problematically, the concept is 
somewhat circular - innovative milieu exists where there is innovation and 
innovation 
takes place because of the innovative milieu. 
Cooke et al. (1998) and Newlands (2003) see the problem as one of confusion 
between institutions and organisations. Is the milieu the set of conventions. practices 
and rules within which a group of innovators operate (the institutional environment of 
section 2.6.3)? Or is the milieu the network of firms, research institutes and policy- 
48 
making organisations that establish the framework conditions for innovation (the 
institutional arrangements of section 2.6.3? To answer this, Cooke et al. take a 
sporting metaphor and compare institutions to the rules of the game, With 
organisations being the teams that play the game. Organisations are embedded in 
institutions, but impact back upon those institutions. To Cooke, the milieu is an 
institutional setting of norms, rules, routines and conventions, but it is the 
organisations that enable us to conceive of the milieu. 
When considering the relevance of milieu thinking for understanding clusters, it 
should be remembered that innovative milieu are not necessarily economically 
specialised, and milieu can demonstrate linkages without being innovative (Malmberg 
and Maskell, 1997). However, elements of the milieu approach do appear relevant to 
explaining the functioning of clusters. Territory is seen as both a resource and a 
system. Interactions are seen as significant, and these interactions are seen as being 
facilitated by spatial proximity. There is a movement away from considering solely 
traded input-output relations and the concept considers the role of learning, 
particularly collective learning. The significance of the institutional context is 
recognised, as is the role of the milieu in developing extra-local linkages. Maillat 
(1995) rightly concludes that non-physical resources and `relational capital' are 
significant and contends that the territorial context has the ability to `valorise the 
players' proximity', although it is unclear how the valorisation process works and 
particularly unclear why the process works better in some locations than others. 
2.6.7 Collective Learning 
The work of GREMI drew attention to processes of collective learning. Capello 
(1999) highlights the need to differentiate between collective learning and learning, 
giving the general definition of collective learning as `a social process of cumulative 
knowledge, based on a set of shared rules and procedures which allow individuals to 
coordinate their actions in search for problem solutions' (ibid. p. 354). Drawing on 
the work of Lorenz, Lawson (1997) seeks to elaborate on the processes by which the 
milieu facilitates knowledge transfer using the concept of collective learning. 
Collective learning is seen as being achieved through a social process and results in a 
club good available to be exploited by local firms. The mechanisms by which 
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knowledge is transferred include labour mobility, the spin-off of new firms from the 
existing firm base and interaction between suppliers and customers (Capello, 1999). 
Whether the knowledge is exploited depends on the internal capacity of firms to 
exploit the collective learning, and the firms' private strategies. Collective learning is 
not necessarily collaborative learning and knowledge is transferred independently of 
the will of the firms holding the knowledge. Therefore collective learning is an 
externality, not a cooperative mechanism. The use of the knowledge by other firms 
crucially depends on their abilities and strategies and Lorenz draws particularly on 
theories of the capabilities of firms (Keeble et al., 1999). 
Keeble et al. also point out that there are preconditions for collective learning, 
including regionally and culturally specific rules of behaviour and tacit codes of 
conduct between firms. These preconditions, which are analogous to untraded 
interdependencies, enable trustful relations, and trustful relations are seen as 
imperative for collaborative innovation, even though, as noted above, not all 
collective leaning is explicitly collaborative. 
Camagni (1991) suggests that the synergy effects in the milieu, which result in these 
preconditions for collective learning, are sometimes enhanced by a local `collective 
agent' (ibid. p. 133). He does not expand upon the concept of a `collective agent' but 
the role of individuals appears interesting in understanding how clusters are sustained, 
and is an area that is under explored in the literature. 
Keeble et al. (1999) draw attention to similarities between the concept of regional 
collective learning and the concepts of `the learning region' (Morgan, 1997a) and 
`regional innovation systems' (Braczyk et al., 1998). However, Keeble et al. (1999) 
point out that the latter two concepts stress the role of non-firm organisations (for 
example, universities), whereas the concept of collective learning focuses on 
interactions between firms. 
2.6.8 Untraded Interdependencies 
I have suggested that the preconditions for collective learning, the role of the milieu 
and an institutional approach are all related to the concept of untraded 
50 
interdependencies. It was in response to dissatisfaction with existing explanations for 
the differing performance of regions that Storper (1995; 1997) looked to the notion of 
`untraded interdependencies' as a way of explaining differential performance amongst 
regions. Dosi (1988) had identified untraded interdependencies as existing between 
sectors, technologies and firms in the form of `technological complementarities, 
`synergies', and flow of stimuli and constraints which do not entirely correspond to 
commodity flows' (ibid. p. 226) and he suggested that they formed a `collective asset' 
available for firms to exploit. Untraded interdependencies, according to Storper 
(1997), `take the form of conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate 
economic actors under conditions of uncertainty' (ibid. p. 5) and include `labor 
markets, public institutions, and locally or nationally derived rules of action, customs, 
understandings, and values' (ibid. p. 19). As will be seen in section 2.7.5, Storper 
particularly links untraded interdependencies to technological progress. Storper sees 
untraded interdependencies as relational rather than material assets and, because 
untraded interdependencies are both scarce and hard to imitate or recreate, territories 
and clusters with favourable untraded interdependencies are at an advantage. 
2.6.9 Social Capital 
The concepts of untraded interdependencies and relational assets are closely 
associated with that of social capital, defined by Putnam (1993) as `features of social 
organisation such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions' (ibid. p. 167). Cooke (2000b) defines 
social capital as `an attribute of societies from which individuals or collectivities may 
benefit, derived from community-like relationships of reciprocity, favor-exchange, 
trust, dependability, and open communication' (ibid. p. 2). Cooke and Wills (1999) 
distinguish between an individualistic approach to conceptualising social capital in the 
work of Coleman (1990) and Burt (2000), and a collective approach which they 
associate most closely with the work of Putnam (1993; 2000). 
Social capital has two dimensions - it is both part of the process by which economic 
activity is conducted and a result of the process, building over time through ongoing 
economic relationships. Anderson and Jack (2002) point to a third and fourth 
dimension. The third dimension, which they identify in the work of Nahapiet and 
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Ghoshal (1998), is a cognitive dimension by which social capital provides rules of 
appropriate behaviour. The fourth dimension, which they identify from the work of 
Leana and Van Buren, (1999), is a willingness to subordinate individual desires to 
group objectives. 
Social capital can be exploited by individuals, but it cannot be owned individually - it 
is a club good and immovable, being a result of complex interactions and 
relationships between individuals. Social capital is often seen as applying to regions 
and localities, but clusters can be perceived as an environment in which social capital 
can both play a part in facilitating relationships between actors, and exist as a club 
good available to be exploited. 
Trust is a particular form of social capital and is seen as a precondition and result of 
networking (Tödtling and Trippl, 2004). Morgan (1997a) identifies five benefits of 
trust: it saves time; reduces transaction costs; helps agents cope with complexity; 
facilitates thick information exchange and abbreviates the learning curve. Cooke 
(2002) maintains that social capital and associated concepts, such as trust, have 
become more relevant as economic relations have become more complicated. The role 
of trust within knowledge exchange is expanded in Maskell and Malmberg's (1999) 
taxonomy of ways to exchange knowledge. In the first stage, knowledge is 
exchanged by barter; in the second; through a dyadic relationship between two players 
who have exchanged knowledge previously; in the third, partners act as if they trust 
each other and in the fourth, that network is extended so 'your-friend-is-my-friend' 
(ibid. p. 17). By the fourth stage, infringement of trust is unlikely, due to the close 
network, and therefore the exchange of knowledge can more easily take place. The 
link to clusters is that that kind of network is more likely in a territory where 
individuals from different firms know each other and may belong to the same 
industrial organisations and associations, and where new firms will already be used to 
the unwritten rules of conduct. Once again, therefore, the transfer of knowledge is 
related to territory and institutions. Maskell and Malmberg (1999) go on to point out 
that, for the network to function, active cooperation is not necessary, what is 
necessary is acceptance of the local rules of the game and the potential sanctions for 
non-compliance. This establishment of shared trust and the notion that `your-friend- 
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is-my-friend', enables firms to benefit from trustful relationships without having to 
invest in building individual trustful relationships. 
The concept of social capital can, like the concept of the milieu become rather 
circuitous - social capital is `the origin and the expression of successful network 
interactions' (Cooke and Wills 1999, p. 224). However, the concept opens up 
meaningful questions in relation to clusters. Is social capital the club good which 
enables clusters to flourish? How is social capital developed and used within 
clusters? What is the role of individual actors in the formation of social capital? 
What are the implications for policy? 
2.6.10 Territories - Some Conclusions 
The interactions that take place within territories are both influenced by and influence 
the social, cultural and political context of the territory. Certain concepts, including 
institutions, untraded interdependencies and social capital, have been used to describe 
the club goods that facilitate traded transactions and also, due to processes of 
collective learning, facilitate the transfer of knowledge. Club goods are available for 
exploitation by those comprising the club (the club can be a region or a cluster and 
should not be taken to have connotations of formal membership). The ability to draw 
on those club goods depends on the capabilities of the firm. These club goods are 
both hard to create and imitate, and confer advantages on certain territories and 
clusters. Untraded interdependencies encompass both soft institutions (rules, 
conventions and norms of behaviour) and hard institutions (public organisations) that 
bolster the soft institutions. The role of hard institutions is particularly important 
when looking at policy. However, what makes territories innovative? What makes the 
technologically dynamic industrial district technologically dynamic? What makes an 
innovative milieu innovative? Having concluded that clusters are sustained both by 
the traded transactions of firms and by the ability of interactions within territories to 
influence the way in which those firms operate, I now want to examine the literature 
that links clusters with innovation and technological change. 
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2.7 Technologies 
For Storper (1997), `the essence of the process of technological change is now the 
tissue of relations by which asymmetric, non cosmopolitan knowledge is generated, 
applied, and further evolved' (ibid. p. 34). Clusters are frequently associated with 
technological change and innovation (OECD, 1999) and most commentators would 
agree that innovation is important to economic development. 6 To Dosi (1988) 
innovation `concerns the search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development, 
imitation, and adoption of new products, new production processes and new 
organisational set-ups' (ibid. p. 222). Cooke et al. (1998) suggest that innovation in 
that wide sense accounts for 80-90% of the growth of productivity in advanced 
economies, and productivity growth accounts for over 80% of total gross domestic 
product growth. Innovation is seen as crucial means of competing in an era of `New 
Competition' (Best, 1990) and is inherently linked to learning. 
Lundvall (1992) makes two assertions in respect of knowledge and learning. The first 
is that knowledge is the most important resource in the modern economy and that 
learning is, consequently, the most important process. The second is that learning is 
an interactive, and therefore socially embedded, process that cannot be explained 
without considering the institutional and cultural context in which it takes place. 
Clusters are therefore significant because they can provide an advantageous context 
for learning. 
The understanding that clusters may provide a favourable context for learning arises 
from a new understanding of how innovation occurs. Cooke et al. (1998) point to the 
rise of a distinctive evolutionary economic theory to challenge neo-classical 
economics. Evolutionary economic theory incorporates a critique of the linear model 
of innovation, where innovation was seen to proceed from laboratory to shop floor in 
a linear, sequential manner, and innovation is no longer solely equated to R&D 
intensity. Camagni (1991) identifies seven foundational elements of evolutionary 
economics: there is an interest in processes of growth and change in different 
contexts: the non-natural resources responsible for comparative advantage (for 
example, knowledge, information, learning) are considered; the mechanisms involved 
6 For a more cautionary note see Lovering (1999 pp. 386-387). 
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in the process of agglomeration are taken into account (including issues relating to 
labour markets, inputs, innovation); innovation is of key interest: disequilibria and 
cumulative causation are recognised; the approach is non-mechanical, if not fully 
biological; and finally, providing a link back to the concepts that I have considered in 
section 2.6, institutional and organisational matters are emphasised (for example, 
institutional interactions, learning, trust-building, network management, social capital, 
cooperation, trajectories, path dependence and lock-in). 
Storper (1997) points out that within transaction cost economics, cost minimisation is 
significant, whereas, the innovation process in evolutionary economic theory is about 
changing the rules, so that costs are not the most significant aspect of competition, 
and untraded interdependencies come to the fore. 
The innovation process is interactive and systemic in that it includes different steps of 
the process; different firms and organisations in the supply chain; different knowledge 
producing infrastructures and different departments within firms. It is cumulative, in 
that innovations rarely come `out of the blue' and are not extraordinary, exogenous 
events, but build on existing knowledge, combined in new ways. It is path dependent 
in that choices, once made, cannot necessarily be reversed and the choices that are 
made constrain the opportunities to further develop the technology. Firms and 
regions, once embarked on a particular technological trajectory can, therefore, be 
subject to lock-in (cf. section 2.7.6 and Grabher, 1993b). 
Innovation is therefore seen to involve the production and use of knowledge, and to 
be the result of an interactive, context dependent, systemic process. I want to look at 
these two aspects in turn - firstly, the nature of knowledge and its production and use, 
and secondly, the systemic nature of the process from which innovation results. In 
both respects it can be seen that clusters can provide a particularly favourable context 
for innovation and learning. 
2.7.1 The Nature of Knowledge 
Knowledge is not like other resources. It does not reduce in value with use and 
transference of knowledge is not easily achieved in the market place. partially because 
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knowledge is not easily appropriated privately (Lundvall, 1992). Competitive 
advantage is not just about using existing knowledge efficiently and effectively - it is 
about continuous learning and innovation. Lawson and Lorenz (1999) observe that 
innovation in high technology product development is often the result of 
multidisciplinary knowledge and is therefore facilitated by the cooperation of 
individuals with overlapping tacit knowledges. I have already considered the concept 
of collective learning and I now want to consider other aspects of knowledge and 
learning, and their link to clusters. 
2.7.2 Tacit vs. Codified Knowledge 
Clusters are seen as being appropriate sites for the transfer of tacit knowledge and this 
has been linked to the success of local agglomerations. Codifiable knowledge can be 
recorded and transmitted easily and quickly across long distances, particularly given 
advances in information and communication technologies. Maskell and Malmberg 
(1999) term this process 'ubiquification'. Tacit knowledge, which is embodied in 
individuals, rather than recorded in transmissible form, is considered to be related to 
specific ways of doing things in certain places and is presumed to be more easily 
exchanged over shorter geographical distances. Malmberg and Maskell (1997) 
attribute this firstly, to the need to exchange tacit knowledge by way of frequent and 
direct face-to-face contact, which is more likely in geographically proximate 
situations, and secondly, to the need for mutual trust and understanding, which is 
more likely to arise with shared language, values and culture. Maskell and Malmberg 
(1999) assert that, as tacit knowledge becomes codified and therefore ubiquified, it 
becomes ever more important for firms to either shield their tacit knowledge from 
becoming transmissible or to acquire tacit knowledge more quickly than their 
competitors. Therefore, tacit knowledge is considered to be significant for learning, 
and clusters are an appropriate site for the development and transmission of tacit 
knowledge because they usually benefit from geographical proximity and are likely to 
incorporate shared language, values and culture. 
It is important, however, to avoid presuming that tacit knowledge is superior to 
codified knowledge (Amin and Cohendet, 1999). Maskell and Malmberg (1999) 
point out that codified knowledge remains significant in at least three ways: 
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codification can lead to economic gain by the packaging of knowledge in such a way 
that it can be sold; codification reduces the cost of training staff; and codified 
knowledge can result in further technological progress because the existence of 
codified knowledge makes it easier for ideas to be progressed and subsequently 
codified. Amin and Cohendet (1999) highlight the importance of a dense educational, 
science and technology base undertaking diverse, high quality research and with deep 
links between schools, universities and industry. 
Undoubtedly, to emphasise the significance of tacit knowledge alone would be a 
mistake. However, tacit knowledge, and its link to clusters, remains important and 
can be illuminated by more nuanced theorising. Lawson and Lorenz (1999), drawing 
on work by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) on product innovation in Japanese firms, 
develop the idea of a cycling between tacit and codified knowledge. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi develop a product innovation cycle of four stages. In the first stage, tacit 
knowledge is shared. In the second, and key, stage, individuals with diverse tacit 
knowledges come together to articulate new ideas. The process of articulating those 
ideas forces the individuals to clarify their concepts. In the third stage, these new 
concepts are combined with existing knowledge to produce a product prototype. In 
the fourth stage, production has started and new tacit knowledge is developed around 
that production, providing a foundation for further product developments. The link to 
clusters is that Lawson and Lorenz suggest that this process may occur not only 
within firms, but also in technology producing regions or clusters. Spin-offs and 
labour mobility would provide the context for the cycling between tacit and codified 
or `articulated' knowledge to take place. 
Drawing on insights from management studies, Pinch et al. (2003) also develop a 
model linking knowledge to the competitive success of clusters. They point out both 
the multi-dimensional nature of knowledge, which is often lost in the simple tacit 
versus codified split adopted in much of the literature, and also point out that the 
transfer of knowledge depends not only on the nature of that knowledge, but also on 
the capacity of the recipient of the knowledge to absorb and utilise it. Pinch et al. take 
the distinction between component knowledge and architectural knowledge, which 
has been used to shed light on differences in competitive advantage between firms, 
and apply it to industrial agglomerations This links to Malmberg and Maskell's 
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(1997) work, where they point out that, in the resource based view of the firm, there 
are resources internal to the firm and resources available from the market and the 
agglomeration or cluster provides a third category of resources - those external to the 
firm, but internal to the cluster. 
2.7.3 The Knowledge Community and Knowledge Pools 
From their empirical work on the British Motor Sport Industry (BMSI) and its spatial 
agglomeration in an area of 50-mile radius, centred around Bicester in Oxfordshire, 
and termed Motor Sport Valley, Henry and Pinch have considered whether concepts 
such as `institutional thickness' (Henry and Pinch, 2001), untraded interdependencies 
(Henry et al., 1996) and the work of Krugman (Pinch and Henry, 1999) apply to the 
British Motor Sport Industry and Motor Sport Valley. They have also developed the 
analytical concept of 'the knowledge community' to explain why the spatial 
organisation of knowledge production and dissemination often takes the form of a 
regional agglomeration or cluster (Henry and Pinch, 2000). The knowledge 
community, a geographically concentrated node of knowledge production, is formally 
defined as `a group of people [... ] often in separate organisations but united by a 
common set of norms, values and understandings, who help to define the knowledge 
and production trajectories of the economic sector to which they belong' (Henry and 
Pinch 2000, p. 194). This definition has similarities to the notion of Communities of 
Practice (Seely Brown and Duguid, 2000a), but the particular focus of Henry and 
Pinch's work is how knowledge is not only accumulated, but spread, within clusters. 
One particularly interesting element of their methodology is the way in which they 
seek to demonstrate empirically the processes by which knowledge is transmitted by 
tracing the career histories of key individuals in the industry to show the mobility 
within the industry and its particular geography. 
Knowledge is especially important to the motorsport industry because it is the key 
asset in the industry where firms have few tangible assets and innovation is very 
rapid. As is often posited for other industries, knowledge is developed and moved 
through relationships with suppliers (Gertler, 1995), however, the labour market plays 
a particular role in this case. NA-ith the production of motor racing cars characterised by 
a highly mobile labour market, spatially concentrated in Motor Sport Valley (Henry 
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and Pinch, 2000). The frequent movement of staff between an ever-shifting stock of 
firms causes the knowledge embodied in individuals to be circulated. The circulation 
of knowledge improves the knowledge core by allowing ideas to be combined, 
evolved and adapted, and therefore Motor Sport Valley acts as a `knowledge pool' 
raising the knowledge base for the whole agglomeration, not just changing the 
pecking order (Henry and Pinch 2000, p. 199). In line with Capello's (1999) analysis, 
the processes within the knowledge pool result in a club good. Motor Sport Valley 
may be exceptional in the spatially concentrated nature of its labour market, but 
Henry and Pinch do demonstrate that the labour market is one way in which 
knowledge becomes accumulated and transmitted within the cluster. 
2.7.4 Local vs. Extra- Local Linkages 
In much of the literature there has been a tendency to underplay extra-local networks 
(Cumbers et al., 2003a). Contrary to this tendency, Amin and Cohendet (1999) 
dispute the claim of `the superiority of relational and geographic proximity (for 
example, intense face-to-face contact, local industrial clusters and districts) as a 
unique source of grounded knowledge over formally constituted and distantiated 
networks of knowledge and learning based on universally available fruits of science 
and education' (ibid. p. 88) and Cooke (1998) points out that the very close internal 
interaction of the industrial districts model will not necessarily work in the absence of 
links into global networks. Tacit knowledge, which is associated with clusters, is 
transferred by way of learning-by-doing and imitation, and is associated with 
incremental innovation. Particularly in peripheral areas, attempting to play `catch up', 
radical innovations and the creation of new knowledge are needed in order to move 
onto a more advanced technological trajectory. The origin and character of 
knowledge creation does vary between industries, but there appears to be a need to 
link in to sources of radical innovation and not to depend solely on incremental 
adaptation from within the cluster. 
An important question is therefore how local clusters develop valuable external links 
(Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). Amin and Thrift (1995) conceive of neo-Marshallian 
nodes, territorially embedded but acting as 'forcing houses for the construction of 
worldwide networks of social relations' (ibid. p. 101), and Keeble and Nachum's 
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(2002) empirical work shows that there is a strong link between local clustering and 
global networking. This also links back to the GREMI concept of innovation 
networks and the role of the milieu in forging external links. 
In recent works `buzz' has become the buzzword (Storper and Venables. 2004). 
Bathelt et al. (2004) describe the concept of buzz as `the idea that a certain milieu can 
be vibrant in the sense that there are lots of piquant and useful things going on 
simultaneously and therefore lots of inspiration and information to receive for 
perceptive local actors' (ibid. p. 38). This local buzz, which can be participated in by 
just `being there' (Gertler, 2003), is contrasted with the need for `pipelines', which 
have to be consciously constructed, through which knowledge external to the cluster 
is sourced. Just as Camagni (1991) suggested that the local milieu could assist in the 
formation of external innovation networks, Bathelt et al. (2004) suggest that local 
buzz and global pipelines are reinforcing. As Power and Lundmark (2004) highlight, 
the concept of buzz is vague, and it appears that there is a requirement to consider the 
mechanisms by which buzz is accessed, because it appears likely that these may be 
different in different sectors, and possibly different countries. 
2.7.5 Innovation and Untraded Interdependencies 
Where knowledge is particularly uncodifiable and tacit, as is often the case in the 
early stages of innovation, communicational clarity and common interpretation are, 
however, particularly important (Storper, 1997). Untraded interdependencies, as well 
as `buzz', are significant because they provide the norms and routines, which assist 
communication, and therefore permit actors to travel more quickly along superior 
technological trajectories (Storper, 1997). However, ease of communication and 
clarity of understanding are facilitated not by geographical proximity alone, but by 
closeness in practice, although that may in turn be improved with geographical 
proximity. 
2.7.6 Strong vs. Weak Ties 
Closeness of practice is no guarantee of success. Amin and Cohendet (1999) point 
out that ties can lead to inertia, parochialism and inward-looking behaviour. It is 
more beneficial to have a range of loose ties where the chances for interaction are 
heightened and the possibilities for innovation greater. 
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Grabher (1993b) recounts the decline of the steel industry in the Ruhr region of 
Germany. He identifies three types of lock-in that contributed to the region's inability 
to adapt in the face of the decline of its core industry. Functional lock-in arose 
because the previously stable relationships between the core steel firms and their 
suppliers meant that suppliers invested less than they would have otherwise done in 
R&D and marketing, and became locked into specific exchange relations. Cognitive 
lock-in ensured a particular worldview that rendered firms less able to adapt. There 
was little room for developing personal relationships outside of the established 
relationships and, as a result, no new perspective was gained. Both functional and 
cognitive lock-in were re-enforced by political lock-in, because the political and 
administrative system supported the industry and militated against reform and 
reorganisation. Recent work has sought to broaden the concept of lock-in and points 
firstly, to additional types of lock-in, secondly, to the role of particular structures that 
affect the strength and weakness of lock-in, and thirdly to the need to consider the 
different spatial scales to which the lock-in concept pertains (Hassink & Shin 2005). 
Clusters could be particularly prone to lock-in, because of their network of ties and 
relationships within a geographically proximate area, again reinforcing the need for 
clusters to develop linkages external to the cluster, and external to the local region. 
Grabher (1993b) theorises that `loosely coupled networks' may be particularly 
conducive to the development of an ability to adapt in the face of change. 
2.7.7 The Nature of Knowledge: Some Concluding Remarks 
Therefore the nature of knowledge is such that it is more easily transferred where 
conversations are facilitated by untraded interdependencies in the form of routines. 
conventions and behaviours, which assist communicational clarity, and where trust is 
fostered and openness is encouraged. Geographical proximity can assist the process, 
but it is not sufficient, proximity in other senses - cultural, social and organisational - 
is also required. However, the close relationships that permeate clusters, because of 
the geographical, cultural, social and organisational proximity that exists, can lead to 
inward looking behaviour and, therefore, the need for extra local linkages, both to 
enable new ideas to flow into the cluster and to obviate against lock-in, should not be 
overlooked. 
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2.7.8 The Systems Approach to Innovation 
In the remaining sections of this chapter I will suggest some links between systems 
and clusters. Writing about clusters, Cooke (1998) points out that it is the systemic 
rather than simply aggregative nature of the phenomenon that is of potential interest' 
(ibid. P. 10) 
The National System of Innovation approach is particularly associated with the work 
of Lundvall (1992) and Freeman (1995). It explores the extent to which differences in 
innovation performance between nations can be ascribed to a nation's institutional 
setting and the innovation system in which innovation processes take place. 
Institutions are taken to be norms, habits, rules, routines and conventions: the system 
is made up of the public and private organisations, economic, political and 
educational, involved in innovation and the structure of relations between those 
organisations. 
The National Systems of Innovation research was partly prompted by the debate over 
whether nation states remain significant in the face of globalisation (Ohmae, 1990) 
and, therefore, the focus is very much on the national level. Cooke et al. (1997) 
suggest that such a focus ignores the equally valid question of how the innovation 
process is organised within regions. 
2.7.9 Regional Innovation Systems 
According to Cooke et al. (1998), early work in the area of innovation was 
'remarkably spatially unsophisticated' (ibid. p. 1564). They ascribe this lack of 
spatial awareness in innovation studies to the national approach taken in the concept 
of `national innovation systems'. As a result of dissatisfaction with this national 
focus, a body of work on Regional Innovation Systems was developed (Braczyk et al., 
1998). Cooke (2000a) identifies key dimensions at infrastructural, institutional and 
organisational (firm) level that provide for a strong or weak regional innovation 
system. This work is inherently more geographical as it takes a region and considers 
the system operating within that region. An interest in Regional Systems of 
Innovation drew partly on the National Systems of Innovation work but also draws on 
concepts around institutions. norms, routines. conventions and local conditions for 
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learning. As with the GREMI research into innovative milieux, Regional Innovation 
Systems research concludes that the innovation process is both interactive and 
dependent on linkages within the region and outside the region. However, Regional 
Innovation Systems research has a strong policy orientation. In both National 
Systems of Innovation and Regional Innovation Systems literature a key area of 
interest is to identify the most appropriate institutional framework in terms of training. 
finance and inter-firm networking that will enhance the innovative potential of a given 
territory (Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). The link between clusters and innovation 
systems is not clear. Some see clusters as a sub-system of the innovation system, 
comprising predominantly firms, with a separate but linked sub system of R&D 
organisations, universities and technology transfer organisations (Tödtling and Trippl, 
2004). Others would include the R&D infrastructure within the cluster and view 
clusters as `reduced-form innovation systems' (Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies, 2003), focusing on particular economic specialisations. 
Tödtling and Trippl (2004) point out that the `systems' of the innovation systems 
literature are `conceptualised in a rather simple and traditional way as being 
constituted by elements and their relationships' (ibid. p. 1177). Drawing on modern 
social system theory, Tödtling and Trippl seek to understand how system building 
takes place. They highlight different stages including, selective communication; 
boundary-drawing; building-up of structures; coordination of processes, structures 
and resources; self-themisation and reflexivity; and the developing of strategic and 
generative abilities. They suggest that looking at these aspects ensures that we can 
consider the `systemness' of clusters, which they define as the level of integration of 
their actors by networks, institutions for coordination and a collective identity and 
reflexivity' (2004, p. 1177). The notion of system building is particularly useful when 
considering the policy implications of the cluster approach. 
Camagni (2002) also uses the notion of systems to explain the role of territories in 
economic performance. He distinguishes between three kinds of system: a system of 
localised technological externalities - material and immaterial factors which, because 
of proximity and the reduction in transaction costs, can become pecuniary advantages: 
a system of economic and social relations resulting in relational or social capital; and 
a system of local governance to bring together a collectivity. 
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The concept of `systemness' therefore appears promising in considering the processes 
at work within clusters as it combines notions of interactions with notions of 
collective identity and purpose, and also provides a framework for considering the 
role of hard institutions (non-firm organisations, unions, trade associations), non- 
tangible institutions such as the local labour market, and soft institutions such as 
language, conventions, habits and norms of behaviour. 
2.8 Conclusion: Holding the Strands Together 
There are examples across the world of specialised concentrations of economic 
activity where the interactions between actors have brought benefits to that 
concentration, and we might term these phenomena 'clusters'. Given that these 
`clusters' exist, we need language and tools to describe and explain them. Porter's 
definition may be useful in describing clusters and his analysis has some insights, 
particularly in his understanding of the role of government, but his analysis is too 
functional and devoid of the social and historical context to explain the dynamism of 
clusters. 
However, Porter's analysis, and the use of clusters as an analytical tool to describe 
concentrations of specialised economic activity, is only one aspect of current cluster 
theorising. Storper (1997) notes the emergence of a new heterodox paradigm in 
economic geography that breaks down issues of economic development into three 
separate domains - the `holy trinity' of technologies-institutions-territories. This has 
provided a useful framework for marshalling the literature relating to clusters and 
enabled an exploration of the different kinds of processes that may occur within 
clusters. 
In the introduction I raised the question, posed by Cumbers and MacKinnon (2004), 
of whether the cluster approach adds anything to existing theories that seek to explain 
spatial agglomeration. There are two very different responses to the question of 
whether clusters are a useful, coherent concept. One, promulgated by Martin and 
Sunley (2003) is that the concept of clusters is ambiguous and chaotic, and not a 
model to be rigorously tested and evaluated, but a `way of thinking'. However, by 
taking a multi-layered approach to clusters, akin to Storper's (1997) holy trinity, the 
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strands can be separated and evaluated individually. This leads to a second more 
supportive response from those, like Raines (2002a), who sees the cluster concept as 
bringing together different strands of theory and `promot[ing] a wider discussion of 
the sources of local competitive advantage' (ibid. p. 2). For Benneworth and Henry 
(2004) `[t]he `clusters' approach can be thought of as the act of holding together [... ] 
dissonant threads in conversation' (ibid., p. 1017) and Chapman et al. (2004) argue: 
instead of simply `dropping' clusters as rapidly and uncritically as the term 
was adopted (Martin and Sunley 2003), we need to assess and `unpack' the 
underlying concept, stepping back from the clusters label and the specific 
Porterian assumptions and claims that underpin it. In moving beyond such 
`deconstruction' to `reconstruction', what seems to be required is not a single, 
overarching theory but the conceptual abstraction of key notions and relations 
which can then be subjected to detailed empirical scrutiny (ibid. p. 394). 
For Chapman et al (2004) the key notions and relations are proximity, learning and 
evolution. For Storper (1997) phenomena such as clusters are conceived as `stocks of 
relational assets' and `the economic process as conversation and coordination' (ibid. 
p. 28 italics in the original), with economic accumulation relating to relational assets 
as well as material assets. Others see clusters as involving processes of institutional 
thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995), knowledge communities (Pinch et al., 2003), 
innovation systems (Cooke, 1998), collective learning (Capello, 1999) and notions of 
systemness (Tödtling and Trippl, 2004). For Malmberg and Maskell (2002) the 
ability to emphasise these different aspects in analysing clusters is related to the issue 
of spatial scale and they call for more discussion of spatial scale in empirical work. 
The explanations of clusters will be specific to the territory and cluster involved and 
can only be uncovered by detailed empirical work. Cumbers and MacKinnon (2004) 
berate the lack of such detailed empirical research with limited exceptions (Cumbers 
et al., 2003a), (Keeble et al., 1999) and (Swann et al., 1998). My empirical research 
into the marine and offshore engineering cluster in the North East of England touches 
on some of the key notions and relations within the cluster, but my main focus is on 
the way in which policy-makers have implemented a cluster approach to policy at 
different scales and the way in which policy has impacted upon the assets and 
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relationships within the cluster. Through such empirical work we can seek to add to 
the theoretical understanding of clusters and cluster policy by further unpacking the 
cluster concepts and considering the usefulness and fit of existing theories that have 
sought to explain clusters and the processes within them. 
My empirical work has two elements - firstly, a study of the way in which two cluster 
policies were conceived, developed and implemented and secondly, an examination of 
the impact of those policy initiatives within a cluster. However, before going on to 
outline the detailed research questions I sought to answer and the methodology I 
adopted, I want to look at the literature regarding cluster policy theory and the use of 
cluster concepts in policy circles. I consider how, and why, clusters have become so 
influential in economic development policy, I outline the implications for cluster 
policy of the concepts discussed in this chapter and I suggest that cluster policy 
making be best understood as a process. 
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3 Cluster Based Economic Development Policies 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the competing explanations for the workings and success of 
clusters were explored, and it was concluded that the cluster concept is not accounted 
for by one universal theory, but is composed of different theoretical strands, which 
contribute to our understanding of how particular places exhibit particular patterns of 
economic specialisation and how the firms located in those places apparently benefit 
from being so located. In particular, concepts such as relational assets (Storper. 
1997), institutional thickness (Amin and Thrift, 1995), knowledge communities 
(Pinch et al., 2003), innovation systems (Cooke, 1998), collective learning (Capello, 
1999), and notions of systemness (Tödtling and Trippl, 2004) were identified as being 
of use in explaining the types of processes occurring within clusters. 
I now want to look at the way cluster policy has developed and whether, and how, 
policy makers have picked up the theoretical strands identified above. In section 3.2, 
I consider the implications of the concepts discussed in Chapter 2 for cluster policy 
theory. In section 3.3, I seek to define cluster policy. In section 3.4 I outline the 
reasons why a cluster approach to economic development policy has appealed so 
strongly to policy makers. In section 3.5 I outline a cluster policy process model and 
examine the ways in which cluster policies have been put into practice. In section 3.6 
I consider what is new about cluster policy and in section 3.7 I conclude that, 
although there are caveats, a cluster approach to economic development can be a 
useful aspect of policy making. 
3.2 Cluster Policy Theory: Academic Antecedents 
The theoretical basis for cluster policy has been little explored, with much work on 
cluster policy being descriptive and offering preliminary evaluations of what are 
relatively new initiatives (Raines, 2002). The lack of a `universal theory' to explain 
clusters and the multiple threads of explanation for the phenomenon partly explain the 
popularity of the concept for policy makers, but also mean that the theoretical basis 
for cluster based policy must be teased out of a complex web of discourses on 
clusters. In trying to tease out that theoretical basis the following caveat is 
significant: ` [i]t is important not to over intellectualise the cluster approach [to policy] 
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into a coherent philosophy, because the ideas have been driven by policy-makers and 
consultants, giving a very pragmatic feel to much of the work'(Benneworth, 2002, 
p. 314). In section 3.4 of this chapter I will return to the pragmatic reasons for the 
appeal of clusters to policy makers, but in the meantime I want to draw out the 
implications for cluster policy theory of the literature examined in Chapter 2. 
The predominant theories used to explain the performance of clusters do not tend to 
focus on policy (Raines, 2002). Marshall, one of the earliest theorists in this area, saw 
little role for public intervention (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999). However, the work 
of Porter has inspired many cluster policies and I want to start by looking at its policy 
implications. In Chapter 2, I sought to move Porter from the centre of the debate 
around understanding clusters by emphasising the significance of other theoretical 
contributions. In the same way, the other theories discussed in Chapter 2 have 
implications for policy and this will be discussed subsequently. 
3.2.1 Michael Porter 
Given the widespread association of Porter with cluster policy it is interesting that 
Porter's earliest and most heralded work in relation to clusters, The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (1990), foresaw little role for direct government intervention. 
However, by 1998 Porter is much more explicit about the role of government in the 
economy as a whole, envisaging five roles for government: providing macroeconomic 
and political stability; improving general-purpose inputs (for example, workforce, 
infrastructure and information collection and provision); ensuring rules and incentives 
favour rivalry, investment and innovation; facilitating and upgrading all clusters and 
implementing a long term economic change plan. 
In terms of cluster policy it is his recommendations for facilitating and upgrading 
clusters that are of interest. These recommendations are framed in terms of the four 
factors comprising the 'diamond' of influences on local competitiveness (cf. section 
2.3). For each of the diamond factors Porter identifies actions that governments can 
take to upgrade clusters. The actions can be grouped into five categories: providing 
infrastructure, encouraging dialogue, information collection and provision, dealing 
NAith regulatory issues, and marketing. 
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Porter is adamant that government should look to upgrade all clusters, With those 
clusters being identified by mapping exercises, which have always played a 
significant role in Porter's academic and consultancy work. Porter's work tends to 
identify that a large proportion of an economy is clustered and the implication is that a 
large part of the economy will benefit from a cluster approach. While Porter accepts 
that projects will have to be sequenced, the avoidance of selectivity runs contrary to 
other academic discourses (Raines, 2002) and much policy practice. This highlights 
the significance of the methodology used to identify clusters and also leaves open the 
question of what to do if clusters cannot be identified in a given economy, a situation 
faced by some more peripheral areas. 
As noted in section 2.3.1, Porter leaves open the question of the scale at which 
clusters exist and notes that clusters can be embedded within broader clusters (for 
example, wine within agribusiness). Porter also leaves open the scale at which policy 
should be implemented, but maintains that government has a role in upgrading all 
clusters, with that role varying depending on the maturity of the cluster and being a 
matter of removing barriers and obstacles to development and actively participating in 
privately led initiatives, rather than running the initiatives themselves. It is implied 
that different functions are carried out at different levels of government and he 
introduces an idea that is key to cluster policy - that of opening dialogues and 
generating conversations between a wide range of actors. He also highlights the need 
for a long-term perspective and recommends the institutionalisation of a cluster 
approach. 
Although Porter leaves many questions with regard to policy open, it can be argued 
that his work `should be used as a starting point or a catalyst to undertake cluster 
development and not as some manual which has to be rigidly followed' (Brown, 
2000b, p. 5). Other literatures may not have had the same appeal to policy makers, but 
they do have implications for our conceptualisation of cluster policy and practical 
implications for the implementation of cluster policy. 
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3.2.2 Storper's Holy Trinity 
In Chapter 2, Storper's holy trinity of technologies-organisations-territories was used 
as an organising framework to consider the theories that contribute to our 
understanding of clusters and we can use the same framework to explore the 
implications of those literatures for cluster policy theory and I want to look at the 
policy implications of each element in turn. 
Organisations 
Certain schools of thought, including Marshallian economics, the Californian School 
and the New Geographical Economics of Krugman, rely on the actions of atomistic 
firms (organisations) operating via markets to explain clusters. The benefits of co- 
location, clustering or agglomeration are taken to arise automatically through external 
economies or reduced transaction costs. It is implied that policy intervention should 
therefore be limited to resolving market failures (Newlands, 2003) and the implication 
is that such intervention will be appropriate at a national scale. 
Territories (and their institutions) 
A key understanding from the literatures encompassed under the heading `territories' 
is that a firm's performance is affected, not only by the markets in which it operates, 
but also by the environment in which it operates. The question in policy terms is 
whether, and how, that environment can be affected by policy. Maillat (1995) 
identifies two aspects of the milieu, or environment, amenable to policy intervention - 
the interaction logic and the collective learning dynamic. By classifying regions 
along both axes, policy makers can identify whether they should focus on increasing 
cooperation between players or on developing learning processes, but in both cases 
the focus is on creating regionally specific resources to promote development. To 
these aspects I would add a further interconnected dimension potentially amenable to 
policy intervention - the institutional framework. Each of these three aspects is now 
examined in turn. 
The original Italian industrial districts demonstrated strong interaction logic and were 
based on close inter-firm cooperation, including adherence to norms of reciprocity 
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and the provision of collective goods, such as training, by local trade and civic 
associations. Although the original industrial districts had little role for public 
intervention, policy makers, looking to emulate the districts" success. sought to 
identify mechanisms to facilitate cooperation between firms and to provide 'real 
services', whereby services, such as marketing, were provided directly by public 
authorities. The provision of such `real services' is particularly appropriate for cluster 
policies addressing the needs of small firms, because it involves the provision of 
services that a small firm would otherwise find too difficult or too expensive to 
provide. Cluster policies have therefore often concentrated on collaboration and 
improving the interaction logic, although this ignores the non-collaborative 
mechanisms that are also necessary to explain the success of certain industrial 
districts. 
Because geographical proximity is seen to be beneficial for knowledge transfer and 
learning (although cf. section 2.7.4), policies to support a collective learning dynamic 
at a spatially and sectorally (or cluster) focused scale are justified and a network 
approach to encouraging learning amongst SMEs is popular. Additionally, as 
knowledge is exchanged both through links between firms, and by movement of 
individuals through spin-outs from existing firms, the popularity of policies to 
promote links between firms and to support spin-outs is understandable. However, 
the functioning of the local labour market and interactions between suppliers and 
customers have also been seen as significant for knowledge transfer, but may be less 
amenable to policy intervention. 
The cluster approach can be criticised for a tendency to focus on interactions within 
regions, and within clusters, at the expense of acknowledging the importance of 
external linkages (cf. section 2.7.4). However, Camagni (1991) sees the milieu as a 
way of linking local firms into extra-local innovation networks and Bathelt et al. 
(2004) see a role for policy in forging these extra-local linkages. 
While acknowledging a role for policy in fostering an interaction logic and collective 
learning dynamic. I would argue that those two attributes are likely to be more 
effective in an environment with an institutional framework including shared cultural 
and social norms and routines, and a key question is whether the literature supports 
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the assertion that the institutional framework is amenable to policy intervention. As 
discussed in section 2.6.3, the term `institutions' comprises a number of facets 
ranging from formal organisations to informal habits, routines and conventions. As 
discussed in section 2.6.8, Storper refers to these institutions as untraded 
interdependencies and, because untraded interdependencies are hard to imitate or 
recreate, territories and clusters with favourable untraded interdependencies are at an 
advantage. 
I have suggested that untraded interdependencies are related to the concept of social 
capital and that both concepts are linked to notions of trust. The key issue for policy 
makers is therefore, if social capital, untraded interdependencies and trust are 
territorially specific, can they be nurtured and developed by policy interventions? In 
certain areas social norms of trust and reciprocity result from of a long history of 
trustful relationships (Sabel, 1989). Putnam (1993) maintained that the social capital 
that enabled areas like Third Italy to flourish was centuries old. However, in Bowling 
Alone (Putnam, 2000) he cites the example of Tupelo, which was one of the poorest 
counties in the poorest state in the USA in the 1940s, but a national model of 
community and economic development by the 1990s. Putnam ascribes this success to 
the community pursuing collective goals under the exceptional leadership of one 
individual. Social capital developed in the town over decades, rather than centuries, 
offering hope for currently lagging areas. However, the significance of one individual 
appears key to this example and is an area of interest in research. 
Lorenz (1992), discussing the United States, points out that policy makers can appeal 
to firms' self-interest, by demonstrating the benefits of collective action. Once 
collective action is undertaken, a virtuous circle is created whereby communication 
increases and trust builds, leading to the sharing of information. Policy-makers need 
to ensure that this behaviour does not evaporate at times of economic downturn. 
Asheim (1992) cites studies by Lorenz (1990) and Sabel (1990). both showing that 
what Sabel calls `studied trust' can be intentionally created. Cooke (1997) agrees that 
trust can be promoted by an appeal to self-interest, but argues that individuals do in 
any case prefer to operate within trustful relations rather than in isolation. Both 
Ceglie et al. (1999) and Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) suggest that trust can be 
established between actors by running small, low risk projects first before moving on 
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to more complex relations. Boekholt and Thuriaux (1999) point out that informal 
contacts need to precede formal contacts and that building trust takes time. If social 
capital is amenable to policy intervention the regional level is seen as relevant 
because that is where interaction is easiest (Morgan, 1997a) and clusters, sharing 
common linkages and language, become a policy focus. 
Untraded interdependencies are seen as more important than ever because firms 
operate in an increasingly uncertain environment. The role of uncertainty is also 
relevant to the work of GREMI and, as discussed in section 2.6.5, firms develop 
functions of search-selection-transcoding-transforming-control (SSSTTC) to enable 
them to operate in this uncertain environment. Camagni ( 2002) envisages the milieu 
as supplementing and enhancing the SSSTTC functions and, while a policy role 
cannot be envisaged in certain aspects (for example, managerial mobility), there are 
other aspects (for example, setting of quality standards, provision of information and 
provision of specialised services) that could be undertaken by policy makers. What is 
less clear is how policy can contribute to the intangible synergy effects that ensure 
that certain territories or `milieus' are better able to reduce uncertainty. 
In addition to the soft institutional framework, the institutional framework of formal 
organisations is significant and the functioning of the formal institutions depends on 
the functioning of the softer institutions. As outlined in section 2.6.3 the term 
`institutional thickness' has often been used to describe this framework. Amin and 
Thrift (1995) point out that policy-makers have found it possible to create institutions, 
and even encourage interaction between them, but that the other two aspects of 
institutional thickness - collective representation and sense of mutual awareness have 
been much harder to foster because institutional thickness is the product of `a 
complex set of institutional conditions, which are not ubiquitously available' (ibid. 
p. 105). Not only is it difficult to generate the combination of conditions to result in a 
favourable form of institutional thickness, but also in less advantaged areas there may 
be an institutional structure that militates against change and `locks in' the area to an 
unfavourable institutional culture. That said, clustering can be seen as a form of 
institution building and often leads to forums that may develop further. This can be 
particularly important in areas where formal institutions are weak (Lagendijk and 
Charles, 1999). Additionally, Grabher (1993b) envisages a role for policy makers in 
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avoiding lock-in and promoting adaptability by linking together specialist support 
organisations because `linking different institutions may uncover potentials for 
cooperation between firms of different sizes and technological specialisation' (ibid. 
p. 274). 
Technologies (and innovation systems) 
Having considered the ways in which policy makers might intervene to influence 
`territory' I now want to look at the involvement of policy makers in the third element 
of Storper's holy trinity - technologies. As discussed in section 2.7, recent work on 
innovation has focused on the `system' within which innovation occurs. Policy 
intervention to provide elements missing from the system, and particularly to facilitate 
the operation of the linkages within the system so that it functions in a systematic, 
networked manner, is justified. 
The change in understanding of the innovation process to one informed by 
evolutionary economics, leads to a change from a policy of provision of physical and 
functional infrastructure, to a policy focusing on knowledge infrastructures and the 
creation of innovation networks (Asheim and Cooke 1999). Emphasis is placed on 
the ability to develop and exploit linkages outside the firm's boundaries (Nauwelaers, 
2001). Nauwelaers also points out that emphasis moves from the provision of inputs 
to the innovation process, to the innovation process itself She suggests that the focus 
of policy has moved from hardware and physical capital (infrastructure, R&D etc) to 
software and human capital (trained workers and knowledge) to `orgware' and social 
capital (norms and institutions, culture and ethics). She notes that the visibility, 
measurability and speed of effect of the policies declines with a move from providing 
hardware to 'orgware'. 
Locally and regionally based formal institutions to support innovation are also seen as 
significant in facilitating innovation and the collective learning process (European 
Commission, 1999b) and policy can play a role in supporting or developing 
institutions such as service centres or technology centres as part of a cluster. 
Crucially, Asheim and Cooke (1999) note that different industrial sectors have 
different requirements in terms of innovation systems. Consequently innovation 
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policy should be tailored and clusters can be seen as an appropriate focus for 
innovation policy. 
3.2.3 Conclusion: A Theoretical Basis for Cluster Policy? 
While the work of Michael Porter has undoubtedly been significant, both in 
popularising the term clusters and in encouraging policy makers to take a cluster 
approach to economic development policy, to equate clusters and cluster policy solely 
with Porter's work ignores the work of many economic geographers. The theoretical 
basis for cluster policy lies within the complex web of theories, discussed in Chapter 
2, about the operation of markets, the way in which a firm's operating environment 
impacts upon its performance and the way in which innovation takes place. The 
different literatures suggest different instruments and therefore the choice of policy 
instrument is influenced by the policy makers understanding of cluster concepts. 
Three particular issues of relevance to the design of cluster policy can be highlighted 
as emerging from this group of theories. 
The first aspect is that most of the literatures that have been discussed - the Italian 
industrial district literature, GREMI research, work on collective learning, untraded 
interdependencies and institutional thickness - stress the place specific and 
historically bounded nature of the processes underlying clusters. Porter's work, on 
the other hand, views clusters as more functional and, although he mentions the 
importance of social relations, his work appears to have been interpreted by policy 
makers as suggesting that the benefits of clustering are aspatial and replicable in other 
areas (European Commission, 2002). If policy makers ignore the socio-cultural and 
place specific reasons for the success of clusters, they underestimate the difficulty of 
designing policies, and the policies they design are unlikely to succeed. 
The second aspect to consider, highlighted by Newlands (2003) is that it is a mixture 
of cooperation and competition drives clusters. Policy makers should not neglect the 
competition aspect. Collaboration alone does not explain the functioning of the 
Italian industrial districts or Silicon Valley and a policy of encouraging cooperation 
and collaboration is not sufficient for cluster development. 
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The third aspect is that cluster theories increasingly stress the value of external links 
in addition to local links, and the need to avoid functional, cognitive and political 
lock-in (Grabher, 1993b). Policy makers have not necessarily picked up this aspect of 
cluster policy theory. 
The theories that contribute to our understanding of clusters suggest that policy- 
makers should ensure satisfactory framework conditions for clusters and can intervene 
to improve the `systemness' of clusters. However, they also provide theoretical 
justification for intervention to improve the untraded interdependencies within 
clusters by encouraging cooperation to promote localised collective learning 
processes, promoting the building of social capital of a favourable nature and 
facilitating the development and linking of formal organisations. Clusters, because of 
their perceived advantages in terms of agglomeration economies and collective 
learning processes, are seen as an appropriate focus for the design of policy 
interventions of this nature. However, in section 2.2.1, we have seen that different 
processes occur at different cluster scales and the implication is that cluster policy 
should also vary with scale. 
Before considering the ways in which the theoretical implications of our 
understanding of clusters have been put into practice by policy-makers, I want to 
consider what we mean by cluster policy, and why policy-makers have adopted such a 
complex and contested concept as clusters so widely. 
3.3 Towards a Definition: Common Aspects of a Cluster Policy Approach 
Just as in Chapter 2 the meaning of the term `cluster' was discussed, it is worth 
considering what is meant by the term `cluster policy'. Again this is not an easy task, 
particularly given that ' [i]n essence, cluster policy is not an isolated, independent and 
well-defined discipline. It embraces all policies that affect the development of 
clusters, taking into account the synergies and interchanges between these policies" 
(European Commission, 2003, p. 10). Cluster policies have proliferated since the 
1990s across Western Europe (Raines, 2000), North America (Rosenfeld, 1995) and 
increasingly the developing world (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). However, initiatives 
vary from those supporting small, non-sector specific business networks to much 
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larger programmes focusing on a specific industry in a particular locality 
(Hallencreutz and Lundequist, 2003) and policies have been initiated by supranational 
organisations such as the United Nations International Development Organisation 
(UNIDO), by national governments of many political colours; by state and regional 
authorities in many nations and by numerous local economic development agencies. 
Consultancies, most famously Michael Porter's Monitor Company, have sprung up 
worldwide seeking to advise policy makers on their cluster strategies. 
There are some very broad similarities across the approaches. There is a tendency to 
deal with the needs of firms on a collective basis, rather than individually. There is an 
element of selectivity in terms of choosing clusters to support, although on occasion 
clusters have been defined very broadly to ensure political acceptability. There is a 
tendency to act in a cross-sectoral manner and. the clusters selected for assistance are 
often more widely defined than would be the case for sectors. There may be a move 
to cross-departmental working because a cluster approach encourages a more holistic 
approach to policy. A more participatory method of policy making may be 
encouraged by the involvement of actors not usually involved in designing policy. 
There may be a shift towards stimulating social processes rather than concentrating on 
financial incentives and formal programmes. Public or semi-public organisations may 
act as mediators in encouraging inter-firm networks and joint projects. There is 
frequently an emphasis on improved business cooperation and networking. There is 
often an emphasis on the need to improve innovation capability and an emphasis on 
the linking of firms to the regional technological infrastructure. There may be an 
attempt to stimulate the creation of specialised factors, particularly knowledge. 
As Enright (2000) posits, `[with] such different governments all adopting cluster- 
based strategies, it is easy to conjecture that we have either stumbled across universal 
truths, mass delusions, or the same words used to describe very different programmes' 
(ibid. p. 309). So what have we stumbled across: what is cluster policy? As a starting 
point, I want to draw attention to a paper by Benneworth et al. (2003) that contributes 
to a clarification of terminology. The paper dissects the cluster approach into five 
theoretical elements: 
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- The cluster - the concentration of activity characterised by interactions between 
firms, 
- Clustering - cooperative interaction to gain advantage, which may or may not 
take place within a cluster, 
- Cluster activities - the events and activities at which clustering takes place, 
- Cluster organisations - the organisations which organise clustering activities, 
- Cluster policy - policies from government to support cluster development. 
This typology is useful in allowing us to distinguish between different components of 
the cluster approach to policy and, having isolated cluster policy from the other four 
elements, I now want to consider why a cluster approach is so popular amongst 
policy-makers. 
3.4 A Cluster Approach: Why the Appeal? 
To many academics the cluster concept appears fuzzy and chaotic (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003). This fuzzy nature appeals to some commentators and Jacobs and de 
Man (1996) suggest `[t]here is not one correct definition of the cluster concept, but 
[... ] different dimensions are of interest. The practical situation facing policy-makers 
and business strategists will lead them to emphasise some of those dimensions over 
others. In our view, this is not a drawback of the cluster concept' (ibid. p. 425). 
Raines (2002) concurs, `the ambiguity of the cluster concept - often cited as a 
weakness - has surprisingly allowed a range of 
different economic development ideas 
to be combined in new configurations' (ibid. p. 2). However, for others, `[t]he very 
openness of the cluster concept is at the same time its weakness' (Nauwelaers, 2001, 
p. 98). To policy makers, given the proliferation of cluster initiatives, the appeal 
appears more universal and there are many practical `how to' type guides to cluster 
development, including those produced for the European Commission (1999a), US 
Department of Commerce, (1997) and the Department of Trade and Industry (2004). 
In fact, it is partly the multitude of facets to clusters and hence to cluster policies that 
is appealing, as they enable policy makers to stress the aspect that is relevant to their 
particular issue or locality (Jacobs and de Man, 1996). 
78 
Enright (2000) sees the failure of previous policies as being the most important reason 
for the appeal of cluster strategies but also identifies five other causes of their 
popularity - globalising and localising forces; perceived difficulties with development 
through large firms; trends towards outsourcing and downsizing among larger firms: 
case studies on successful clusters and the tendency to push economic policy making 
from the national to a subsidiary level in some nations. Some of these aspects are 
considered in more detail below. 
3.4.1 Previous Industrial, Regional and Technology Policy 
Cluster policy has been described as being on the boundaries of industrial, regional 
and technology policy (Boekholt and Thuriaux, 1999). Therefore it is necessary to 
look at trends in each of these policy fields in turn, accepting that there is some 
overlap between them, in order to understand the increased interest in the cluster 
approach. 
Industrial policy has tended to be narrowly sectoral and consisted of subsidising 
certain industries. In the 1960s, policies tended to support mature industries against 
increasing and inevitable international competition. This policy of `backing losers' 
(Jacobs and de Man, 1996) was aimed at protecting employment but was not 
successful. In the 1970s, policy became more offensive and attempted to `pick 
winners' by supporting industries which it was hoped would be future economic 
successes. This was no more successful because `picking winners' is a pursuit at 
which governments are notoriously poor and many countries and regions pursued the 
same potential `winners', leading to considerable duplication of effort (although the 
same pitfall can apply to cluster based policies). The policies were prohibitively 
expensive and fell foul of international fair trade agreements. 
Regional policy has tended to follow this sectoral approach and used the tools of 
industrial policy, subsidies and state aids, in an attempt to even out regional 
disparities. In the United Kingdom regional policies were only applied to lagging 
regions and state aid was given to firms to locate in depressed areas in the hope of 
providing employment growth. However, these 'branch plant' jobs were often low 
skilled and low paid. Indeed such policies may have been counter-productive in that 
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they encouraged grant dependency and a continuing employee culture. thus stifling 
entrepreneurial activity. Growth pole policies attempted to attract large companies to 
kick start economies (Enright, 1996) and in the 1980s there was an attempt to attract 
foreign direct investment, leading to bidding wars between different UK regions. 
While there have been successful cases of inward investment, there has been 
increasing disillusionment in the face of a wave of factory closures (Pike, 1999). In 
any case, within the EU, despite decades of regional policies, significant territorial 
disparities within countries remain. Indeed disparities between regions within each 
Member State increased between 1990 and 2000, with only Germany, France and 
Austria seeing reductions in the variation of GDP per capita across regions (HM 
Treasury et al., 2003). 
Science and technology policy has historically been based on the linear model of 
innovation, with a focus on knowledge production at a high-level within research 
institutes and universities. In the 1980s there was a move to support more applied and 
pragmatic research. With some notable exceptions, such as the Science Park in 
Cambridge (Segal, 1985) the high-tech industrial parks that appeared to offer promise 
in the early 1980s have not been successful either. It has been claimed that these 
policies failed to look at the socio-economic context in which the science parks 
operated and ignored factors to do with embeddedness, community and social capital, 
(Asheim and Cooke, 1999). UK Government policy on technology in the past two 
decades, both spatial (technology parks) and non-spatial (technology transfer 
centres), has been criticised for being too supply driven, failing to meet the needs of 
(potential) customers, too short term in funding terms, politically driven and 
operating in isolation from other institutions (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). Policy 
has been seen as being too narrowly technologically focused and there is now a wider 
focus on innovation. 
These failures in policy led to what Sabel (1989) has called `a new orthodoxy of 
endogenous local development'. The stress on development from within lends itself 
naturally to the use of clusters as the focus for policy intervention. 
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3.4.2 SME Development 
A second reason for the popularity of cluster approaches is their suitability as a means 
of support for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). SMEs have become of 
increasing interest to policy makers. Not only are they increasingly significant in 
employment terms, they tend to be more rooted to their environments, making them a 
particular target for policy-makers wishing to develop the endogenous assets of their 
locality, and increasingly disenchanted with their ability to support large firms. SMEs 
have been badly served by policy makers. Although the number of initiatives has been 
abundant, the take up of services is notoriously low (Henderson and Morgan, 2002), 
suggesting a picture of confusion and disillusionment. However, SMEs face 
particular problems that can be ameliorated by a cluster approach. Their small size 
and isolation means that they can benefit from an approach that builds their capability 
to develop linkages. Small firms tend to learn well from other firms (Curran and 
Blackburn 1994; Morgan 1996). The benefits of economies of scale, purported to 
arise from clusters, are especially relevant for SMEs and it is easier for policy makers 
to intervene at a cluster level than attempt to reach SMEs individually. A cluster 
approach has also been perceived as a way of combining support for SMEs while also 
embedding inward investment projects (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). 
3.4.3 Change in Economic Development Governance 
A third reason for the appeal of the cluster approach to policy-makers relates to a 
change in the nature and governmental scale of policy intervention. The move 
towards a cluster approach has varied from country to country and the way in which 
the approach has been adopted depends on the policy-making history of the country. 
However, the appeal of cluster policy has tended to coincide with a change in the role 
of the state to one of indirect, rather than direct, intervention. Morgan (1997a) 
highlights the role of government as one of `animateur'. There is a trend away from 
direct intervention, towards creating mechanisms and incentives for indirectly 
facilitating the network process. 
Cluster policy is often seen as a low cost option in three respects: it tends to involve 
indirect intervention rather than direct subsidy; it leverages private sector resources: 
and there are scale economies in delivery. Given limits to budgetary expenditure 
81 
worldwide, this notion of achieving substantial results from limited financial input is 
appealing and is of particular relevance to the European Union given its substantial 
enlargement with inestimable budgetary implications. Therefore a cluster approach 
has fitted well with moves towards low cost, indirect government intervention. For 
example, it has been noted that local authorities in the United Kingdom pursued 
cluster policies at an early stage in the popularity of the cluster approach to policy, 
due to a need for European funding (often linked to partnership working) and private 
money, at a time when the Conservative administration was curtailing local authority 
spending (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). 
The appeal of cluster policy has also coincided with a move, certainly in the United 
Kingdom, to the devolving of regional policy to a more local level. The assumption 
that significant interactions occur at a regional level fits especially well with a move 
to supporting regional economic development. However, a cluster approach has an 
appeal at a range of geographical scales as will be explored further below. 
3.4.4 Conclusion: The Appeal of the Cluster Approach 
In an influential article, Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) trace the career of the cluster 
concept from its introduction by Michael Porter in his 1990 seminal text The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations. They show how the linking of clusters with 
competitiveness in Michael Porter's work ensured its initial appeal to policy makers. 
Undoubtedly this was heightened by the readability of his work, `couched in the [... ] 
accessible verbal language of business strategy' (Feser and Luger, 2003, p. 12), his 
background in business strategy, and his reputation as an international management 
`guru'. Lagendijk and Cornford (2000) then recount the `journey' of the cluster 
concept from its origins in the work of Porter. Picking up on the way the `baggage' of 
networking (not found in Porter's original work), the concept `travelled along 
different routes' and during its travels, the concept became popular with different 
audiences who all sought to apply it to their own needs and circumstances. However, 
Lagendijk and Cornford point out two paradoxes - first that, although clusters are 
specifically intended to be cross-sectoral, a cluster approach allowed policy makers to 
revisit their sectoral policies and second that, despite Porter's outright criticism of 
networking in his initial work, clusters quickly became associated with networking. 
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They go on to show how this networking variant of the cluster concept was easily 
aligned both with the increasing tendency for regional development to focus on 
indirect measures of support, and the need for partnership working to secure funding 
from the European Structural Funds. Clusters then became linked with economic 
restructuring, a role not envisaged by Porter, with policies to embed footloose foreign 
investments on the one hand and to develop indigenous development on the other. 
Clusters have also become widely associated with the notion of innovation. The 
theoretical justification for this has been explored in Chapter 2, but, given the 
popularity of concepts of innovation with policy makers, the association of clusters 
with innovation again `sells' the cluster approach to policy makers. Lagendijk and 
Cornford conclude, as I have done in Chapter 2, that `there is perhaps not sufficient 
justification to perceive clusters as a singular `black box' (2000, p. 215), but they 
maintain that the concept is powerful in that its `career' has taken it down many 
different routes, in academic and policy terms, with different actors `enrolling' the 
concept for their own purposes. 
3.5 Putting a Cluster Approach into Practice 
Not only is the use of clusters within policy warranted by a number of different 
theoretical strands, but also cluster policies have been designed in varying policy 
contexts and the cluster concept has followed a very varied career path in policy 
terms, becoming associated with different priorities and policy interests. However, 
even if clusters cannot be perceived as. a singular `black box', an analysis of cluster 
policy making suggests a distinctive policy making process. Before outlining my 
model of the cluster making process I want to clarify some further definitional issues 
and look in more detail at the question of the geographical scale of policy 
intervention. 
Feser (1998) distinguishes cluster specific from cluster-informed policies. A cluster 
specific approach uses tailored demand side and supply side initiatives to develop a 
distinct, identified cluster. The interventions will not always be traditional economic 
development tools and may incorporate aspects of regulation and education for 
example. A cluster informed perspective aims to improve an individual policy 
initiative by applying an understanding of the economic and spatial interdependencies 
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that constitute clusters. Porter (1998) similarly maintains that there is a role for 
government in upgrading specific clusters (cluster specific) and that cluster based 
thinking should be used to guide all aspects of policy, including science and 
technology and education policies (cluster informed). This dual role for government 
as, on the one hand, having a role in upgrading individual clusters, but also, on the 
other hand, taking a holistic approach to economic development by applying 'cluster 
thinking' to all aspects of government is also recognised by the European 
Commission (2002). In discussing the cluster policy process I am predominantly 
referring to cluster specific policies, but my empirical work touches on the extent to 
which policy in the United Kingdom has been cluster informed. 
Just as clusters can be distinguished from clustering, as discussed in section 3.3, so 
policies designed to support clusters on the one hand can be distinguished from those 
that seek to promote clustering on the other. Policies impacting upon clusters can 
either be direct and intentional cluster policies (for example, provision of 
infrastructure for a specific cluster) or policies which indirectly or unintentionally 
have an impact upon given clusters, where that impact can be positive or negative (for 
example, defence procurement policy intends to acquire the best equipment for the 
armed services, but the way in which it does so has an impact on defence related 
clusters). Policies to promote clustering are almost always direct and intentional and 
include promoting networking and the formation of small groups of businesses 
working in coordination for mutual benefit. 
3.5.1 The Scale of Cluster Policy Intervention 
The scale of policy intervention depends on the level at which clusters are analysed, 
although in practice this is partly dependent on the institutional context in which 
cluster policies are designed. We have seen in section 2.2.1 that clusters exist at 
different geographical scales and that the processes that characterise clusters vary 
depending on the scale at which they are analysed. Roelandt and den Hertog (1999) 
also examine how the focus of analysis, and indeed the cluster concept, depends on 
the level of analysis. A national (macro) level of analysis looks at overall patterns of 
economic specialisation and clusters are conceived of as `broad industry groups 
linked within the overall macroeconomy' (Feser, 1998, p. 20). A branch or industry 
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(meso) level of analysis conceives of clusters as comprising inter-industry and intra- 
industry linkages, horizontal and vertical, around a value adding production chain. At 
a firm (micro) level, clusters are seen to comprise a small number of linked 
enterprises and their immediate supply chain. Roelandt and den Hertog (1999) 
conclude that the scale at which clusters are analysed implies the need for different 
types of policy initiative, from framework conditions at a national level to small scale 
networking at a micro level. Boekholt (1997) points out that the micro-meso-macro 
split does not necessarily correspond with geographical, national-regional-local levels 
of intervention (for example, a national networking programme can impact at a micro 
level). 
Lagendijk (1999) develops a typology based on the instruments used to develop 
clusters and relates these back to the literatures used to explain clusters. He identifies 
four approaches: 
- The industrial cluster. Drawing on the work of Porter, this approach involves 
improving the cluster specific framework conditions incorporated in the 
`diamond'. Policies include integrating policy along cluster lines and supporting 
cluster based innovation systems. 
- Institution-building. Drawing on institutional and associational economics, this 
approach looks at building capability in firms and clusters. Policies include 
developing cluster-based service centres or associations. 
- Network-building. Drawing on networking literature, this approach considers the 
advantages of collaborative attitudes amongst firms, and between firms and 
business support organisations. Policies include the facilitation of business 
networks and learning to cluster. 
- Learning-oriented. Drawing on notions of learning regions and learning 
organisations, this approach involves learning though a cluster. Policy initiatives 
include focus groups or initiatives developed around `mentor' firms and may be 
supply chain based. 
The different approaches are scale dependent and Lagendijk suggests that the 
industrial cluster model is oriented to a national or regional scale, the institution- 
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building model is oriented to a regional or local scale, and the last two approaches are 
oriented to a local level. 
However, although theory suggests that the nature of policy should vary depending on 
the scale of cluster to which it is applied, once again the context dependent, pragmatic 
way in which cluster policy has developed is in evidence. Nauwelaers (2001) lists 
nine uses of the term cluster in policy approaches, operating at different geographical 
scales and ranging from private strategic alliances between a restricted number of 
companies to very broad sectors accounting for an important share of the national 
economy. The scale at which cluster policies are designed also varies from country to 
country and depends on the political structure and policy-making history of the 
country, and indeed the size of the country. In the Netherlands a national, top down 
approach has been utilised (Roelandt et al., 1999). In Sweden cluster initiatives have 
emerged on a regional basis and the national government has subsequently tried to 
take a more systematic approach. 7 In countries where there has been a tradition of 
strong regional government, for example, Germany and Spain, cluster policy has been 
designed and implemented at that regional level. Some would argue that in areas like 
the Basque Country and Scotland this has been a conscious effort to assert 
independence (Benneworth and Henry, 2004). 
A key area of interest, and one that has been little explored (Brown, 2000b), is the 
way in which cluster policies undertaken at different scales within the same country 
are coordinated and I will return to this in my empirical work. 
3.5.2 The Cluster Policy Process 
Academics have used cluster policy process models as frameworks for examining and 
analysing cluster policies (Benneworth and Charles; 2001; Raines, 2002). Drawing 
upon these, I propose to discuss five broad components of a cluster policy process; the 
decision to take a cluster approach; identification, selection and analysis of clusters; 
participant mobilisation, cluster animation and relation building; selection and 
NUTEK, the Swedish Development Agency. has formed Klustergruppen, an initiative to link together 
regional cluster initiatives to learn from each other and to provide assistance to other regions wishing to 
implement cluster policy. 
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implementation of policy instruments and evaluation and policy learning. While 
broadly sequential, in practice these categories should and do overlap. The categories 
should form a continuous loop in which the experiences gained in the policy process 
are fed back into the process. In order to illustrate the cluster policy process I draw on 
examples from cluster policies in Europe and elsewhere. 
3.5.3 The Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
Benneworth and Charles (2001) highlight that the first stage of the process is the very 
decision to employ a cluster approach at all. The decision to take a cluster approach 
is context dependent and, on occasion, influenced by funding considerations and 
determined by policy decisions at a higher level. However, clusters have usually 
emerged via a market-led process with little government interference. Even where 
government influence can be observed it has often been, as in the case of Silicon 
Valley (Cooke, 2002), in the form of government expenditure, often related to 
defence, rather than in the form of conscious policies to develop clusters. Therefore 
what is the justification for pursuing a cluster strategy? 
Traditionally government intervention in economic development is justified by 
market failures. However, given that the innovation systems approach indicates that 
innovation arises through a system and given that policy makers are tasked with 
seeing `region economies whole' (Bergman, 1998), intervention can also be justified 
to correct system imperfections or to enhance systems. Boekholt and Thuriaux (1999, 
2000) tabulate the rationales for cluster policy in terms of market and system failures 
and identify the policy actions and instruments associated with each kind of failure 
and an adaptation of their table is reproduced in Table 3-1 below. 
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Boekholt and Thuriaux (2000) also point out that different countries have different 
rationales for government intervention and in each country cluster policy has to fit 
with the individual country's policy framework. The Dutch government have three 
rationales for government intervention: removal of market imperfections hindering 
interactions within the innovation system; providing input where the social rates of 
return on R&D investment exceed private rates of return; and matching public 
research funding to private needs by improving cooperation between firms and the 
public knowledge infrastructure. All of these rationales are related to the Dutch 
understanding of innovation as a product of an `innovation system' and influence the 
adoption of cluster policies (Roelandt et al. 1999). Benneworth and Charles (2001) 
point out that in England the decision to implement regional cluster policies was 
partly as the result of the introduction of Regional Development Agencies. These 
agencies provided an appropriate mechanism for delivering cluster policies and a 
remit to deliver cluster policies for their regions has existed since their initiation. 
The Aims of Cluster Policy 
An EU study (European Commission, 2002) identified two general aims of cluster 
policy: to strengthen inter-firm collaboration and business networking and to build up, 
or strengthen, organisations for technology transfer corresponding to firms' needs. 
However, this appears to offer a very narrow view of cluster policy and it appears 
useful to consider that different policies have a different focus, be that spatial, SME, 
innovation or industry. Boekholt and Thuriaux (1999; 2000) identify four broad 
`cluster policy models' - National Advantage Model, Inter-firm Networking Model, 
Regional Development Model and Industry-Research Link Model. 
The National Advantage Model. In this model clusters of national importance are 
identified and framework policies, in areas such as education, regulation and applied 
research, are developed at a national level, so that the cluster can sustain or improve 
its competitive position. The Danish Resource Area Initiative is cited as a clear 
example of this policy approach. 
Inter-firm Nenvorking Model. This model usually focuses on the use of networking 
schemes to improve the capabilities of SMEs. Cluster policy approaches often 
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include an element of SME networking. The networking is usually amongst 
geographically proximate firms, but the policy can be implemented by a national 
government (for example, the USNet programme in the United States or the Danish 
Networking programme), or it can be initiated at a much more local scale. 
The Regional Development Model. Policy makers at a regional level, wanting to 
improve the attractiveness and economic performance of their region, may focus on 
certain economic specialisations or regional clusters. Within each region there may 
be particular goals and priorities such as the embedding of foreign direct investment 
or improving networking between SMEs (Lagendijk and Charles. 1999). Lagendijk 
and Charles also point out that cluster policies have a role both at a business level and 
at a structural level, where cluster policies can be used to reorient economies, and 
therefore policy instruments will vary and include attraction of inward investment. 
supply chain development and SME networking. Boekholt and Thuriaux (2000) 
mention Wales and Scotland as cases of this kind of cluster policy approach. 
The Industry-Research Link Model. In this model policies are used to intensify the 
links between research and industry in certain fields, particularly where there are 
emerging technologies. Policies are used to try to attract research funding, inward 
investment and new firms. The Bio-Region initiative in Germany is cited as a good 
example of this approach. 
Each model implies a varying geographical scale of policy intervention and each 
focus suggests the use of different policy tools to fulfil different aims (Boekholt and 
Thuriaux, 1999). Therefore the decision to take a cluster approach is justified by a 
variety of rationales and the decision is highly context dependent. Equally, the aims 
of cluster policy are varied and are again related to the context in which the policy is 
designed. 
3.5.4 Identification, Selection and Analysis of Clusters 
Most academics would concur that clusters cannot be built from scratch by policy 
intervention, but must build on some pre-existing combination of elements, which 
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might include firms in inter-related industries, the presence of supporting 
organisations, research expertise and particular skills within the workforce. 
Therefore, having chosen a cluster approach, a key aspect of the policy process is to 
identify clusters of activity where policy intervention may be beneficial. However, 
the differences between such clusters of activity are substantial and therefore a one 
size fits all' policy is inappropriate and likely to be ineffective. Cluster policy should 
be specific to the cluster involved and therefore, not only identification. but also 
detailed analysis of individual clusters is required before policy can be designed. It is 
particularly important to note that analysis of clusters should be an ongoing process 
and not a one-off exercise, given that clusters are dynamic and changing (Lagendijk 
and Charles, 1999). 
There are many ways to identify a cluster ranging from complex statistical exercises 
to pure wishful thinking on the part of policy makers. Porter's methodology has been 
detailed in section 2.3 and many articles detail complex statistical methodologies for 
identifying clusters (cf. Hill and Brennan (2000) on cluster and discriminant analysis. 
Held (1996) on a combined quantitative and qualitative method, De Bresson and Hu 
(1999) on the use of innovative interaction matrices compiled from innovation 
surveys and Bergman and Feser (1999) for a general review). Rosenfeld (1996b) 
prefers a qualitative approach asking questions in areas including R&D capacity, 
workforce skills, specialised services and suppliers, social infrastructure and shared 
vision and leadership. 
There are problems with technical methodologies both quantitative and qualitative. 
There are well known deficiencies in SIC code data (Brown, 2000b), not least that the 
cross-sectoral nature of clusters cannot be captured. Input-output data and 
employment data are rarely available at regional level and quantitative analysis can 
neither capture the soft linkages, the untraded interdependencies that characterise 
clusters, nor usually detect emerging clusters. Qualitative data has the equally well- 
known problems of respondent bias, limited sample size and the difficulty of 
clarifying concepts. 
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We can conclude therefore that there are methodological difficulties in identifying 
and understanding clusters but, as Benneworth and Charles (2001) point out, the 
designation of clusters is a highly politicised process, often heavily dependent on the 
prior existence of sectoral groups to lobby and press government to support particular 
sectors' (ibid. p. 393). Drejer et al. (1999) point out that in Denmark `the majority of 
the cluster studies were carried out with specific policy aims as a major driving force' 
(ibid. p. 310). 
Feser and Luger (2003) make the point that cluster analysis as a mode of inquiry is 
fundamentally different from cluster analysis as a technical methodology. Their point 
is that cluster analysis is inevitably flexible given that there are varying definitions of 
a cluster, different technical methodologies, different assumptions about spatial scale 
and different views about the process of cluster development. They point out that the 
choices made about how cluster analysis is undertaken, and the results from that 
analysis, cannot be separated from the policy concerns and policy background that led 
to the cluster analysis being undertaken. At best, cluster analysis exposes 
interdependencies within economies and challenges existing assumptions about 
strengths and weaknesses, prospects and challenges: at worst, it contributes to `naive 
boosterism'. Feser and Luger therefore call for a methodology that varies with policy 
objectives, and transparency in cluster studies with the `goals, objectives, definitions, 
indicators, weights, data sources, and models [... ] all [... ] clearly laid out and the 
limitations and likely biases of the selected approach explicitly discussed' (2003, 
p. 15). 
The Observatory of European SMEs report on Regional clusters in Europe tabulates 
national studies to identify and map clusters at different geographical scales in ten 
European countries. The policy background and policy experience have influenced 
the way in which clusters are identified, but Table 3.2 below highlights the range of 
results obtained for the same country by employing different methodologies. Using a 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative data may be the best approach to identifying 
clusters, but the political nature of the choice of method and scale of analysis cannot 
be ignored. Enright (2000) also makes the important point that non-recognition 
within a policy framework does not mean a cluster does not exist. 
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Cluster analysis can be used to obtain a detailed understanding of the cluster in order 
to tailor policy measures (Brown, 2000a). Cluster analysis can also be used as part of 
the dialogue process, rather than being expected to give one `right' answer. Roelandt 
et al. (1999) point out that, in the Netherlands, cluster analysis and cluster studies 
have moved from being analytical devices to gain insights into individual clusters, to 
being the starting point for discussions on potential policy interventions. 
3.5.5 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
Lagendijk and Charles (1999) point out that cluster initiatives come from a political 
structure showing a tendency towards governance forms based on networking and 
partnerships and, as discussed in section 3.4.3, this highlights a new role for policy 
makers - that of `animateur' (Morgan, 1997b). There is a suggestion that, within 
cluster policy, the public sector should act as a catalyst only (European Commission, 
2003). However, there is a need for a balance between waiting to be industry led and 
needing to intervene (Cooke, 2002). Cooke goes on to point out that, in the context of 
regional cluster policy making, it takes time for regional administrative bodies to 
develop the competencies to design such policies and also that they do not necessarily 
have the financial or political power to influence, for example, university research 
agendas. 
Therefore cluster policy making suggests a new role for the public sector and involves 
a participatory approach leading to the use of the term 'business led, but what does 
this actually entail? If support is more demand led, the requirements very quickly 
become sector or cluster specific and specialised, and public authorities do not have 
this expertise. An associational trend is therefore required to involve the private 
sector and other parts of the public sector (Lagendijk, 2000). Business involvement 
should be, and is often, part of cluster analysis, even of a quantitative kind, as local 
actors can reinforce or rebut results. However, the role of businesses and other 
organisations is even more significant when it comes to designing policy interventions 
because the cluster approach implies a demand led approach to designing policy, 
rather than the supply driven approach that has gone before. A cluster approach is 
about identifying problems and then reaching a consensus as to solutions. Altenburg 
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and Meyer-Stamer (1999) highlight the importance of benchmarking exercises in 
drawing attention to the need for action. A key element is to mobilise all the actors in 
a cluster and identify the common issues that are of concern to them. It appears that, 
at this stage, the role of policy makers should be to facilitate discussions and draw out 
the true nature of the problems. Held (1996) points out the role of focus groups in 
contributing to the analysis of clusters, but also in developing an identity and 
generating policy options. Therefore actors from the cluster should be involved in the 
analysis of the cluster, the identification of issues and the design of solutions, and 
their role in the process should continue beyond the policy design stage. 
If there is a new role for public policy makers as catalyst and animateur, and a role for 
the private sector in the design of cluster policy, there is also a new role for the private 
sector in the implementation of cluster policy. Andersson et al. (2004) conclude that 
`to underpin successful policy intervention a better understanding of the role of 
different players is required' (ibid. p. 8). They identify four types of players - firms, 
policy makers, academia and finance and also highlight the relevance of what they 
term `clusterpreneurs' and `glue organisations'. The role of finance is certainly 
significant in the development of clusters and cluster policy, but has not been the 
subject of this thesis. The role of firms, organisations, policy makers and, to a lesser 
extent, academia, will be examined in my empirical work and the literature 
particularly in respect of individuals and organisations is considered below. 
Porter and Emmons (2003) highlight the role of what they term, `institutions for 
collaboration' or IFCs. IFCs are those organisations that are not government entities, 
regulatory agencies, companies or universities, but do have an effect on the 
environment in which firms operate. IFCs include `industry associations, professional 
associations, chambers of commerce, technology transfer organisations, quality 
centers, non-profit think tanks, university alumni associations, and others. Such 
organisations can play an important role in cluster policy and provide important 
services to the cluster. Given the time constraints for those operating businesses. 
these organisations have an important role in understanding the needs of the business 
community, expressing these to policy7 makers and can potentially deliver policy 
initiatives. They can provide industry knowledge without bias from individual 
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commercial interests; undertake competence audits to add to the analysis of the 
cluster; identify cluster activities; encourage interest in cluster activities amongst 
cluster actors; coordinate and implement cluster activities; promote the cluster 
initiative externally; gather and share information, and provide meeting places and 
networking opportunities (Andersson et al., 2004). Bathelt et al. (2004) see these 
institutional arrangements as contributing to the local `buzz' (cf. section 2.7.4) by 
providing meeting places and opportunities for social interaction and argue that 
`[o]ver time, these structures of social relations stimulate fine-grained information 
transfer, joint problem-solving arrangements and the development of trust and 
reciprocity' (2004, p. 39). Interestingly, although they note that different kinds of 
agglomeration will generate different kinds of buzz, Bathelt et al. (2004) do not see a 
particular role for policy makers in generating local buzz, considering that `it largely 
takes care of itself (ibid. p. 48). They recommend that policy makers instead consider 
support for the development of `pipelines' to link clusters to external sources of 
knowledge. However, it does appear that policy-makers could also have a role in 
fostering and linking organisations that might contribute to a local buzz. 
Given the potential number of actors involved in cluster policy it is not surprising that 
Eklund et al. (2002) conclude that there is a need for a cluster `animator', charged 
with initiating and implementing cluster policy measures. These animators can be 
from the public or private sector and can be organisations. Their role is to 
communicate and maintain unity. This role may be akin to that of the `collective 
agent', identified by Camagni (1991) as increasing the synergy effect within a milieu. 
Andersson et al. (2004) go further and identify eight competency groups (leadership; 
integrity; enabling capabilities; interpersonal skills; knowledge and vision; 
management skills; analytical skills; and resources) that they see as being required, in 
varying measure, at different stages of the cluster development process (cf. Andersson 
et al., 2004, pp. 84-85). They also discuss the role of the `clusterpreneur' who is seen 
as combining many of these competencies and is described as being `visionary, 
. 
facilitatilve, analytical and excelling in networking' (ibid. p. 100, italics in the 
original). What is less clear is how this individual emerges and how policy makers 
can identify them. 
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Storper (2002) considers a mechanism by which policy-makers can identify key 
individuals. He concludes that coordination is the key problem in economic life and 
conventions are a key mechanism for achieving coordination: coordination exists 
because of conventions, and conventions arise through coordination. He concludes 
that such a circular relationship poses particular problems for policy makers and 
recommends two unorthodox policy strategies - `talk' and 'confidence'. Both are 
related to my notion of participant mobilisation and relation building. Policy makers 
can play a role in `getting low cost talk going' (2002, p. 140). The talk must involve 
deep communication and there must be confidence that it will be an ongoing process. 
Storper indicates that talk can be encouraged by incentive, but suggests that this is 
only a short term solution, preferring `small, repeated, experimental interactions' 
(ibid., p. 142) which echo the discussion of trust in section 3.2.2 and the policy 
recommendations of Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) and Boekholt and Thuriaux 
(1999). Through talk, the actors who are key within clusters can be identified or, as 
Storper explains, `[t]he second step is the definition of the capacities for action and 
identities of actors which are associated with the world(s) of production to be assisted 
by policy' (2002, p. 154). 
However, while policy makers can play a positive role in encouraging interaction and 
talk, Andersson et al. (2004) note that `the active involvement of policy makers [can] 
impact, positively or negatively, on the scope for, and direction of action by, private 
sector representatives, such as Institutions for Collaboration (IFCs), individual 
entrepreneurs and businesses, and also civil society' (ibid. p. 11, emphasis added). 
Therefore the private sector and other bodies such as universities have such a key role 
in designing and implementing cluster policy, that considering participant 
mobilisation, cluster animation and relation building as a discrete stage of the policy 
making process is justified, even though their involvement is necessary throughout the 
other stages. As was mentioned above, in the analysis stage, participation of cluster 
actors, with their in-depth knowledge, strengthens analysis. And as will be seen, the 
drawing up of action plans and their implementation is more finely tuned and 
effective with private sector involvement and commitment. Evaluation is also more 
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effective with the involvement of stakeholders. Relation building is also seen as a key 
part of this stage and it is part of the intended outcome of the cluster policy process. 
3.5.6 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
While relation building is a key objective of the cluster policy process, it may also be 
possible to design, again in conjunction with cluster actors, policy interventions that 
may assist in the development of the cluster. There is no specific cluster policy 
instrument, but the potential policy interventions link back to the rationales for 
government intervention (see Table 3-1) and depend both on policy makers' 
understanding of clusters and the specific policy making environment in which policy 
is being designed. For example, Enright (2000) categorises cluster strategies by the 
extent of government intervention, which can either be catalytic with government 
playing a facilitating role in encouraging private led clusters or interventionist with a 
more active role for government. 
Also, and crucially, a cluster approach should involve tailoring initiatives to meet the 
requirements of individual clusters. Jacobs and de Man (1996) stress the need to 
consider the geographical coverage of the cluster; the horizontal, vertical and lateral 
linkages; shared technologies; any central actor (for example, key firm or research 
establishment) and the quality of the network. Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) in 
their work on Latin American clusters highlight the need to formulate policy 
responses appropriate to the type of cluster under consideration. They identify three 
types of cluster in Latin America: survival clusters of micro and small scale 
enterprises; advanced and differentiated mass producers; and clusters of transnational 
corporations. They conclude that for the survival clusters, policy should concentrate 
on generating dialogue, identifying joint problems and ensuring successful pilot 
projects to demonstrate the benefits of cooperation. For the mass producer clusters, 
the emphasis should be on upgrading capabilities, improving regulatory frameworks, 
using inter-firm cooperation in non-core activities such as environmental protection, 
providing information and advisory services, ensuring training provision is adequate 
and relevant and taking a step-by-step approach to build relations between firms and 
technology providers. For the clusters based around Transnational Corporations, 
101 
policies should aim at embedding and deepening the cluster by attracting additional 
foreign investment, undertaking supplier development and ensuring technology 
transfer to local firms. Brown (2000b) also makes the point that policy must be 
sensitive to the stage of development of the cluster (cf. Enright, 2000 and section 
2.2.4). Different policy instruments are important at different stages of the cluster. 
Roelandt et al. (1999) identify different innovation styles within clusters and note that 
the significance of different actors and relationships vary within different styles. 
They categorise clusters as self-creating clusters which are knowledge-intensive. and 
where firms and research institutes generate research within the cluster; absorptive 
where little research is conducted and innovation is dependent on the supply base; 
self-sufficient where research is not conducted by firms but is generated within the 
cluster by research institutes and knowledge-intensifying where research and 
technology are used to increase the knowledge intensity of their products which are 
then supplied into other clusters. Policy initiatives need to take into account such 
varying innovation styles. 
Therefore cluster policy initiatives will vary according to the policy makers' goals and 
understanding of clusters, and should also vary according to the specificities of the 
clusters selected for policy intervention. All the studies mentioned above emphasise 
the significance of the second stage of the cluster policy-making process - 
identifying, selecting and analysing clusters. It is necessary to understand the cluster 
before attempting to design policy interventions. 
However, having argued that there is a need for a tailored approach, it can also be 
concluded that a particular range of policy instruments is often associated with cluster 
policy. As discussed in section 3.2.1, Porter identifies five categories of actions for 
upgrading clusters - providing infrastructure; encouraging dialogue; information 
collection and provision; dealing with regulatory issues and marketing. Raines (2002. 
pp. 28-29) highlights three broad objectives of cluster policy, which he relates to three 
aspects of a cluster, and for each objective he details associated policy measures and 
these are tabulated below in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3 Types of Cluster Policies 
Aspect of a cluster Objective of policy Policy Measures 
Interactions amongst cluster Increase interaction by " Incentives for joint R&D 
actors (firms, trade associations, creating conditions for " Provision of business premises to 
universities) cooperation and encourage interaction 
increasing or highlighting " Network brokering 
incentives for 
cooperation 
Presence of common Development of common " Provision of information 
competitive advantages in the resources to improve " Technological and business 
form of specialised labour competitiveness of the infrastructure 
markets, research expertise, cluster " Technology transfer 
specific tacit knowledge " Tailored skills training 
" Venture capital provision 
Collective awareness and Building internal Cluster mapping 
understanding of the cluster, and awareness of the cluster " Marketing and brand building 
sense of belonging to the cluster (identity building) and " Foresight and benchmarking 
projecting the identity of exercises 
the cluster (identity " Setting up cluster representative 
projecting) organisations 
Source: adapted ftom Raines (2002a) 
I want to highlight that while there is no single cluster policy instrument and the 
design of cluster policy initiatives is influenced by policy making traditions and the 
goals of policy makers, certain themes and policy tools are particularly relevant 
within cluster approaches. This can be illustrated by considering Table 3-4, which 
tabulates some of the different processes that have been used worldwide to develop 
clusters. 
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No matter which policy instruments are utilised, Eklund et al. (2002). from a review 
of Swedish regional cluster initiatives, identify seven general requirements. which 
they see as being necessary for successful cluster development - the presence of 
cluster animators; support for competence and skills development; the availability of 
meeting places; division of labour in cluster development; brand building and a vision 
for the cluster. These aspects will be discussed further in the chapters detailing my 
empirical work, but before drawing some conclusions about what makes the cluster 
policy process distinctive, I want to consider the last stage of my stylised cluster 
policy process - evaluation and policy learning. 
3.5.7 Evaluation and Policy Learning 
The aims of evaluating economic development policy are three fold. They are firstly, 
to assess the efficiency of policy in terms of the operation of delivery mechanisms; 
secondly, to assess the effectiveness in terms of whether policies have had the 
anticipated impact and finally, through assessing the efficiency and effectiveness, to 
enable policy learning via a feedback loop into the policy making process. In 
undertaking an evaluation of any economic development policy there are certain 
generic problems. These include questions of additionality (would the impact have 
been seen anyway? ), displacement and substitution (has the effect been achieved at 
the expense of another area or organisation ineligible for assistance? ), ascertaining the 
counter factual position (what would have happened in the absence of policy? ) and 
considering the multiplier effect of the policy (what are the knock-on effects? ). 
However, there are particular problems with evaluating cluster policy because the 
situation is complicated by firstly, the need to consider the unit of evaluation given 
that benefits should arise at a cluster level, as well as at a firm level, and secondly, the 
need to define success given the focus on `softer' social and institutional measures as 
well as `harder' targets such as job creation. 
Level of analysis. Economic development policy traditionally has a dual purpose - the 
development of individual firms and the development of the region or other territorial 
area under consideration and, not only is the way in which the two are related key. 
(Lagendijk, 1999), but it can be harder to assess the wider benefits than to discern 
advantages for individual businesses (Rosenfeld, 1996a). When using a cluster 
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approach there is a triple focus - the development of the individual businesses, the 
development of the cluster and, as a result, the development of the wider territory-. 
Again this highlights the importance of mapping and analysing and understanding the 
cluster in order to identify the object of the evaluation and illustrates that the lack of 
availability of cluster level statistical information can be problematic, both in 
identifying clusters and in evaluating policies towards them. Additionally the cluster 
is a fluid entity and over time the firms and organisations that comprise the cluster 
will change. Raines and Tsagdis (2002) therefore discuss the notion of `collectives'- 
identifiable groups of interacting actors, and propose that they could be the objects of 
evaluation. 
What is success? Measurables and deliverables. Given that cluster policy is not a 
single instrument, but an amalgam of separate initiatives and regulatory reforms, not 
only is the object of policy and level of analysis hard to define, but also the outcomes 
of cluster policy can be difficult to single out. Cluster policy has wider and more 
intangible objectives than can be captured by traditional indicators of economic policy 
development success. The more intangible objectives may include changed behaviour 
and attitudes of actors within the cluster, and increased levels of innovation. 
Henderson and Morgan (2002) distinguish between linear indicators, which focus on 
`hard' outputs (patents, R&D expenditure, workforce qualifications) and interactive 
indicators, which aim to measure `softer' indicators (institutional linkages, network 
formation, information flows). Despite attempts to develop proxies, such as patenting 
activity and headcounts at network meetings, the more intangible objectives cannot be 
captured by quantitative methods and require in depth qualitative observation and 
analysis (Diez, 1999). Strict targets with measurable indicators are therefore not only 
difficult to identify, but may be counter-productive as they force the pursuit of 
particular targets, which may not have been the most appropriate way to tailor support 
(Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). However, the political reality and funding regimes for 
many cluster initiatives, especially those financed through European structural funds 
programmes, mean that, in many cases, specific targets, including the number of jobs 
created, are imposed. Evaluation is then of an accounting kind to ensure funding has 
been applied correctly. While those given public money must be accountable, this 
focus on short-term measurable achievements may distort project design. 
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Given that I have suggested that cluster policy should be viewed as a process, I would 
argue that the cluster policy process itself, as well as the outcomes, should be 
evaluated. Diez (2001) advocates a holistic approach so that the essence of the cluster 
approach is captured rather than each policy strand being considered in isolation. She 
also points out the highly contextualised nature of cluster policies which are deeply 
rooted in their social and economic environment and calls for these factors to form an 
integral part of the evaluation. 
Raines (2000) suggests a method for evaluating cluster policies by both measuring 
cluster activity (for example, by benchmarking with comparative clusters in terms of 
growth) and also linking cluster activity, particularly that initiated by policy makers, 
with economic development (for example, linking brand building with increased 
export sales). He stresses that, given the resource intensive and expensive nature of 
such detailed evaluations, it is more important to identify positive progress than to be 
able to quantify it. He expands on this in a later paper where he argues that there is a 
need to focus on directionality and sustainability (Raines and Tsagdis, 2002). The 
cluster should be showing progress on many fronts and these improvements should be 
sustainable. Diez (2001) also doubts the applicability of very quantitative, objective 
evaluation arguing that `when attempting to evaluate complex policies involving 
broad interrelated aims, the objective of the evaluation must be to create practical 
knowledge, instead of mechanistic judgements concerning the results' (ibid. p. 918). 
Rosenfeld (1996a) similarly raises the example of the Michigan Modernization 
Service programme of grants for collective activity, which was evaluated not in terms 
of measurable outcomes, but in terms of lessons that could be learned for subsequent 
programmes. 
Diez (2001) argues that not only is the use of qualitative indicators indispensable, but 
also suggests that an assessment of the effects of policies should be obtained from the 
beneficiaries and intermediate organisations involved. She outlines a method of 
participatory evaluation resulting in collective learning for all the actors involved in 
the process and argues that such a participatory approach is a natural extension of the 
idea of involving all stakeholders in the policy making process. That said, Rosenfeld 
(1996a), writing about network programmes amongst SMEs in the United States, 
notes that `network members do not report (or may not even realise) all of the ways in 
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which working more closely with peers affects their operations' (1996a, p. 248). 
Henderson and Morgan (2002) suggest that continued participation may be a mark of 
success for networking programmes and certainly business people are unlikely to 
continue to participate if they do not obtain any benefit from so doing, but the 
effectiveness and value of such participation is harder to measure. Another measure 
would be whether firms had engaged in new, similar, collaborative arrangements. 
Therefore there are particular issues when evaluating cluster policy and there needs to 
be clarity with regards to the unit of analysis or level at which evaluation takes place. 
The many different strands of a cluster policy approach need to be taken into account, 
suggesting a holistic approach to evaluation. Such an approach may necessitate a 
focus on the general progress of the cluster, rather than on strictly quantifiable 
measures. In many cases evaluation frameworks have not been established for cluster 
policies, partly because many such policies are relatively new and experimental. 
However, there is an increasing recognition of the need for appropriate evaluation and 
attempts to design evaluation frameworks and Andersson et al. (2004) point out that 
the actors involved in the cluster policy will have a better sense of direction if the 
evaluation framework has been established in advance. Learmonth et al. (2003) are 
developing, and have documented, the evaluation framework for Scottish Enterprise's 
cluster policy. The evaluation framework will measure the impact of cluster policies 
at the macro, meso and micro (firm) level. It will account for the long timescale over 
which cluster policies have an impact and it will seek to measure tangible and 
intangible outputs. Similarly Pickernell et al. (2005) have documented a multi- 
method framework for understanding, reviewing and monitoring sectors in the Welsh 
economy and Cassidy et al. (2005) have outlined a pilot method of cluster evaluation 
in Canada. 
In the same way as cluster policy should be context dependent, it can be argued that 
cluster policy evaluation must also be context dependent and that `evaluators must use 
the models and techniques that adapt best to each situation' (Diez, 2001, p. 915). 
While this may appear to suggest that `anything goes, it should rather be seen as 
suggesting a new role for evaluation as a participatory process used throughout the 
policy making process as a way of policy learning. rather than as an independent add- 
on at the end of the process. Evaluation should result in a `learning loop so that the 
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results are fed back into the policy making process (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). 
This is particularly important in a policy environment where, as Nauwelaers (2001) 
points out, policy makers are the part of the system they are trying to influence. 
3.6 What's New? 
From these discussions around the rationales for cluster policy, the focus and aims of 
cluster policy and the cluster policy process it can be seen that there are many facets 
to a cluster approach, but what is new? What differentiates a cluster approach? Again 
there is no consensus. 
Some academics see the starting point of a cluster approach as its distinguishing 
feature. Policy makers look to build on available resources and the current 
environment in which firms and organisations operate. Therefore, for Enright (1996), 
it is the indigenous nature of the material policy makers are working with, with an 
emphasis on developing the skills, capabilities and industrial base found in regions. 
For Boekholt and Thuriaux (2000), cluster policy all stems from a view that 
`improving competitiveness or increasing innovation is an interactive process between 
firms and their environment' (ibid. p. 5). Therefore cluster policy is about stimulating 
the links to that environment. This once again highlights the significance of 
understanding and analysing the base from which policies can be developed. 
For others, it is the type of policies that are put into place that distinguish a cluster 
approach as they are both broad and wide ranging, and tend to focus on linkages 
between actors. For Raines (2002) cluster approaches have common themes in the 
role of cooperative behaviour and a multi-faceted approach to policy support. 
Nauwelaers (2001) points to the focus on developing linkages and synergies and Feser 
(1998) notes that one hallmark of a cluster specific approach is that it is holistic in 
nature. 
However, looking at the outcomes of the cluster policy process reveals another aspect 
- the formation of `club goods'. Benneworth et al. (2003) see such assets as defining 
cluster policy, arguing that ` [a] cluster policy can be regarded as any policy which 
seeks to encourage transient relationships to solidify into more tangible and 
sustainable cluster assets' (ibid. p. 518). Lagendijk (2000) defines club goods as 
`assets that are accessible and beneficial to specific groups of businesses and 
organizations in a locality' (2000, p. 174). He goes on to outline particular 
characteristics of `club goods', pointing out that they can be conventional in nature, 
such as a specialised labour market and dedicated infrastructure, but that the key club 
goods are associational in nature and represent relational assets that can `underpin the 
institutional capacity for reflexive and strategic action' (2000, p. 174). These are akin 
to the conventions that Storper (2002) maintains permit coordination amongst 
economic actors (cf. section 3.5.5). Therefore the cluster approach aims for the 
production of cluster specific assets in the form of `club goods', both tangible and 
intangible, outside of individual firms but available to be exploited by actors within 
the cluster, depending on their individual motivations, strategies and capabilities. 
For some it is the policy making process that is distinctive, particularly its 
participatory nature. For Benneworth et al (2003) the difference is the way policy has 
been produced from a two-way dialogue between academic and policy spheres. 
Nauwelaers (2001) notes that cluster policy involves a more interactive way of 
implementing policy and Feser and Luger (2003) also see cluster policy as 
differentiated by a participatory rather than top down policy making process. 
Nauwelaers (2001) also points out that a cluster approach is more than a strategic and 
interactive way of developing policy, it also involves a focus on `orgware', rather than 
hardware and software. 
Therefore it can be argued that, although taking a cluster approach can, and should, 
result in differentiated policies (depending on the context in which the policy is 
designed, the aims and focus of the policy maker and the specific requirements of the 
cluster), the cluster approach is distinctive. A cluster approach is differentiated by its 
starting point which is very much the existing resource base of a territory; by its 
approach which is holistic, inclusive and focused on synergies, and by the intended 
outputs which are cluster specific assets, `club goods', available for exploitation by 
actors within the cluster. 
would argue that the cluster policy-making process set out above provides a 
framework to draw together all these threads. The decision to take a cluster approach 
reflects the policy-making context and the rationale and goals for intervention. The 
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identification, selection and analysis phase clarifies an understanding of a territory's 
economic structure and starts to bring on board actors from within that structure, but 
from outside normal policy making circles. This participatory aspect is continued 
through the participant mobilisation stage, during which a vision for the cluster should 
be agreed. The policy instruments employed are varied and depend on the analysis of 
the needs of the cluster and its developmental stage. Evaluation is of the cluster 
development process, as well as the outcomes, and can be participatory, should be 
ongoing and provides an opportunity for learning in policy circles. 
3.7 A Cluster Approach: Myths and Misunderstandings: Caveats and 
Conclusions 
Therefore I would argue that there is a distinctive cluster approach to policy. 
However, this approach to policy is frequently misunderstood and meets with far from 
universal approval. Having highlighted a number of myths and misunderstandings 
around clusters, we can consider first, the criticisms of those who, while supporting 
the use of the cluster approach in policy, highlight caveats to pursuing such an 
approach, and second, the criticisms of those who challenge the use of clusters in 
policy. 
Drawing on the work of Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (2003) 
and Peneder (1999) it is possible to debunk some myths and misunderstandings about 
cluster policies, as follows: 
A cluster approach is not a specific policy instrument. A range of policy instruments, 
including technology transfer and networking initiatives, can be used to develop firms 
within specific clusters. Most clusters are also affected by other public policies. For 
example, aerospace and marine engineering clusters will be affected by defence 
procurement policies; biotechnology and pharmaceutical clusters will be affected by 
health policies and drug regulation. Therefore the cluster approach is not a specific 
policy instrument; rather a cluster specific approach moderates existing policies 
affecting particular clusters and designs specific initiatives to develop them. 
ll. 
A cluster policy is not a strategy for `picking winners'. Cluster analysis should 
involve a much better understanding of the linkages and synergies between different 
industries and parts of industries. This should enable policy makers to establish 
priorities, to schedule initiatives and in certain cases take action to improve the 
regional economic structure (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999), but should not equate to a 
naive attempt to `pick winners'. 
A cluster policy does not necessarily involve large-scale government schemes. On 
occasions new policy initiatives will not be required at all because cluster policy is 
often about tailoring existing programmes to meet specific cluster needs and 
removing barriers to growth. 
Collaboration is not sufficient to build clusters. In successful clusters, even where 
there is a degree of collaboration, it is not necessarily formal, intentional cooperation. 
Cluster policies often focus on developing cooperative relationships between firms, 
but successful clusters cannot be accounted for on the basis of cooperation alone and 
the development of cooperative relationships, while potentially beneficial, is not 
sufficient for cluster development. 
Cluster policies do not have to be private sector led. Indeed some of the most 
successful clusters have grown out of substantial public investment and procurement 
policies (for example, aerospace clusters). Public sector involvement will vary from 
situations where well-established private sector groupings approach the public sector 
for assistance, to situations where the public sector can identify an emerging cluster, 
but that cluster has little or no identity and the public sector needs to develop 
appropriate policies to achieve a vision for the cluster. 
Not all regions can have multiple clusters although many may have multiple cluster 
development policies. In England, at least eight of the nine Regional Development 
Agencies have at some point identified a business and financial services cluster within 
their region. Given that a cluster should be overly represented in its region and 
significant at least nationally, if not internationally, it is extremely unlikely that so 
many business and financial services clusters exist. However, a policy to promote 
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clustering within business and financial services in each of these regions might prove 
an effective way to provide business support. 
Cluster policies are not just for firms in so-called high technology industries. Many 
policy makers have chosen to focus on new industries based on new technologies but 
many clusters are based around more traditional industries and policy makers should 
consider all clusters, not just those around biotechnology and information and 
communication technologies. 
Held (1996) classifies various potential pitfalls including: 'prescribe but don't 
identify', where cluster type remedies are initiated without cluster analysis: 'identify 
but don't prescribe' where purely quantitative analysis gives little guidance for policy: 
'say cluster but think industry' which involves reverting to more traditional narrow 
sector policies and `only the "classic" cluster will do', where policy makers are only 
interested in clusters dominated by vertical supply chain linkages. Roelandt et al. 
(1999) also highlight that policy makers should not try to create clusters from 
-scratch'; should not try to take a direct lead in cluster initiatives, acting instead as a 
catalyst and broker; should not focus on analysis alone; should not stifle competition 
and should not ignore small and emerging clusters. 
However, the most cautionary note of those opting the `proceed with caution' 
approach regards the way in which clusters have been selected for support. A cluster 
approach should focus on the endogenous potential within a territory and should be an 
individual tailored approach - why then are such similar clusters identified in so many 
locations? Enright (2000) points out that ` [i]t would be particularly ironic if a process 
predicated on the embeddedness of economic activity into local society results in the 
same set of disembodied policies regardless of the local context' (ibid. p. 327). 
There are particular problems for non-core regions in developing cluster strategies. 
Where there are few obvious endogenous strengths it is tempting to aim for clusters 
that are at best a product of wishful thinking. The recommendation is therefore not to 
go for high-tech (in the traditional sense of the word) clusters, for example, 
biotechnology, but rather to look to exploit local university strengths and attract 
compatible R&D inward investment (European Commission, 1999b). Feser (1998) 
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points out the paradox that the traditional goals of regional policy are to reduce 
economic disparities between regions. However, industry clusters are likely to be 
stronger in economically strong regions. If policies encourage the promotion of 
clusters throughout a nation the disparities between regions may therefore increase 
causing further problems for non-core regions. 
Not only should the clusters selected typify the unique strengths of the region but 
policies should consider the dimensions of the cluster and the stage of the cluster and 
look to improve the relevant dimensions considering, not only the areas requiring 
improvement, but also the areas in which policy actions will make a difference. 
Particular attention is required to ensure that clusters are adaptable in the face of 
external changes. Clusters are a product of specific historic development trajectories 
and are path dependent. They therefore may face risks of functional, cognitive and 
political lock-in and decline (Grabher, 1993a). Enright (1996) identifies five failure 
mechanisms from the literature; falling demand for the cluster's products, 
organisational obsolescence, competition, loss of ability to coordinate activities and 
ossification. There is therefore a role for policy in helping clusters to adapt and 
change in the face of external pressures, particularly as too much support for existing 
trade and products can delay a required radical reorientation of a cluster (Boekholt 
and Thuriaux, 1999). The type of innovation encouraged by the learning-by- 
interacting approach fostered in regional clusters is likely to be of an incremental type 
and therefore not only must policy makers ensure that clusters deal with the risks of 
lock-in, they should also encourage them to be open to the sources of radical 
innovation, which are often to be found in universities and research institutes (Asheim 
and Cooke, 1999). 
Other critics are more trenchant in their opposition to a cluster approach. Lovering 
(1999), in criticising the new regionalism, of which cluster policy could be said to be 
a part, argues that such policies are merely tinkering and too insignificant to solve the 
true problems of regions such as Wales. He argues that the whole agenda is being 
driven by policy makers, who are ignoring welfare and macro issues. and is being 
bolstered by the rise of a regional service class and academics chasing research 
contracts. Hudson (1999) also points out the limits to a policy based around 
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'learning'. However, Morgan (1997b) defends the approach as sound in theory and 
worthwhile in practice, if not sufficient. 
Enright (2000), writing about the case of Venezuela, highlights a more serious 
allegation. Particularly with the spread of cluster type approaches to such developing 
countries, there is the possibility that cluster policies will be used, and absorb 
considerable resources, when they are inappropriate because certain skills and basic 
infrastructure are missing. 
Martin and Sunley (2003) see the popularity of clusters in policy terms as a passing 
fashion successfully branded by Porter, `[a]t its best the current policy preoccupation 
with cluster strategies looks like a fad for a fairly imprecise and flexible label for 
differing combinations of measures' (ibid. p. 28). However, they appear to accept 
many of the ideas behind a cluster approach provided they are not harnessed to the 
cluster `brand'. They outline four main varieties of public goods that cluster policy 
seeks to provide; cooperative networks and the facilitation of dialogue between firms 
and other agencies; the collective marketing of an industrial specialism; the provision 
of local services targeted on industry specialisms; the filling of gaps and the 
strengthening of linkages in cluster value chains. They then state: 
It is by no means our intention to argue that all of these measures are, in 
themselves, misguided and of no benefit to local and regional economies. 
However, what is dubious is whether setting and attempting to implement such 
policies within a cluster framework actually improves their effectiveness and 
outcomes. In many cases it appears that the cluster framework is either 
unnecessary or even constraining (2003, p. 24) 
While I would agree that Porter's specific cluster framework may be unnecessary or 
constraining, I would argue that a cluster approach can be beneficial in delivering 
tailored policies through a participatory process predicated on a detailed 
understanding of the local economic (and cultural, social and political) environment. 
Where a cluster -a pronounced and recognisable critical mass of 
firms and associated 
support organisations and research and education establishments exists, that cluster 
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can provide an appropriate scale at which policy makers can intervene to generate 
`talk', which can lead to a tailored programme of policy actions. 
In this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical justifications for taking a cluster 
approach to policy and the pragmatic reasons why the cluster approach has appealed 
to policy makers. I have outlined a cluster policy process involving the decision to 
take a cluster approach; cluster identification, selection and analysis; participant 
mobilisation, cluster animation and relation building; selection and implementation of 
policy instruments; and evaluation and policy learning and illustrated this with 
examples of how cluster policy has been put into practice in different countries. I 
conclude that, while not a policy panacea, a cluster approach to policy can be 
beneficial if properly applied. My empirical work goes on to focus on the cluster 
policy-making process and examines the way in which cluster policies have been 
developed and implemented in the North East of England. I particularly consider the 
impact of the policies on firms and supporting organisations within the marine and 
offshore engineering cluster. This work illustrates the need for cluster policies to be 
context dependent and sensitive to the requirements of individual clusters; highlights 
the role of individual actors and organisations and also demonstrates that issues of 
scale, not only in terms of policy, but also in terms of the cluster itself, are important. 
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4 Research Questions and Methodology 
In the first section of this chapter I want to explain how the findings from the 
literature that I have reviewed in the previous two chapters gives rise to my detailed 
research questions. In the second section, I then want to outline the context in which 
the research came about and in the third section, I want to discuss the methodological 
approach and research design before looking, in the fourth section, at the methods I 
have utilised to answer the research questions. I conclude the chapter by outlining the 
limits of the study and the nature of the results that are set out in the following four 
chapters. 
4.1 Reaching the Research Questions 
In Chapter 2, I concluded that clusters comprise a pronounced and recognisable 
critical mass of firms and any associated support organisations and research and 
education establishments who, by their interactions, create cluster-specific assets. 
These cluster-specific assets are available for exploitation by actors within the cluster, 
depending on the actors' capabilities and strategies. I highlighted that clusters are 
often associated with particular places, but they are not geographically concentrated 
over predetermined scales. The scales at which clusters are concentrated will vary, 
because it is the scale of the interactions within the cluster that determine the 
geographical area of the cluster, rather than any pre-defined geographical limits. 
I have argued that there is no universal model that can account for the origin, 
sustainability, and, in some cases, decline of clusters, but the diverse explanations that 
can be found are all inherently concerned with interactions between actors and the 
cluster specific assets that arise as a result of those interactions. Cluster specific 
assets are of many kinds and range from, at the softer end of the scale, trustful 
relations, untraded interdependencies and collective learning, through intangible 
assets such as the labour market, to more formal assets including specialised training 
providers, research institutes and business support organisations. It should not be 
taken for granted that the cluster specific assets are beneficial. In certain cases the 
interactions within clusters have led to an introverted mindset and the cluster has 
become characterised by a situation of lock-in (Grabher. 1993b). 
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In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that there has been a burgeoning interest in cluster 
concepts in policy circles since the 1990s. The application of cluster concepts has 
ranged from simple renaming of existing policies at one end of the spectrum, to a 
more academically informed approach to policy-making at the other end of the 
spectrum. Again there is no universal model of cluster policy and I have preferred to 
consider a cluster approach as a process including overlapping and continuous stages: 
firstly deciding to take a cluster approach; secondly identification, selection and 
analysis; thirdly the mobilisation of participants, cluster animation and relationship 
building; fourthly design and implementation of policy interventions; and finally 
evaluation and policy learning, with the overall aim of the process being to stimulate 
and facilitate the kinds of processes believed to be occurring within successful 
clusters, in order that cluster specific assets can be generated for the benefit of the 
cluster. Clusters are not necessarily geographically concentrated at a scale that 
mirrors administrative and policy boundaries, but policy tends to apply within those 
boundaries and the assumption tends to be that the wider territory in which the cluster 
is situated will benefit from the cluster's development. 
A key question is therefore whether, and in what way, policy can stimulate and 
facilitate the processes that characterise successful clusters, particularly given that 
most successful clusters have not been subject to cluster development policy, even 
though they may have benefited from government policy in other ways (for example, 
Silicon Valley and defence spending). Because many successful clusters have 
flourished, not due to any form of cluster development policy, but as an unintentional 
side effect of other government policy and expenditure programmes, often 
implemented at a national scale, it is important to consider the impact of other aspects 
of government policy because this can often have a far greater impact on clusters than 
specific cluster development policies. 
Research into cluster policy is particularly appropriate at this time because there is a 
suspicion that cluster policies are not delivering all that they were expected to. I say 
suspicion because, given that cluster policy operates over the long term, the policies 
have often not been in place for sufficiently long to be adequately evaluated. 
Therefore I want to examine empirically the way in which two cluster policies were 
developed and implemented to consider how particular understandings. or indeed a 
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lack of understanding, of the processes occurring within clusters impact upon the 
outcomes of cluster policy. I want to consider the cluster policy process, including 
the context in which the policies were designed, and also to examine the way in which 
the implementation of the policy has impacted upon individual clusters. In doing so I 
want to achieve a deep understanding of the policies and to consider how the impact 
of the cluster policy is not only affected by the context in which it is designed and the 
process by which it is designed, but also to examine how the impact of policy is 
partially determined by particularities within the cluster. While there has been 
research into individual cluster policy initiatives (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999, 
Gilsing, 2001, Lundequist and Power, 2002) and comparative studies of cluster policy 
initiatives across different countries (Raines, 2002), little research has been conducted 
into the coordination of different scales of cluster policies (Brown, 2000b) and there 
are many unanswered questions in this respect. Therefore rather than singling out an 
individual policy, I wanted to look at two policy initiatives, designed at different 
levels of government, that have had an impact in the North East of England. I have 
therefore looked at the development of regional cluster policy (Chapter 5) and the 
development of a local authority cluster initiative (Chapter 7). To consider the 
outcomes of policy I have examined the impact of policies on the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster. 
As discussed above, to understand the impact of the policy it is necessary to 
understand the cluster that the policy is intended to develop. In seeking to gain an 
understanding of how firms and organisations, in particular those within the marine 
and offshore engineering cluster, have been affected by the two cluster policy 
initiatives in the North East of England, I have attempted to identify the nature of 
interactions within that cluster and the scale at which they occur and to examine the 
role of institutions, particularly in the form of formal organisations. 
By examining the design and implementation of two cluster policies from 
initiation 
through to the impact on the firms and organisations, this work should advance our 
understanding of the cluster policy-making process and enable policy-making lessons 
to be drawn. 
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The specific research questions I have sought to address are: 
How has the cluster policy that impacts upon the North East of England been 
developed? What are the antecedents of the current policies and what is the polic)-- 
making background? What is the cultural, social and economic context in which the 
policies were designed? What are the rationales for adopting a cluster approach? 
What are the aims of the individual cluster policy approaches? At what scales is 
cluster policy developed? How are different policies coordinated? Using the model of 
the cluster policy process outlined in section 3.5 - What analysis was undertaken? 
What clusters were identified? How were clusters for support selected? How was 
consensus built and participants mobilised? Was a more participatory method of 
policy-making encouraged? What policy measures were introduced? What was the 
focus of the policy measures? How were policies tailored to individual clusters? 
What is the role of the public sector and of the private sector? How is the policy 
evaluated? 
How has cluster policy impacted on the marine and offshore engineering cluster 
in the North East of England? What is the composition of the cluster, if indeed it 
can be classed as a cluster at all? What are the interactions between actors? What 
clustering activities and organisations have arisen either as a result of policy 
initiatives or in the absence of policy initiatives? What obstacles have been 
encountered in developing cluster policies for these clusters? How do the actors 
within the cluster perceive the cluster policy approach? To what extent have cluster 
policies facilitated and stimulated the processes taken to characterise successful 
clusters, such as trustful relationships? What cluster assets that have arisen and how 
are they valued by the firms involved? What other policies have impacted upon the 
clusters? 
What lessons can be learned? What can be learnt from studying the impact of 
different cluster policies on two clusters in the North East of England? What does 
this study tell us about the usefulness and -fit' of different concepts employed to 
explain clusters and cluster policy? What does this tell us about the scale at which 
clusters and clustering operate and what does it tell us about the coordination between 
different scales of cluster policy-making? To what extent has a cluster approach 
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contributed to business and regional development? To what extent can difficulties in 
implementing cluster policies be accounted for by the circumstances of individual 
clusters and to what extent can difficulties in implementing cluster policies be 
accounted for by a lack of understanding of the processes occurring within clusters? 
Can the processes of the type occurring within successful clusters be stimulated b`- 
policy-makers or do policy-makers need to adapt to a different kind of policy 
approach? 
4.2 The Background to the Research Project 
This research project was developed by the Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies (CURDS) at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and the 
Regional Service for Clustering, as an Economic and Social Research Council CASE 
collaborative studentship. The staff of the Regional Service for Clustering, a small 
project promoting clustering, whose development will be outlined in Chapter 7, had 
an ongoing dialogue with CURDS and were keen to part-fund a PhD studentship in 
order to provide them with a reflective view on their activities. Previous academic 
research in which they had participated had provided an independent and rigorous 
input to their thinking and they valued academic research as a way of linking them 
into debates about alternative approaches to economic development. 
The Economic and Social Research Council funds collaborative studentships as one 
way of promoting and supporting successful social science research collaboration 
between industry and academia. The ESRC recognises that such collaboration brings 
its own particular issues, particular for PhD research, and has published advice in this 
respect (Bell and Read, 1998). Some of these issues relate to negotiations regarding 
the establishment of the studentship (for example, identifying a research need in the 
non-academic organisation that can provide a three year PhD project), but I want to 
concentrate on issues that can arise once the project is up and running. 
Some of the particular issues that arise with CASE studentships are, firstly, that there 
are requirements for the student to establish a sound working relationship with the 
non-academic partner, as well as their academic supervisor. Secondly. there can be 
conflicts between the expectations of a PhD project and the expectations of the non- 
academic partner, who is contributing financially, both to the student and the 
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university. These conflicts can be resolved by strictly defining the research project 
before recruiting the student, but this in turn can appear constraining for the student. 
Thirdly, issues can arise if there are changes of policy and personnel at the partner 
organisation. 
In terms of establishing a relationship with the non-academic partner I was fortunate 
to be made very welcome by the RSC. Some of the staff, including my non-academic 
supervisor, had, as mentioned above, already been involved in research projects 
conducted with my department and there was a positive attitude towards collaborative 
research. There were only five staff at the RSC when my studentship was arranged, 
although two new members of staff started as my studentship commenced. This 
meant that all the staff were immediately aware of my research. I was given my own 
desk and complete access to any files, computer or paper, which I required. From an 
early stage I was included in social events and generally encouraged to feel part of the 
team. This inclusion was to bring its own issues, which I will explore later, but 
provided a pleasant initial backdrop to conducting the research. 
The starting point for the research was constrained by the collaborative nature of the 
research. It had already been decided that the research would start with a case study 
of the organisation itself. The initial expectation was that comparative case studies of 
similar organisations worldwide would then be undertaken. However, a series of 
events and developments led to the research design being revised and consequently 
the research questions detailed in section 4.1 were arrived at. This was because, as I 
reviewed the literature on clusters, it became apparent that there were interesting 
questions around the geographical scale at which clusters and cluster policies operate. 
This is not to say that I fell into the trap, highlighted by the ESRC guidelines (Bell 
and Read, 1998), of being side tracked into changing the scope of the project on 
purely academic grounds. Cluster policy was being developed by the Regional 
Development Agency at the time my studentship commenced and the RSC, which had 
begun as a stand-alone policy experiment, was seeking to find a place as cluster 
policy moved into the mainstream. Therefore research that would contribute to an 
understanding of cluster policy at different scales was apposite to the organisation. 
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There were subsequently several changes of leadership at the RSC. These were 
difficult times for the RSC, and for a short period of time the situation was so 
unsettled that, although the issues arising were entirely unrelated to my research. I 
lessened my involvement with the organisation. Once matters had been resolved, and 
I had returned from a year's maternity leave, the priorities and personnel at the 
organisation had changed and, although I was still given all the access that I required 
and always made welcome by all the staff, the original project, to compare the RSC 
with similar organisations worldwide, had lost priority and a different research design. 
outlined below, was developed. 
4.3 The Research Design 
Hoggart et al. (2002) suggest that we ask three questions of the research design - is it 
`credible (capable of providing convincing conclusions), directed (targeted at the 
question in hand) and feasible (given cost and time constraints)' (ibid. p. 50, italics in 
the original). My specific research design has evolved and was initially directed by 
the RSC, but it was always going to take the form of a multiple case study approach. 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context (Yin, 1993). A case study design is appropriate for 
answering `how' and `why' type questions, rather than a survey type approach which 
looks for answers to the puzzles `who', `what', `where', `how many' and `how much' 
(Yin, 1994). 
The selection of cases was initially influenced by the pre-selection of the RSC as a 
case study of a local level cluster policy initiative (case study lb). In order to 
compare the RSC approach, operating at a local scale, with an alternative approach 
conducted at a regional scale, the local Regional Development Agency, One 
NorthEast was selected as a case of cluster policy-making at a regional level (case 
study 1 a). The national level was also examined but, for reasons that will be outlined 
in section 5.1.2, a full case study at a national level was not appropriate. 
In developing the proposal for the CASE studentship it had always been the intention 
to study the micro clusters facilitated by the RSC and, given my second research 
question regarding the impact of cluster policy on the firms and organisations Within 
clusters, it appeared appropriate to identify a micro cluster within an area of economic 
125 
activity where a larger regional cluster could be identified. This would permit me to 
examine whether, and how, interactions within the cluster varied depending on 
geographical scale and to consider the role of policy enacted at varying scales. 
Peck (2003) suggests that cases be selected for their explanatory power. The selection 
of marine and offshore engineering as the regional cluster (case study 2a) to study 
was, to an extent, pragmatic. Argonautics (case study 2b), a marine technology 
cluster, was one of the earliest examples of a micro cluster facilitated by the RSC. 
My literature review had highlighted the time taken for relational assets to develop, 
and the length of time for which Argonautics had existed enabled me to analyse the 
development of relationships over time. Also, as I conducted the interviews with the 
firms within Argonautics, it became apparent that there was a wealth of material. The 
marine and offshore industries, in which Argonautics was involved, had traditionally 
been associated with the North East of England and, although these industries were 
not consistently named as a cluster to be supported within the cluster development 
programme of the regional development agency, they were affected by regional policy 
and embodied a complex institutional framework, again providing a rich depth of 
material. 
Rodriguez-Pose (2001) calls for an expansion in the number of cases and for those 
cases to be conducted in a more systematic way. Similarly Markusen (2003) favours 
large comparative research projects, but such projects are not practical for PhD 
research. The research detailed in this thesis could be expanded to cover other 
clusters in the North East of England or it could compare the experience of regions 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom, or internationally, with the experience of the North 
East, but, for the purpose of this thesis, the research is limited to considering in depth 
the development of two cluster policy initiatives within one region and the impact of 
those initiatives within one cluster in that region. 
Although a case study approach was obligatory, it was also appropriate. Case study 
research is a form of intensive research. Extensive research is capable of revealing 
patterns whereas intensive research is more likely to unearth causal processes (Crang, 
2002). As Lagendijk (2003) suggests, 'actual research on regional development 
requires insights into how, in particular places, a multitude of forces, factors and 
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actors produce specific outcomes, that are beyond the reach of model-based 
approaches' (ibid. p. 725). My framework for understanding clusters has highlighted 
the importance of such forces, factors and actors in the forms of untraded 
interdependencies, relational assets, collective learning and social capital, and the 
economic, cultural and social context in which these factors are played out. These 
factors and their context, I would argue, can only be accessed through intensive, 
qualitative methods. 
Malmberg and Maskell (2002) point to the difficulty of empirically validating these 
intangible factors and acknowledge that, although much effort has gone into 
researching clusters in the past decade, the causes and effects of spatial clustering 
remain `elusive'. They highlight major shortcomings in existing research on spatial 
clustering, particularly a lack of systematic attempts to assess empirically the precise 
mechanisms behind and the magnitude of localisation economies. They attribute this 
in part to clusters being a relatively new, or newly rediscovered line of research and 
partly to the fact that empirical testing requires a level of simplification that would be 
unacceptable to those seeking a deep understanding of the operation of clusters. They 
also criticise the case study approach in so far as it has a bias to success stories; a 
tendency to static research design and an inability to support the main theoretical 
argument, that localisation economies exist - in most research they remain `elusive'. 
While, as detailed above, my research necessarily took a case study approach, I have 
attempted to avoid the pitfalls outlined by Malmberg and Maskell (2002) by 
concentrating on industries that would not fall into the normal definition of `high- 
tech', in a region that would not be categorised as successful. I have attempted a 
more dynamic research design, avoiding a very narrow snapshot approach, by trying 
to obtain a historical perspective and by conducting interviews over a three and a half 
year period. I have also tried to obtain an understanding of those horizontal relations. 
which are not necessarily of a collaborative nature and are not easily observable, as 
well as the vertical relations and collaborative horizontal relationships, which are 
more visible. The research design, summarised in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 was 
developed in order to identify key actors, organisations, and locations and meeting 
places and I have tried to trace the relationships between them in order to understand 
the heterogeneous networks from which clusters are comprised (cf. Yeung, 2003. 
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pp. 449-450) and which policy should influence. This thesis might therefore be seen 
as a part of an increasing trend to relational economic geography. 
4.4 Methodological Debate in Economic Geography: The Need for a Relational 
Turn? 
A relational `turn' or approach to economic geography (Bathelt and Glückler. 2003, 
Boggs and Rantisi, 2003) has developed from an ongoing debate over how to 
understand economic activity and how to account for the social context in which 
economic activity takes place. 
Some are concerned that while the `cultural turn', which is seen to have arisen as a 
reaction to dissatisfaction with the formal mathematical modelling that dominated the 
discipline of geography for a time, represents the important recognition of cultural, 
social and institutional processes in economic life, it actually represents too great a 
move to social and cultural explanation, at the expense of the economic and that this 
carries `the danger of reducing economic geography to superficial "storytelling" 
reliant on a trendy and fast-moving jargon that constantly evades any rigorous 
evaluation' (Martin and Sunley 2001a, p. 149). There are related debates around the 
issue of the policy relevance, or otherwise, of the work of economic geographers 
(Martin, 1999b; Peck, 1999, Pollard et al., 2000, Henry et al., 2001, Yeung, 2001, 
Martin, 2001) and standards of research (Markusen, 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2001 a, 
Grabher and Hassink, 2003). Martin and Sunley (2001a) welcome `a 
multiperspectival economic geography that gives due weight to the socio- 
institutional-cultural context and dimensions of economic life' (2001, p. 152), but 
accuse `new' (cultural) economic geographers of having vague theory and thin 
empirics. They call for `detailed, carefully formulated, and empirically testable 
theoretical frameworks in which structural causes are assigned a key explanatory role' 
and suggest that, in the place of such detailed frameworks, theory is based on ill- 
defined concepts and fuzzy metaphors or highly jargonised `discourses' from cultural 
or social theory, which, as Lagendijk (2003) also suggests, ignore criticisms and 
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debates in the home field. However, as Yeung (2003) concludes, `the context of 
economic action becomes a critical component in any economic-geographical 
explanation. As the discursive plurality of social actors increasingly shapes this 
context, it is highly difficult to determine the exact causality of economic action' 
(ibid. p. 445). 
For Yeung, the methodological issues and `practicalities of what it means to `do' new 
economic geographies are still unclear and remain underdeveloped' (2003, p. 442). 
For Yeung the key features of new economic geographies are an understanding of the 
social embeddedness of economic action, mapping shifting identities of economic 
actors, and exploring the role of context in explaining economic behaviour. This 
stress on context and multiple identities avoids the determinism associated with both 
positivism and Marxism, but complicates the methodological challenge of `doing' 
new economic geographies. 
For Boggs and Rantisi (2003) and Bathelt and Glückler (2003) what is required is a 
relational approach to economic geography. Ettlinger (2001), in arguing, from a post 
feminist perspective, for a research agenda that includes `people', concludes that `a 
relational perspective suggests connecting culturally and economically focused 
research' (ibid. p. 217). What is important is that a relational approach allows that 
`actors, their inter-relations and consequent practices themselves carry explanatory 
weight' (Boggs and Rantisi, 2003, p. 111). This is not to discard structural 
approaches entirely, in favour of agency; actors are `still viewed as operating within a 
context of institutions, norms and rules which condition their choices and relations' 
(ibid. p. I 11). In studying clusters and cluster policy, the actors include the firms, 
individuals within the firms, policy-makers, cluster organisations and individuals 
within cluster organisations and more importantly the relations and interactions 
between them, as Boggs and Rantisi explain `[rjelational geographers do not resort to 
methodological individualism by viewing actors as atomistic units. Rather, they view 
actors as interdependent subjects whose identities and resource capabilities i. e. the 
very assets that enable them to act - are co-constituted by their relations with other 
actors' (2003', p. 112). Studying relations and `relational proximity' also avoids 
elevating the role of geographical scale to prime importance by considering 'relational 
proximity' to be equally as important as geographical proximity'. 
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A relational approach is not new, both Ettlinger (2001) and Yeung (2005) point out its 
antecedents, and Yeung (2005) calls for further theorisation as to the causal nature of 
relationality and power relations and concludes that much recent work of a relational 
nature is relational in a thematic sense only. However, a relational approach appears 
to offer a `mid range' theoretical theme (Yeung, 2005, p. 39), avoiding the extremes of 
both structural determinism and anti-essentialism. 
I now want to turn to the methods I employed to study the relations within clusters, 
the impact of policy and the cluster specific assets that arose from those relations and 
from policy interventions. 
4.5 Methods 
`Data are not "out there" waiting collection, like so many rubbish bags on the 
pavement' (Dey 1993, p. 15, quoted in Hoggart et al. 2002). My three main methods 
for collecting data were: interviews to trace and understand the actor networks' 
through which clusters operate; participant observation; and analysis of 
documentation. In section 4.4 1 mentioned the debate about standards of research in 
new economic geography. Markusen (1999) criticises `fuzzy concepts and scanty 
evidence' and ties these into the debate about policy distance. Markusen's article was 
the subject of a debate on the SECONS (Socio-economics of Space) Discussion 
Forum (www. guib. uni-bonn. de/grabher/) and the articles from the forum, along with a 
rejoinder from Markusen, were then featured in an edition of Regional Studies 
(Grabher and Hassink, 2003, Hudson, 2003, Lagendijk, 2003, Peck, 2003, Markusen, 
2003). I have attempted to detail my conceptualisation of clusters in Chapter 2 in a 
way that views clusters as a framework against which different explanations and 
theories can be considered and applied. My research intends to be policy relevant by 
the very nature of its subject matter, not that policy relevance should be the yardstick 
for judging the merit of economic geography research, but now I want to look at the 
nature of evidence in my research, in part drawing on the Markusen debate. 
8 Yeung distinguishes between the methodological implications of researching actor networks from the 
epistemological claims of actor network theory. Here I am referring to the methodological practice of 
tracing actor networks as a way of understanding how they influence the operation of clusters. 
1.3) 2 
Yeung (2003) considers a range of research practices and assesses them against the 
criteria of validity, reliability, and reflexivity both within neoclassical economic 
geography and new economic geographies and tabulates the results (see Table 4-3 
below). The validity, reliability and reflexivity of research methods depend on both 
the research objectives, and epistemological and ontological opinions. Yeung outlines 
that neoclassical economic geography has as its goal the explanation of spatial 
patterns and processes of economic activities. It adopted a quantitative methodology, 
testing hypotheses and models against survey data and government data sets with a 
key presumption that `the causality of empirically observable outcomes can be 
identified and measured, and no external influence on this causality can be found' 
(Yeung, 2003, p. 447). Such a methodology meets scientific standards of objectivity, 
reliability and validity. However, if we do not accept the premise that economic 
processes are empirically observable, it is not a suitable methodology and it does not 
provide a method of studying the actions of individual actors within their particular 
setting. Because I accept the highly complex nature of economic life and the role of 
multiple actors and their interactions in constructing clusters, my research practices 
are related to the last three of Yeung's categories (tracing actor networks, in situ 
research, abstraction and deconstruction). 
Table 4-3 The Validity, Reliability and Reflexivity of Research Practices in Economic Geography 
Validity in Explanation Reliability of data Reflexivity of Approach 
Research Neoclassical New Neoclassical New Neoclassical New 
Practices Economic Economic Economic Economic Economic Economic 
Geography Geographies Geography Geographies Geography Geographies 
Using Strong Weak Strong Ambiguous Irrelevant Weak 
quantitative and 
secondary data 
Tracing actor Weak Strong Weak Ambiguous Irrelevant Strong 
networks 
In situ research Ambiguous Strong Ambiguous Strong Irrelevant Strong 
Abstraction and Irrelevant Strong Irrelevant Good Irrelevant Strong 
deconstruction 
Source: )'eung (2003) 
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I will return later to the specific strategies I employed to demonstrate validity. 
reliability and reflexivity but in the meantime the use of each of my three methods 
raises substantive issues. 
4.5.1 Interviews 
In-depth interviews, or as Clark (1998) terms them, `close dialogues', are time- 
consuming and labour-intensive but enable the exploration of issues of complexity in 
a depth that could not be achieved with a survey. Neither postal surveys nor even the 
personal administration of a standard questionnaire allow elaboration of answers. 
There is of course no guarantee of who answers a postal questionnaire (Healey and 
Rawlinson, 1993). Poor response rates can also be a feature (Curran and Blackburn, 
1994). Even a standardized interview does not guarantee consistency because the 
meaning of language will differ amongst respondents (Healey and Rawlinson, 1993). 
Much of my data collection was therefore by way of semi-structured interviews. This 
method is not without critics and Cochrane (1998) questions whether it is really 
`enough simply to buy a tape recorder, invest in a suit and tie or a smart dress, write 
some letters, prepare a semi-structured questionnaire and seek out some research 
subjects' (ibid. p. 2123). However, I maintain that an understanding of the 
relationships and interactions occurring within clusters, the developing of policy, and 
the interface between policy and clusters can best be obtained by talking to those 
involved in those relationships, interactions and development. Ethnography would be 
an alternate approach, and elements of my research at the RSC were, to an extent, 
ethnographic and based on participant observation. However, it would have been 
impractical to try to gain the level of access to the clusters, or other cluster 
organisations and policy-makers, required for ethnographic approaches given the 
timescale of the project and the range of relationships I was attempting to explore. 
Selection of interview respondents 
Markusen (1994) calculates that a two-hour interview involves an additional ten hours 
work in initiation, preparation, transcription, analysis and write up. I was seeking to 
interview, not only the owners/managers of firms, but also policy-makers at different 
geographic scales; university officials involved in clusters and cluster policy: 
13ý 
representatives of cluster organisations; staff of business support organisations and 
trade union officials. Time considerations meant careful selection of potential 
interviewees. 
Patton (1990) distinguishes between random sampling, which seeks to achieve 
statistical representativeness, and purposeful sampling, which seeks out information 
rich cases. My choice was purposeful sampling. Markusen (1994) accepts that 
purposeful selection of interviewees is acceptable, providing the process is 
acknowledged and explained. I used various methods to identify the kinds of 
respondents identified in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2. 
For case study 1 a, looking at the development of cluster policy in One NorthEast, I 
sought to identify individuals at the agency who were involved, or had been involved 
in the development of cluster policy. Given my understanding that the development 
of cluster policy is highly context dependent I also interviewed individuals from the 
agency who had worked on the policies that had preceded cluster policy. I also 
interviewed individuals in the region who were considered to be knowledgeable with 
regard to regional development policy. These individuals were initially identified 
with the assistance of my supervisor. 
For case study lb, the development of the Regional Service for Clustering, I 
interviewed current and former members of staff. I also interviewed 28 of their 
clients in order to understand the way the service had developed and to ascertain the 
impact of the service provided to them. I also interviewed representatives from 
organisations that provided funding to the Regional Service for Clustering, again to 
understand the context in which the initiative had developed. 
When it came to identifying actors in the wider regional cluster for case study 2a, the 
impact of cluster policy on the marine and offshore industries in the North East of 
England, the interview respondents were not so obvious. I was trying to trace the 
networks and linkages that exist within those industries and one tactic was to use a 
snowball approach. I would try to identify an initial key actor from the background 
information I had. When meeting them I would try and identify the networks in 
which they operated and the circles in which they moved and then I would try and 
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meet the actors (other firms and organisations) they mentioned as significant. When 
selecting particular informants within firms the researcher is faced with difficulties if 
the firm is large. Most of the firms I interviewed were relatively small (less than ten 
employees) and the target to interview was straightforward. In other cases I 
interviewed at managing director level because I was looking at the overall impact of 
the cluster and cluster policy, rather than having a focus on any one aspect such as 
skills and training, for example. For case study 2b, Argonautics it was a 
straightforward process to identify the firms as the micro clusters facilitated by the 
RSC have a formal membership and I interviewed representatives of member firms as 
well as representatives of firms that had left the microcluster. I also was able to speak 
to members of RSC staff about their involvement with Argonautics. 
The size of sample required is not easy to ascertain. My plan was to involve as many 
people as possible until I reached `saturation' and no new themes emerged, or given 
the time limits present for most research, I ran out of time. Snowball sampling can 
lead to biases, which must be recognised, and in order to alleviate this I did try and 
obtain a wide range of points of view, by speaking to former members of micro- 
clusters and retired heads of cluster organisations as well as current members. I also 
sought a historical context by talking to people who had been involved early on in the 
development of policy and initiatives. In addition to relying on recommendations 
from other interviewees in the `snowball' approach mentioned above, I also identified 
`target' firms from the membership lists of various cluster organisations and where 
possible identified firms with multiple memberships, feeling that this would enable 
them to comment on a range of initiatives. This sampling inevitably leads to a bias 
towards those firms who have been involved in cluster policy initiatives and excludes 
those firms who have not engaged in policy initiatives but, given the focus on the 
interaction between cluster policy and clusters, I maintain that this bias is justifiable, 
but it must be recalled in reading the research. 
Arranging interviews 
I therefore had very specific 'targets' to interview and would need to arrange specific 
meetings with them. As Mullings (1999) points out, you are unlikely to come across 
these people accidentally and whether you achieve access to them is highly dependent 
on how you approach them. She also questions whether, and how, the strategies used 
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to encourage respondents to participate in research impacts on the information 
revealed. 
In most cases I did write a letter, very briefly explaining my research, and then 
followed that up with a telephone call. I always used headed note paper from my 
university department, which is well known in the locality, and usually mentioned my 
Economic and Social Research Council Funding in an attempt to provide credibility 
for my research. I used various strategies in the letters to obtain interviews. While I 
accept that it may have given a particular impression of how my research was 
developing, I did on occasion mention the names of other people I had seen. The 
wording of my letters also changed depending on the recipient. `Clusters' is not a 
universally popular word in the business community and on occasion I consciously 
avoided using the term. Most people I approached were willing to be interviewed. 
On occasion the response was surprisingly quick. The owner of a local shipyard 
telephoned me personally on receipt of the letter to arrange a meeting the following 
day. Other meetings required much more perseverance -a letter written in September 
2004 resulted in a meeting in March 2005. Another strategy I employed was to try to 
meet potential respondents at other events and functions and obtain their agreement to 
a meeting in due course. All of this came fairly naturally to me having previously 
worked in business development for a bank. 
I should distinguish here between those interviews that were with `clients' of the RSC 
and those that were not. Macmillan and Scott (2003) highlight a particular question 
that arises when contacting potential research subjects during collaborative research. 
Do we stress our identity as being associated with our university or with the 
collaborating organisation? This was an issue in both my research into the Regional 
Service for Clustering and Argonautics (case studies 2a and 2b). I never used RSC 
headed paper and, although I did mention that the. RSC were part funding my research 
when I was approaching their clients, I stressed my independence and willingness to 
keep their views confidential. On occasions I would ask the RSC to telephone a client 
to mention that I would be contacting them. However, I found a useful alternative 
was to approach people at functions arranged by the RSC so that I could introduce 
mv, self rather than relying on the RSC to do so. 
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Ward and Jones (1999) remind us of the need to consider the time specific nature of 
the interview process, particularly in terms of influencing access to organisations. 
One manifestation of this is that access, particularly to politically sensitive 
institutions, may be restricted at times of political sensitivity. We should also 
consider that `the personnel that make-up a locality's elite are likely to be open to 
regular change'(Ward and Jones, 1999, p. 308). There was certainly a great deal of 
change in personnel in the policy-making community during the course of my 
research and this complicated matters, particularly with regard to my case study of 
One NorthEast (case study 1 a), because each incoming individual impacted on the 
policy of the organisations. 
Once interviews were scheduled they usually took place as planned and where they 
were rearranged it was usually by policy-makers not by firm owners. 
Recording the data 
On most occasions I asked to tape the meeting. On occasions this was impractical 
(see below), on a very few occasions it was refused and on two occasions I did not 
even ask - once because I was under the, mistaken, impression that the meeting was 
only to provide me with the names of other people to speak to and once because a 
colleague had recently been refused permission by the same individual and it would 
have seemed ill-informed to ask again. When I was taping interviews I still took 
notes for back up purpose and when I knew the meeting was not being recorded I took 
more detailed notes, although I could never attempt to write down verbatim what was 
said. 
The interview journey 
Sabot (1999) uses Kvale's (1996) metaphors of the interviewer as a miner or traveller. 
For Kvale (1996), the miner `digs nuggets of data or meanings out of a subject's pure 
experiences, unpolluted by any leading questions' whereas the traveller `wanders 
along with local inhabitants, asks questions that lead the subjects to tell their own 
stories of their lived world. and converses with them' (Kvale 1996, p. 3. quoted in 
Sabot 1999. p. 329). Like Sabot, I chose the traveller approach, attempting to 
construct understanding from conversations. I used a checklist (appendix A) to guide 
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these conversations, although as I 'journeyed' and my understanding grew-. this 
checklist changed from being a detailed list of questions and themes, to a list of key 
words. The initial questions were always very general to ensure that the interview did 
not progress down a predetermined path. A general, non- exacting start also puts the 
interviewee at ease and encourages trustful dialogue. The initial topic guide was 
developed with feedback from staff members at the RSC and other researchers. I 
tried to avoid framing my questions in such a way that would prejudge and lead 
responses to support a particular theoretical line and I also included a very general 
question at the end of the interview so that any issues that I missed, but which may 
have been significant for respondents, could be raised. I tried to avoid using language 
that, while widely used in the academic community, is alien in the business 
community. 
I let conversations develop in an open-ended way, not shutting off respondents' 
detours. That said the interview is often a `one-off , and time limited, chance to elicit 
information and too much deviation from the planned topics could leave particular 
issues uncovered. Often my interviews took much longer than I had expected (up to 
2'/2 hours) but where they were strictly time constrained (fortunately rarely) I did, on 
occasion, feel I had left paths unexplored. Schoenberger (1991) discusses the issue of 
control, suggesting that in corporate interviews the respondent is often used to 
exerting control but suggesting that it would be a mistake for the researcher to try to 
impose `military discipline' and suggests in place of either extreme, `a collaborative 
dialogue' (ibid., p. 182). 
This approach would be anathema to those of a positivist persuasion as it implies a 
lack of consistency and neutrality, but I maintain that interviewing is a dynamic social 
process and that my research project had more to gain from the insights achieved by 
attempting to build up rapport with interviewees than is lost due to any perceived lack 
of neutrality and consistency (cf. Hoggart et al. 2002, p227). 
In an article on researching embeddedness, Oinäs (1999) raises three important issues 
that are relevant to conducting interviews and to my research on clusters. Firstly there 
is a need to create an atmosphere in which trustful dialogue can take place. Secondly 
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there is a need to engage the respondent and thirdly there is a need to consider silence 
as well as voice. Each of these is examined below. 
Getting Started: creating the atmosphere. The interviewer has to create an 
atmosphere in which a trustful dialogue can take place. Some of this work has been 
done, as mentioned above, by establishing some credentials prior to the meeting (the 
status of my department, the nature of the funding, other people who have devoted 
time to the project) and also by opening the dialogue with very general questions. 
Oinäs also mentions the need for appropriate appearance and behaviour. Undoubtedly 
there is more to interviewing than the smart suit, but appearance, in the form of attire 
and body language, is part of the context in which the interview takes place, and my 
background experience of interviewing company owners and managers, gained during 
previous employment, gave me some confidence in this respect. In introducing myself 
and in conducting the conversation, I took a `modest' approach to my level of 
knowledge. Being female may have actually helped; the, predominantly male, 
respondents did not necessarily expect me to know a great deal about marine 
engineering or offshore technologies. I believe that showing a willingness to learn 
from the specific experiences of those I interviewed encouraged them to be more 
forthcoming. However, in an attempt to establish myself as a `temporary insider' 
(Mullings, 1999), and win respect from respondents, I did attempt to show a 
reasonable level of background information on the industry. 
Engaging the Interviewee. Having established an appropriate atmosphere for 
dialogue we come to a second and more important point raised by Oinäs- an 
academic researcher trying to gain insight into concepts such as embeddedness or, in 
my case, concepts including social capital, untraded interdependencies, relational 
assets and collective learning, has to engage the interviewee and `translate academic 
terminology into questions that interest managers from the perspective of their life 
and work' (Oinäs, 1999, p. 356). As Malmberg and Maskell (2002) highlight. these 
intangible concepts can be `elusive'. I talked with interviewees about their day-to-day 
activities, relationships with other firms and organisations, the ways in which the 
relationships that arose through the cluster impacted upon them and their engagement 
with cluster policy. I also explored how their activities with firms within the cluster 
differed from activities with firms outside the cluster. Therefore, rather than asking 
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directly about academic concepts which would not have engaged them, I sought to 
hear how they benefited from the cluster in practice. 
The problem of silence and multivoicedness. Oinäs mentions a third issue - the 
problem of silence and multivoicedness. What is not uttered can be as significant as 
what is uttered. She identifies different forms of silence from both researcher and 
respondent. As researchers we may choose to remain silent about particular views we 
have or about particular aspects of our identity (Mullings 1999). We may remain 
silent because we are unable to articulate in appropriate language the concepts we 
seek to uncover. Respondents may remain silent because they are being asked to 
speak about issues outside the range of matters they usually confront or they may 
chose to remain silent because they are unwilling to comment. I found that an 
awareness of issues where respondents might be unwilling to comment was useful and 
careful analysis of transcripts after the event can be helpful in identifying silences, 
although, as Oinäs points out, by that time it is often too late to uncover what was 
hidden in that silence. I may just have to accept that material may be intentionally 
withheld and I will never know what kinds of information I am missing 
(Schoenberger, 1992). 
Respondents also speak with multiple voices, reflecting their multiple roles and the 
complicated context in which their opinions are formed. In my research I needed to 
be aware of whether respondents were speaking as members of a `micro-cluster', or 
were seeking to represent the views of the wider regional cluster, or were defending a 
particular cluster organisation, or were solely representing the views of their firm. 
With policy-makers again it was significant to distinguish whether individuals were 
expressing the `the party line' of their organisation or a more personal view. People 
did voice strong opinions, only very rarely requesting that those were not recorded. 
Power relations 
Power relations are rightly considered to be an issue in interviewing. As mentioned 
above, power is often held to lie with the interviewer. but in interviewing business 
owners this is not clear-cut. I was very aware of differing agendas. Business owners 
and policy -makers may have their own agendas and a vested 
interest in presenting 
their organisation in a favourable light. The RSC is a grant giving 
body, so I tried to 
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avoid interviewing firms during the period of time that their grant applications were 
under consideration (Schoenberger, 1991). In other cases I tried to remain very aware 
of interviewees' potential agendas and tried to corroborate their opinions against those 
expressed by others. 
The issue of multivoicedness and silence, and power relations are related to the need 
to question the reliability of informants (Cochrane 1998). Reliability may be an issue 
of conscious and subconscious decisions about what to reveal. I did conduct as many 
interviews as possible to corroborate what different individuals said or to identify 
conflicts and silences. During my interviews there was no evidence of unreliable 
`factual' information. Different respondents, particularly within the micro clusters, 
expressed different views as to the effectiveness, purpose and equity of the clusters. 
This does not mean their evidence was unreliable, but rather reflects the way in which 
they perceived the situation. I have tried to encompass these different perspectives in 
the narrative of the chapters detailing my empirical work. 
Neutrality 
Sabot (1999) discusses the dilemma highlighted by Moyser and Wagstaff (1987) 
when dealing with `threatened elites'. If the interviewer appears neutral in the 
academic sense of the word, this `inhibits and may even prevent the conduct of the 
research' (1987, p. 190), but not achieving such neutrality could call into question the 
objectivity of the research. This was certainly a dilemma I faced. Mullings (1999) 
discusses this issue in terms of her research into the data input industry in Jamaica, 
where she interviewed managers and workers, and she accepts that at some time you 
are destined to end up in the camp of one or the other group. Given a level of 
dissatisfaction from the business community towards One NorthEast's cluster policy, 
I was faced with a similar dilemma, although it did not have the impact on obtaining 
access that Mullings found. I accept that I probably portrayed myself as in the camp 
of the business community in order to gain trust and openness from respondents in the 
business community. In the same way when I encountered any dissatisfaction with 
the RSC I felt it was necessary to be empathetic in order to elicit the most 
understanding from the dialogue. Again I feel the position I took Was justified but I 
recalled it in analysing the data and it should be recalled when reading the results. 
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Location, location, location 
For Elwood and Martin (2000) where interviews take place is a key issue. They call 
for an analysis of interview sites in order to assist in interpreting and understanding 
interview material. We should consider the effect of the interview location on the 
researcher, but also on the interview participant. I usually visited respondents at their 
business premises. McDowell (1998) questions whether this inhibits people's 
responses to questions on non-work issues, but in my case the respondents were in 
powerful positions within the organisation, usually had their own private offices and, 
in any case, my questioning mainly related to matters related to their work. 
Additional information can be gleaned from visiting interview participants in a 
location in which they usually operate, rather than in a neutral location or on the 
researcher's university premises. Elwood and Martin (2000) point out that this can be 
from observation of artefacts or observation of interactions between participants and 
their colleagues. 
I found it especially useful when I was offered a tour of the premises. Not only does a 
tour provide useful background material for understanding a business, it also triggers 
additional thoughts from the interview participant - it is just much harder to `record' 
these aspects of the interview and such tours have on occasion resulted in a mad dash 
to the car and a rather breathless recounting of all I could recall into a tape recorder. 
Other locations cause practical problems. I conducted one interview in a light and 
airy restaurant just before Christmas. I did take notes, as I always do for back up 
purposes, which was fortunate as when I came to transcribe the tape it consisted 
mainly of `canned' Christmas music. The next time I conducted an interview in a 
cafe I chose not to tape the interview at all, but took very detailed notes instead. 
By the end of my research I had interviewed around 70 people and further details are 
included in appendix B, including which respondents were used to inform which case 
studies. 
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4.5.2 Documentary Evidence 
Particularly in respect of the RSC (case study 1b) and Argonautics (case study 2b) I 
obtained staggering levels of documentation. I had free access to all the files of the 
RSC, including computer files. This raised ethical issues as I had access both to 
information that had been given to the RSC in confidence and to internally recorded 
opinions about individuals and relationships within clusters that could have been 
controversial if aired. Although this information was useful to me, I was careful not to 
reveal sensitive information to interviewees. Although some of the documentary 
evidence from the RSC gave me insights into opinions about individuals and 
relationships, on the whole it is difficult to gain insights into intangible factors such as 
untraded interdependencies from documentary evidence. However, access to 
monitoring reports and returns that had to be submitted to funding organisations gave 
me access to quantitative data on the impact of the policy. 
From other policy bodies, cluster organisations and firms, I had access to publicly 
available information, for example, published documents and websites, but other than 
that I was restricted to documents that I was offered, or I requested, during interview. 
One employee of the One NorthEast had collated a pack of information ahead of our 
meeting, but this was unusual. However, I was able to use the documentary evidence 
obtained in certain ways for all of the cases. It provided me with background 
information ahead of interviews thereby giving me more confidence and credibility in 
interviews. Historical documents allowed me to obtain a wider time perspective, 
particularly on cluster policies and cluster initiatives. Particularly with regard to the 
case study of One NorthEast (la), documentary evidence in the form of the 
organisation's regional economic strategies was important in tracking the way in 
which the approach to cluster policy changed over time. The use of documentary 
evidence permitted me to either confirm, or triangulate, information obtained from 
other methods or to highlight differences worthy of further investigation. In general 
the documentary evidence was used to support the interview process and to provide 
additional information in developing the narrative of events. 
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4.5.3 Participant Observation 
Whereas documentary evidence and interviews were used in all four case studies, 
participant observation was only used for the case studies of the Regional Service for 
Clustering (2a) and Argonautics (2b). Hoggart et al. (2002) drawing on the work of 
Junker (1960) distinguish between different combinations of `participant' and 
`observer'; the complete participant often associated with covert research; the 
complete observer where social interaction is avoided; the participant as observer 
where participation takes priority over observation and the observer as participant 
which is really observation with some participation. My main site for observations 
was the office of the RSC where I spent at least one day a week for 18 months and my 
observations at the RSC fall into the last category.. I was able, and indeed was asked, 
to join in with formal and informal meetings within the RSC. I was also party to, and 
could observe, conversations and interactions as they occurred. I observed the RSC 
bi-monthly steering group meetings and `away day' meetings where future strategies 
were discussed. 
There was a possibility of joining meetings, led by the cluster project officers from 
the RSC, with micro clusters, but this never materialised and I sensed some 
unwillingness in this respect from RSC staff. I also preferred to stay more removed 
from the RSC, in the eyes of the members of the micro clusters, in order to maintain a 
sense of independence. 
Observing enables the researcher to look at events in their natural settings, as they 
occur, whereas interviews are always based on recollection. I accept various caveats 
in terms of observation. I did consider my impact on the observed events and I did 
not assume that my observations matched what every one else is observing (Mason, 
1996). I recorded observations by taking field notes that were written up under 
descriptive and reflexive headings. 
Other observations, outside the RSC, included joining an informal meeting of one of 
the micro clusters at a local pub, observing a meeting of members of one of the cluster 
organisations, observing a networking meeting of members of one of the micro 
clusters, and attending a networking event for RSC micro clusters. 
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4.5.4 The Focus Group 
Research can be about taking opportunities as they arise and towards the end of my 
project a new project looking at the subsea element of marine and offshore 
engineering was commencing at Durham Business School as part of the EU funded 
NEKS (Networks, Knowledge Sharing and Cluster Development) project, which aims 
to develop clusters of knowledge-based companies through hands-on research, 
collaboration and a series of supporting actions. As a result I was invited to 
participate in a focus group which provided useful material for case study 2a, the 
marine and offshore cluster. Hoggart et al. (2002) distinguish between focus groups 
rooted in a psychotherapy context and those rooted in a market research context. The 
former requires in-depth, repeat interactions whereas the latter has a reduced level of 
intensity, depth and interaction over time. The focus group I participated in was of 
the latter type. The group of ten industry/policy representatives included three 
individuals that I had interviewed and three of the other participants were from 
organisations where I had interviewed other individuals. In the one-to-one interviews 
I could only hear what the individuals said and respond to it myself, but in the focus 
group situation I could see how other participants reacted to, and even challenged, 
what was said. This does not strictly permit triangulation of what was said in 
interviews, as people do behave and react differently in group situations, but it did 
provide further insight into their opinions. There is little literature on the use of focus 
groups in academic settings (Hoggart et al., 2002), and there are issues with this 
method. Particularly in this situation, I was not responsible for selecting the questions 
for discussion or for moderating and facilitating the discussion; I did not decide that 
the discussion be recorded and, perhaps most importantly, I was not involved in 
selecting the participants. This latter point is particularly significant as the discussion 
was designed to lead to policy recommendations and I am aware that a representative 
of one of the firms was particularly significant in eliciting the attendance of other 
firms at the focus group. However, this material did provide me with more context. 
specifically for analysing the interviews I had conducted with three of the focus group 
participants, and also provided me with more background understanding of the 
offshore industry and relationships therein. 
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4.6 Extracting the Data 
Interview data 
The data I had collected was mainly in the form of the narratives from the seventy 
interviews I had conducted. I now had to extract the data from these records. I have 
retained the original recordings and transcribed or taken detailed notes from the tapes. 
I never attempted precise transcription techniques, where every pause and intonation 
is recorded, but in the early stages of my research I transcribed word for word. At 
times, due to time pressures and recognition that I was going to want to listen to the 
tapes again and again to analyse them, I reverted to the less time consuming practice 
of taking detailed notes from the tapes. I chose not to use any of the variety of 
qualitative analysis packages available, partly because I had chosen not to transcribe 
all my interview tapes, but also because they are not widely used in qualitative 
economic geography and I was not convinced that their use would add to my analysis. 
My chosen alternative was to first listen to transcripts that I recalled as being `rich' 
and to extract themes from them. I would then listen to other transcripts and look for 
their contribution to those themes. The identification of themes was guided not only 
by the rich transcripts but also by the literature. If new themes emerged from later 
transcripts I would go back to the transcripts I had already studied and look for their 
contribution to the new theme. 
McDowell (1998) describes her use of the Listeners' Guide, developed by feminist 
psychologists Brown and Gilligan (1992), whereby the researcher reads through 
transcripts or listens to tapes several times, each time `listening' for different voices. 
McDowell notes that this is a particular feminist method designed to ensure the 
female voices are heard. Due to the nature of the research I was conducting, the 
interviews were almost entirely undertaken with males and the females I did interview 
were not in an inferior position or less powerful. However, repeated listening to tapes 
and reading of transcripts has proved enlightening and McDowell reminds us to 
constantly question who we were speaking to and the context in which their answers 
were given. 
Schoenberger (1991) also draws attention to the issue of interpretation and language - 
there are no objective facts -I interpret what is said to me and respondents interpret 
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what I say to them. The interviewee responds to my questions, the response prompts 
further questions or comments and the whole process of the interview is intertwined - 
the particular themes and words I choose may influence the responses I obtain. 
There are different attitudes as to whether interviewing can be used for formal 
hypothesis testing. Markusen (1994) argues it can, whereas Schoenberger (1991) 
argues that it does not lend itself in this way. I used interview material. not for formal 
hypothesis testing, but to build up a picture of how the particular clusters functioned, 
how relationships were built up within the cluster and how the cluster was affected by 
policy, in order that that picture could be viewed against the framework developed for 
understanding clusters and cluster policy. 
Participant observation and the focus group 
My field notes from participant observation and my notes from the focus group were 
analysed in a similar way to my interview transcripts. As mentioned above, case 
study lb of the Regional Service for Clustering was the case study most informed by 
participant observation. I was able to go back through the notes that I had made and 
use my recall of events again to build up a picture of how the service had developed. 
Observing policy develop in front of you also gives a particularly good sense of the 
tensions that existed within the organisation. 
From my other observations of meetings of micro clusters and cluster organisations, 
and from my participation in the focus group, I was able to extract examples of the 
benefits of clusters in practice that I could use in writing up my research (cf. p. 266) 
and also I could use the insights that I gained from observing how individuals 
networked with each other to gain a better understanding of the interactions (and the 
value of the interactions) that took place within clusters at different scales. 
Documentary evidence 
As mentioned above, the documentary material was used in all four case studies as 
background information to assist in the interviewing process. In the case studies of 
One NorthEast's cluster policy making process (1 a) and the development of the 
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Regional Service for Clustering (lb) analysis of documentary evidence was used to 
establish the way in which policy had been presented by the two organisations. 
Documentary evidence of evaluations was also available for both policy making 
organisations and was used to gain a picture of the success of both policies. 
For the case study on the marine and offshore industries (2a) documentary evidence 
was used, as mentioned above, to assist in identifying potential interview respondents 
but the evidence was also analysed to identify policies and initiatives that had 
impacted upon the cluster. Press cuttings were used in an attempt to keep up with 
some of the events in what is an unstable industry in the North East. 
For the case study on Argonautics (2b) the documentary evidence was used to provide 
background information on the firms who were members of the cluster. Additionally 
the internal records of the RSC provided details of key events in the microcluster's 
history and these were used to develop a picture of the evolution of the cluster and to 
inform the interview process. 
4.6.1 Writing the Research 
Hughes (1999) reminds us that the knowledges revealed by interviews are `subjective, 
partial and positioned' (ibid. p. 365, italics in the original). We, as researchers, 
interpret our respondents' interpretations of events and relationships. Hughes 
recommends taking a polyphonic textual strategy to representing the voices of the 
narratives obtained by corporate interview. For Hughes, such a strategy `allows the 
social and cultural complexity [... ] to be articulated in the texts, rather than the 
interviewees' descriptions being subsumed under generalisations' (1999, p. 372). I 
have therefore used verbatim quotations from the transcripts I obtained and picked out 
examples from observations. While seeking to keep quotations anonymous, I have 
identified them in such a way that it is possible to trace the voices of particular 
individuals throughout the narrative. As well as allowing the narratives to 'speak for 
themselves', Hughes recommends triangulating the narratives from interviews with 
other data and reflecting it in the light of theoretical perspectives on the issue. I have 
used evidence from observation and documentary evidence along side evidence from 
interview transcripts to do that. Even with such triangulation we must acknowledge 
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that the account we are giving remains partial and developed from situated 
knowledge. 
4.6.2 Judging Qualitative Data 
There are various criteria against which research can be evaluated. The most often 
quoted criteria are those of validity, reliability and objectivity and these criteria have 
been `lifted' from traditional scientific research. An attempt to evaluate qualitative 
research according to scientific criteria can be problematic given that, as outlined in 
table 4.1 above, the research objectives, epistemological and ontological basis of 
much qualitative research, including that practised within new economic geography, 
differ from both traditional scientific research and geographical research of a more 
positivist nature. 
Yeung (2003) concludes that a methodological framework must be legitimised by a 
`tripartite litmus test' of validity, reliability, and reflexivity (ibid. p. 443). Within 
traditional scientific research, reliability is the likelihood that repetition of the 
research process would achieve the same results. Validity is the extent to which the 
results are accurate and conform to `true' reality. In the absence of an acceptance of a 
single reality, Yeung argues that the deep insights from direct engagement with 
respondents during `in situ' research increases the validity of explanations of actors' 
actions and concludes that tracing actor networks is a valid approach, if we 
understand the economy to be composed of these heterogeneous networks. However, 
reliability, in terms of producing replicable results, is not achievable using these 
methods. Reconstructing the questions I asked would not elicit the same responses, 
even if it was me who asked them again, as each dialogue is contingent and time and 
context dependent. Schoeneberger (1991) also questions whether notions of 
reliability and validity are compatible. Traditional scientific standards call for 
objectivity, but Yeung replaces this with a call for reflexivity. True objectivity is 
again not observable with the kinds of methods I employed. There is no 'neutral' 
observer standing outside, and having no impact upon, a site of observation. In place 
of objectivity we need to be reflexive and open about our role as researchers. 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) call for research to be judged against the criteria of 
credibility, transferability', dependability and confirmability. Their notion of 
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credibility is akin to that of validity and demands that we give an authentic 
representation of experience, accepting that there is no single reality but multiple 
constructed realities. Their concept for transferability relates to the criteria of 
generalisability. Qualitative research is often criticised for providing findings that are 
not representative and are not transferable to contexts outside the study (Markusen, 
1999). However, Hudson (2003) responds by arguing that, while qualitative accounts 
may not be representative in a statistical sense they may `be representative of key 
causal processes and mechanisms' (ibid. p. 744) and therefore, again returning to table 
4.1, different theories have different epistemological assumptions and different 
quality criteria to be met. Lincoln and Guba's notion of dependability is linked to that 
of reliability, which, as mentioned above, is problematic due to the temporally 
specific nature of this kind of research. Finally their notion of confirmability is linked 
to notions of objectivity. Again, as mentioned above, objectivity, in a traditional 
scientific sense, is not achievable in qualitative research and reflexivity is the required 
standard. 
4.6.3 Strategies for Demonstrating Rigour 
Taking into account these issues regarding the appropriate standards required within 
qualitative research and concurring with Peck (2003) that `the search for reliability 
need not (and should not) lead us to reach for the props of traditional theory, positivist 
proofs, and statistical verification' (ibid. p. 730), we can draw on the work of Baxter 
and Eyles (1997), Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Yeung (2003) to employ a range of 
strategies that are, in Peck's terms, `epistemologically coherent' (ibid., p. 737) in order 
to establish the rigour or quality of qualitative research in terms of validity/ 
credibility, reliability/dependability, confirmability/objectivity and transferability/ 
generalisability. These are tabulated below in Table 4-4 and the strategies I used are 
subsequently discussed. 
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Validity/Credibility 
Taking the four categories outlined in Table 4-4 I would argue that I have established 
validity/credibility with a range of strategies including providing the rationale for my 
methodology (cf. section 4.3), by using multiple methods as outlined in section 4.5, 
by providing information on informant selection and interview practices in section 
4.5.1, and by using verbatim quotations widely in the next four chapters. I also 
sought verification by respondents. Revisits to respondents and member checking 
involves ensuring opinions are accurately expressed. Baxter and Eyles hold that this 
is an ethical imperative, but there are both practical issues in terms of firstly, 
arranging for the research to be reviewed by individuals who have already dedicated 
time to the project and may not be willing or able to devote further effort and 
secondly, dealing with disagreements over interpretation. Also, theoretically. we 
acknowledge that respondents do not have privileged access to one `truth' and their 
responses are constructs in themselves from which we construct our understanding. 
However, each of the empirical chapters was provided in draft form to at least one 
respondent to enable them to provide feedback and I received feedback from three 
respondents. 
I received no feedback from One NorthEast. The feedback in the case of the RSC 
case study (case study lb, written up as chapter 7) was by e-mail from a former 
member of North Tyneside Economic Development Unit staff. I used the feedback to 
correct some misapprehensions that I had gained, although at times his interpretation 
of events differed from my own and I chose to retain my own interpretation of events. 
The feedback in the case of the marine and offshore cluster (case study 2a) was from a 
colleague at Durham University and might be considered more accurately as peer 
review. It was once again by e-mail. He, in addition to kindly pointing out some 
typographical errors and providing some reassurance as to the content and argument 
of the chapter, also provided some interview evidence from his interviews and 
findings from his research that supplemented my arguments and some additional 
literature and documentary material that I was able to use for that chapter. The 
feedback in the case of Argonautics (case study 2b) was partly from the same former 
member of North Tyneside Economic Development Unit staff and partly 
from the 
managing director of one of the firms within Argonautics, to whom 
I spoke by 
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telephone. It was reassuring to hear that the Argonautics member had been 
entertained by the case study, but also thought it was an accurate and interesting 
account. He had found the chapter thought provoking and planned to use some of the 
points raised in a review of the future of Argonautics. His comments were 
particularly useful because while I had highlighted certain characteristics of the 
microcluster that he had not necessarily thought of, he was able to draw out 
implications of those characteristics that I had not necessarily identified (cf. sections 
8.1.2. and 8.1.3). 
Reliability/Dependability 
I have sought to demonstrate reliability/dependability with strategies including 
mechanically recording interviews and taking detailed field notes. As detailed above 
I also sought review by interview respondents as a form of member checking. Peer 
review and peer debriefing are an integral part of the graduate supervision process and 
according to Baxter and Eyles (1997) involve `exposing data and interpretations to a 
respected colleague in order to point up possible sources of misinterpretation and the 
`suppression' of themes voices that do not `fit' the `storyline"(ibid., p. 514). In 
addition to review and debriefing by my supervisor throughout the research process, 
sections of my thesis were reviewed by colleagues both prior to submission of my 
thesis and prior to my viva. 
Triangulation is a much-used term but requires clarification. Drawing on the work of 
Burgess (1984), Hoggart et al. (2002) specify five different types of triangulation - 
data, investigator, theory, method and academic discipline. The most common, and 
feasible for a PhD research project, are the use of different data sources and data 
collection methods. Crang ( 2002) points out concern that triangulation of different 
methods, survey and interview, may not be satisfactory because the data arising from 
the different methods answers fundamentally different questions (Winchester, 1999). 
I did not attempt to combine survey methods with the more detailed interviews, 
believing that that information that could be elicited from a questionnaire would not 
uncover the processes underlying clustering. I also felt the use of questionnaires 
ahead of interviews could influence the scope of subsequent interviews. Participant 
observation was used alongside interviews for aspects of the research and an element 
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of documentation was available to enhance most of the interviews. Rather than using 
systematic triangulation of method I therefore concentrated on seeking out as many 
possible sources of data from which to construct my account and analysis. 
Confirmability/Objectivity 
The need for confirmability/objectivity highlights the need for reflexivity and a key 
theme running through the evaluation of qualitative research is the need to reflect on 
our role as researchers. As Crang (2002) puts it `no one will brag about being 
unreflexive' (ibid. p. 651), but he goes on to point out that reflexivity has in turn been 
critiqued for implying that we can eventually fully know a social situation. Even if I 
try to be reflexive about my identity as a researcher, I have to accept that conducting 
the research has changed my identity. When I listen back to transcripts of early 
interviews I am aware how much my understanding of the cluster policy environment 
and the particular clusters I have researched has, inevitably, and fortunately, increased 
during the research process, but I am also aware that, because of the interactive nature 
of the interview, this means the knowledge I obtained from later interviews is of a 
different nature to that obtained early on. 
It is all very well to reflect on my perception of me, but how was I perceived? Some 
characteristics are visible -I am fairly obviously white, female and in my mid- 
thirties. Other characteristics are audible -I had already lived in the North East of 
England for ten years when I commenced my research, but I do not have a local 
accent. I had worked for a bank for eight years prior to commencing my research and 
as an industrial surveyor prior to that. Most of my banking work had involved 
corporate customers and I was accustomed to visiting them at their premises. As an 
industrial surveyor I was also used to visiting industrial premises and I was therefore 
comfortable interviewing at industrial locations. I was always very open about my 
affiliation to the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, although sometimes less so 
about my connections to the RSC. The respondents tended to be male, usually older 
than me. and mainly, particularly in the case of respondents from industry, with a long 
career in their industry. Baxter and Eyles (1997) call for the implications of the 
characteristics of interviewer and respondent to be stated, but I am unsure that I can 
know what the implications were, and so in this chapter I have preferred to be open 
about my tactics for conducting the interviews, and in analysing the interview 
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transcripts I have endeavoured to be aware of how the context in terms of timing. 
setting and my presence have impacted upon what was revealed. 
Transferability/Generalisability 
Results from studies such as mine are clearly not typical or representative of all 
situations where clusters may appear to exist and where cluster policy is employed, 
but this does not render them less valid. However, there should be a connection 
between data and theory, and the findings should be valid for those researched (Baxter 
and Eyles, 1997, p. 511). Strategies for checking validity with those researched have 
been discussed above, but Yeung (2003) maintains `whatever one's epistemological 
orientations, he/she should still be concerned with theory development' (ibid. p. 452). 
The multi layered explanations that I have taken to account for clusters cannot `be 
taken off the shelf and `tested" (Peck, 2003, p. 732), but they are still useful and, as 
Benneworth and Henry (2004) argue, `[f]rom a position of hermeneutic theorising, 
`clusters' have the potential to add value by allowing theoretical debate across a wide 
range of (overlapping and competing) perspectives whose partiality and situatedness 
are made explicit' (ibid. p. 1011). 
Yeung appears to hold a similar position to Barnes (2001) and Benneworth and Henry 
(2004) when he argues that `epistemological theorizing', where theories are `deducted 
a priori and tested statistically by empirical data' (Yeung, 2003, p. 452) is not 
appropriate within new economic geographies. Just as the quality of qualitative 
research should not be judged using scientific standards, theorising should have 
epistemological coherence (Peck 2003). Yeung identifies two alternatives to 
'epistemological theorising', first, abstraction and second, deconstruction of grand 
theories. Yeung (2003) concludes there is `an urgent need for theory reconstruction 
through different rounds of abstractions and deconstructions' (ibid. 2003, p. 453 italics 
in the original) and Peck (2003) argues that `in theoretically informed intensive 
research, conceptualisation occurs through abstraction and through continuous 
dialogue with concrete cases, selected on the basis of their potential elucidation of the 
relationships in question' (2003, p. 732). My research attempts to contribute to the 
`process of critical scrutiny [that] will take place in order to establish the `usefulness' 
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of a theory' (Benneworth and Henry, 2004, p. 1013). Clusters are so context 
dependent that there can never be one theory of their development, but, through 
investigating individual clusters and the application of cluster policy, the usefulness 
and `fit' of different concepts employed to explain clusters can be examined. 
4.7 Limits of the Study 
The choice of interviewing ensures a time-consuming research process and one that 
produces data that is temporally bounded (Markusen, 1994). I did try to re-interview 
certain key informants and due to personal circumstances the interviewing did extend 
from 2001 to 2005. The spread of time brought its own problems in equating 
information from four years ago with current data, but it did allow for an, albeit 
limited, element of historical perspective. I also sought out views of what had 
happened in the past and attempted to reconstruct policy approaches form 
documentation. 
The research also covers a very limited geographical area and focuses on only one 
cluster within that area. This can be justified as it was the only way of obtaining 
detailed insights into the processes at work within the timescale of a PhD project but, 
as explained in section 4.3, the research detailed in this thesis could be expanded to 
cover other clusters in the North East of England or it could compare the experience 
of regions elsewhere in the United Kingdom, or internationally, with the experience of 
the North East. 
4.8 Conclusion 
What follows is the result of a long journey through interviews, documents and 
participant observation, via my analysis. It is my constructed version of how cluster 
policy has been developed in the region and how that has policy has impacted upon a 
given cluster, given the particular relationships and context of that cluster. As 
Hoggart et al. (2002) explain `there is no `telling it like it is'; only interpretation, 
selection and an attempted directing of the reader' (ibid. p. 238). I do not believe that 
there is some truth out there waiting to be recorded, but in this chapter I have tried to 
be open about how I collected my data and began analysis of it. The next four 
chapters of this thesis contains my interpretation and selection of material, but, again 
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to quote from Hoggart et al. (2002), 'insight from another keyhole might produce a 
different emphasis and understanding' (ibid. p. 300). 
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5 The Cluster Policy Approach in Practice: The Case of the Regional 
Development Agency for North East England, One NorthEast 
In Chapter 3, I argued that a cluster policy approach to policy-making does exist and, 
while not a policy panacea (Martin and Sunley, 2003), it can be applied in a beneficial 
manner. I identified rationales and aims in respect of such policies but concluded 
that, given the different contexts and backgrounds in which cluster policy is designed 
and the consequently different policy outcomes, it is the cluster policy-making 
process that can best be used as a framework for analysing a cluster policy approach. 
I therefore proposed a five-part model for analysing the cluster policy process 
comprising the decision to take a cluster approach; identification, selection and 
analysis of clusters; participant mobilisation, cluster animation and relation building; 
selection and implementation of policy instruments: and evaluation and policy 
learning. Through this analysis it is possible not only to draw lessons for cluster 
policy-making, but also to consider whether policy-makers have taken into account 
the concepts identified as underlying clusters in Chapter 2. 
Various cluster policy initiatives have impacted upon North East England and in this 
chapter and Chapter 7, I want to look at case studies of two particular cluster policy 
initiatives in order to answer my first research question - how have cluster policies 
that impact upon the North East of England developed? The first case study, 
addressed in this chapter, is of the Regional Development Agency, One NorthEast, 
which has sought to introduce policies for the development of regional clusters. The 
second case study, developed in Chapter 7, is of the Regional Service for Clustering, 
which has sought to develop clusters at a very local scale. 
To answer the question of how these two cluster policies have developed I outline. in 
the first section of each chapter, the cultural, social and economic context and policy 
background against which the policies were designed, considering the antecedents of 
the current policies in order to identify how previous policies have impacted upon the 
development of cluster policy. In the second section of each chapter, I apply the 
model of the cluster making process in order to analyse the way in which the cluster 
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policies developed. The final section of each chapter will draw out generic lessons 
from each case study. 
In Chapters 6 and 8I seek to answer my second main research question - how has 
cluster policy impacted on the marine and offshore engineering cluster in North East 
England? Focusing on the outcomes of cluster policies within a particular area of 
economic activity allows us to draw on theories around clusters, as outlined in 
Chapter 2, to analyse the dynamics of the cluster and then to integrate that with our 
understanding of cluster policy, as outlined in Chapter 3, in order to account for the 
outcomes of the cluster policy process. Such an approach also enables us to examine 
scale issues both in respect of a cluster and the cluster policies impacting upon it. This 
emphasises the particular issues faced in developing a cluster policy for the marine 
and offshore industries in North East England, but also allows general lessons to be 
drawn about the problems and challenges of adopting a cluster approach to economic 
development. The results highlight the importance of viewing cluster policy as a 
process, the significance of the scale at which cluster policy is implemented and the 
role of cluster organisations and animators in the cluster policy process. 
5.1 The Background to One NorthEast's Cluster Policy Development 
5.1.1 The Cultural, Social and Economic Context 
One NorthEast is the Regional Development Agency with responsibility for the North 
East of England, which is a diverse region, covering Northumberland, Tyne and 
Wear, County Durham and Tees Valley. With a population of 2.5 million it is the 
smallest English region in population terms (Office of National Statistics, 2004a). 
Historically its economy has been dominated by heavy industry - coal mining, steel, 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering - and manufacturing still accounts for 24% of 
gross value added (GVA), compared with 19% for the United Kingdom (Office of 
National Statistics, 2004a). There are also large rural areas, particularly in County 
Durham and Northumberland, and these were deeply affected by the Foot and Mouth 
Disease Crisis in 2001. 
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The well-known decline in heavy industry has left the region in a disadvantaged 
position. Regional gross value added for 2003 is the lowest per head in the United 
Kingdom, with the exception of Wales. GVA did grow by 5.5% in 2002, a figure 
above the national average, but the region provides the lowest share of UK GVA of 
all the English regions (Office of National Statistics, 2004b) and the performance 
relative to the UK national average has worsened from a level of 84.5% of the 
national average in 1991 to 79.7% in 2003. The region had the lowest employment 
rate (for people of working age) in the UK, at 68.2 per cent in spring 2003, and there 
is above average employment in public administration, defence, education and social 
services (Office of National Statistics, 2004a). The highest proportion of people 
living in low-income households was to be found in the North East region in 2000/01 
(Office of National Statistics, 2003). Research and Development expenditure is also 
poor, with businesses expending only 0.4% of total regional GVA on research and 
development, compared with an average for the United Kingdom of 1.4% and 
government only expending £4 million in the region out of a total budget exceeding 
£ 1.8 billion. Rates of entrepreneurship are also low with business registrations 
standing at only 43.8 per 10,000 of resident adult population, a figure considerably 
below that for other regions (Office of National Statistics, 2004a) and there is a 
perception that a history of large scale employers and branch plants has led to an 
`employee' culture. 
There have been successes - there are research strengths in the region's five 
universities, which are seen by One NorthEast as an integral part of their economic 
strategy, and the region received worldwide press coverage when the first licence for 
the cloning of human embryos for therapeutic stem cell research was granted to 
researchers at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne in 2004. Culture has also 
played a large part in regenerating the physical fabric and image of the region, with 
particular successes being the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Arts and the Sage 
Music Centre on the Gateshead quayside. A history of high quality manufacturing 
and heavy engineering expertise has provided the region with a reputation for high 
quality engineering and manufacturing, and a legacy of a highly skilled, albeit ageing, 
engineering workforce. 
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However, it can be concluded that the North East is a geographically- peripheral region 
within the United Kingdom, a position exacerbated by relatively poor road links. The 
region exhibits a weak economic performance, with substantial structural weaknesses 
in the economy and associated issues of social deprivation, and therefore presents 
policy-makers with a significant challenge. 
5.1.2 The Policy-Making Background 
The establishment of Regional Development Agencies 
One NorthEast is one of nine English Regional Development Agencies sponsored by 
the Department of Trade and Industry, and its remit, in common with the other RDAs, 
is to use all the resources at its disposal, in both rural and urban communities 
throughout the region, to further the economic development and the regeneration of 
the region; to promote business efficiency, investment and competitiveness in the 
region; to generate employment; and to encourage and enhance the relevant work 
skills of the people living in the region. 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were established in eight English regions on 
1 April 1999, with the ninth development agency for London being launched on 3 
July 2000 and their geographical coverage is depicted in Figure 5-1 below. In certain 
cases this necessitated the formation of new organisations, but in the North East an 
existing organisation, the Northern Development Company, evolved into the new 
regional development agency, One NorthEast. The Northern Development Company 
(NDC) was formed in 1986 and it, in turn, took over from the North East of England 
Development Council (NEDC). The role of both organisations had been focused on 
inward investment attraction, although NDC had also sought to develop the supply 
chains supporting inward investments, and had included a research function. The 
Regional Development Agency is a much larger organisation in terms of people, 
budgets and sphere of influence, but the legacy of its predecessor organisations has 
influenced its development. Many staff moved from one organisation to the other and 
the previous policy work on inward investment and supply chains was to influence 
both the choice of policies and the modus operandi of the new organisation. 
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One of the first priorities for the RDAs was to generate regional economic strategies 
and the then sponsoring department, the Department for Transport, Environment and 
the Regions (DETR), published supplemental guidance in this respect on 14 April 
1999. This guidance was heavily influenced by the 1998 Government White Paper on 
Competitiveness, Our competitive future: building the knowledge driven economy 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1998), and highlighted cluster and business 
networks as an important policy initiative. The early approach to clusters was in line 
with Porter's early views on the role of government towards clusters, and the main 
focus was to ensure that regulation and legislative measures do not impact 
unfavourably on clusters - s. 2.4.57 of the supplemental guidance recommends that, 
`[i]n order to promote the development of clusters and business networks in their 
regions, RDAs are encouraged to identify and support key clusters and business 
networks and address any barriers facing them'. In addition, one of the activities 
undertaken by the DETR was a review of the planning system to consider its impact 
upon clusters (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000). 
By 2001, clusters had become further embedded in government thinking and the 
publication of the White Paper, Opportunity for all in a world of change continued to 
stress the role for RDAs in developing clusters. Sponsorship of RDAs transferred to 
the Department of Trade and Industry in June 2001. 
The National Government approach to cluster policy 
As mentioned above, while cluster-based approaches had been employed at local 
authority level for some time and Scottish Enterprise was piloting a cluster approach, 
it was the publication in 1998 of the Competitiveness White Paper that signalled an 
interest by the United Kingdom national government in a cluster approach to policy. 
Central government policy for England has been to encourage Regional Development 
Agencies to focus on facilitating regional clusters, while cluster policy focusing on 
national clusters has been much more limited. The national government's role was 
initially seen as being concentrated on framework conditions `to encourage the 
formation and growth of clusters' (Department of the Environment Transport and the 
Regions, 2000) and in so far as any explicit national cluster policy directed towards a 
national cluster can be identified, it is probably the work that was done on the 
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Biotechnology Cluster (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999) by Lord Sainsbury's 
team. However, it could be argued that the Foresight Panels, particularly the first 
round, contained elements of national cluster policy. Actors were brought together in 
certain industries to identify structural weaknesses and create new development 
strategies (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999). The sector panels in the Technology 
Foresight Programme 1995 were agriculture, natural resources and environment; 
chemicals; communications; construction; defence and aerospace; energy; financial 
services; food and drink; health and life sciences; information technology and 
electronics; leisure and learning; manufacturing, production and business processes; 
materials; retail and distribution and transport. Marine was subsequently added to the 
list. 
Benneworth and Charles (2001) point out that the national government in the United 
Kingdom were latecomers to the cluster approach and One NorthEast officials shared 
this perception. In interviews with officials from One NorthEast it was also clear that 
there was confusion around the concept of clusters: 
As a concept it was really quite chaotic in terms of how people understood it 
or didn't understand it, and it was very difficult, I think, to really see it as [ ... 
anything other than another way of describing sectoral policy (ONE 
representative 1) 
The RDAs provided the DTI with a regional delivery mechanism for the first time. 
However, the DTI's previous lack of a territorial framework and a history of dealing 
with individual companies was identified as a problem by a university representative: 
They do not really understand place and space within it. They do not 
understand the whole importance of things like infrastructure; they don't really 
get their heads around the whole idea of social, soft tissue. The basic cluster 
model is still quite problematic (university representative 1) 
There was also an ongoing tension between regional policy and the national interest. 
The focus in the North East is on trying to reduce the economic performance gap 
between the region and the rest of the country, whereas the national focus is on 
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improving the performance of the United Kingdom as a whole and the DTI did not 
explicitly identify the cluster approach as a mechanism to address regional economic 
imbalances. 
The national government did commission the research project to map clusters 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2001), but unlike in the Netherlands where 
national clusters were mapped (Roelandt et al., 1999), the exercise was to identify 
clusters existing at a regional level in an attempt to assist RDAs in formulating cluster 
strategies. The methodology employed was to identify `regional highs', defined as 5- 
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes with a location quotient of over 
1.25 and employing over 0.2% of the regional workforce and then, using a more 
subjective approach, to group these into regional clusters. A second element of the 
process was to consider allocating other 5-digit SIC codes to regional clusters where 
there was either a location quotient over 1.25 or significant employment, not serving 
solely local demand. There was also an attempt to use local knowledge to identify 
clusters not revealed by SIC code analysis, either due to their embryonic nature or due 
to inadequacies in SIC code data (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001c). This 
top down, broad brush, predominantly statistical analysis inevitably has weaknesses, 
not least its inability to gain a deep understanding of the nature of linkages in the 
clusters identified. This is acknowledged, not least in the title of the document, 
Business Clusters in the UK -A First Assessment but the exercise was seen as 
supporting the RDAs in their cluster development efforts. 
A Ministerial-led Clusters Policy Steering Group headed by Lord Sainsbury and an 
Official Level Working Group were set up in 2000 to undertake a review of cluster 
policy, to identify barriers to the growth and development of clusters, and to 
recommend new policy initiatives on cluster and network activities. The Cluster 
Policy Steering Group included cross-ministerial delegates and representation from 
trade unions and academia, and oversaw the above mapping exercise, but the RDAs 
were seen as the key delivery mechanisms. Both the Clusters Policy Steering Group 
and Official Level Working Group were dissolved in January 2003, by which time it 
was felt that cluster strategies were sufficiently embedded in the RDAs' strategies. 
The Business Relations Unit at the DTI continues to liaise with RDAs in respect of 
cluster policies and advice to Regional Development Agencies was formalised in The 
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Practical Guide to Cluster Development, a report to the DTI and the English RDAs 
by Ecotec Research & Consulting, although this was not published until April 2004. 
The influence of the DTI on the development of cluster policy within One NorthEast 
will be discussed further, but the UK national government did not take an overtly 
cluster approach to policy-making in general and did not foresee a role for the 
national government in fostering clusters at a national level, preferring to devolve 
responsibilities for clusters to the RDAs. 
The regional policy-making context 
The policy background is further complicated by the existence of other policy-making 
and delivery organisations in the regions. 
In a referendum in November 2004, the North East rejected the possibility of having 
an elected Regional Assembly, but an unelected Regional Assembly remains in place. 
The North East Assembly was established in 1999 by the Government as part of its 
commitment to strengthening policy in the English regions. It came into operation in 
April 1999, at the same time as the regional development agency, One NorthEast, and 
has over 70 members drawn from local authorities, private business, trade unions, 
culture, media and sport organisations, further and higher education, skills and 
training providers, MPs and MEPs, health providers, rural organisations, the 
environment and voluntary sectors. As well as providing scrutiny of the operations of 
One NorthEast, the North East Assembly has been the regional planning body since 
April 2002 and is responsible for producing the Regional Spatial strategy. The 
Assembly has a wider role for ensuring that broader regional interests are properly 
represented and voiced in relation to One NorthEast' s regional economic strategy and 
on issues, such as transport, land use planning and improving quality of life. 
The Government Office for the North East represents the interests of ten central 
government departments and is 'charged with working with regional partners and 
local people to help deliver the Government's central aims in the region' 
(Government Office North East, 2003). It is also responsible for managing the 
Objective 2 and 3 programmes of European Structural Funding in the region. 
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Local authorities retain some economic development functions and an interest in 
cluster development. For example, Newcastle City Council intends to support eight 
clusters. 9 Four sub-regional partnerships, which include local authorities, business 
leaders and other stakeholders, covering County Durham, Northumberland, Tees 
Valley and Tyne and Wear, also have their own economic development strategies and 
programmes financed by funds delegated to them by One NorthEast and other 
European and national funds. Some of these development strategies include their own 
cluster strategies. 10 
At a more aggregated level the Northern Way is a strategy launched in September 
2004 to address the productivity gap between the north and south of England. It was 
initiated by the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, and is led by a coalition of the 
three Northern RDAs - the North West Development Agency, Yorkshire Forward and 
One NorthEast. The Northern Way has its own economic strategy with a£ 100 
million Northern Way Growth Fund. The strategy includes a cluster development 
programme, receiving £6 million of growth fund money and covering three clusters in 
its first phase (Chemicals, Food and Drink and Advanced Engineering) and a further 
three in its second phase (Energy and Environmental Technologies, Financial and 
Professional Services and Logistics). 
In the skills area the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) has a responsibility for 
planning and funding the provision of almost all government funded post-16 
education and training, including work based training, other than higher education. It 
became fully operational in April 2001, replacing the Further Education Funding 
Council and the 72 Training and Enterprise Councils. The Learning and Skills 
9 Digital Technology and Creative Industries, Financial/Professional Services, Engineering 
(Marine'Added Value/Renewables), Retail, Construction, Tourism/Hospitality and Culture, Life 
Sciences, Airport and Avionics 
10 The TyneWear Economic strategy. Leading the Way, lists 11 sectors/clusters - power, environmental 
industries, chemicals, engineering, automotive, offshore/marine, construction, food and drink, digital 
and telecommunications, creative industries, tourism. Tees Valley Vision Strategic Framework lists 7 
priority sectors'clusters - chemicals/process industries, renewable energy and environmental 
technologies, higher value business and financial services, civil and mechanical engineering. health and 
social care, digital media technologies, tourism 
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Council has a national office in Coventry and 47 local offices, including local learning 
and skills councils for Tyne and Wear, Northumberland, County Durham and Tees 
Valley. Given that the local LSCs have responsibility for working with local business 
to forecast and prepare to meet local skills needs from local learning provision the 
local LSCs are potentially significant in cluster policy-making. More recently, and as 
a result of central government's National Skills Strategy, 21 S` Century Skills, a 
Regional Skills Partnership, Skills North East was established in June 2004 to provide 
a more strategic approach to skills. 
In the business support arena a review of business support services in the North East 
was commenced in March 200011 and as a result a new Business Support Network 
was established in June 2003 to deliver business support in accordance with a 
brokerage model whereby Business Link advisers signpost businesses to appropriate 
specialist support organisations. 12. While the status and identity of the specialist 
support organisations was uncertain at the time of writing, the approach is both 
generic, in that there is no apparent alignment with the cluster/sector team within One 
NorthEast, and responsive, in that businesses are required to make contact with 
Business Link advisers once an issue is perceived. The model also tends to providing 
support to individual businesses and is far removed from a cluster policy approach. 
Overall many regional delivery bodies and policy-making organisations are involved 
either directly in cluster policy-making or indirectly because they are developing 
policies that impact upon clusters. Many of these organisations are recently 
established, or substantially changed in function, and this complicated policy 
environment has impacted upon the cluster policy-making process and its subsequent 
delivery. 
5.1.3 The Antecedents of the Current Policies 
There is a long history of regional development policy in the North East which is well 
documented elsewhere (Hassfink. 1992. Lagendijk, 1999). Regional policy measures 
11 One NorthEast Review of Business Development Infrastructure 
12 One NorthEast The New Business Support Network for the North East 
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date back to at least 1934 and the establishment of the Team Valley Trading Estate. 
and have included a particular focus on inward investment attraction. However, 
cluster type policies preceded the establishment of Regional Development Agencies. 
As discussed in section 5.1.2, in the North East, One NorthEast took over 
responsibility from an existing body, the Northern Development Company (NDC), 
which had received central government support for its inward investment role. 
Inward investment marketing had taken place around sectors and had particularly 
emphasised the availability of labour. Prior to the establishment of the RDAs, NDC 
was already looking to develop a regional sector strategy and in Cooperating to 
Compete (Northern Development Company, 1998), a strategy on sector development 
was established. One of the reasons for developing this strategy was in order to 
access additional European structural fund monies for SME development. The Single 
Programming Document, which directs the expenditure of Structural Funds for a 
region, had been renewed in 1997, and 32m ECU was available to develop 
endogenous strategic sectors (Charles and Benneworth, 1999). The requirements for 
the structural funds dictated both a tight definition of the sectors that would get 
support and demanded a concentration on job creation. This report in itself drew on 
the experience of previous sector working groups that had been established in the 
region. 
Sector working groups had been developed, as part of a Department of Trade and 
Industry pilot initiative, by the DTI regional office for the North East in the early 
1980s. They had included industrialists and academics, but one of the main lessons 
taken from this exercise was the need for an institutional framework to drive forward 
the ideas generated. Subsequently there was a focus by the NDC on developing 
sector associations. This was partly as a result of the establishment, and success, of 
the Northern Offshore Federation, which had been established in 1988 and will be 
discussed further in Chapter 6. Progress was made with defence industries, food and 
drink and chemicals but little progress was made in electronics/IT or plastics and 
materials manufacturers. The rationale for adopting the sector working group 
approach was due to perceived benefits from interaction between firms. The benefits 
were seen to be of two main types - firstly, peer group support and secondly. 
collective action to identify constraints and opportunities within `clusters of common 
interest'. Four critical success factors had been identified: - the need for a critical 
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mass and inclusive nature to constitute a `viable community of interest'; the ability to 
identify and prioritise issues that were of relevance to a significant part of that 
community; the existence of a neutral and knowledgeable facilitator and finally 
motivation within the business support and academic arenas to provide tailored 
support to meet demand. Four main types of modes of production were identified as a 
background against which to develop clusters - high volume clusters, low volume 
clusters, process clusters and service clusters. Meetings were held with groups of 
companies in the Electronics, Call Centres, Food and Drink. Defence and Aerospace. 
Life Sciences and Low Volume Engineering industries to verify the analysis 
undertaken for the report. Although little attention appeared to be paid to the critical 
success factors identified through this exercise, this work went on to shape the 
conception and selection of clusters in the first regional economic strategy and the 
legacy of an institutional framework of sector associations would influence the 
operation of One NorthEast's cluster development programme. 
A Regional Foresight Programme had also been established, which is now run by the 
Regional Technology Centre. At the time of its inception, and during the operation of 
the sector working groups, there was no recognition for third strand activity within the 
Research Assessment Exercise and the Foresight coordinators were reliant on the 
voluntary commitment of those in industry, DTI or academia. 
Other attempts had been made within the region's five universities to stimulate 
academic-industry links, a common feature of cluster policies and, while all 
universities in the region are undertaking these types of activities, examples from the 
University of Newcastle are used here to illustrate the types of links formed. The idea 
of establishing a Centre for Marine Technology research had been proposed in the late 
1980s by the Marine Technology Directorate of the DTI. This became encompassed 
in a DTI proposal to establish engineering design centres across the country. In the 
Engineering Design Centre (EDC), based at the University of Newcastle, 12 to 14 
large companies were brought together and matched research council funding of 
£ 13M over three years to fund innovative research. At the outset there was a generic 
core and four sub groups -subsea; naval architecture and shipbuilding; aerospace and 
petrochemicals, nuclear and chemicals. The initiative brought together Newcastle. 
Northumbria, Sunderland and Teesside Universities and the EDC also ran the 
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Regional Foresight Initiative. The centre contributed to collective learning by 
providing a forum within which even commercially sensitive information came to be 
shared. 
Given the success of the Engineering Design Centre, the Regional Centre for 
Innovation in Engineering Design (RCID) was set up in 1995. The RCID, now 
known as the Resource Centre for Industrial Design, was aimed at smaller companies 
but again a group of companies, some with a marine focus, but all with a 
manufacturing focus, came together to undertake design work. The RCID acted as a 
collective asset by giving access to expensive equipment to small companies in areas 
like rapid prototyping and advanced CAD systems. A visiting professor scheme 
assisted in enrolling the support of small companies and additionally trustful, 
beneficial relations were built to such an extent that several respondents referred to 
RCID as a 'club'. Specific problems were addressed for SMEs so they could see real 
immediate returns on their involvement, but a proportion of the funding was used to 
address fundamental, long-term issues. 
In a further initiative to establish industry-academia links, Newcastle University had 
established a team of Business Development Mangers with an award from the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England's Higher Education Reach-out to Business 
and the Community (HEROBC) fund. Similarly, the other universities in the region 
were establishing links with industry and EPICC, the European Process Industry 
Competitiveness Centre, was established in 1995 by the University of Teesside. The 
Regional Centre for Electronics Technologies (ReCET) was established by the 
University of Durham, and in 1993 the University of Sunderland set up the Centre for 
Achievement in Manufacturing and Management (CAMM) which later evolved into 
the Institute of Automotive and Manufacturing Advanced Practice (AMAP). 
5.2 One NorthEast's Cluster Policy-making Process 
It is clear that the development of One NorthEast's cluster policy takes place against a 
complex, and at times contested, policy background and there are antecedents within 
the region that have gone on to influence the subsequent development of cluster 
policy. I now want to analyse the development of that cluster policy using the model 
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of the cluster making process developed in Chapter 3 to consider the decision to take 
a cluster approach; the selection and analysis of clusters; participant mobilisation, 
cluster animation and relation building; selection and implementation of policy 
instruments; and evaluation and policy learning. In section 5.1.2, I mentioned that the 
RDAs were charged with developing regional economic strategies. To the date of this 
research three regional economic strategies had been published and the approach to 
cluster policy changed over time. These strategies are identified as RES 1, RES 2 and 
RES 3 throughout the chapter. 
5.2.1 The Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
As outlined in Chapter 3 the first stage in a stylised cluster policy process model is the 
initial decision to take a cluster approach and the associated rationales. The need to 
adopt cluster development strategies was imposed on One NorthEast and the other 
RDAs by the requirements of Central Government, although there were elements of 
previous practice in the region that fitted well with a cluster approach. Links between 
academia and industry were being developed, supply chain initiatives were well 
established in the region, industry fora were being established to identify the 
requirements of particular groups of industries and an institutional framework of 
sector/industry associations was being put in place. 
In addition, given that the region has been eligible for Objective 2 European 
Structural Funds, One NorthEast has been influenced by the priorities of Single 
Programming Documents, which determine the allocation of funds and have offered 
funding for clusters. The cluster approach favoured by the European Union tended 
towards support for SMEs via a networking approach and through improved delivery 
of business support assistance. One NorthEast was to an extent constrained by these 
requirements, which were very sectoral and focused on a target of jobs created. 
The first Regional Economic Strategy of One NorthEast (RES 1), Unlocking Our 
Potential, published in 1999, was therefore written against, and influenced by. this 
background. Clusters were defined in a loose manner as 'a group of industries. 
organisations and businesses whose interrelationships enhance the competitive 
advantage of individual and groups of companies' (One NorthEast. 1999, p. 33). 
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RES 1 had six main strands 13 and the aim of cluster development was to contribute to 
the first priority - `creating wealth by building a diversified, knowledge driven 
economy'. Identifying new markets was to be a particular focus with the overriding 
aims being an increase in GDP and job creation. The approach was very inclusive 
`[c]lusters will be developed in the North East so that all the Region's companies have 
a part to play' (One NorthEast, 1999, p. 33). The language was very much around the 
`knowledge economy' and `competitiveness' in line with the government' s 
competitiveness white paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 1998). In section 
3.5.3, seven possible rationales for cluster policy were identified: government 
regulation may impact disproportionately on certain clusters; SMEs do not take 
opportunity to collaborate with other firms; firms do not have access to information 
and knowledge when they operate in isolation; firms do not access knowledge from 
public providers; clusters may lack self awareness; clusters may lack certain 
components and there my be a lack of demanding customers. The rationale for 
intervening was not made explicit in RES 1, but the implicit rationale was to bring 
together firms who would not usually take the opportunity to collaborate, in order to 
develop new products and access new markets. This focus on collaboration alone has 
already been highlighted as a tendency amongst policy-makers. 
An evaluation of RES1 commissioned by One NorthEast had indicated that `[t]o date, 
there is little or no statistical evidence that the economic step change in the North 
East, upon which the strategy is posited, is being achieved' (SQW Limited, 2002, 
p. ii). A feature of One NorthEast's approach was a desire to achieve an impact 
quickly and it could be argued that, given that RES 1 had been in place for less than 
three years, an expectation of a step change was unrealistic. However, there were 
specific criticisms of the cluster development programme, not least that it had been 
poorly communicated. A topic paper (One NorthEast, 2002b), produced as part of the 
review of RES 1, indicates that modes of production, which had previously been used 
to identify clusters, was to be replaced by a method of identifying clusters by linked 
13 The six strands were - creating wealth by building a diversified, knowledge driven economy; 
establishing a new entrepreneurial culture; building an adaptable and high],, skilled workforce; placing 
universities and colleges at the heart of the region's economy: meeting 21 S` century transport. 
communication and property needs and accelerating the renaissance of the North East 
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industries or common markets. This appeared to be a conscious move away from the 
solely inward investment and supply chain work of the agency's predecessor. NDC. 
In the second Regional Economic Strategy (RES2), Realising Our Potential. the six 
priority strands were similar to the previous strategy, although by 2002 national 
priorities had changed with an ever-increasing focus on productivity (HM Treasury 
and DTI, 2001) and therefore the priority related to wealth creation changed to 
`creating wealth by raising the productivity of all businesses'. 
In RES2, the definition of clusters had been clarified to `[c]lusters are concentrations 
of competing, collaborating or interdependent companies and institutions connected to 
one another through market and non-market links. Clusters organise to achieve shared 
aims. They are business led and backed by a responsive public sector'. Three 
different approaches to cluster development were now outlined -the enhancement of 
globally competitive clusters; the establishment of new globally competitive clusters 
and collaboration to improve competitiveness amongst smaller groups of companies. 
The overarching aim of the cluster development programme was the `increased 
prosperity of the Region', which was to be achieved by increased productivity, 
commercialisation of R&D and increased competitiveness with consequent benefits in 
terms of increased learning and employment opportunities. 
The rationales for intervention varied according to the different strands of cluster 
development. It was recognised that the region had only a small number of the first 
strand of clusters, `truly globally competitive industries', and the rationale for 
intervention was to remove barriers to growth and to provide an environment 
conducive to growth. The wish to establish the second strand of clusters, new 
globally competitive clusters', grew in part from a desire to exploit the research 
strengths of the region's universities and the rationale for intervention was to mitigate 
the risks of investment which would otherwise lead to an under investment in new 
areas (Roelandt and den Hertog, 1999). The third strand of cluster development, and 
one that was largely overlooked, was 'clustering for competitive advantage' where it 
was perceived that companies outside the clusters identified for further development 
could enhance their competitiveness through collaboration around supply chains, 
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markets or other forms of network. This accords with the five-part typology 
discussed in section 3.3 where clustering, defined as cooperative interaction to gain 
advantage, which may or may not take place within a cluster, is seen as theoretically 
distinct from the cluster. The implicit rationale for intervention in this case was that 
SMEs might not take the opportunity to collaborate in this way without some, limited, 
public sector intervention. 
This breakdown of the definition of clusters into three elements indicated a better 
understanding of the cluster concept and the need for differentiated policies, but there 
were still to be great difficulties in putting the policy into practice. 
It should be noted that a significant part of what might be considered One NorthEast's 
cluster policy is not termed cluster policy by the agency. A Strategy for Success was 
submitted to the DTI in November 2001 - this was influenced by the innovation 
agenda of national government and reflected research into the region's research base. 
Following the decision not to site the new Synchrotron at the Darsbury Laboratories 
in Cheshire, Stephen Byers, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, had 
arranged a review of the science base in the North West. Byers subsequently 
recommended the same review for the North East. The review was to consider the 
research base in North East England in relation to the current and future needs of key 
industry clusters. Notwithstanding some misgivings in the research community about 
the review process, the resulting report, Realising the Potential of the North East's 
Research Base, along with the desire to see universities at `the heart of the regional 
economy' and disappointment with the cluster analysis, led to the Strategy for 
Success. The intention was to develop more effective linkages between industry and 
academia through the mechanisms of new institutions, known as Centres of 
Excellence. Five Centres of Excellence for the commercialisation of research were 
established, each with an industry led board, in the areas of Life Sciences, Process 
Industries, Nanotechnology, Digital Technology and Multimedia and New and 
Renewable Energies. Using Boekholt and Thuriaux's (1999)and (2000) conception of 
'cluster policy models' it can be said that the Strategy for Success and Centres of 
Excellence represented an Industry-Research Link Model. 
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The consultation process for the third Regional Economic Strategy (RES3), 
provisionally entitled Leading the Way, began in 2005. Again the overall language 
and tone are influenced by national agendas with an emphasis being placed on 
sustainability and the overall goal being `to deliver greater and sustainable prosperity 
to all of the people of the North East over the period to 2016' (One NorthEast, 2005a). 
In place of the previous six strands, RES3 centres on eight key drivers14 emerging 
from SHINE, which was a scenario-planning project initiated and funded by One 
NorthEast and managed by The Henley Centre, a strategic marketing consultancy. 
In place of cluster development, RES3 proposed a strategy of `enhancing established 
significant sectors and helping to create `new market' globally competitive sectors' 
within a framework of three strategic pillars (cf. section 5.2.2). The dropping of the 
term clusters was seen from within One NorthEast as a subtle change, reflecting the 
difficulty the agency had had in communicating its clusters policy. In a review of 
RES2 (Frontline Consultants, 2005), the cluster approach was seen as an example of 
`fashion-chasing'. There appears to be little appreciation that a sector policy could be 
very distinct from a cluster policy, however, it is noticeable that the sectors are 
narrower than the previous clusters. The rationale for adopting the sector approach 
was to provide specialist support to improve the performance of firms in a limited 
number of sectors and also to identify gaps in supply chains, to embed inward 
investment operations and to address structural weaknesses in the economy. These 
rationales were very similar to the work that had been done in the days of the 
Northern Development Company. However, it could be argued that a cluster 
approach continues to exist within the agency as the three `pillars' could be seen to 
equate to clusters. 
The decision to adopt a cluster approach has been, to a certain extent, imposed on One 
NorthEast by central government and influenced by the European Union Structural 
Funds programme. Although the approach taken has been heavily influenced by 
previous policy traditions in the region, the influence of central government priorities 
14 Leadership; Enterprise and Business Support; Sectoral and Global Networks; Innovation and 
Creativity; Skills; Economic Inclusion; Infrastructure and Built Environment; Image and Cultural 
Assets 
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also pervades the changing aims and rationales of One NorthEast's cluster approach. 
The background of poor economic performance has led One NorthEast to look to 
achieve radical and swift structural changes through its economic strategy. Given the 
need to base cluster policies on existing strengths, the acknowledged reservations as 
to whether clusters can ever be built from scratch and the long time frame required to 
achieve results from a cluster approach, a cluster approach to policy-making in the 
region was always going to challenging. Some respondents also expressed the 
opinion that One NorthEast never fully embraced the cluster concept: 
I am not sure that One NorthEast has really bought into the concept of clusters 
as a way of tackling economic regeneration (university representative 2). 
Certainly up here it is difficult to see the avowed cluster philosophy being 
pulled through so that it becomes the warp thread of policy. It is almost as if it 
is in a separate box (university representative 2). 
One of the issues highlighted in chapter 3 is that there is there is no specific cluster 
policy instrument, but rather a range of potential policy interventions that need to be 
tailored to the requirements of individual clusters. The utilisation of differing policy 
instruments depends on the rationales for government intervention, policy-makers' 
understanding of clusters and the specific policy-making environment in which policy 
is being designed. This left One NorthEast, and other RDAs, with the problem of 
how to put a cluster approach into practice. A One NorthEast representative talking 
of the cluster development strategy said: 
I think there was a strategy of sorts. It struck me that One NorthEast knew of 
it - in terms of cluster development and the 
fact that there was a management 
guru who was peddling it and everyone else had bought into it and therefore 
the DTI thought it was a good idea - therefore we have to follow that 
methodology - what it didn't tell me or what it 
didn't seem to be telling us is 
how you actually go about it (ONE representative 3). 
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And another commented: 
I think for us, certainly for me, the cluster concept is a good way of 
understanding a set of relationships and a set of organisations, institutions and 
so it is more an analytical tool, an understanding and conceptual tool than it is 
in itself a policy tool (ONE representative 1). 
5.2.2 Identification, Selection and Analysis of Clusters 
How cluster analysis is undertaken, and the results from that analysis, cannot be 
separated from the policy concerns and policy background that led to the cluster 
analysis being undertaken (Feser and Luger, 2003). 
There have been numerous attempts to identify and understand clusters in the North 
East. The DTI commissioned report, Business Clusters in the UK -A First 
Assessment identified nine clusters for the North East and these are tabulated below in 
Table 5-1, with an estimation of the number of employees in each cluster. 
Table 5-1 Regional Clusters and Employment in the North East of England 
Regional Clusters Employment (1999) 
Agriculture/food 31,000 
Automotive (assembly) 13,000 
Chemicals (organic) 20,000 
Clothing 11,000 
Electrical industrial equipment 14,000 
Electronics 11,000 
Furniture manufacture 9,000 
Metal processing, ship repair and industrial equipment 42,000 
Plastics (primary, industrial products) 9,000 
Total Employment 952,000 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry (2001 b) 
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The conclusions from this national study were not encouraging: 
The clusters are small with relatively few industries and few supporting and 
related industries [... ] it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, with the 
exception of chemicals, the region has no distinctive cluster strengths with a 
dominant role within UK economy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001 b, 
p. 39). 
The problems of using SIC code data to identify clusters are well known and were 
rehearsed in section 3.5.4, but the lack of cluster strengths identified from SIC code 
analysis left One NorthEast with an immediate problem of needing to implement a 
cluster policy without any strong clusters having been identified. The inability to 
identify and understand the region's clusters has been a recurrent and considerable 
problem for One NorthEast's attempts at cluster development. 
The publication of RES 1, predated the DTI national assessment of clusters. The 
clusters selected for particular development were to be those where there was `a 
strong science and technology base, an entrepreneurial culture, a growing company 
base, a skilled workforce and ability to attract key staff, suitable premises and 
infrastructure, the availability of finance, effective networks, close collaboration 
between academic institutions and industry, and a supportive public policy 
environment' (One NorthEast, 1999, p. 34). However, RES I is fundamentally 
contradictory in proposing that there should be an initial cluster assessment, but then 
prejudging the clusters. Five clusters were identified using the modes of production 
approach seen in the NDC report, Collaborating to Compete, in high volume 
manufacturing (inward investment in the 1960s and 1970s had seen a growth in high 
volume manufacturing), low volume manufacturing (where the region's traditional 
strengths lay), process industries, transactional services and bespoke services with a 
further four clusters of importance being tourism; heritage, leisure, culture and sport; 
logistics, public authorities and the voluntary sector. According to a One NorthEast 
official, the mode of production approach arose from dissatisfaction with SIC code 
data and it instead took a supply chain approach to understanding why businesses 
might want to work together. Eleven cluster development groups were proposed for 
the nine clusters due to the subdivision of the process industries into chemicals, food 
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and drink and agriculture and life sciences. A key requirement had been inclusivity 
and RES 1 was described as `making sure everyone was inside the tent not outside' by 
ONE representative 4, and it appears that the list of clusters had mainly been drawn 
up by a process of negotiation with local stakeholders, particularly businesses. 
By the time of the review of RES 1 in early 2002, the use of means of production, 
heavily associated with the team who had produced Collaborating to Compete. had 
been dropped. There had, according to a One NorthEast official, been a question as to 
how the programme would be operationalised because money was to be allocated to 
sector federations, but neither a low volume, nor a high volume, association was ever 
established. 15 It was decided instead to identify clusters where there were linked 
industries or common markets. In the topic paper produced as part of the review of 
RES 1 (One NorthEast, 2002b), thirteen clusters were identified and, as with RES 1, 
there was an emphasis on being inclusive to ensure that cluster development 
initiatives covered a substantial proportion of the Region's industry. Once again there 
was no explicit methodology for identifying clusters to support and on the whole the 
process appears to have been to commission research on pre-selected clusters, rather 
than to overview the region as a whole. 
RES2 was published with the addition of Creative Industries as a further cluster and 
minor amendments to the list in the topic paper. However, the policy implementation 
framework for RES2 included sixteen clusters, with the addition of Construction and 
Rural clusters and, as will be discussed further in Chapter 6, a significant change in 
the designation of one cluster, from Offshore to Energy. Other lists appeared in 
subsequent One NorthEast presentations and there was never a clear methodology for 
selecting clusters for support. According to ONE representative 5, `there was a 
thought process of well, if it isn't Centres of Excellence and it doesn't fit anywhere 
else in the agency, it must be clusters'. 
15 There had been proposals to use research centres at local universities, EPICC at Teesside, CAMM at 
Sunderland and EDC'RCID at Newcastle as the foundations of the process industry/ high volume'low 
volume approach, but this was not taken forward. 
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By 2003 there was perceived to be a need to rationalise the list of clusters so that the 
clusters team would be doing more than generic business support and the number of 
strategic clusters was reduced back down to eight in 2003. These were apparently 
selected on the basis of employment, GDP, opportunity, technology and development 
although no analysis or methodology was made available by One NorthEast. The 
main criterion, according to ONE representative 5, was the potential for One 
NorthEast, working with organisations and businesses to `make a difference'. 
In 2004 an Industrial Landscapes study was commissioned because One NorthEast 
required further research on the significant industries in the region and the way in 
which benefits from those industries could be exploited for the benefit of the region. 
By 2005, following a major restructure within One NorthEast, the term `clusters' was 
no longer being overtly employed and, in the consultation process for RES3, nine 
sectors were designated for support. These sectors were related to an understanding 
that the region's economy was supported by three main economic pillars - energy and 
environment, processing industries and healthcare and health sciences and this model 
of the economy is depicted in Figure 5-2 below. Interestingly the website of the 
Strategy for Success team describes these pillars as clusters. ' 6 
Figure 5-2 One NorthEast's Three Pillars of the Economy 
16 <http: ///'www. strategyforsuccess. info/page/about. cfin> accessed 26.10.05 
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Although broad goals in terms of `building a diversified, knowledge driven economy' 
and `raising the productivity of all businesses' were expressed, and the underlying 
aim of all three regional economic strategies was to reduce the performance gap 
between the North East and the remaining English regions, One NorthEast has never 
been explicit about the rationale for choosing particular clusters for support. I was 
told: 
The [clusters] that we believe are key in terms of underpinning wealth 
generation in the region are the ones that we have identified and I would argue 
that certain other ones - we need to give them support, create an environment 
for them, but the level of intervention is less than for those ones that we 
believe are absolutely critical (ONE representative 1) 
However, it was never made clear which were the `absolutely critical' clusters and 
throughout the agency, and the region, there was confusion about which clusters 
should be supported, and, indeed, what the cluster concept was: 
Well the honest answer to that is that it was handed to me (ONE representative 
6, when asked how the then current list of clusters/sectors had been compiled) 
And there were two questions [about the cluster policy] - which sectors do 
you want to support and secondly - why? Because nobody knew. [... ] There 
was lots of rhetoric. There was no rationale, there was no appreciation of the 
reality, it was very diluted, it was extremely broad in coverage (ONE 
representative 3). 
In a further demonstration of the difficulties of balancing the political approach and 
the evidence based approach to selecting clusters/sectors for support, the above 
sectors were announced, both on One NorthEast's website and in presentations, at the 
same time as further research was commissioned to obtain, according to the tender 
specification, an 'assessment of current and potential industry sector strengths within 
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the region' to allow `the inclusion of a clear articulation of sectoral strengths within 
the revised RES [3]'. 17 
Therefore, six years after the establishment of the RDAs, there was still not an 
understanding of the regional economy and the areas where One NorthEast could add 
value by being involved in a strategic manner, and there was yet another list of sectors 
for support to add to previous lists of clusters. These lists are tabulated in Table 5-2 
below. 
17 ONE Tender Specification CT05 06-02-05. Identifying and assessing sectoral strengths in the North 
East 
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Table 5-2 Clusters and Sectors Identified for Support by One NorthEast 
RES I Review of REST 
2002 
RES 2 RES 2 Policy 
Implementation 
framework 2002 
RES3 
Consultation 
High volume Automotive Automotive Automotive Automotive and 
manufacturing aerospace 
Low volume Offshore and high- Offshore Energy (including Oil and Gas 
manufacturing value added offshore, marine and 
engineering defence) 
Environmental Environmental Environment New and renewable 
Industries industries energy and 
environmental 
technologies 
Defence, aerospace and Defence and precision Defence (including 
component engineering naval marine) 
manufacturing 
Nuclear 
Chemicals (a sub cluster Bulk/base chemicals Base chemicals Base chemicals Chemicals 
of process industries) 
Pharmaceutical and Pharmaceutical and Pharmaceutical and 
speciality chemicals speciality chemicals speciality chemicals 
Food and Drink (a sub Food and Drink Food and Drink Food and Drink Food and Drink 
cluster of process 
industries) 
Agriculture and Life Biosciences Bioscience Life Sciences Health 
Sciences (a sub cluster of 
process industries) 
Tourism, heritage, Tourism and cultural Tourism Tourism 
leisure, culture and sport industries 
Creative industries Creative industries Creative Industries (not 
dealt with by the sector 
team) 
Nanotechnology Nanotechnology Nanotechnology 
Digital Digital Digital 
Electronics Electronics Electronics 
Transactional services Service industries* Service 
Industries Business Services 
(including retail) 
Bespoke services 
Clothing and Textiles Clothing and Textiles Clothing and Textiles 
Construction* Construction 
Logistics 
Public Authorities 
Voluntary Sector 
Natural resources Rural 
based clusters e. g. 
forestry* 
* indicates that clusters were described as 'to follow' 
Source: author's own representation 
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A cluster approach should permit a more detailed understanding of an economy. 
however, mapping exercises were not undertaken until 2002 when, according to ONE 
representative 1, `we then clearly recognised that we had quite a serious lack of 
detailed understanding of some of the clusters and how they operated in the region'. 
Contracts for the various mapping exercises were all let at the same time. The initial 
idea was to have a consistent methodology across the clusters, but that intention was 
never followed through. It could be argued that a consistent methodology would 
have, in any case, been inappropriate and the mapping exercise for the creative 
industries cluster, for example, took a very innovative approach (Benneworth, 2002). 
In line with a tendency to want quick results, the mapping exercises were conducted 
over a very short time scale, with the process intended to be complete within twelve 
weeks. Although the exercises did usually seek input from local `experts', there was 
no real attempt to win support for the cluster approach through the mapping exercises 
and the exercises produced mixed results. According to university representative 2: 
The cluster mapping exercise, so called, was supposed to be the springboard 
for taking actions. I think that stage has been very, very patchy. 
The exercise was also not ongoing. Some of the results were made available on One 
NorthEast's website and then removed; some were never published. By 2005, only 
the Food and Drink mapping exercise was accessible via the website. However, the 
process raised people's expectations and ONE representative 5 complained: 
Everyone who assumed they had a group of businesses working together or 
had had a mapping exercise done felt they were a regionally significant 
cluster. 
The selection of clusters for support has always appeared problematic for One 
NorthEast. Despite acknowledging in RES2 that the region has few globally 
competitive clusters, One NorthEast has attempted to have a cluster policy covering 
many economic specialisations. It is only in the Centres of Excellence programme 
that a more selective approach has been taken. This in itself is a high-risk strategy 
and a One NorthEast official accepted there was an element of picking winners, but 
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argued that was justified because it was not possible to be equally interventionist 
across the board: 
It is not all eggs in one basket, but there are quite a few of those eggs in one 
basket (ONE representative 1). 
The establishment of the Centres of Excellence also highlighted the difficulty of 
combining an industry-research model with a more general model of regional 
development as will be seen as the operationalisation of policies is considered. 
5.2.3 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
A key element of a cluster approach is the involvement of all parties to the cluster in 
developing the policy, with facilitation provided where necessary by public 
authorities. In this way, a cluster approach should not only ensure that policy is 
demand led, but it should also be cost effective as it should leverage in private 
resources. An additional element of the cluster approach is the need to have key 
actors, not necessarily within the public sector, who can animate and drive forward 
the cluster. Eklund et al. (2002) include the presence of cluster animators as a 
necessary condition for successful cluster development and, as discussed in section 
2.6.7, Camagni suggests a role for a local `collective agent' (1991, p. 133) in 
enhancing the milieu. 
In section 3.5.5, I discussed the role of cluster organisations, or as they are termed by 
Porter and Emmons (2003) `Institutions for Collaboration' (IFCs) and concluded that 
they can have an important role in the design and delivery of cluster policy. I also 
highlighted that policy-makers can have a positive or negative impact on the ability of 
cluster organisations to perform that role. 
In RES], One NorthEast identified that for each cluster there was a need for a set of 
formal institutional mechanisms, in the form of a representative organisation. In 
certain cases those organisations existed, but in other areas funding was to be given to 
establish organisations. The role of these organisations was partly to identify policy 
needs and identify instruments to meet those needs, but the initial idea, according to 
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ONE representative 4, had been to develop forums that would achieve group 
competence and exchange knowledge thus gaining competitive advantage. There was 
also an intention, stated in RES 1, to establish Cluster Development Teams, 
comprising key private companies, individuals with expertise from outside the region 
and relevant university and college based staff to prepare Cluster Development 
Programmes. Local authority staff, business support advisors and other public 
authority and voluntary sector organisations were to be involved as appropriate. ONE 
representative 1 commented that, at the outset: 
They really didn't know how to implement a policy, that's probably not true, 
but they were defining the means of how they would take that forward. 
Eklund et al. (2002) identified a division of labour in cluster development as a 
necessary condition for success, but in the case of One NorthEast's policy there was 
no clear division of labour and it was not clear who was responsible for different 
aspects of the process. 
By early 2002, as detailed above, the clusters selected for support had changed but it 
was reported that `[r]egional cluster development initiatives are now well underway in 
many industries with the establishment of business-led cluster teams' (One NorthEast, 
2002, p. 4). 
However, the relations between the cluster organisations or to use Porter's 
terminology, IFCs, and One NorthEast were problematic. In some cases new bodies 
were established, including an organisation known as the P&S Cluster, representing 
the pharmaceutical and speciality chemicals industries within the chemicals cluster. 
Some of the organisations that One NorthEast intended to use to deliver cluster 
activity were existing trade associations and the perception within One NorthEast was 
that the cluster development programme had encouraged those trade associations to 
seek public funds. According to ONE representative 5: 
In reality what happened was the organisations took the money and ran and 
delivered their core activity. 
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This may have been influenced by a history of public sector support for cluster 
organisations in the region, particularly through European Structural Fund 
programmes, which meant that members of organisations were not necessarily used to 
paying for the benefits, and the organisations expected funding to deliver their 
activities. 
The model that was frequently held up as best practice was an existing organisation, 
Northern Defence Industries (NDI). Not only did NDI have a particularly charismatic 
leader, it also worked in a very particular, focused way, to bring together small groups 
of, not necessarily regional, companies, to work on contracts. However, it would be 
unlikely to deliver a wider range of what would be termed cluster activity and did not 
directly undertake work on competitiveness or training as it focused on meeting the 
procurement requirements of major defence contractors. 
There were some issues with the cluster organisations. It was difficult to sustain 
private sector involvement because a lot of public sector bodies `sat round the table, 
talking about public sector outputs and how to fund their activity' (ONE 
representative 5). Others voiced the concern that the creation of host bodies is 
problematic, particularly when they are membership-driven, because the `clubs' 
created tend to want to keep non-members out. There was also a concern about the 
ability and skills within the cluster organisations and whether they were suited to 
delivering cluster activities. For example, a strategic vision for each cluster is 
required, but it is uncertain how this can be developed. 
The status of the Centres of Excellence was also problematic, partly because their 
remit in relation to the clusters was not clear. Only Codeworks, the digital media 
Centre of Excellence, performed the role of a typical cluster organisation. However, 
in healthcare, when One NorthEast realised that there was not a representative body, 
the Centre for Excellence in Life Sciences (CELS) were asked to develop a cluster 
strategy - although previously they had specifically seen their role as excluding that 
aspect. This was seen as an evolution in that CELS would still have its incubation 
and early stage commercialisation role, but would move forward to trying to get 
groups of healthcare companies together to identify strategic projects. 
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One NorthEast were in a powerful position in relation to these organisations as in 
many cases they provided substantial proportions of their funding. Over time One 
NorthEast reviewed the cluster organisations and for example, the P&S Cluster and 
TCI were seen as duplicating effort and the two organisations were brought together 
as NEPIC, the North East Process Industries Council, to focus on skills issues, export 
issues and order issues. One NorthEast tended to view some of the trade associations 
as offering only representation and lobbying for their members. One NorthEast's aim 
was to create organisations to create orders, increase revenue and decrease costs, 
however, this may ignore the more intangible benefits obtained from the existing 
functions of the organisations. 
To refer back to the five-part typology of (Benneworth et al., 2003) there were often 
existing `cluster organisations' delivering `cluster activity'. These organisations 
varied in effectiveness and often overlapped, reflecting the complicated nature of the 
regional economy. 
A second group of actors often involved in the development of cluster policy is 
universities. Universities were seen as being `at the heart of One NorthEast's 
regional economic strategies and initially Newcastle University, for example, 
conceived that it could have a strong role in the clusters policy of One NorthEast. A 
Business Development Team had been established with HEROBC funding and 
academics were working already working with clusters, for example the food and 
drink cluster. However, one university representative expressed the opinion that with 
the strong science push approach of the Strategy for Success model, the universities 
got separated from the elements of the cluster development programme that were not 
related to the Strategy for Success and therefore: 
The people who were cluster managers [at ONE] were not at all plugged into 
the knowledge base of the university and [the university's] business 
development managers, who were around, in a way got marginalised from 
discussion (university representative 1). 
The focus on the science push model also meant universities were predominantly 
valued for their technical knowledge. but not for their social, cultural, political 
190 
knowledge, which could have been particularly useful in terms of international 
marketing. 
Some academics felt they were kept at arm's length because of pressure from the DTI 
to have industry-led clusters. University representative 3 commented that if One 
NorthEast had identified the right academics in the region who knew how to `make it 
tick' with industry, had the energy to drive the process and the knowledge of funding 
regimes, the cluster policy process would have been more productive, but that 
approach was rejected because of a drive by DTI to be industry-led. This is not to say 
that One NorthEast did not seek to engage with the universities in the region, or to say 
that individual academics were not involved within clusters, but universities appeared 
to be sidelined from One NorthEast's cluster development programme. 
The role of businesses in the cluster policy process was also problematic. A cluster 
approach should encourage a more participatory method of policy-making and, as 
mentioned above, there was a desire for clusters to be `industry-led', but there were 
issues of time: 
They haven't really got time to say right let's sit down with a clean piece of 
paper, what's our strategy, how are we going to move forward [... ] because 
they are too busy fire fighting, too busy trying to win orders (university 
representative 5) 
Businesses could also not necessarily see where they fitted into the cluster approach: 
The problem we've got in the region now, because they decided we'd have 
these 14 regional clusters - if people don't see themselves fitting neatly in to 
one of the boxes, they don't see themselves as being involved in cluster 
activity (ONE representative 5). 
The focus of One North East had become clusters as an outcome, rather than the use 
of theories that underlie clusters as a method to improve business performance. As a 
result, there was little evidence of initiatives to build relationships and, although 
RES' had talked about 'clustering', the cluster development policy, which had at the 
191 
outset been intended to be inclusive, had become exclusive, because firms felt 
excluded from the programme. 
The constant change in the clusters selected for support caused widespread confusion 
and disillusionment, and the lack of progress caused businesses to drift away from the 
process. University representative 2 commented that `businesses remain unconvinced 
that this is something they can respond to, that they can identify with' and ONE 
representative 1 admitted that, `if you mentioned cluster programmes, people groaned, 
because there was such confusion about it'. Industry representative 1 commented of 
One NorthEast: 
I think they could have a role - it appears to be that they are struggling to find 
a role. They seem to be continually `is it clusters? Is it this? Is it that? ' And 
while they continue to pay a load of people to analyse that, they are not 
actually helping anyone. 
Certain key individuals and organisations did participate in One NorthEast's cluster 
development policy, but overall the opportunity to encourage participation was 
missed. Even in 2005, the action plans for the sectors were being drawn up by 
individual sector specialists within the agency and the industry involvement was, 
according to ONE representative 6, only to `sanity check all of those plans'. 
Although there was recognition that there was not enough external involvement, there 
was a continued tendency to draw up strategy within the agency, rather than seeking 
to mobilise industry leaders and cluster organisations, in order to build a consensus 
about what needed to be done within clusters. 
The role of policy-makers in cluster policy is different from former roles. The role is 
much more one of intermediary and facilitator or animateur (Morgan, 1997b). with 
the cluster actually being driven from within. There was a concern that those within 
the agency did not have a sufficient understanding of cluster concepts or the necessary 
skills to implement a cluster development policy. Many were drawn from an existing 
policy environment, but it was suggested that you require: 
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a cadre of people, professional intermediaries in the RDAs to tackle this really 
subtle question that for clusters to work you need a combination of soft tissue. 
hard infrastructure, industrial policies, working with national policies, working 
with the University (university representative 1) 
Even from within the agency there was a recognition that: 
If you have spent 30 years managing someone else's schemes of a fairly 
traditional nature and then you suddenly start coming across people that are 
sort of talking about developing significant institutions in the area of 
nanotechnology, then you might find it difficult to understand and the things 
that have really dogged us have not been in the area of overall policy - they 
have been much more at the nitty, gritty detailed level and that's been a hard 
learning curve for us (ONE representative 1). 
5.2.4 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
A cluster approach requires a new style of policy delivery with policy-makers acting 
as catalysts, to encourage the private sector to participate in policy development, and 
then as facilitators and brokers, to oversee the design and delivery of necessary policy 
actions. As can be seen the encouragement of private sector involvement proved 
difficult and a facilitator/broker role to policy delivery was very different from the 
role of the predecessor organisation to One NorthEast. `Part of the problem is that 
RDAs, rather than accepting a role as catalysts and brokers, are still tempted, as in the 
case of foreign investment acquisitions, to acquire full ownership and credit for the 
projects they are involved in' (Lagendijk and Charles, 1999, p. 139). 
One NorthEast can be seen as operating two of Boekholt and Thuriaux's (1999) and 
(2000) four broad `cluster policy models' - the industry-research link model and a 
more traditional regional development model and the policy instruments developed 
within each model were distinct. 
The Industry-Research Link Model: the Centres of Excellence. A substantial amount 
of funding was earmarked for the Strategy for Success programme, approximately 
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£200 million over 5 years. The idea was to establish five centres to exploit world- 
class research in the Region's universities. The Centres covered life sciences. process 
industries, new and renewable energy, nanotechnology and digital media. Although 
the underlying idea was that each Centre of Excellence might lead to the creation of 
an aspirational cluster, at the outset the Centres of Excellence did not have a remit to 
grow the cluster or even to develop links with the cluster. Instead they were seen as 
being a resource for the cluster. Only the Centre of Excellence for Digital Media, 
Codeworks, undertook cluster development work and brought companies together, 
and its status was subsequently changed so that it was no longer seen as a Centre of 
Excellence. While the Centres are fundamentally different from each other, the kind 
of activities they undertake can be seen from a brief review of two of the Centres. 
The Centre for Excellence in New and Renewable Energy, NAREC, has a focus on 
the provision of testing facilities for new forms of energy production, including wave 
and tidal tanks, an electrical lab to simulate connection to the national grid and a wind 
turbine blade test facility. However, it also provides incubation facilities and 
investment in technology businesses to fund development of product ideas. It is also 
seen as having a role in branding the North East as a hub for wind and wave 
renewable energy with the aim, partially, of attracting inward investment. The overall 
idea is to provide the infrastructure to enable the region to build on the skills of 
universities and the SMEs that support the supply chain. 
Recognising the region's universities' research strengths in oncology, ageing and 
health, genetics and stem cell research, and plant biotechnology, the Centre for 
Excellence in Life Sciences, CELS, was tasked with identifying areas of scientific 
excellence in the region that could be developed commercially. They also sought to 
promote the region's biotechnology capability worldwide and to attract talented 
individuals into the region. Like NAREC, CELS also sought to provide incubation 
facilities and investment particularly in start up companies. 
According to a One NorthEast briefing note: 
The Strategy for Success. with partners in business and the universities, is 
establishing the basis for a more successful and prosperous economy. whereby 
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businesses would engage in higher value adding activities, competing through 
innovation, design and functionality, by applying scientific and technological 
research outcomes (One NorthEast, 2005b), 
However, the history of the Centres of Excellence programme is relatively turbulent. 
Three of the centres have changed chief executive in their relatively short lives. The 
links between the Centres of Excellence and the clusters was initially unclear, 
although on the whole the Centres of Excellence were seen as providing a resource for 
a wider industry cluster. ONE representative 7 described the initially strong links 
between the two programmes as having become `muddled and lost'. 
The Regional Development Model: The Cluster Development Programme. Having 
invested so heavily in the industry-research model of cluster development, the status 
of the residual cluster development programme was unclear. The Strategy for 
Success team, overseeing the Centres of Excellence, worked very independently for 
the first eighteen months of its existence, even being based in a different location 
from the cluster development team. 
Given the investment in the Strategy for Success programme, the direct budgets for 
the other parts of cluster development were not large either as a proportion of One 
NorthEast's budget or in comparison with the cluster development budget of other 
RDAs. While one of the benefits of a cluster development programme is its low cost 
and ability to leverage in private sector resources, the small budget available meant 
that the cluster development team needed to influence other public sector activity and 
to encourage the private sector to invest. However, given the troubled status of 
cluster development this was difficult to achieve. 
The difficulty in teasing out a coherent series of activities is also compounded by the 
existence of sub-regional partnerships to whom One NorthEast devolved a large 
proportion of its funding. As discussed in section 5.1.2, there are four sub-regional 
partnerships within the region and some of those had their own cluster development 
programmes, which, while overlapping, did not appear to be coordinated with One 
NorthEast's cluster development programme. Even within One NorthEast there 
appeared to be a differentiation between those clusters that were eligible for funding 
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under the Objective 2 Structural Funds programme and those that were not, and also 
the culture and tourism clusters came to be the responsibility of the Tourism and 
Regeneration Directorate, rather than the cluster development team. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Raines (2002) groups policy measures under three 
headings - those intended to increase interaction amongst cluster actors, those 
intended to develop common resources to improve the competitiveness of the cluster 
and those intended to build and project an identity of the cluster. The Centres of 
Excellence programme was narrowly focused on the development of a particular 
resource - research expertise within the universities and also to an extent on image 
building. Due to the difficulties that had been encountered in analysing the economy 
of the region, the constant change in clusters selected for support and the general 
confusion surrounding the cluster development programme it is difficult to identify 
coherent action plans for the clusters selected for support. It was therefore difficult to 
demonstrate progress and the small steps required to build momentum and trust 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999, Ceglie et al., 1999) were in many cases not 
achieved, partially because of difficulties earlier in the process whereby clusters were 
not properly identified and did not become animated. Gilsing (2001) identifies the 
need for a learning policy-maker who can switch from analysis to action, but ONE 
representative 6 expressed the opinion that: 
the agency is skewed so much towards planning and policy, it makes it very 
difficult for business led initiatives to actually get through the system. 
A key aspect of cluster policy is that the policy instruments selected should be 
specific to the cluster in question. However, partially as a result of the difficulties 
detailed above, there was a tendency to look for generic measures that could be 
applied to all clusters. University official 2, talking about the need for tailored 
solutions, commented: 
I think that all gets put in the too difficult box. It is much cheaper to mount big 
generic [programmes]. 
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It is inevitable that the policy aims for clusters will reflect the overall aims of the 
RDA and, following the publication of RES2, the focus for all the clusters was to be 
productivity enhancement, innovation, and gap identification and response. Again 
echoing previous policies, other officials mentioned the need to encourage inward 
investment. One NorthEast representatives talked about `gap identification and 
response', which built on previous work around supply chains. Productivity 
enhancement was based around the work of NEPA, the North East Productivity 
Alliance. NEPA had been set up to work on the automotive supply chain on projects 
such as the Digital Factory, which looked at the digitisation of the manufacturing 
process, but its relevance to other clusters was not clear. By 2005 the `offering to 
business' of the cluster/sector development team was to increase revenue, decrease 
costs, identify new market opportunities and develop networks, in order to obtain 
jobs, orders and new businesses, but again the intended `toolkit' was very generic. 
The stress on productivity by 2005, and the possible perception that all innovation 
related to the Centres of Excellence, reduced the emphasis on innovation within the 
sector team and there was an ongoing emphasis on supply chain work, which had 
been the specialism of One NorthEast's forerunner, NDC. In addition, the focus 
tended to be on providing business support to individual businesses rather than in 
encouraging the interaction between businesses that would lead to increased trust, 
untraded interdependencies and other relational assets. 
Again returning to Benneworth et al. 's (2003) five-part typology, it should be noted 
that cluster activity is distinct from cluster policy. Despite the lack of signs of 
progress being initiated under the One NorthEast's cluster development programme, 
there was cluster activity going on in the region. There was funding for small 
collaborative projects - RCID received funds to purchase hardware and software to 
use with their client base of 300 companies. Within the renewable energy field, 
clustering activity was being undertaken by differing cluster organisations including 
NE BioDiesel, Biomass Initiative, Photovoltaics North East (PVNE) and NOF 
Renewables. Although these projects were partly funded by One NorthEast and 
involved more interaction between firms, what was less visible was the strategic role 
from One NorthEast in cluster development. 
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Where the analysis of the cluster was strong and the cluster was consistently 
identified as being appropriate for support, progress can be more easily identified. 
The Food and Drink Cluster has been recognised as a regionally significant cluster 
since the first Regional Economic Strategy in 1999 and there had been a sector- 
working group in the late 1980s, which had led to the NE Food and Drink Federation, 
although by 2002 this was in abeyance. A detailed mapping exercise was undertaken 
in 2002 and a strategy was devised with the involvement of industrialists and support 
agencies in the region. 18 
Similarly the Creative Industries cluster, although not recognised as a cluster until 
2002, used the mapping exercise conducted by CURDS as a springboard to further 
development. Although consultations were held, the mapping exercise was seen as 
having little direct input from businesses so a series of `co-creative' dinners were held 
to bring together businesses and partner organisations. From these emerged eight 
broad project proposals for each of which it was intended to produce a detailed 
delivery plan. One of the participants told me that a lot of people had been involved 
up to this stage, but operationalisation proved difficult and some of those who had 
been involved became disillusioned at both the time taken to achieve results and the 
time they were having to devote to the endeavours. By 2005 the creative industries 
were no longer detailed amongst the list of strategic sectors, and policies relating to 
them were generated by the Tourism and Regeneration Directorate of One NorthEast. 
Again successful initiatives, such as the Cultural Skills Development Initiative, were 
funded by One NorthEast and a participant in the work of the Creative Industries 
Cluster maintained that there were able and competent staff within One NorthEast 
with responsibility for the creative and cultural industries, but a coherent cluster 
approach was not clearly identifiable. 
Another key role One North-East has sought to undertake has been the identification of 
market opportunities to foster the restructuring of the economy, but it is debatable 
how well resourced they are to fulfil this task. Opportunities were identified in 
nuclear decommissioning and wind energy, and substantial efforts were put into 
18 Great North East Food and Drink: Food and Drink Sectoral Support Strategy and Food and Drink 
Cluster Mapping (2002) for One NorthEast. 
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developing awareness in the SME community of these markets. One NorthEast 
commissioned research into the supply chain for wind energy. Pursuing such 
opportunities is highly resource intensive and entails a type of Foresight role in 
identifying early market and technology trends, bringing them to the attention of 
firms, encouraging investment into the region and developing links with outside areas 
showing positive trends. The precise role for a Regional Development Agency in this 
respect is unclear. NAREC are involved in the wind energy supply chain initiatives 
and RCID have been working with One NorthEast on nuclear decommissioning. 
Therefore while there is evidence of clustering activity within the region, there is an 
acceptance within One NorthEast that the cluster development programme has `never 
gone the way it's supposed to have gone' (ONE representative 6). The difficulty in 
developing policy instruments tailored to the individual clusters is largely related to 
the difficulties in earlier stages of the cluster policy-making process. Without a clear 
understanding of clusters and without the participation of key actors from those 
clusters in the design of policy, it is impossible to design tailored policies for clusters. 
Without a detailed idea the division of labour and the allocation of responsibilities, 
operationalising policies is also difficult. What also seems to have been lacking, 
despite the intentions in RES2, is any policy to encourage clustering, not necessarily 
within designated clusters, which may have been more beneficial given the structure 
of the economy. The Regional Service for Clustering, the subject of the chapter 7, did 
seek to encourage such clustering. 
5.2.5 Evaluation and Policy Learning 
Within One NorthEast there is an acknowledgement that the cluster policy has not 
gone well, it has been difficult to put into practice and a lot of time was spent in 
talking about what were clusters and what were not. Lessons have been learnt and 
during interviews there was acknowledgement that maintaining the Centres of 
Excellence so separately from the cluster development programme was problematic 
and also that with certain designated clusters, for example, textiles, so little progress 
was being made that no further policy would be developed. There have been 
substantial changes to the cluster development programme and therefore there must 
have been an internal review. and there are references within external documents to 
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`reviewing regional commitments including strategy for success and clusters', 19 but 
this has not been clearly communicated outside the agency. 
In section 3.5.7, I highlighted that evaluation can be of an `accounting' kind, whereby 
progress is assessed against numeric targets, and the performance of the Agency is 
measured quarterly by the DTI against such targets. Similarly, individual projects 
funded by One NorthEast or with European Structural Funds have been subject to 
evaluation. The cluster strategy as a whole was evaluated as part of the evaluation of 
RES I undertaken in 2002 (SQW Limited, 2002) and RES2 undertaken during 2005 
(Frontline Consultants, 2005). 
The evaluation by Frontline Consultants makes the point that RES2 does not identify 
specific measurable indicators to assess progress under each theme. Consequently 
Frontline Consultants used the Tier 2 and 3 indicators required by the DTI and used 
Gross Value Added per capita and labour productivity as measures for the success of 
the `Creating wealth by raising the productivity of all businesses' theme, within which 
the cluster development programme fell. Frontline Consultants also noted the lack of 
`bottom up' assessments of activities and projects, which would have added to the 
statistical analysis. There does not appear to have been any attempt to produce 
evaluations of the progress of individual clusters. In addition the evaluation of the 
cluster policy process has not been an integral part of the cluster policy-making 
process and had this been done there might have been more of a recognition of the 
need to move from strategy to implementation. 
Although, as has been noted in section 3.5.7, there have been moves in Scotland, and 
more recently in Wales, to design and implement cluster evaluation frameworks, this 
lack of clear evaluation frameworks is not unusual, and throughout the RDAs there 
have been issues in respect of how to evaluate cluster development programmes. with 
some agencies attempting top down broad, thematic evaluations and other agencies. 
including Yorkshire Forward, proposing a bottom up approach building on the 
19 Discussion paper for SPMG meeting 8.9.04 accessed on 18 November 2005 at 
<http: / www. europeanfundingne. co. uk/downloads/meetings, '? 0041109111001. doc> 
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evaluation of individual projects. 20 However, the constant change in policy approach 
within One NorthEast appears to have hampered the development of an evaluation 
framework. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The decision to take a cluster approach was to an extent imposed on One NorthEast 
by central government and influenced by European Structural Fund requirements. 
The aims of cluster policy, and economic development policy in general, did change 
over the first five years of One NorthEast's existence, but there was an underlying 
desire to effect a quick change to the structure of the region's economy, and the 
cluster development programme and Strategy for Success were seen as key tools for 
achieving such a change. However, the move to cross-departmental working that a 
cluster policy requires was difficult to achieve within the Regional Development 
Agency and ONE representative 6 reported: 
A lot of people see clusters as being a totally separate entity to everything else 
that goes on. We have inward investment, we have business support, we have 
Regional Selective Assistance, and then in its own box they see clusters. 
An apparent difficulty in understanding cluster concepts appeared to lead to an 
inability to stabilise a cluster development policy and a related inability to 
demonstrate progress in cluster development. These factors contributed to the 
decision by One NorthEast to move away from the explicit use of the term 'cluster'. 
However, I would argue that the three pillars approach, more recently adopted, still 
represents a cluster approach and that policies to support the energy and environment, 
processing industries and healthcare and health sciences `pillars' and their component 
`sectors' should be informed by an understanding of clusters and the policy processes 
required to support them. There have been continual difficulties in the cluster policy- 
making process within One NorthEast, particularly due to problems in identifying, 
selecting and analysing clusters within the region. To illustrate the effect of these 
20 Information obtained from telephone conversation with Bea Jefferson, Head of Evaluation, 
Yorkshire Forward, the Regional Development Agency for Yorkshire and Humberside. 
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difficulties on the outcomes of the cluster development programme I want to look at 
the impact of One NorthEast's cluster development policy on the marine and offshore 
industries in the region in the next chapter, before looking at an alternative case of a 
cluster policy initiative in chapter 7. 
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6 The Impact of Cluster Policy on the Marine and Offshore Engineering 
Cluster in North East England: One NorthEast's Cluster Development 
Programme 
The previous chapter used a cluster policy process model to examine the way in 
which One NorthEast's cluster policy developed. By examining the policy process I 
have demonstrated that the goals of, and background to, the policy-making process 
impact upon the development of cluster policy. I now want to look at One 
NorthEast's development of policy for a specific cluster, to demonstrate that existing 
relationships and activities within a cluster affect, and are affected by, particular 
interpretations of the concept of clusters and cluster policy, and that those 
interpretations influence the outcomes of cluster policy. Chapter 7 then examines the 
development of an alternative policy approach and Chapter 8 considers the outcomes 
of that approach. In both cases the need for policy to consider the role of trust and 
untraded interdependencies in developing the perceived advantages of clusters is 
highlighted, as is the length of time required to develop these assets. In the case of 
regional cluster policy the role of existing cluster organisations or, as Porter terms 
them, `institutions for collaboration' (Porter and Emmons, 2003) is seen as 
particularly significant, because it can be through these organisations that networks 
form and activities conducive to the development of untraded interdependencies 
occur. 
The cluster I have used to examine the outcomes of both policy approaches is the 
marine and offshore engineering cluster. Many studies of clusters and cluster policy 
focus on `new' industries, but for several reasons this more traditional cluster is a 
useful case study through which to examine the questions raised in the previous 
chapter. Firstly, although the industries within the cluster are well established in the 
region, they have undergone significant change and face considerable challenges and 
therefore this case study can provide lessons for developing cluster policy for more 
mature industries. Secondly. a complicated institutional framework has grown up 
within the cluster and therefore the role of a variety of cluster organisations can be 
identified. Thirdly. policy from all governmental scales has impacted upon the cluster 
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and therefore the interdependency of regional cluster policy with other scales of 
policy can be examined. 
In section 6.1, I provide a background to the marine and offshore industries in the 
North East and highlight some of the relationships that exist between actors. In 
section 6.2, I outline the institutional framework and range of cluster organisations 
that have arisen, in order to highlight both the complexity of that framework and the 
benefits that arise from those organisations. In section 6.3, I analyse One NorthEast's 
policy approach to the cluster, again using the cluster policy process model outlined in 
Chapter 3. In Section 6.4, I conclude that, while One NorthEast's cluster policy 
towards the marine and offshore engineering cluster has been flawed, there were 
particular issues and difficulties in designing policy for this cluster. 
6.1 Background 
The marine sector, as a whole, throughout the United Kingdom, is characterised by 
diversity and complexity and is very difficult to identify from SIC code data. Scottish 
Enterprise found marine related companies across 99 separate four-digit SIC codes. 21 
The Marine Foresight Panel defined marine related activities as `those activities 
which involve working on or in the sea, together with those activities that are 
involved in the production of goods or the provision of services that will themselves 
directly contribute to activities on or in the sea'. 22 UK Trade and Investment operate 
a much narrower definition of the marine sector, `Boat building; cruise ships; EEZ 
(Exclusive Economic Zones) related equipment and services (marine only); Inland 
waterway craft; Leisure boats; Marine equipment and associated services: 
Powerboats; Sail craft; Ship repair and conversion; Shipbuilding and associated 
services; Ships; Superyacht building, repair and conversion and equipment; 
Workboats; Yachts'. 23 
21 Marine Engineering, Technologies and Services Cluster Analysis. A report for Scottish Enterprise 
by Frontline Management Consultants and Ron Botham Associates (June 2000) 
22 Foresight Progress Through Partnership 16: Marine, Office of Science and Technology (1997) 
23 ýwww. uktradeinvest. gov. uk> 
'104 
There is no statistical analysis of the significance of these industries in the region, but 
a desk based analysis of the North East membership of various industries bodies24 
identifies a minimum of 180 companies operating in the marine, offshore and subsea 
sectors. This figure is adjusted to exclude organisations such as solicitors, banks and 
colleges who may be members of marine and offshore organisations, and will be an 
underestimate as many smaller SMEs may be excluded. These industries have also 
represented a sizeable, if difficult to quantify, workforce in the region, estimated at 
between 25,000 to 38,000 in 400 firms in 2000 (Department of the Environment 
Transport and the Regions, 2000). The cluster in the North East of England is 
depicted schematically in Figure 6-2 below, in which three overlapping areas are 
identified - ship building, construction for the offshore oil and gas industry and 
construction of renewable offshore energy equipment. The size and scope and 
evolution of these different aspects of the cluster are considered below. 
6.1.1 Shipbuilding: `They build ships here to perfection y25 
There is a long history of marine industries in North East England, with one of the 
earliest examples being shipbuilding, driven by a need to transport coal and other 
cargoes from the region. Indeed shipbuilding pre dated the industrial era, with a 
galley for the king's fleet being built in Newcastle in 1294 and shipbuilding recorded 
in Sunderland from 1346, and at Stockton from 1470. By the early seventeenth 
century shipbuilding was well established on the Tyne as demonstrated by the 
foundation of a shipwright's guild in Newcastle. The skills of the shipwrights, in 
repairing ships at sea, were easily transferred to wooden ship construction. 
Shipbuilders in the North East of England pioneered the production of iron vessels 
and the use of steam power, and the Tyne was to become one of the world's centres 
for metal shipbuilding. Skills developed in boiler making were easily transferred to 
24 Author's own 2005 analysis of regional membership of ND! Marine, NOF, NEKS project at Durham 
University Business School, NEMOC, Shipbuilders and Ship Repairers Association (SSA), Tyne First 
25 Said to have been written by Daniel Defoe of Newcastle at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
and quoted in Lost Shipyards of the Ti vie (French & Smith, 2004), which has been used extensively for 
this section. 
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shipbuilding in iron, but it was soon steel that was the preferred metal for ship 
construction. The world's first steam turbine-driven warship was built at Hawthorn 
Leslie's Hebburn yard, drawing on the local engine making skills of Sir Charles 
Parsons. Other innovations involved the use of welding to replace riveting. However. 
by the First World War, shipbuilding in the North East, which had been a world 
leader in technological developments, was already starting to lose its edge (Tomaney 
et al., 1999). 
The industry was always cyclical. Hawthorn Leslie's Hebburn workforce was 
reduced to only 600 in the early 1930s, rising again to 6,000 during the Second World 
War. Between 1928 and 1930 the Redheads yard launched 13 cargo vessels, but only 
one new ship was completed between 1930 and 1937, with the yard surviving on ship 
repair work. There was a further peak during the Second World War when 35 ships 
were constructed at the yard. The region continued to produce a substantial 
proportion of UK output, but the UK market share of world output fell from 24% in 
1946 to 7% in 1960 (Tomaney et al., 1999). Tomaney et al. point out that in a 
growing market, absolute levels of output were maintained for a time, but 
shipbuilding was moving towards large scale, capital-intensive production that did not 
accord with the facilities at the UK yards. Lord Geddes' report of 1966 (Geddes, 
1966) recommended amalgamation of yards into regional consortia and the industry 
was subsequently nationalised in 1977. 
At the end of 1918, there were 20 shipyards on the Tyne alone, however global trends 
in shipbuilding have seen production move to areas such as China, Korea and Japan, 
with European shipbuilding moving into more specialist areas (cf. Eich-Born and 
Hassink, 2005). The leisure boat industry, which has been a source of growth in the 
South of England, does not exist in the North East. Most of the yards have now 
disappeared under business developments, with the most striking example being 
Sunderland, where there were 65 shipyards in 1840 making it the largest shipbuilding 
town in the world, but no shipbuilding industry at all by the late 1980s. 
Although the A&P Group still has a presence on the Tyne and the Tees, the only true 
ship builder on the Tyne is now Swan Hunter (Tyneside) Limited, bought out of 
receivership in 1995 by Jaap Kroese. During its history, Swan Hunter had built over 
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1,600 ships at its Wallsend and Neptune yards (Rae and Smith, 2001). It had been 
privatised in 1986 and during the 1980s there was an increasing reliance on warship 
orders, including HMS Ark Royal and HMS Illustrious, because the yard had been 
designated as a warship builder and was therefore ineligible for European 
Commission subsidies for merchant shipbuilding. It had gone into receivership on 
May 13,1993 having failed to secure the order for the helicopter carrier, HMS Ocean. 
Jaap Kroese also bought the Port Clarence Yard on the Tees, although this was 
mothballed in 200526. 
Early contracts were for ship conversions and Swan Hunter (Tyneside) Limited 
converted the merchant ship Solitaire into the world's largest pipeline laying vessel, 
securing 3,000 jobs for 20 months, followed by the conversion of Global Producer 
into an FPSO (floating production, storage and offloading) vessel. However, the yard 
also secured orders to build two 16,000 tonne amphibious landing vessels for the 
Ministry of Defence. 
Naval shipbuilding in the United Kingdom is witnessing a resurgence with the United 
Kingdom navy due to embark on a substantial replacement of its fleet, with up to six 
new ship programmes over the next 15 years - the Type 45 destroyer, the Astute-class 
attack submarine, the Joint Casualty Treatment Ship (JCTS), the Miltary Afloat Reach 
and Sustainability programme (MARS), the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) and 
most significantly the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF). 
The CVF project was initiated in 1998 and relates to the construction of two aircraft 
carriers, costing in the region of £3bn, which could be the largest warships ever 
constructed in the United Kingdom, displacing 65,000 tonnes and being 280 metres 
long. The proposal was to construct the ships in super blocks and transport the blocks 
to one shipyard for final assembly. It is anticipated that non-shipbuilder suppliers will 
provide in excess of 50% of the value of each vessel, 
27 offering substantial 
28 
opportunities in the supply chain. The process was highly protracted, but a physical 
26 Yard work ends, report in the Evening Chronicle May 20 2005 
2' Can the United Kingdom Rebuild Its Naval Fleet? Rand Europe Research Brief w ww. rand. org 
28 Still ongoing in 2006 
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integrator, KBR Ltd, was appointed in 2005. It was originally envisaged that Swan 
Hunter would be one of only four UK shipyards competing for work on the main 
structure of the CVF project, however, in December 2005, it was announced that none 
of the super blocks would be awarded to Swan Hunter, but would instead go to BAE 
Systems in Govan and Barrow, VT Group in Portsmouth and Babcock in Rosyth. It 
became apparent that smaller yards, including A&P Tyne, could, however, bid for 
sub-packages of work, with the super superstructure above the hangar deck being 
constructed in over twenty upper blocks. 29 
Given the fragility of the offshore fabrication and shipbuilding industries there was 
always a need to identify alternative sources of work pending the possible naval 
contracts. This need was heightened by the decision by the Ministry of Defence to 
not award the construction of CVF super blocks to Swan Hunter and to remove the 
last ship under construction on the Tyne, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Larg's Bay, from 
Swan Hunter to be completed on the Clyde due to an escalation of costs and 
dissatisfaction with performance. A working group was established to explore 
opprotunities for job creation on the Swan Hunter site. 30 
Swan Hunter had already been investigating the possibility of establishing a ship 
recycling facility, potentially using the dry dock on the North side of the Tyne, 
vacated by A&P's consolidation at their Hebburn Yard. Ship scrapping is 
predominantly undertaken at present in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China and 
there are concerns about the health and safety implications of procedures in these 
countries. There is a growing interest in recycling ships and it is likely that the north 
east's industrial strengths give it potential in this area. The Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency have estimated that approximately 750 ships of a weight greater than 500 
tonnes are decommissioned worldwide each year, with a further 2,000 single hulled 
vessels requiring decommissioning over the next 5 to 10 years. In July 2005, the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee agreed that the International Maritime 
Organisation should develop, as a high priority, a new instrument on recycling of 
29 <http: /i www. mod. uk'DefenceInternet/FactSheets/Proj ectFcatsheets/WhatNext. htm> 
'0, - http: //www. newcastle. gov. uk/press. nsf'Iatestbyid/D879 150B5525648380257 
1 E200369583? 
opendocument> 
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ships with a view to providing legally binding and globally applicable ship recycling 
regulations for international shipping and for recycling facilities by 2008. In 2005, 
British Maritime Technology assessed the United Kingdom's ship recycling 
capability on behalf of The Department of Environment, Food and Rural affairs. 
Ship repair ranges from routine maintenance and repair, done almost `en route', to 
major refits where projects are more internationally mobile. From 2000 to 2003. 
United Kingdom turnover in ship repair and conversion increased by 25% to Euro 420 
million. 31 A&P Tyne, the main ship repairer on the Tyne had turnover of £31 m in the 
first half of 2004, compared with £36m in the whole of 2003, but the industry is 
cyclical and by November 2004 they had mothballed one of their two Tyneside yards 
and announced 48 redundancies from their workforce of 283. 
In addition to ship building, ship repair and the potential for ship recycling, there are 
other related industries in the North East. It is estimated that over 50% of ship 
construction involves subcontracted work (RAND Europe, 2005) and there remains a 
significant supply chain in the region in this respect. Within the shipbuilding supply 
chain, and as will be seen below, in the offshore fabrication supply chain, there are 
many firms that offer general engineering and services to a large range of sectors, 
albeit some companies focus on the marine market. There are specialist suppliers 
providing marine equipment e. g. coatings/paints and specialist blinds to both local 
fabricators and worldwide markets. Although UK shipbuilding is in decline, world 
shipbuilding is forecast to continue to grow. Figures are not available for the region, 
but the UK marine equipment industry has an annual turnover of around £ 1.7 billion, 
of which 62% is exported32. Within the region there are also a range of naval 
architects; draughting companies, marine engineers and consultants, and specialists in 
shipyard and port design. There are also a number of marine and offshore recruitment 
and labour supply services. 
Marine Sector Technology Plan, DTI 2005 
32 Competitive Analysis of the UK Marine Equipment Sector, DTI 2001 
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6.1.2 Offshore Construction 
In other regions significant investment has been made to retain shipbuilding capacity- 
(Hassink, 2005), but in the North East of England, as shipbuilding declined through 
the 1970s, an offshore fabrication industry grew up, constructing major platforms for 
oil production within the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS). To an extent 
new industries grew from the ashes of the old and the yards survived by not building 
ships. The physical infrastructure of the shipyards transferred easily into this new 
market and the skills that had been developed for shipbuilding also transferred to 
offshore construction. 
The North East became an acknowledged world leader in offshore platform 
construction and it has been estimated that as many as 80% of the platforms in the 
UKCS involved North East companies as prime contractors or suppliers. 33 In 
particular the use of FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Offloading) technology 
for oil extraction was a boon to the region, because it involved converting vessels to 
take topside oil production facilities on deck. In 2002, the Amec yard undertook a 
£300 million contract to refit the 300,000 tonne Bonga for oil production in Nigeria. 
Offshore fabrication is a cyclical industry and by 2004 the position had become 
extremely fragile, especially on the Tyne. In 2002 the industry in the Northeast had 
been relatively buoyant with the AMEC yard undertaking the above work on the 
Bonga. Subsequently the AMEC yard was mothballed and faces an extremely 
uncertain future and McNulty Offshore had a period in administration. However 
Heerema on Teesside won a substantial part of the construction of the Buzzard 
contract for the oil company, EnCana. The oil and gas industry still intends to invest 
over £ 18bn in the UK Continental Shelf during 2003 to 201034, albeit an increasing 
proportion of development is subsea and further substantial large-scale platform 
fabrication is unlikely. There are however possibilities in offshore decommissioning 
with costs of decommissioning projected to be £9.1 billion (2003 money) to 
203035 
33 Alan Campbell MP in parliamentary debate 4 April 2000. Recorded in Hansard Official Reports of 
Parliamentary Debates, The Stationery Office. London 
'4 Maximising Britain's Oil and Gas Resources UKOOA Economic Report 2004 
Maximising Britain 's Oil and Gas Resources UKOOA Economic Report 2004 
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and the North East having the necessary skills and facilities to handle 
decommissioning projects. The market is emerging and remains dependent on the oil 
and gas operators' plans for the North Sea infrastructure. 
Even within the offshore market the range of products provided is wide, extending 
from the manufacture of specialist valves to the provision of survival equipment for 
helicopter passengers en route to offshore installations. Additionally the technology 
used in oil and gas extraction is changing and moving away from large platform 
construction. According to a manufacturer in the industry, `high tech subsea trees, 
manifolds, flowlines and control systems are replacing the B. M. T. s (Big Metal 
Things)'. 36 Firms within the North East have a growing interest in such subsea 
technology and there is evidence of an emerging subsea technologies cluster arising 
from the region's long history of pipeline expertise, the presence of two world-leading 
firms in the production of subsea flexible products, DUC037 and Wellstream38 and a 
number of highly innovative SMEs (Siedlok and Andriani, forthcoming). The 
manufacture and installation of subsea equipment serves many markets - including oil 
and gas, renewable energy instalations, defence, nuclear and telecommunications. 
However, the main market relates to the manufacture and installation of subsea 
equipment for subsea oil and gas exploration and production (including the 
manufacture of pipes that go down from FPSOs to the seabed) and it is a growing 
industry, not only in the UKCS but also worldwide, as subsea production grows at the 
expense of new platforms, and oil and gas production moves towards deeper waters 
and smaller fields, requiring different technologies. Subsea production now takes 
place in depths beyond 2,300 metres and demand is strong in Brazil, West Africa and 
the Gulf of Mexico. In the North Sea, subsea technology is being used to increase the 
field life of existing assets. 2,349 subsea wells are forecast to be installed in the period 
2006/10. This represents an 89% growth from the period 1999/03, where 1,242 wells 
'`' Allen Southern writing in the NOF directory 2004 -2005 
37 Duco is a manufacturer of control umbilicals for subsea production systems. It has been based in 
Walker, Newcastle since 1990 and has approximately 350 employees and revenue for the Newcastle 
plant in excess of £ 100 million. 
'8 Wellstream is a manufacturer of unbonded flexible flowlines and risers established in 1989. 
Headquartered in the north east since 1996, it has 430 employees locally and spends over £30 million 
in the region per annum. 90° o of its output is exported. 
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were installed. 39 Durham University Business School have identified over 100 
companies in the region involved in the subsea industry many of them being world 
leaders in their respective fields. 
6.1.3 Offshore Renewable Energy Construction 
Developments in energy markets and increasing concerns with regard to climate 
change are leading to a growing interest in wet renewables (offshore wind, and wave 
and tidal energy sources). Smith Reay (2002) noted the potential to exploit this 
emerging market, given the presence of the United Kingdom's first offshore wind 
farm at Blyth, specialist consultancy capability and existing manufacturing expertise. 
However, this remains only an emerging market. 
6.1.4 The Cluster: Firm Relationships and Rivalries 
In terms of relationships amongst the fabrication yards, bilateral agreements in terms 
of labour have long existed between the yards on each river, so that one yard would 
move workers to another yard, but retain them on their own books. In boom times 
work would be moved between the yards and there was movement of staff and 
management too. Wider groupings of firms have also come together and in the 1970s 
there was an umbrella group of six ship repair yards called Tyne Ship Repair Group. 
Despite a perception of union militancy, sources from both the yards and the unions 
reported a long history of partnership between the unions and the yards and trade 
unions were involved in marketing missions overseas. Despite these arrangements 
between the yards, other sources highlighted a lack of trust and `huge cleavages 
between the employers based upon personal animosity' and highlighted the fragility 
of the relationships in that `the relationships are as cyclical as the work - when things 
are going well people get on better' (trade union official 1). The yards were often 
competing for the same work, but would collaborate when work was plentiful. 
The supply chain for the fabrication yards is diverse and, as mentioned above, is not 
exclusively serving the shipbuilding and offshore industries. When the offshore 
industry began its rise to prominence in the North East, this supply chain was ill 
39 <http: /; ý,, Aw, A,. infield. com subsea production_market_reports. htm> 
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defined and relatively anonymous but it has subsequently been developed. Within the 
SME community in the cluster there is a certain level of personal knowledge of other 
actors. People have often worked together in the past and know, or at least know of, 
each other. In certain cases there were close working relationships in the supply 
chain, with joint development of products and technologies occurring. That said, on 
occasion, people highlighted that, although they knew of people, it took an organised 
meeting to bring them together as they would not have met through normal business 
engagements. Networking and informal learning exchanges did not necessarily occur 
exclusively within the region and the managing director of one valve company 
reported networking nationally with contacts made through national trade associations 
and mutual suppliers. 
Therefore there were relationships, within and outside the region, beneficial to 
businesses throughout the industries comprising the marine and offshore engineering 
cluster. Some were long standing, close working relationships, whereas others were 
more pragmatic, functional and dependent on specific business opportunities. What 
was particularly interesting was that the names of certain key individuals were often 
mentioned during interviews as being significant or as having brought together a 
number of firms. 
6.2 The Institutional Framework of the Cluster 
A complicated institutional framework has developed from these relationships and a 
series of organisations have been formed, sometimes with support from policy- 
makers, but usually instigated from within the industries. To use the terminology of 
Benneworth et al. (2003) these could be termed `cluster organisations' or in Porter's 
terminology, `institutions for collaboration'. I would argue that these organisations 
themselves form a kind of 'collective asset' or `club good' available for firms within 
the cluster to draw upon, and that these cluster organisations are able to produce other 
cluster assets of the kind that cluster policy-makers would seek to deliver. 
Because, as was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, these organisations 
affect, and are affected by. the policy-making process, I want to look at a range of 
these cluster organisations in order to consider their origin, the activities they organise 
and the way in which they have contributed to the production of cluster assets and 
214 
other forms of untraded interdependencies. I will then go on to emphasise the 
significance of the organisations in terms of cluster policy development. 
6.2.1 Northern Offshore Federation 
The Northern Offshore Federation was formed in 1988. Significant actors within the 
offshore industry in the region thought there could be a role for a representative 
organisation in the region, and a member of staff from the AMEC offshore yard was 
seconded to approach companies in the offshore industry to see if they were interested 
in such an organisation. 
The offshore construction industry has a clear pyramid structure with, at the top, the 
oil companies, as clients, followed by the prime contractors, many of whom were 
based in the North East, beneath which were several layers of smaller suppliers. At 
the outset Northern Offshore Federation was very tightly restricted to the offshore 
industry and did not include shipbuilding. Its role was to strengthen and develop the 
supply chain by raising awareness of, and within, that supply chain. It soon grew to 
300 members of two different types - those supplying oil companies direct and those 
supplying main fabricators. Unique factors led to its success -a brand new, 
emerging, local market; prime contractors in the locality; the need for a new supply 
chain and SMEs who could form that supply chain due to the strong engineering base 
in the region. 
Northern Offshore Federation initially offered information dissemination and market 
information. Its activities included meetings with project managers from the major oil 
companies who would visit and explain their procurement policy. The Federation 
also provided information on the stringent requirements of the industry (for example 
in health and safety). It was particularly aimed at the smaller players who would have 
otherwise been unable to access such information. 
This role changed, partly as the result of the availability of European Structural 
Funds, and the Federation began to offer more active support including training and 
business development services, especially in relation to exporting. According to their 
literature, their services involve market intelligence and information provision, 
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networking and mentoring, training and export support, and include bi-monthly 
technology meetings to present and discuss emerging technologies, Inward and 
Overseas Trade Missions, inclusion in directories and a web portal, export training 
and project management courses, and representation at offshore exhibitions. All 
services are considered to be industry driven, with representatives from industry 
leading steering groups for the different aspects of NOF's activities. 
In 2002 the Federation conducted a Foresight exercise in conjunction with 20 
companies, Newcastle University and the Offshore Suppliers Office in Aberdeen. 
This was considered a fruitful exercise as the key actors in the firms were brought 
together and indeed two companies produced a subsea manifold together as a result of 
the process. A further series of foresight workshops commenced in the summer of 
2005. Northern Offshore Federation also commissioned a study on unused reserves in 
the North Sea to provide information to members and to support its activities in 
lobbying the government to promote further development in the North Sea oil fields. 
The organisation was renamed NOF in 2001 and its scope widened to provide 
business support to the marine, offshore and renewable energy sectors. In recognition 
of the decline in work in the North Sea region, it provides support and encouragement 
to firms to export and, in line with the strategy of One NorthEast, it is also looking to 
encourage firms to diversify into the renewable energy and nuclear decommissioning 
markets. Traditionally a lot of NOF's work was around supply chains for the offshore 
industry and their Renewables Club now tries to replicate this for the offshore 
renewables market, where they work with One NorthEast and have hosted events to 
promote opportunities in the renewables sector. 
The organisation faces great challenges at present. The construction of topside oil 
platforms involved a very clear pyramid of suppliers and NOF was very influential 
when it was involved with the main fabricators. As this element of the industry has 
declined the role and focus of the organisation has been less clear and it has tried to 
diversify into other areas such as marine, nuclear decommissioning and wet 
renewables. The challenges of a decline in its main industry focus are compounded 
by' a transformation of the organisation's funding structure to a dependency on 
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membership fees with the ending of substantial structural fund contracts in April 
2005. 
There are also very different views about the efficacy of the organisation and the 
cluster assets or collective goods it provides: 
What have they ever done? (Industry representative 1) 
It's been going a long time, it's not terribly effective, but it's there (university 
representative 3) 
However, the cluster assets provided by NOF are not always quantifiable. For a time 
regular networking lunches were not held, but NOF came to realise that members 
valued the social aspects of these lunches and that they offered meeting places for 
industry players to meet and exchange information. 
One member highlighted the role of the federation in providing access to significant 
players in the industry and government. Through his membership of NOF he had 
come to act as manufacturing representative on the Industry Leadership Team (ILT), a 
top level team from the oil industry who were working with PILOT, a group 
comprising ILT, DTI and HM Treasury, to create a vision and strategy for the future 
of the North Sea. Because of this role he reported: 
Once every two months you are on a table with 20 other people who are chief 
execs of BP, Shell - there's no way I could get to that forum as a managing 
director of a valve company' (industry representative 1) 
Having members in positions of national significance, not only on ILT but also on the 
International Oil and Gas Advisory Board, not only provides benefits to those 
members, but it also enables those members to provide feedback to other members. 
This is one way in which NOF collects and disseminates information but it has also 
conducted foresight exercises and provided other industry relevant and specialist 
information to its members. 
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A representative body also enables the needs and requirements of its members to be 
fed into policies at a regional level and NOF has been linked to the Learning and 
Skills Council and involved in skills strategies for the ' Energy Cluster' in the region. 
Crucially, as an industry body, NOF has a level of specialist knowledge, not available 
to policy-makers, which enables it to identify market failures relating to the future 
development of the UK Continental Shelf, and to lobby national government in this 
respect. 
Therefore the initiative came from industry and was built on the requirements of the 
participants. It provided collective or `cluster' assets for its members particularly in 
terms of firstly, provision of information which might have otherwise been 
inaccessible or too costly to obtain; secondly, by providing tailored business services 
in terms of training and export support; thirdly, by providing status and voice at a 
regional and national level and fourthly, by providing a meeting place for networking 
to take place. Its capacity to generate these assets depended on its level of specialist 
knowledge, its ability to bring together a critical mass of local players in the region 
and the availability of funding to finance its activities. However, the precipitous 
decline in offshore fabrication has resulted in the need for a revised focus for the 
organisation and this has coincided with a substantial drop in the availability of 
European Structural Funds to finance some of its activities. It is yet to be seen 
whether the management of the organisation have the necessary skills to achieve a 
revised strategy, particularly given the drop in availability of public funding. 
6.2.2 North East Maritime Group 
A second organisation that arose from industry was the Tyne Maritime Group, later to 
be known as North East Maritime Group. This group started in around 1999, 
originally as Tyne Maritime Group, as a result of an idea from the then Regional 
Secretary of the GMB Union. After 18 months it became the North East Maritime 
Group (NEMG). It was never formalised into a legal entity and took the form of a 
forum meeting every 6-8 weeks to identify issues in the industry and propose 
solutions. The main sector businesses on the river (the offshore yards, shipyards and 
one of their main suppliers), unions. local Members of Parliament and organisations 
such as Northern Offshore Federation were part of it, although NEMG tended to 
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represent major employers whereas Northern Offshore Federation was more focused 
on the supply chain. 
In the marine industry, particularly in the main sector businesses, there was nature of 
employment was highly cyclical. People were continually in and out of contract with 
consequent detrimental impacts both on their livelihoods and in terms of training and 
pensions. This was having a long term, damaging impact on the sector. The original 
overarching idea of NEMG was to have one holding company employing all the 
labour in order to provide continuity of employment, to facilitate pension provision 
and to permit up-skilling of the workforce, particularly during cyclical downturns. 
The idea was also to produce a coherent industrial voice with the involvement of 
politicians. The radical idea failed - it would have competed with the business of one 
of the yards, which operated a labour supply organisation, and generally there was a 
lack of trust. The group was more successful in terms of harmonising health and 
safety and pay and conditions, for a time, and in organising collective lobbying 
activity. The group also worked with the Sector Skills Council, SEMTA (the Science, 
Engineering, Manufacturing Technologies Alliance) and the Learning and Skills 
Council on remodelling adult apprenticeships and a skills passport to assist labour 
mobility between the yards. 
The group contributed to the development of conversations that did lead to more 
trustful relationships. One trade union official demonstrated the step-by-step nature 
of these conversations. NEMG was: 
[T]rying to get the employers to talk on a regional basis, initially on a sub 
regional basis, but then on a regional basis (trade union official 1). 
In the end the radical idea did fail as the result of a lack of trust. but relationships 
were improved in an industry where: 
They haven't trusted each other for forty years (cluster organisation official 1) 
And where, while there were hosts of good bilateral agreements 
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The relationships are as cyclical as the work' (trade union official 1). 
The creation of a `voice' for the industry, the Common Labour Agreement and the 
health and safety passport could all be seen as `cluster assets' available for 
exploitation by the individual companies and the industry as a whole. NEMG also 
provided links into national government and the group met with the then Energy 
Minister, Brian Wilson MP. However, by 2005 NEMG was considered to have 
`mothballed' itself and there was a feeling of frustration at the lack of progress. 
Lobbying was still done by MPs and key actors from the main sector businesses and 
the Skills Passport still being worked on by SEMTA but: 
The big draw back is that we haven't realised our ambition in terms of having 
commonality on all counts because of the lack of work - it's the lack of work, 
it's the lack of work' (trade union official 2). 
In interviews it was emphasised to me that the group had undoubtedly benefited from 
charismatic and focused leadership at the outset, highlighting Eklund's emphasis on 
the need for cluster animators and Camagni's suggestion of the need for a `collective 
agent', as discussed in section 5.2.3. However, interest waned and one local authority 
official described the group as having fallen apart. As one trade union official 
explained: 
Getting round the table to talk about the demise of the sector isn't how anyone 
wants to spend their time' (trade union official 1) 
Notwithstanding the mothballing of NEMG and the extreme downturn in the yards. 
key individuals involved in the industry continue to have a role in identifying market 
opportunities, such as naval decommissioning, and this has involved much lobbying, 
often done by the unions and those key individuals. The GMB union worked with 
Greenpeace to lobby the national government to agree to decommission Royal Navy 
vessels in United Kingdom yards. There has still been a concern that on occasion 
invitations have gone out to tender for such contracts and not reached Tyneside and 
this highlights the importance of the links key individuals within industry have to, for 
example, the Ministry of Defence, which enable local players to link into the national 
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scale. Collaboration between the yards in respect of decommissioning has been a 
possibility, although there remains suspicion and the local evening newspaper 
headline, `Fury as yard's cranes removed'40, draws attention to continuing tensions 
between the yards. These tensions could be eased by the presence of a facilitator 
charged with moderating relations and building trust. 
6.2.3 Jobs on the Riverside 
Jobs on the Riverside was an initiative that resulted from the work of NEMG, which 
initially funded the post of Tyne Strategy Manager to analyse the skills and workforce 
on the Tyne and to conduct a skills gap analysis, given concerns over an ageing 
workforce and lack of training during downturns in work. Although this was not a 
policy led initiative, once the local authorities were alerted to the need for strategies to 
overcome potential skills shortages, Jobs on the Riverside was funded in a unique 
arrangement between Newcastle City Council, North Tyneside Council and South 
Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council using money from their Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB6). The initiative went on to develop three main schemes - an adult 
apprenticeship piloted and developed in conjunction with Swan Hunter; funding for 
existing workforce training in an attempt to restore training as an integral part of 
businesses and a sector development programme operating at entry level into the 
industry. Swan Hunter viewed the adult apprenticeship scheme as successful, but it 
never moved beyond being a pilot scheme and concern was expressed amongst those 
involved that the tailored, small scale approach that it entailed did not fit with a 
regional model for skills which dealt with much larger programmes. Other problems 
associated with the provision of training included the lack of work and the lack of 
investment in facilities at further education colleges. 
Alongside these training initiatives there was an attempt to develop a brand, `Tyne 
First', to raise the profile and improve the image of the river. The brand building was 
aimed at encouraging recruitment into the industry and at bringing together 
companies to work together. The instruments included a website with around 20 
companies and exhibiting at trade exhibitions. The aim was to build on improved 
40 Newcastle Evening Chronicle, 15 July 2005 
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relations that were perceived to be emerging from the work of NEMG. but crucially 
these depend on there being a surfeit of work. Certain local authority interviewees 
were concerned that Tyne First represented the imposition of a brand with little 
behind it and saw the website as a duplication of other local authority initiatives. 
There was also a concern in other parts of the region that the focus was entirely on 
Tyneside. 
The issues around this industry initiated, local authority initiative were never resolved 
and in 2004 the local authorities withdrew funding and the project closed. The 
difficulty of operating within a regime of short term funding is also highlighted by the 
experiences of the Regional Service for Clustering (cf. Chapter 7). 
6.2.4 NEMOC 
A further industry driven cluster organisation is NEMOC, the North East Marine and 
Offshore Cluster. Partially funded by European Structural Funding, originated by 
Swan Hunter and representing their first tier suppliers, NEMOC is a group of fifteen 
companies. Views vary widely on the purpose and benefits of NEMOC. According 
to one member NEMOC is motivational and assists in the functioning of the supply 
chain: 
I like to work with the same people, because if you keep the same people 
sometimes you have a job that doesn't go all that well and they will help you 
out - if it's a one off they can say `well we're not going to get the next job' 
(industry representative 2). 
Another member, while seeing little direct benefit from membership, did 
acknowledge: 
indirectly it probably has benefits in that [our] name is mentioned in the same 
breath as some of the other players in NEMOC (industry representative 3). 
Another member noted that to an extent the organisation is political in that it 
demonstrates, to the Ministry of Defence amongst others, a UK supply chain for the 
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Dutch-owned Swan Hunter shipyard. However, that member also pointed out that 
NEMOC has been motivational and has provided NEMOC members with access to 
government ministers, which they would not otherwise have obtained. NEMOC has 
certainly provided a focus for lobbying the government with regard to the naval 
shipbuilding programme. This lobbying has been done in conjunction with the GMB 
Union and with the support of the local press, as One NorthEast are perceived to have 
been less prevalent in the campaign than their Regional Development Agency 
counterparts in the South West or North West of England. Cluster organisation 
representative 2 voiced the opinion that, three years into its existence, One NorthEast 
was only just giving the naval shipbuilding programme sufficient senior attention. 
NEMOC has also been used by Swan Hunter as a vehicle through which to pursue 
diversification opportunities for itself and its supply chain. For example, the proposal 
to develop a ship recycling facility for naval decommissioning on the Tyne has been 
pursued by Swan Hunter under the banner of NEMOC with the assistance of One 
NorthEast and Newcastle City Council. 
Local authority official 1 saw NEMOC as the key to securing a future for the 
shipbuilding industry in the North East, but others were much more cynical viewing 
NEMOC as a way for Swan Hunter to extract funding from it supply chain. ONE 
representative 8 also made the point that the owner of the Swan Hunter shipyard, a 
key player in the offshore and marine engineering cluster, was unwilling to participate 
in the energy cluster, partly because, in their view, they were well served by NEMOC. 
On balance NEMOC predominantly appears to have functioned as a lobbying vehicle 
working in the interests of Swan Hunter and its supply chain. In a similar way to the 
way in which certain NOF members saw that organisation as providing access to 
players that they would not otherwise have been able to access, NEMOC has given its 
members access, particularly to government circles, that they would not otherwise 
have reached. However, and again drawing attention to the key role of individuals in 
clusters, it is the Managing Director of Swan Hunter. Jaap Kroese who has been the 
key driver in this process. Successful individuals often have forceful and dynamic 
personalities and some resent this forcefulness. During interviews some people 
expressed concern about Jaap Kroese. whereas others expressed admiration. 
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6.2.5 NDI 
NDI, with the initials originally standing for Northern Defence Initiative, was formed 
in 1996, as the result of a public sector initiative. There was concern that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the anticipated `peace dividend' was going to have an adverse 
effect on the defence sector, particularly the marine sector. Although the initiative 
was started by the public sector, the idea was to get players together in the industry to 
generate ideas of what could be done to `turn swords into ploughshares'. It became 
clear that there was an ongoing market for defence related products and by April 2001 
NDI, now standing for Northern Defence Industries, was formed as a company 
limited by guarantee. 
NDI's growth since then has been remarkable. NDI's business model involves firstly, 
promoting opportunities in the defence supply chain to firms in the North of England; 
secondly, finding and bringing together suppliers, preferably from the North of 
England, but in practice from all over the United Kingdom, capable of meeting the 
procurement requirements of global defence players and thirdly, helping global 
defence players promote their bids to the Ministry of Defence. 
NDI provides meeting places for its members to network and it brings together small 
groups of firms to work together on larger defence contracts. It too has a role in 
promoting the region as a location for naval construction and in 2004 hosted a 
conference entitled Shipbuilding for the 21St Century, which brought the major players 
in the warship programme onto Tyneside. NDI also enables smaller firms to 
participate in large exhibitions by taking stands at major defence exhibitions and 
again this enables firms to have access and status that they would not necessarily 
achieve alone. It arranged for both BAE Systems and Thales to present to the region 
and through newspaper campaigning stimulated some 200 small companies in the 
North of England to register as potential suppliers. 
Both NOF and NDI are fee paying membership organisations and there is an overlap 
of membership, although NDI's membership is growing and NOF's is declining. The 
overlap arises because of the interest from both organisations in the potential warship 
contracts and as a result of the previously mentioned tendency for the firms in both 
the offshore and defence supplies chains to supply into diverse markets. Both One 
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NorthEast officials and members of these organisations pointed out the danger that 
such member organisations become mere talking shops and highlighted the need for 
both the management and the members of these organisations to ensure that they fulfil 
a purpose for their members. NDI have remained strictly and intentionally focused on 
supply chain management, whereas NOF diversified into export support and training. 
NDI have been very astute as an organisation in regularly marketing figures for the 
additional business won by firms in the defence industry. NOF profess not to 
measure the value of contracts obtained as a result of their endeavours: 
We don't measure it, but it has to be the case because it's gone on so long and 
there is still a clamour for it' (Cluster organisation representative 3). 
6.2.6 Cluster Organisations: Conclusions 
The cluster organisations discussed above are not the only organisations representing 
elements of the marine and offshore industries in the region, although they are the 
most significant ones. The organisations have predominantly arisen from industry, 
although in many cases they have subsequently attracted public funding. The 
activities they organise are diverse but the benefits or `cluster assets' that have arisen 
and are then available for cluster members to exploit (depending on their own 
competencies and strategies) include specialised and tailored training; representation 
and voice; information provision; access to individuals, organisations and contracts 
that would not otherwise have been obtained and meeting places for networking and 
information exchange. Many of these activities are those highlighted in Chapter 3 as 
potential activities to be promoted as part of a cluster development policy. 
Several sources pointed out the pressures of time when it came to drawing on the 
potential benefits of cluster organisations 
I have limited my involvement to the associations I can commit time to - 
otherwise if you don't put the time in, you don't get the return (Industry 
representative 1) 
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There are only so many [organisations] that you can concentrate on (industry 
representative 4) 
There are only so many organisations that an individual can focus upon and the 
benefits offered by cluster organisations are only realised if the individuals within 
firms are able to focus on that organisation. This in turn highlights a potential 
difficulty in that a complex institutional framework has grown up around the marine 
and offshore engineering cluster as it has developed and diversified, and there is 
therefore a wide range of cluster organisations all representing overlapping, but 
different, aspects of the cluster. If, as I have argued, cluster policy is distinguished by 
the participation of key cluster actors in the design and delivery of highly tailored 
policy instruments aimed at impacting upon all aspects of the cluster including the 
softer relationships therein, then policy-makers need to engage with these cluster 
organisations to both design and deliver policy. Grabher (1993b) concludes that an 
institutional infrastructure that incorporates overlap and redundancy can be beneficial 
in avoiding the lock-in that can characterise older industrial regions. However, the 
organisations need to be linked together. This was not achieved partly because there 
was disquiet at One NorthEast about the ability of some of these organisations 
We have many organisations who have evolved into trade associations and 
they probably still think they are the catalyst for the sector but they are 
probably just representing the sector (ONE official 6) 
This difficulty was one of many that One NorthEast would face in developing cluster 
policy for the marine and offshore engineering cluster. 
6.3 Regional Cluster Policy for the Marine and Offshore Engineering Cluster 
There has been a long, contested and well-documented history of national policy and 
political involvement in the shipbuilding industry (Tomaney et al., 1999). Within the 
region. prior to the establishment of the regional development agency, there had been 
local authority initiatives for the offshore industry. Newcastle City Council in 
particular had been active in providing infrastructure support. However, in the 
remainder of this chapter I want to look specifically at the approach of One NorthEast 
towards this cluster. As in the previous chapter, I propose to use the cluster policy 
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model as a framework to analyse the process of developing a cluster policy, in this 
case for the marine and offshore engineering cluster in the region. In Chapter 6. I 
mentioned that the first stage of the model is the decision to take a cluster approach to 
policy. As One NorthEast had decided to adopt a cluster development approach 
across a range of clusters, of which offshore came to be one, I will start at the second 
stage of the model - the selection and analysis of the cluster. 
6.3.1 Identification, Selection and Analysis 
The selection of marine and offshore industries as a regional cluster for support, or as 
an element of a wider regional cluster for support, was predictable because those 
industries given the sizeable, if difficult to quantify, workforce in the region. It must 
also be noted that there is also a historic and political attachment to the offshore and 
marine sectors, which would have made their exclusion from a clusters policy 
difficult. Therefore the inclusion of the marine and offshore industries within a 
clusters development programme in the North East is unsurprising. What has proved 
to be more changeable and unstable is the way in which One NorthEast 
conceptualises the cluster of which the offshore and wider marine industries are a 
part. 
As discussed in section 5.2.2, the clusters identified for support by One NorthEast in 
the initial Regional Economic Strategy, Unlocking Our Potential, were based on the 
modes of production approach that had pervaded the sector strategy of their 
predecessor body, Northern Development Company. Offshore engineering was not 
specifically identified as a cluster, but was encompassed under the Low Volume 
Manufacturing cluster. The difficulties of operationalising the cluster strategy 
outlined in Unlocking Our Potential have been highlighted, and by the time 
Unlocking our Potential was reviewed, the way of defining clusters had moved away 
from modes of production and clusters were defined by industry or market. As part of 
the review process, topic papers covering each of the main themes of Unlocking our 
Potential were prepared. The topic paper covering cluster policy classified the cluster 
containing the offshore industries as `offshore and high-value added engineering' 
(One NorthEast. 2002) although the second Regional Economic Strategy. Realising 
Our Potential, published in October 2002. simply lists 'offshore' as one of 14 clusters 
and it claims that ja] business plan for the offshore cluster, embracing the offshore, 
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marine and energy industries in the Region, is well in hand' (One NorthEast, 2002. p. 
21 emphasis in the original). 
As highlighted in section 6.1, the offshore and marine industries are difficult to define 
and the difficulties that lay ahead in defining a regional cluster to incorporate the 
offshore and marine industries had been presaged in the DTI mapping exercise 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2001b) where ship repair and large scale metal 
fabrication, including the construction of oil rigs, were included in a diverse `metal 
processing, ship building and industrial equipment cluster', which was, according to 
that exercise, the largest of the North East's clusters. 
At the outset of One NorthEast's cluster development policy the focus was very much 
on the offshore industries and marine engineering. Existing players in the region 
including Northern Offshore Federation and North East Maritime Group were heavily 
involved in consultations with regard to the cluster. One of the series of mapping 
studies commissioned by One NorthEast (see Section 5.2.2) was for the offshore 
cluster. The mapping exercise was conducted by the consultancy Smith Rea Energy 
Limited and they conceptualised the offshore cluster as comprising three sectors - 
offshore engineering, marine renewables and shipbuilding and repair. Key industry 
players attended meetings where they were advised that an offshore/marine cluster 
would `commence' in September 2001. Initially a large steering group was 
established. This body, initially called the Regional Offshore Cluster, was chaired by 
former minister Stephen Byers, who was quoted on Newcastle City Council's website 
41 as saying; 
The newly formed Offshore Cluster incorporates all significant regional 
players in both the public and private sector. The cluster, combining offshore 
with marine and engineering, is looking at significant growth in these 
industries. If we get this right, we have the opportunity to become a critical 
player in the global market place bringing with it a considerable number of 
contracts and jobs to the North East. 
41 <http: /; w, Aww. newcastle. gov. ukýcompnewc. nsf%ipt/bcap_engineering> accessed 22.04.04 
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The language around the cluster `commencing', being `newly formed' and being seen 
as a body shows confusion about the cluster concept, as clearly the cluster both pre- 
dated One NorthEast's policy towards it and also existed independently of the steering 
group. However, there was more fundamental confusion about the conceptualisation 
of the cluster. 
By the time of the publication of Realising our Potential (RES2) in 2002, the offshore 
and marine industries were already firmly bracketed with the energy industry as a 
result of possible diversification opportunities into wave, tidal and offshore wind 
equipment construction and installation, although the list of clusters the Corporate 
Plan 2003-2006 (One NorthEast, 2003a) includes offshore as a separate entity and 
does not include energy. However, by the time of the production of the policy 
implementation framework for Realising our Potential (RES2)42, offshore and marine 
industries were actually subsumed into an expanded `Regional Energy Cluster', which 
also included the defence industries. The link between the defence industry and the 
offshore and marine industries arose because of the planned programme of new 
vessels for the Royal Navy. However, as will be seen below, the energy cluster was 
subsequently to be conceptualised as incorporating the oil and gas sector, renewable 
energy and environmental industries and the nuclear sector, hence losing the link to 
shipbuilding and repair all together. 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2, One NorthEast have not been explicit about how 
individual clusters came to be selected for support and the mapping exercises were 
rarely published. In the case of the offshore mapping exercise there were cluster 
organisations specifically involved in that industry who were unaware of the mapping 
exercise (interview with Cluster organisation representative 4). However, it must be 
remembered that, as Feser and Luger (2003) point out, the methodology for 
identifying clusters is influenced by the aims of cluster policy, which are in turn 
related to overall policy priorities and there appear to have been particular issues 
around defining and conceptualising this cluster. 
42 Downloaded from onenortheast. co. uk on 15.10.03 
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Firstly, there were issues around the scale and significance of the industries involved. 
Boekholt and Thuriaux (2000) note that a cluster should have `a certain critical mass 
in terms of size and `actor mix'. Subsequent to the Smith Reay mapping exercise. 
which had identified an offshore cluster comprising offshore engineering, marine 
renewables and shipbuilding and repair, there had been a severe downturn in work for 
the main fabricators for the offshore oil and gas industry and continuing delays in the 
planned warship programme. Some voiced the opinion that the offshore and marine 
industries had never been a suitable focus for the cluster: 
I think it has always been a mistake to think of what is the residue of an 
international industry, fragmented through major international forces as some 
kind of voluntary, dynamic, organic kind of cluster (university representative 
4) 
Others pointed to the issue of scale particularly in terms of the marine industry where 
one expert pointed out that `the region doesn't really map onto the industry' 
(university representative 3). This again illustrates the problem, discussed in section 
2.2.2, of identifying clusters within predetermined geographic areas, rather than 
tracing the linkages. Another respondent pointed out: 
This is where the public sector goes wrong. It thinks clusters are bounded by 
[public sector] territorial boundaries, but of course they are global. If you 
have to go looking for capability elsewhere, which makes a bunch of 
companies here successful you have to do that (cluster organisation 
representative 2). 
However, the delivery mechanisms for cluster policy within the United Kingdom have 
largely been the Regional Development Agencies and this has tended to lead to a 
widening of the industrial boundaries of the cluster for policy purposes rather than to 
a widening of the geographical boundaries and this has led to consequent problems as 
the structure has appeared incoherent: 
[One NorthEast] see offshore and energy as the cluster and it is not, they don't 
see marine as a separate sector (university- representative 3) 
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Secondly, as a strategic body for a poor performing region, One NorthEast was trying 
to find areas of growth and, given the decline in offshore fabrication, there Was a 
perceived need to identify strategic opportunities for diversification. Again it is 
unclear how particular opportunities were assessed, but there was a particular 
emphasis on the possibility of diversification into nuclear decommissioning, in light 
of the anticipated spend by the newly formed Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 
and opportunities were envisaged in offshore wind energy, given that the 
Government's Renewables Obligation requires licensed electricity suppliers to source 
specified percentages of the electricity they supply from renewable sources. The 
percentage target is set to increase each year from its current level of 4.9 per cent in 
2004/05 to reach 10.4 per cent by 2010/11. Therefore nuclear and renewable energy 
were conceptualised as being part of the same wider energy cluster because the lower 
tier of suppliers could potentially feed into any of these areas. However, the resulting 
cluster was not necessarily coherent. It is also unclear why these two diversification 
opportunities were privileged above other opportunities including those in ship 
recycling. Platform decommissioning and particularly those in subsea technology. 
Thirdly, the choice of energy as a cluster may have been influenced by other events at 
a national and regional level. At a national level there had been an increased focus on 
energy with the publishing of the Government's 2003 Energy White Paper, Our 
Energy future - creating a low carbon economy and, for example, the DTI Oil and 
Gas Industry Development Directorate became the Energy Industry Development 
Team, responsible for providing support to energy sectors including - oil and gas, 
renewables and civil nuclear decommissioning. 
Within the region there was a growing number of initiatives in respect of both the 
demand for energy (encouraging the uptake of low carbon technologies and energy 
efficiency measures) and the supply of energy (seeking alternative sources of energy 
from new and renewable sources) and a North East Energy Policy Group was formed 
in October 2003 by the Government Office for the North East, One NorthEast and the 
Regional Assembly to take overall responsibility for the coordination of energy 
related activity in the region. 
^131 
As noted in section 5.2.4, renewable energy had been identified as an opportunity 
within the region by the Arthur D Little research and the New and Renewable Energy 
Centre (NaREC) had been established in Blyth as one of the five Centre of Excellence 
under the Strategy for Success. The focus initially had been very much on offshore 
sources of renewable energy (offshore wind, wave and tidal) but there was a 
perception that there were firms in the region that had expertise in power generation 
that was not covered by a marine/offshore cluster. There was also a perception that 
there was expertise and activity around other new energy sources such as biomass and 
fuel cells that were unrelated to a marine/offshore cluster. Indeed, in addition to the 
plethora of cluster organisations in the marine and offshore industries, there were a 
multitude of cluster organisations and activities in energy related areas including 
Renew Tees Valley, a company limited by guarantee and supported by both One 
NorthEast and the sub regional partnership for Tees Valley, to promote economic 
opportunities from renewable energy and recycling; the Environmental Industries 
Federation, a trade association representing businesses in the environmental sector 
and again receiving funding from One NorthEast; the North East Biodiesel 
Partnership, seeking to establish a biodiesel supply chain in the North East; the 
Biomass Implementation Group, coordinated by the Environmental Industries 
Federation to promote biomass as a form of renewable energy and North East 
Biofuels, a group of private and public organisations aiming to establish renewable 
transport fuels (Government Office for the North East, 2004). 
Therefore there were a variety of reasons why energy was designated as a cluster for 
support, but by the time of the restructuring at One NorthEast in 2004 and the move to 
a three-pillar approach to driving the economy forward, supported by a sectoral 
support policy, energy remained as a strategic pillar but the component sectors had 
been disaggregated, and oil and gas, nuclear, and renewable energy and 
environmental industries were viewed as separate sectors. It had proved impossible to 
develop a policy for an energy cluster: 
Energy has evolved into its component parts for very good reasons, because it 
was a complete basket case (One NorthEast Official 6) 
ý 
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This provides support for Martin and Sunley's (2003) argument that it is difficult to 
draw industrial boundaries around clusters. The mapping exercise could have been 
more open and participatory, and this could have led to a more accurate understanding 
of the linkages between sub-clusters within the energy cluster. There were certainly 
many views expressed about how the cluster could have been framed: 
I think marine is a more sensible focus in terms of the skills - commercial 
marine, offshore and naval marine skills are very much the same, whereas the 
skills needed in other defence are very different. The scale is the problem. 
(university representative 3) 
The thing that would give you critical mass would be engineering (trade union 
official 2). 
This concurs with comments made in the DTI mapping of clusters in the North East, 
which pointed out that the economy did not have strong clusters: 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, with the exception of chemicals, 
the region has no distinctive cluster strengths with a dominant role within UK 
economy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001) 
There may have been apparently insufficient critical mass to have an offshore or 
marine cluster, but to encompass all the industries into an energy cluster did not work. 
A different focus might have arisen had the mapping been more inclusive and had the 
links between firms and sets of skills been more fully explored. The mapping might 
then have resulted in an advanced engineering cluster which could have incorporated 
offshore fabrication, ship building, ship repair, subsea technologies and fabrication for 
marine renewables, along with other areas of expertise in the region related to defence 
and aerospace industries. The chemicals cluster in the region could then have 
incorporated biomass and biodiesel, which had been included as part of the energy 
cluster. Interestingly, although no mapping exercises have been published, advanced 
engineering has been identified in the Northern Way cluster programme (see section 
5.1.2). 
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Therefore both an increased focus on energy at a national and regional policy level 
and the level of activity in renewable energy, which was seen as a form of growth. 
may have influenced the move within the region to designate the cluster as an 
`energy' cluster. Whatever the reasons for the continual change in designation, the 
constant modifications have led to much confusion amongst key players in the 
offshore and marine industries, and have also impacted upon the ability of One 
NorthEast to mobilise participants in the cluster and to select and implement suitable 
policy instruments. 
6.3.2 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
One of the reasons for taking a policy process approach to analysing cluster policy is 
to highlight the impact of decisions and activities throughout the policy-making 
process and to demonstrate that different aspects of developing the policy are 
intertwined. This section will show that the difficulties in analysing and 
understanding the cluster of which the offshore and marine industries formed a part 
impacted upon the ability of One NorthEast to build consensus around the cluster and 
to achieve sufficient participation from the key actors to drive the cluster forward. 
The process by which an energy cluster was identified by One NorthEast has been 
described, but it was apparent that this cluster was so diverse that key players in the 
marine and offshore industries became disengaged and even officials at One 
NorthEast were unclear about its origin: 
There is an attempt by One NorthEast to come up with a group, a big energy 
cluster. It's taken some time to get off the ground to be perfectly honest and 
I'm not convinced it's the answer [... ] I'm not sure what its purpose is and 
whether or not it's got what it takes to pull the employers together (trade union 
official 2) 
Were engineers and we came up with an alternative and we had support for 
an alternative, quite frankly I think it didn't go down well with One NorthEast 
and some of the people who were engaged with that because they are looking 
at something different (trade union official 2). 
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There was the thing that Stephen Byers was chairing [ ... 
] and that seems to 
have quietly disappeared and this new strategy, I believe, is coming in to 
replace it and I think there are 3 pillars in it and the other day I did go on to the 
One NorthEast website to try and find out more about it, but failed (industry 
representative 3) 
I honestly don't know the background. When I arrived there was an energy 
cluster [ ... ]- 
it wasn't energy related a lot of it. (ONE representative 3) 
There had been an intention from One NorthEast that the process of understanding the 
cluster and developing cluster policy would be inclusive: 
That definition of what the cluster looks like, how one puts together that 
cluster, is now something they are all engaged in, all the Centres [of 
" Excellence] and supporting bodies are engaged in (ONE representative 1) 
However, this was not borne out by the experiences of smaller cluster initiatives or 
industry players 
[One NorthEast] are looking at the grand plan, so it doesn't sometimes filter 
down to organisations like ourselves, which is a pity because we think we've 
got a lot to contribute (cluster organisation representative 5) 
What [One NorthEast] forget is you need practical experience and smaller 
organisations to make it happen -well they definitely exclude smaller groups 
(cluster organisation representative 5) 
There's not been an open process; there's not been a visible process in any 
sense of taking cognisance of regional industry (industry representative 3) 
Partly the inability to involve all representative bodies in the policy-making process 
can be attributed to the complicated institutional framework that had grown up around 
the constituent industries within the energy cluster 
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There are so many interest groups - we're not working as a team in my view 
in the region. We're not working as a team; we're not joined up (trade union 
official 2). 
One of the main ways in which to drive the cluster would have been to use the cluster 
organisations and that had been the idea at the outset. However, there were concerns 
at One NorthEast about the efficacy of some of these organisations, including those 
involved in the offshore and marine industries, and the decision was made that in 
some cases the agency would work directly with firms rather than through 
intermediary organisations. This was problematic as the agency was not resourced to 
work in depth with a large number of firms, and smaller firms in particular did not 
have the time or the voice to become involved in One NorthEast's policy-making. 
There were other problems more specific to the offshore and marine industries. 
Within the region, personalities made it difficult for certain groupings of firms to be 
brought together and there was a perceived lack of willingness from the private sector 
to see the issues facing the public sector. At times the main sector businesses and the 
public sector were brought directly together but `our mistake was bringing them 
together in one room' (trade union official 1). These difficulties made it even more 
relevant to have a facilitator who could draw the participants together and build 
consensus, but circumstances played a part. Kevin Curran, instigator of the Tyne 
Maritime Group and cited by many in the industry as a key player able to bring 
together divergent interests and individuals, had moved to London as General 
secretary of the GMB Union. Therefore not only were many potential participants 
disengaged at an early stage of the cluster policy-making process, but also the cluster 
was deprived of an individual with potential to animate the cluster. 
6.3.3 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
One of the key aspects of a cluster policy is the need to tailor policy instruments to the 
requirements of the cluster, with those requirements being identified with the 
involvement of players within the cluster. There were already issues in this process 
because, as has been seen above, many players in the offshore and marine industries 
felt excluded for the policy-making process. Another issue arose because of an 
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apparent preference on behalf of One NorthEast for standard policy measures to be 
applied across clusters. For example, the North East Productivity Alliance (cf. 
s. 5.2.4) was seen as a useful tool across all clusters. Undoubtedly this was useful and 
NOF reported benefits to their members, but it was not a specific tool for the cluster. 
There was also a preference to fund larger projects available across the region. This 
partially arose from a perception in the agency that there were too many initiatives 
having too little impact, but it caused problems within the cluster 
One North East have said they don't want lots and lots of small projects going 
on - they want it to be more regional and big - we know from practical 
experience that does not work (cluster organisation representative 4) 
It is too big to think up a whole idea in one go, you've got to do it in smaller 
stages and get people, who are in whatever area they are in, get their practical 
solutions to the problems (cluster organisation representative 5). 
As discussed in section 3.5.6, Raines (2002) highlights three broad objectives of 
cluster policy, which he relates to three aspects of a cluster and then identifies 
possible policy measures. In their 2002 mapping exercise, Smith Reay Energy 
Limited had proposed a series of short term and medium term measures specifically 
for, what was still designated then as, the offshore cluster and these are tabulated 
below in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1 Policy Recommendations for the Offshore Cluster 
Objective of policy Policy Measures Smith Reay recommendations 
Increase interaction by Incentives for joint R&D Developing a strategy for the `Rivers' 
creating conditions for Provision of business 
cooperation and increasing premises to encourage 
or highlighting incentives 
for cooperation 
Development of common 
resources to improve 
interaction 
Network brokering 
Provision of information 
including evaluating the infrastructure 
requirements for future activities. 
Work in close cooperation with NaREC 
Technological and business on technology transfer. 
competitiveness of the infrastructure 
cluster Technology transfer 
Tailored skills training 
Venture capital provision 
Improve cluster competitiveness through 
e-business techniques. 
Specific skills/training initiatives. 
Building internal awareness Cluster mapping 
of the cluster (identity Marketing and brand 
building) and projecting the building 
identity of the cluster Foresight and 
(identity projecting) benchmarking exercises 
Setting up cluster 
existing trade association mechanisms 
Use offshore wind power expertise to 
attract inward investment. 
Develop a regional cross-cluster strategy, 
particularly with energy related clusters. 
Develop a diversification strategy, both 
geographical and sectoral. 
Source: Raines (2002a) and Smith Reay Limited Offshore Mapping for One NorthEast 
Elements of the strategy proposed by Smith Reay can be identified. For example, 
Northern Offshore Federation obtained funding for a cluster portal to encourage e- 
procurement and also received funding for international marketing. One NorthEast, 
with NaREC, made attempts to secure inward investment in the wind energy field. 
Separately the GMB Union, working with Greenpeace launched a report entitled 
`Offshore Wind; Onshore Jobs'. Newcastle City Council continued to have a land 
and buildings interest in the cluster and they participated in other initiatives for the 
Provide a cluster coordinating body. 
Supply chain management and 
benchmarking initiatives. 
Foresight exercises to identify regional 
sub clusters with potential for 
development and export 
representative organisations Focus on export opportunities through 
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cluster, for example, in conjunction with one NorthEast, the council worked with 
Swan Hunter on a proposal to encourage an inward investment project in ship 
recycling. One Northeast also encouraged diversification into nuclear 
decommissioning and offshore wind energy. An Energy Cluster Skills Action Plan 
was published with the Learning and Skills Council, and Jobs for the Riverside. until 
its closure, worked on the adult apprenticeship scheme for the yards. Lobbying was 
undertaken in support of part of the naval shipbuilding work coming to the North 
East, although there was a perception that the firms, unions and MPs largely 
undertook this, as opposed to the regional development agency. In 2005 NOF also 
worked with the Regional Technology Centre (RTC) to launch a series of Foresight 
workshops for the oil and gas industry. However, there was little co-ordination of 
effort and, at times, initiatives appeared very disjointed. For example, One NorthEast 
were unaware of the GMB Union initiative with Greenpeace until the report was 
launched and NOF were unaware of the ship recycling plans. 
Other elements of cluster development mentioned by Raines (2002), but not 
specifically recommended by Smith Reay, can also be discerned. Northern Offshore 
Federation continued to provide a forum for networking. Newcastle University has a 
large School of Marine Science and Technology and, although many industrial links 
were at a national and international level, there were links between the university and 
individual firms, and a masters course in pipeline engineering was offered with much 
of the teaching provided from within the industry. 
However, as with One NorthEast's cluster policy as a whole, there never appeared to 
be an overall strategy or a coordinated selection of policy instruments and a One 
NorthEast Official admitted that he could `never bottom out any modus operandi' for 
the energy cluster. Local authority representative 1 argued that there was no policy 
for marine and offshore regionally and commented that while the public sector 
traditionally was seen as spending money and not delivering `this is beyond a joke'. 
At the outset organisations were encouraged to bid for funds available for cluster 
development and these were assessed and funded on an ad hoc basis through both 
European Structural Fund programmes and single pot finance from One NorthEast. 
If we consider Raines' (2002) policy objectives, it appears that while there were 
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attempts to develop common resources to improve the competitiveness of the cluster 
and to project the identity of the cluster, there were fewer efforts to increase 
interaction amongst the players in the cluster, and attempts to build the internal 
awareness of the cluster were probably damaged by the change in designation of the 
cluster from an offshore cluster to an energy cluster. If we return to section 3.5.6 and 
Eklund et al. 's (2002) seven general requirements for successful cluster development 
- the presence of cluster animators, support for competence and skills development, 
the availability of meeting places, division of labour in cluster development, brand 
building and a vision for the cluster - flaws can be identified throughout the policy. 
Although there were key individuals who could animate certain parts of the energy 
cluster, the concept was too diverse to enable one individual to drive forward the 
cluster. There was support for competence development and skills development in 
the marine and offshore industry but, without the contracts and work, training 
schemes could not operate. Although the cluster organisations such as NOF and NDI 
provided opportunities for networking, the meeting places available were fragmented 
and there was never one body that could cover all the interests within the enlarged 
energy cluster. Crucially there was no division of labour in the energy cluster and the 
feedback was that there was no sense of who was responsible for what aspects of 
policy: 
We had lots of initiatives, we had lots of groups laying claim to skills etc. but 
nobody taking ownership [... ] because it was too broad (ONE representative 
6) 
The brand building was also problematic as many overlapping brands were being 
promoted. Finally, the vision for the cluster was unclear because there seemed to be a 
lack of understanding within the Regional Development Agency about the 
components, and prospects, particularly for the oil and gas element, of the energy 
cluster. 
6.3.4 Evaluation and Policy Learning 
As discussed in section 3.5.7. evaluation and policy learning should be an integral part 
of a cluster policy-making process. Within One NorthEast, as outlined in section 
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5.2.5, there was an evaluation process for the Regional Economic Strategies as a 
whole and the evaluation of Unlocking Our Potential (RES 1) and draft evaluation of 
Realising Our Potential (RES2) were available on One NorthEast's website. 
Individual projects funded by European Structural Funds and Single Pot finance were 
subject to standard monitoring requirements. However, although there was a general 
sense that the cluster policy, and the policy for the energy cluster in particular. had not 
gone well there was no published evaluation of the cluster policy as a whole or of the 
impact on individual clusters. 
As discussed in section 5.2.5 there certainly was an internal review of the cluster 
strategy as part of the restructuring of One NorthEast and the energy cluster appears 
to have been a particular focus of review. However, large number of actors in the 
marine and offshore industries felt excluded from the whole process and there was no 
participatory evaluation as recommended by Diez (2001). 
However, by 2005 there were signs of change and a move to more positive relations 
with cluster organisations 
One of the issues is - do the trade associations have the right people, they're 
almost providing a secretariat, very nice, very woolly you can put on events 
and workshops and take your members up to the international markets, great, 
but the actual strategic vision which I would have thought One NorthEast 
should have been working on with an organisation like NOF is looking at 
these options and saying - actually there's potentially an opportunity in 
sequestration, there's an opportunity for heavy fabrication for offshore wind, 
and there's an opportunity for decommissioning in the fields (ONE 
representative 3). 
However, the issue of understanding the links between firms and drawing them into a 
cohesive framework, be that called a cluster or otherwise, remained unresolved 
following One NorthEast's restructure. Oil and gas. defence, nuclear and renewable 
energy were seen as four separate sectors, with marine industries being split between 
oil and gas, and defence, but there appeared to have been little reference to players 
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within those industries. Crucially the post of sector specialist for oil and gas at One 
NorthEast remained unfilled. 
6.4 Conclusions 
I conclude that the process of developing a cluster policy for a cluster incorporating 
the marine and offshore industries was highly flawed. Even early on in the process, 
while the focus was still on the offshore cluster, Smith Reay, in their Offshore 
Cluster: Summary of Mapping and Strategy, highlighted as a key weakness: 
[c]urrent confusion and frustration regarding cluster strategy and perceived 
lack of regional leadership to drive individual cluster programmes forward. 
Some of the issues that arose were generic and applied across the cluster development 
programme as highlighted in chapter 5. However, there was a particular lack of 
understanding of the marine and offshore industries and the composition of any 
cluster of which they could be considered a part. This partly resulted from a failure to 
use the initial mapping exercise as starting point for understanding and developing the 
cluster, but also arose because of One NorthEast's attempt to use cluster policy to 
quickly address the structural weaknesses in the region's economy and to close the 
performance gap between the North East and the average of the other English regions. 
This led to an aspirational feel to the energy cluster with a focus on renewable energy 
and nuclear decommissioning, rather than engineering and fabrication for the more 
traditional offshore oil and gas and marine markets. 
Some of the issues originated from within the marine and offshore engineering 
cluster. Undoubtedly the cyclical nature of the major industries, offshore fabrication 
and shipbuilding, and the coincidence of the development of the cluster policy with an 
acute downturn in work made it difficult for some of the major players to participate 
in policy development, as they were struggling for survival, and to a certain extent it 
was accepted that regional policy-makers could not overcome that decline: 
I think if there were an easy solution someone would have found it by now 
(trade union official 1) 
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There's not much they can do (industry representative 2, talking of One 
NorthEast) 
Respondents often considered the national scale to be the scale at which policy was 
significant. Offshore construction is linked to rates of exploration in the North Sea, 
which were seen as being dependent not only on the oil price and the whims of 
multinational oil companies, but also on both taxation rules from the Treasury and 
licences from the Department of Trade and Industry. Naval procurement was seen as 
dependent on the Ministry of Defence, with close control from the Treasury, and 
renewable energy was seen as a highly political market dependent on decisions at a 
national and international level. 
That said, and again returning to the lack of understanding of the cluster and the 
difficulty of observing the cluster from SIC code data, other sub-clusters, such as the 
firms involved in subsea technology, were seeing an upturn in work driven by a high 
oil price and changes in oil and gas extraction technology. However, that sub-cluster 
was not recognised by One NorthEast despite having featured in the initial mapping 
exercise. This may have related to a lack of resource within One NorthEast because, 
although oil and gas continued to be a recognised sector within One NorthEast's 
sector development programme, the post of sector specialist, as mentioned above, was 
unfilled. 
Another particular difficulty for the marine and offshore engineering cluster is its 
fragmented nature, both in terms of industries and geography. Tyne Maritime Group 
was widened to encompass the Tees, but on the whole there were few links between 
firms on the Tyne and the Tees and little movement of labour between the Tyne and 
Tees. The fragmented nature of the industries also led to a multitude of overlapping 
cluster organisations representing different elements of the cluster. Although 
understandable given the wide scope of the cluster this may have weakened the 
impact of the organisations and made it more difficult for One NorthEast to engage. 
Industry representative 5 talked of there being small echoes at present, rather than a 
strong voice and it was also argued that 
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What we've got is a number of clusters at present time and in my view we 
should have one cluster [... ] we should have one cluster. There are lots of 
little clusters and in my view we should have a combined operation in terms of 
speaking on behalf of the engineering industry (trade union official 2). 
Therefore prior to the establishment of the cluster development programme by One 
NorthEast there were, within the marine and offshore engineering cluster, cluster 
organisations, cluster activities and clustering, with the latter being described by 
(Benneworth et al., 2003) as cooperative interaction to gain advantage. However, 
One NorthEast's regional cluster policy towards the marine and offshore industries 
has not been successful and it remains to be seen how the cluster organisations, 
activities and clustering will evolve. 
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7 The Cluster Policy Approach in Practice: The Case of the Regional Service 
for Clustering 
In Chapter 5, I outlined the approach to cluster policy-making taken by the Regional 
Development Agency, One NorthEast, and, in Chapter 6, I considered the outcomes 
of that cluster policy-making process in respect of the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster and concluded that difficulties throughout the cluster policy- 
making process, as well as issues within the cluster, impacted on the policy outcomes. 
In this chapter, I want to tell the story of the Regional Service for Clustering, known 
at its inception as the Real Service Centre, a cluster based policy initiative operating 
at the local level, and I want to consider how a different understanding of clusters 
impacted on the development of that cluster development initiative. In the next 
chapter I will consider the outcomes of the initiative by considering its impact on a 
small group of firms, again within the marine and offshore cluster. 
Following a similar structure to Chapter 5, in the first section of this chapter, I outline 
the cultural, social and economic context and policy background against which the 
policy was designed. In the second section I apply the model of the cluster making 
process in order to analyse the way in which the cluster policies developed. In the 
final section I draw out generic lessons from the policy initiative. 
7.1 The Background to The Regional Service for Clustering 
7.1.1 The Cultural, Social and Economic Context 
The Real Service Centre, later to be known as The Regional Service for Clustering, 
was an initiative of North Tyneside Council, one of the five boroughs within Tyne 
and Wear. According to 2001 census data, the borough has a population of 
approximately 192,000 and it is situated on the North Sea coast, along the northern 
banks of the river Tyne. Historically the area's economy was dominated by 
shipbuilding, fishing and coalmining, but the last mine in North Tyneside, the Eccles 
Pit, was closed in 1980 and, as discussed in Chapter 6, there has been a severe decline 
in shipbuilding. 
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While inward investment has been successfully attracted into the area. most notably. ) 
and temporarily, in the form of Siemens' wafer fabrication plant43, employment 
growth has largely been in part time and temporary work, with many new jobs created 
in the emerging 'call centre' industry. While overall North Tyneside is the least 
deprived of the five Tyne and Wear boroughs, it still ranks as the 69th (out of the 354) 
most deprived borough in England according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation 
2000. 
7.1.2 The Policy-making Background 
The local authority 
Staff from the Economic Development Unit of North Tyneside Council instigated the 
RSC initiative. An interest in clustering to support SMEs had existed within North 
Tyneside Council since 1993, when their economic development section became 
interested in the work of the Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies 
(CURDS) at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne. CURDS had published the 
North East of England Economic Assessment and had identified four potential clusters 
within the North East region, in the areas of marine engineering, energy industries, 
pharmaceutical and healthcare activities and environmental groups and technology. 
In order to develop these nascent clusters, CURDS recommended a move away from 
generic forms of business support to the provision of new and innovative policies, 
especially those focused on the promotion of inter-firm networking (Tomaney and 
Bradley, 1993). The council sought to explore the possibility of developing such 
innovative policies to support clusters in these industries at a local level (Tyneside 
Real Service Centre, 1996). 
This interest in clusters coincided with large job losses at two major employers in the 
area. Swan Hunter, the last remaining ship builder on the Tyne, went into 
4' Siemens announced their intention to invest £1. lbn in a wafer fabrication facility on North Tyneside 
on 4 August 1995 (Charles & Benneworth, 1999. The plant was officially opened by the Queen in 
May 1997 but its closure was announced, less than three years after the original announcement, on 31 
July 1998. 
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receivership on May 13 1993 and, although work on HMS Richmond was 
subsequently completed, almost all of the 2,400 workers employed at the time of the 
receivership lost their jobs. Then, in October 1995, the Engineering Research Station, 
one of five British Gas research centres, was closed, with the operations being 
relocated to Loughborough. It had employed between 450/500 people within the 
North Tyneside Borough and was at the forefront of pipeline technology. As a result 
the locality was faced not only with the loss of two substantial employers, but also 
with the potential loss of world-class skill bases in shipbuilding and pipeline 
technology. 
The capacity to develop innovative policies at a local authority level was partly a 
result of the relative autonomous standing of local authorities at that time and partly 
as a result of the capabilities and drive of staff at the Economic Development Unit at 
North Tyneside Council. However, both the need to fit into a larger regional policy 
framework and a high turnover of staff were to impact on the development of the 
initiative. 
In January 1996, following two years of development activity within the council, the 
Real Service Centre, as it was then termed, was established to provide a focused 
research and support service and to offer advice and guidance in the process of 
developing strategic clusters of competitive advantage. The definition of clusters was 
a very narrow one, `groups of similar companies develop[ing] cooperative groupings 
able to access larger contracts' (North Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1996). 
From the outset the RSC had difficulties in finding a place within the complex 
business support network in the North East. During the first six months of the RSC's 
existence a great deal of time was dedicated to resolving such issues with Government 
Office. The temporary nature of the project, and its very nature as a pilot project, led 
to insecurity amongst staff and necessitated the dedication of a substantial amount of 
resource to securing a future for the project. 
The RSC has had various iterations - phase one (from inception to 1998) where it was 
very much a pilot project covering North Tyneside: phase two (1998 to 2002) where 
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the geographical coverage was extended to Tyne and Wear and phase three (2002 to 
date) during which the ongoing existence of the project has been called into question. 
However, throughout these iterations the organisation has continued to carry out the 
primary function of facilitating groups of SMEs, termed micro clusters, to work 
together for mutual benefit, although the mutual benefit has been derived from 
different sources including the achievement of a collective identity; developing 
innovative products; being able to access larger contracts; economies of scale in areas 
such as marketing, developing tangible group assets, and more intangible benefits in 
terms of providing a self help, hand holding and confidence boosting group for the 
SMEs involved. 
The outcomes of the service were monitored by those providing funding and are 
tabulated in Table 7-1 below showing the quantitative impact of the project. 
However, the story of the development of the service gives a much richer 
understanding of how the project worked in practice and also reveals that firms 
received benefits which cannot be captured by quantitative data alone. It is to that 
story that I will now turn. 
Table 7-1: Quantitative outputs of the RSC project 
Outputs Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
(Jan 1996 - (Jan 1999 - Dec (Jan 2002 - April 
Dec 1998) 2001) 2004) 
Micro clusters developed 7 54 82* 
Number of firms in new 102 578 
micro clusters 
Jobs created 208 109 
Total increase in turnover Figures not £3.1 M 
available 
775 
77 
Figures not 
available 
- ------------------- -- - *figure relates to period January 2002 to March 2006 
Source: RSC internal reports 
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The wider local authority context 
The background to the initiative is complicated by the existence of other policy-- 
making and delivery organisations. At the outset the RSC was very much a North 
Tyneside initiative, run by North Tyneside Council and funded through European 
Structural Funds. However, once the policy was extended to cover the whole of 
Tyneside, there was an involvement from South Tyneside and Gateshead 
Metropolitan Borough Councils, and Newcastle City Council. The level of 
involvement varied from council to council, as did the motivation for being involved. 
A member of the RSC team advised that 
You necessarily bring new people on board and it takes time for these people 
to get a handle on what it is [... ] and it also depends on their motivation to get 
involved. It might not be to understand clustering and to try to develop it fully 
in their area: it might be because funds are available; therefore it is a 
mechanism for reaching their own individual patch objectives and doing their 
economic development plans (RSC representative 1). 
Sunderland City Council also became part of the initiative, but this was against a 
background of concern over the way in which the activities of the RSC had impacted 
upon a firm that had located away from Sunderland. 
A Steering Group was formed to oversee the activities of the RSC. At the outset the 
steering group had consisted of two representatives from Tyneside TEC Ltd and one 
representative from North Tyneside Council. The Steering Group had initially 
involved discussions about the shape and form of the project and subsequently came 
to be tasked with supporting the RSC in achieving the aims and objectives of the 
1997-1998 business plan, monitoring achievement of the project outputs and, 
importantly, to share information with partner organisations (The Real Service Centre, 
1997). 
Following the expansion in the geographical coverage of the RSC, the steering group 
was reconstituted in 1998/9 to include representatives from each of the partner 
organisations (North Tyneside Council. North Tyneside Challenge. Newcastle City 
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Council, Gateshead Council, South Tyneside Council, Tyneside TEC and 
subsequently Sunderland City Council). It continued to meet monthly. with day-to- 
day management of the project continuing to be carried out by the Economic 
Development Unit at North Tyneside Council. In an endeavour to link with the 
Regional Development Agency, One NorthEast was invited to be part of the RSC 
steering group in September 1999.44 
In 2000, the steering group were consulted on their views as to the role of the RSC. It 
is interesting to note that, while there was a recognition that the RSC offered an 
innovative approach and that there was a role for modernising small companies, the 
RSC was seen by most parties as part of their portfolio of business support services. 
The RSC was therefore seen as providing business support, rather than being part of a 
wider cluster strategy. There was also evidence of the parochialism that dogged the 
RSC with some local authorities feeling that the effort was entirely focused on North 
Tyneside (The Regional Service for Clustering, 2000b). 
Although the steering group performed a monitoring role for the RSC and provided 
feedback on its services, it did not assist the RSC to achieve a regional profile and the 
RSC has historically been seen as very much focused on North Tyneside. This has 
been somewhat inevitable given that the project remained in North Shields and overall 
management responsibility for the service rested with North Tyneside Council. Even 
when the service was expanded to cover the whole of Tyneside, the first 18 months 
were treated as a pilot exercise and the RSC concentrated support on projects bringing 
benefits to North Tyneside. 45 Other aspects of the association with North Tyneside 
Council could have been avoided, for example, most e-mails originated by the RSC 
unnecessarily had a North Tyneside Council e-mail address. The overwhelming 
association with North Tyneside Council led to problems in terms of `selling' the 
service to other local authorities within Tyne and Wear. The RSC sought to develop 
44 Letter dated 29 September 1999 to Jeff Ball, Head of Business Development, One NorthEast from 
Angus Garrett, RSC Manager 
45 Internal correspondence between Gillian Miller and Mike Halsey, North Tyneside Council, 1998 
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its own identity, but its attempts to operate on a regional basis have always been 
hampered by its close association with North Tyneside Council 
During the early years of the RSC, North Tyneside Council was undoubtedly a lead 
authority on clustering activity and, in 1997, the RSC was recognised as an innovative 
approach to business development and a model of good practice by the European 
Parliament Committee on Regional Policy. The RSC sought to be active in research 
undertaken in the clustering field in the North East of England. This included 
participation in the Regional Cluster Research project, commissioned by One 
NorthEast and conducted by the Foundation for SME Development at the University 
of Durham. As other cluster initiatives emerged across Tyneside, including a cluster 
initiative originated by the then TEC and the emergent cluster strategy from One 
NorthEast, the RSC sought to coordinate clustering activity and sought to be formally 
recognised as the lead cluster authority on Tyneside, in the North East and in the 
United Kingdom as a whole (Ratnatunga, 1998b). This was an unrealistic goal given 
the size of the organisation, but members of the RSC team did carry out a role as 
secretariat for the Tyne and Wear Cluster Development Group, a role that kept the 
RSC in close contact with a wider network of economic development players in the 
area, and also worked with CURDS and the Tyne and Wear Research and Intelligence 
Unit to develop a Cluster Development Framework for the Tyne and Wear Sub- 
Regional Partnership (Regional Service for Clustering et al., 2001). This framework 
positioned the RSC as a form of bottom-up operational support for cluster 
development in contrast to a form of top-down strategic support, which might be 
provided by a regional agency. However, despite initial championing of the 
framework by the Tyne and Wear Partnership, the impact of both the framework and 
the RSC on cluster policy in the region was limited. The role as secretariat for the 
Tyne and Wear Cluster Development Group ended and, in a further retrograde step, 
the Steering Group for the RSC, which had been made up of officials from the other 
local authorities in Tyne and Wear and the Regional Development Agency. was 
disbanded. 
Therefore it can be seen that the project operated against a complicated and, at times. 
troubled, background and one significant task for the RSC was to build a place for 
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itself amongst a myriad of other policy initiatives at a time when there were 
substantial changes in both business support and clusters policy in the region. 
The regional context 
The RSC was, as mentioned above, considered to be a business support agency and at 
times there were tensions between it and other business support organisations. Some 
of the strains arose due to an element of competition and overlap between business 
support organisations and their projects. Particularly as clustering type initiatives 
became more prevalent in the North-East as a means of assisting small firms, the RSC 
continually sought to stress that their service was a unique one within the region 
(Tyneside Real Service Centre, 2000). 
Throughout 2002 and 2003, there were protracted negotiations about who should 
`sponsor' the RSC organisation. Strong links were made with the regional Small 
Business Service, a DTI agency charged with supporting business start-ups and 
subsequent growth in small businesses. However, changes in personnel, and 
subsequently the withdrawal of the Small Business Service from a regional delivery 
role, left the RSC isolated. 
The RSC was also influenced by a review of business support in the North East of 
England (One NorthEast, 2003b). The North East Business Support Network, 
managed by One NorthEast, came into effect in April 2004 and implemented changes 
to the way businesses access publicly-funded business support in the region. The new 
model was a demand led brokerage model, whereby it was intended that businesses 
would seek advice from Business Link representatives who would in turn broker 
advice from a network of business support providers as required. This model 
represented a fundamental change in delivery and funding of business support, with 
funding residing with the recipients of business support in an attempt to deliver a 
more demand led approach. As will be seen, the role of the RSC within that model 
was never clear. 
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The relationships between One NorthEast and the Regional Service for Clustering 
were also complicated. In the early days of One NorthEast, they held the RSC in high 
regard. The RSC Corporate Brochure produced in 2000 includes a foreword by the 
Head of Cluster Development at One NorthEast describing a meaningful partnership 
with the RSC. One NorthEast's first Regional Economic Strategy, Unlocking Our 
Potential cited the RSC as `an excellent example of the systematic development of 
small business `micro' clusters' (One NorthEast, 1999, p. 33). However, in interview, 
ONE representative 1 pointed out that, while the Northern Development Company, 
the precursor of One NorthEast, had been interested in the work of the RSC, that work 
had proved too incompatible with the cluster `model' envisaged by the Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
When the RSC sought funding for Phase 3 of the project it was advised that it was 
ineligible for funding under the cluster policy measures and instead the project 
obtained funding under measures for `access to finance' and `advice to SMEs less 
than and greater than 36 months'. In March 2004 I was advised by ONE 
representative 5 that the RSC did not fit into the agency's cluster model because they 
were not working on regionally significant clusters, but even as late as December 
2003, the same individual from One NorthEast had given the impression to the RSC 
that their services were seen as valuable to One NorthEast's cluster development 
programme and One NorthEast's 2003-2006 Corporate Plan (One NorthEast, 2003a) 
includes `Developing Sub-Regional micro clusters' as a key sub regional programme. 
One of the problems facing the RSC has always been that it has taken the form of a 
project with a limited lifespan. Not only has the time-limited nature of the project 
been an ongoing problem for staff retention - during January and February of 1999 
three of the original five RSC team obtained new positions outside the RSC - but it 
has also necessitated huge dedication of resource to securing short-term funding. This 
has hampered the embedding of the project within the business support network and 
hampered relationships with the Regional Development Agency, both because of lack 
of time and resource on behalf of the RSC, due to the time dedicated to securing the 
funding, and because the uncertainty over the future of the project has not been 
conducive to establishing long term relationships. 
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The difficulty in obtaining funding and other income may partly relate to the 
difficulty the RSC has in explaining its activities and services to clients and the wider 
business support network. This has not been helped by a tendency for individual 
clusters to be managed by individual officers, all of whom have very different ideas 
about the services that should be offered. Not only does this lead to a varying 
approach to cluster facilitation and development, it also gives rise to concern over the 
potential loss of tacit knowledge of the clusters if an officer leaves. 
The particular uncertainty that was to surround phase three of the project was 
exacerbated by the delay in producing strategies and action plans for business 
development at a regional level, which impacted on most business support 
organisations in the region. 
Therefore the policy background resulted in a continual need for the RSC to attempt 
to position itself within a much wider framework of policy. The short term funding of 
the project also made planning ahead difficult and caused issues with staff retention. 
As will be seen these aspects of the development of the organisation impacted on the 
development of the RSC's policy. However, while organisational issues did influence 
the project, a particular understanding of clusters also influenced their policy 
development and it is to this aspect that I know want to turn. 
7.2 The RSC's Cluster Policy-making Process 
In the previous two chapters I have used the model of the cluster making process 
developed in section 3.5 to analyse a policy process for developing specific clusters. I 
suggested in section 2.2.6 that such clusters comprise a pronounced and recognisable 
critical mass of firms and associated support organisations and research and education 
establishments, who by their interactions create cluster specific assets available for 
exploitation by actors within the cluster, depending on the actors' capabilities and 
strategies. The approach of the RSC was distinct and started from the premise that 
`clustering', defined by Benneworth et al (2003) as `cooperative interaction to gain 
advantage, which may or may not take place within a cluster', was a beneficial and 
achievable goal for policy. Therefore the RSC sought to develop `clustering' amongst 
254 
SMEs rather than to develop a predetermined cluster, but the model described in 
Section 3.5 can still be used to analyse the RSC's cluster policy-making process. 
7.2.1 The Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
The Real Service Centre can be seen as a locally driven pilot exercise arising as a 
response to large-scale plant closures in the area. The decision to take a cluster 
approach arose from a desire to retain the skills base that those major employers had 
encompassed and the recognition that existing business support policy would not be 
adequate for that task, but the decision was greatly influenced by the availability of 
European Structural funding for the development of clusters of competitive 
advantage. As mentioned above, the closures coincided with work done by the Centre 
for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS) at the University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne on clusters, and staff at the Economic Development Unit 
became interested in applying this work on clusters to policy. During a time in which 
the Economic Development Unit worked with two specific groups of firms following 
the closures, the idea of applying a cluster approach more widely began to germinate. 
In September 1994 North Tyneside Council (NTC) began to work with a group of 
marine engineering design companies who were based at Davy Bank in Wallsend. 
Following the receivership at Swan Hunter, North Tyneside Council were keen to 
retain the world-class skills base in marine engineering that the area was perceived to 
have. Through discussions with the companies, the companies' needs were explored 
and it emerged that the companies' limited resources, an inability to market on an 
international stage and an inability to tender for larger contracts were the barriers to 
their growth. The Economic Development Team encouraged them to consider 
working collaboratively in order to increase their competitiveness and therefore 
facilitate their growth. By early 1995 discussions were centring on property issues, 
formalising the group, accessing risk and venture capital, and developing research and 
development projects. An initial £30,000 was made available by Tyne and Wear 
Development Corporation to develop the group. which came to be known as 
Argonautics. 
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Also at the end of 1994 talks began with a firm called MicroAlloying International 
Ltd to explore how pipeline expertise could be retained in the North East given the 
announcement of the closure of British Gas's Engineering Research Station in 
Killingworth. Again surveys of need for all potential members of a pipeline 
technology cluster were undertaken. This group came to be known as Pegasus and, in 
providing guidance on structuring and managing the cluster, North Tyneside Council 
sought to use the lessons it had learnt from the Argonautics project. The development 
of Argonautics will be discussed further in Chapter 8, but this chapter will focus on 
the development of the project that arose out of these experiences and came to be 
known initially as The Real Service Centre, and subsequently as The Regional 
Service for Clustering. 
In the second half of 1995 a group of design and marketing companies approached 
North Tyneside Council having heard of the work under way with Argonautics. A 
group with the name of Affinitas was subsequently formed to offer a customised 
package of marketing services to large companies both within and outside the region. 
The RSC also surveyed locally based software companies. A range of common key 
issues was identified and the RSC subsequently brought together a group of software 
companies interested in forming a micro cluster. A micro cluster named Polaris 
(subsequently renamed Sarius) was formed and a European Regional Development 
Fund application was a submitted in April 1996. 
Following the initial interest in the work of the Centre for Urban and Regional 
Development Studies at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and based on the 
experiences of working with these four groups, individuals within North Tyneside 
Council wanted to establish an organisation to provide a focused research and support 
service and to offer advice and guidance in the process of developing what were 
termed as `strategic clusters of competitive advantage'. The definition of clusters was 
a very narrow one - groups of similar companies develop[ing] cooperative groupings 
able to access larger contracts (North Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1996). 
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At the outset the mission statement was: 
To maximise the potential of local SMEs by seizing the opportunities of the 
emerging global economy. To develop effective public and private interaction 
by facilitating private sector interests to generate wealth for the benefit of the 
local economy (The Real Service Centre, 1998b) 
Using Boekholt and Thuriaux's (1999) and (2000) conception of `cluster policy 
models', it can be said that the RSC's approach was an inter-firm networking model. 
The rationale for intervening was that firms within these groups, which came to be 
termed `micro clusters', were expected to be more competitive due to an ability to 
realise economies of scale by joint initiatives in accessing contracts, marketing, 
research and development, and finance. However, it was unlikely that the firms would 
come together without outside support due to a lack of trust, the cost of building 
relationships and a lack of awareness of the opportunity to work together. In order to 
maximise the potential of such firms, the RSC's intention was to give them access to 
new technologies, current research and innovation and market intelligence which they 
could not have gained access to individually. It was felt that cooperation amongst the 
firms would lead to better access to finance, larger contracts and sharing of overhead 
costs. The expectation was that this would generate wealth, as jobs would be created 
due to growth of the companies supported by the RSC, and the local economy would 
also benefit because there would be a base of technical expertise from which to 
develop further innovation and entrepreneurial activity. An underlying theme was 
that it would also be necessary to improve relationships between firms and business 
support providers, in order to assist local SMEs to be more successful. by making 
business support more business led. At the outset the expectation was that the RSC 
would identify groups of firms and then provide a tailored research and information 
service. What was not recognised at the outset was just how much work would go 
into formulating the relationships within the groups. 
During this initial phase, phase one. there was a staff of three Economic Research and 
Development Strategists, a Research Assistant and a Cluster Development Officer. 
The project was financed by European Regional Development Fund Objective 2 
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Structural Funds as a pilot project for one year. The pilot period was the extended for 
a further two years to the end of 1998, the argument being that the developing clusters 
were at too early a stage to be evaluated and that the RSC was a crucial support 
service for their ongoing development (Tyneside Real Service Centre, 2000). 
It had always been the intention of the North Tyneside pilot to expand and become 
Tyneside wide if it was successful. By 1998 it was felt that there was evidence that 
clustering, as supported by the RSC, had encouraged small firms to undertake 
research and development activity, build upon their skill base and the skills of their 
sector, broaden their client base and take on larger contracts all leading to an 
increased competitiveness for small firms in North Tyneside. The proposal for phase 
two was to expand the geographical coverage of the RSC pilot project from North 
Tyneside to the whole of Tyneside. The key aim was now stated as being: 
To maximise the potential of new and established Tyneside firms by 
developing clusters of competitive advantage in order to maximise new market 
opportunities (Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1998) 
The RSC had come to realise that, in addition to accessing larger contracts, there 
could be other benefits from clustering and by March 2000 the Mission Statement was 
less specific and involved: 
Promoting economic prosperity through the creation and development of 
business clusters 
The role envisaged for the RSC was always divided into three elements: the provision 
of a research and information service of benefit to both the private and public sector; 
improving the synergy between the public and private sector, and the development of 
clusters which were, as defined above, `groups of similar companies develop[ing] 
cooperative groupings able to access larger contracts'. 
The RSC has continued to provide a research and information service and attempted 
de. to improve the synergy and responsiveness of the business support they prop 1 
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However, the role I want to examine most closely in this chapter is the way in which 
the RSC used a process to develop small groups of firms into micro clusters and how 
the evaluation of that process was used for policy learning. 
Although at the outset the RSC was intending to focus on certain sectors (cf. section 
7.2.2), it is important to reiterate that in taking the decision to adopt a cluster approach 
the RSC, from a very early stage in its development, was not seeking to develop 
existing, recognisable, regional clusters. It was seeking to develop policy to promote 
clustering, defined, as above, as `cooperative interaction to gain advantage, which 
may or may not take place within a cluster' (Benneworth et al., 2003). The method it 
used to promote clustering was the formation of small, tightly knit, interacting groups. 
The RSC worked from a premise that linkages amongst businesses and other 
organisations are likely to prove beneficial to those businesses and organisations and 
may result in the emergence of new clusters, even though those clusters are not 
necessarily `visible' at the outset of the policy. Therefore a policy to promote 
clustering can be open to all firms within a geographical territory. However, the SME 
population is a natural target as traditionally the take up of business support services 
by SMEs has been low (Curran, 2000) and SMEs face particular problems in terms of 
accessing information, collaborating and overcoming barriers to isolation (Curran et 
al., 2000). 
However, it should be stressed that policies to promote clustering can operate within 
existing clusters (either as part of a specific policy for that cluster or in addition to a 
specific cluster policy) or they can operate within the general business environment. 
This dual role for the public sector in promoting clustering activities is highly 
pertinent to the RSC. Also if, as a result of clustering activity, a critical mass arises or 
becomes evident, a specific cluster policy for that critical mass may be appropriate. 
From an early stage the RSC were aware that taking a cluster approach, which 
involved the formation of small groups of collaborating SMEs, would necessitate 
following a process with those groups. The model they used is not dissimilar from the 
model I have used to analyse the cluster policy-making process and the two models 
are compared in Table 7-2 below. Therefore, just as I have argued that the cluster 
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policy should be analysed as a policy-making process, the staff at the RSC recognised 
at an early stage that there was a process to developing the groups, which they came 
to term micro clusters. 
Table 7-2 Models of a Cluster Development Process 
RSC Model Cluster Policy Process Model 
The decision to take a cluster approach 
Cluster identification 
Cluster Initiation/Creation 
Cluster Development and Facilitation 
Identification, selection and analysis of 
clusters 
Participant mobilisation, cluster animation 
and relation building 
Selection and implementation of policy 
instruments 
Cluster Continuation 
Assessment/evaluation with a feedback Evaluation and policy learning 
loop to cluster identification 
Source: Author's representation 
While the services provided to the micro clusters were always intended to be tailor 
made, attempts were made from the outset to codify the process of supporting micro 
clusters, utilising the experience of working with the first four groups. Stages for the 
development of `clusters of competitive advantage' were identified - cluster 
identification, cluster creation, cluster development, cluster facilitation, cluster 
continuation or self sustainability (exit strategy), assessment/evaluation with a 
feedback loop to cluster identification - and within each stage the interventions and 
support services to be offered by the RSC were detailed. It was intended that this 
clustering model would be available for dissemination and discussion in the UK and 
in Europe (Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1996). 
Attempts to codify this process came to dominate the RSC's activities during Phase 2 
and, at its most formulated, the process was presented as a Cluster Development 
Programme (CDP) depicted in Figure 7-1 below, which was envisaged as a structured 
development programme to help groups work together. Within the Cluster 
Development Programme four stages were identified: Initiation (formation of the 
`group), Planning (group business plan developed), Implementation (plan and 
funding 
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in place) and Review/Workshop (assessment of progress) (The Regional Service for 
Clustering, 2000a). Alongside the different stages the role played by, and services 
offered by, the RSC were outlined. 
Therefore the decision of the RSC to take a cluster approach arose against a 
background of large-scale losses of highly skilled jobs in the locality. The decision to 
react to those losses by utilising a clustering approach was taken by a young, 
innovative and enthusiastic team at North Tyneside Council, inspired by academic 
work carried out locally and by evidence from Emilia Romagna. That team came to 
realise that their cluster approach would involve following a particular process with 
groups of firms. The decision to expand the project to cover the SME population of 
North Tyneside was driven by that team of individuals at North Tyneside Council, 
based on the initial progress of working with the groupings that arose from the 
closures. 
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7.2.2 Identification, Selection and Analysis of Clusters 
As has been stated, the RSC was not attempting to develop regional clusters. It was 
looking to work with small groups of firms in order that those firms might benefit 
from clustering and in the expectation that those benefits would prove beneficial in 
turn to the local economy. At the outset the RSC sought to work with technology 
based and knowledge based firms. The RSC started with a strategic orientation and 
was looking to upgrade the local economy by building on the area's historic skills 
base. Initially it was envisaged that the RSC would predominantly develop micro 
clusters in three key sectors: marine design, pipeline technology and electronics 
(taken to encompass software development and internet related activity). The first 
two sectors were seen as contributing to the offshore engineering sector, a traditional 
industry with ongoing potential, and electronics was seen as a potential new growth 
area that could also be used to provide professional services to other sectors in the 
locality. As mentioned above, initial discussions were with a marine design cluster, 
Argonautics, and a pipeline technology cluster, Pegasus. A cluster of firms involved 
in software technology cluster also came together as the result of a survey of software 
companies. However, apart from this initial focus, the RSC tended to be non-sector 
specific and would work with any group of SMEs where a beneficial outturn could be 
foreseen. 
This lack of sectoral focus partly arose because of a lack of information on the nature 
of the SME base in the area. Attempts were made to establish a comprehensive 
database of companies on Tyneside in the marine/pipeline and electronics sectors. 
This proved to be a difficult exercise despite consultation with Northern Development 
Company, Tyne and Wear Research and Intelligence Unit, Newcastle City Council, 
South Tyneside Council, North Tyneside Council, the Yellow Pages and Business 
Link Tyneside (Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1996). It was anticipated that such 
sectoral research would identify further potential cluster companies for the RSC to 
approach. However, it became apparent that most of the RSC clusters were arising 
when groups of small firms came forward for assistance and the key question for the 
RSC became 'can we identify firms who want to work together? ' 
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One method of identifying firms with the potential to work together was largely 
reactive and involved raising awareness of the service offered by the RSC. The 
awareness raising was amongst other business support agencies and directly with the 
SME community. One major tool for raising awareness was a regular newsletter, 
circulated to SMEs and business support agencies, highlighting the work of the RSC 
and providing case studies of existing clients, 46. Additionally articles highlighting the 
service were published in the local daily newspaper, the Journal, and also in the local 
Chamber of Commerce Business Contact magazine. An initial A5 brochure was 
designed and printed to outline clustering and the services provided by the RSC, and a 
new brochure superseded this in late 2000. An RSC web site was launched in 1999 
(http: //www. clustering. org. uk) and a corporate video was also launched to supplement 
the other marketing material. 
As well as activities aimed at raising awareness in the SME community, workshops 
were held for business support organisations including Tyneside TEC, ENTRUST, 
Sunderland Business Link and South Tyneside Economic Partnership. In September 
2000 a Tyne and Wear Cluster Workshop, mainly attended by public sector 
representatives, was held to explore perspectives on clustering and the RSC played a 
pivotal role in this workshop. The RSC also sought to expand awareness of cluster 
facilitation within other business support agencies by a series of secondments, 
although these were not always successful. Other endeavours to increase the profile of 
the RSC included contacting business clubs with a view to presenting the RSC service 
to their members and offering the service to recipients of other forms of business 
support. Links were made with Trade UK and Business Link Northumberland, 
especially in the tourism area. 
In addition to attempts to increase awareness of the RSC's service in the region, staff 
from the project attended international conferences to promote awareness of their 
services and to learn from other practitioners. Business support agencies from outside 
the area contacted the RSC to learn more about their approach to cluster 
46 The circulation list for Issue 22 (Winter 2001) numbered 1685 clients. Of these, 1249 were private 
sector companies and 436 were public sector contacts 
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developments and staff from Nottinghamshire Small Business Services visited the 
project in 2001. 
The links with other business support and economic development organisations within 
the region were not always strong, and the inability to market the RSC during the 
uncertainty over funding undoubtedly impacted on the RSC's `presence' both in the 
SME community and the business support network. As RSC representative 2 
reported `we haven't been out there [ ... 
] it was a case of when we come back on 1St 
April [2004] are we coming into work or not? ' 
The alternative approach to raising awareness and attracting `ready made' groups was 
to try to build a micro cluster from scratch, i. e. to bring together a group of SMEs, 
who did not know each other, to form a group to work for a mutual benefit. To 
develop a micro cluster from scratch the RSC identified three stages of preparatory 
activity -identification of opportunities or generation of ideas from within the RSC 
(sector selection); groundwork preparation (marketing the concept of clustering to the 
target market) and canvassing for participants. In these cases the RSC was selecting 
the initial companies who would participate in, what were in effect, closed groups, 
where new members could only join with the approval of existing members. Given 
that these clusters were, on occasion, obtaining substantial funding, this was a 
sensitive role to undertake and the RSC's need to be objective was paramount. 
It was always difficult to identify new groups. Work was done with a group of micro 
breweries and staff on occasion sent speculative letters to local firms working in a 
particular field, for example, internet services. The most extreme example of the RSC 
`recruiting' firms for a micro cluster was undertaken in 2003 at a time of great 
uncertainty for the RSC and when they were under great pressure to meet targets for 
the numbers of SMEs assisted by the project. Initial personal experiences within the 
RSC raised the possibility of improving the marketing of wedding services in the 
North East of England. It was anticipated that improved marketing would aid the 
sustainability and professional standards of businesses offering wedding services and 
also retain wedding business in the North East that might otherwise go overseas or 
elsewhere in the UK. Therefore the RSC set out proactively to canvas support for 
clustering amongst wedding businesses. The result was the launch in October 2003 of 
265 
a new organisation, Bit of a Do, with a permanent manager employed. 86 businesses 
were enlisted in 16 separate sub clusters (for example, photography, cakes, cars). All 
members paid a joining fee, standing at £400 in 2004, and a 10% commission on 
business arising from Bit of A Do. £50,000 of public funding was made available 
amounting to approximately £580 per SME. This was a far departure from the initial 
RSC concept of providing research services for groups of knowledge intensive. high 
technology businesses, but it was driven by the need to satisfy targets. 
The predominantly reactive approach to identifying groups of SMEs to work with 
meant that any sector focus amongst the micro clusters supported by the RSC was 
predominantly driven unintentionally by private sector demand for the services of the 
RSC, although it may also have reflected the particular relevance of the kind of 
collaboration promoted by the RSC in certain areas, for example, tourism and 
business services. The nature of the benefits of clustering meant that the RSC's 
model was particularly appropriate in certain sectors where benefits arose from joint 
marketing of very small SMEs. Much work was undertaken in the tourism sector, 
where clusters were formed around group breaks in conjunction with the Tourism 
Information Centres, hotels, clubs, pubs, outdoor and leisure activities and the police. 
The idea was to work together to attract business to North Tyneside that might 
otherwise, with the advent of cheap flights, go overseas, and also to increase the 
average spend of groups visiting the area. Other clusters were formed in the vicinity 
of Hadrian's Wall, again with a view to networking the businesses in order that they 
could market themselves jointly and look to increase leisure spending in the area. The 
work with smaller groups along the Wall complemented work done by a larger 
Hadrians Wall Tourist Partnership, because individual groups obtained financial 
assistance to develop websites that fed into the Hadrians Wall Tourist Partnership web 
site. 
Therefore the RSC was always attempting to identify groups of SMEs that they could 
work with to promote the benefits of clustering and this was done either by reacting to 
groups of companies that came to the RSC or by proactively identifying possible 
combinations of SMEs. Initially it was envisaged that between seven to ten firms 
would be a suitable group. although there was a tendency during Phase 2 to drift to 
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smaller groupings, even though it was recognised that the smaller groups would not 
necessarily generate as many benefits to those involved. 
In one case an initial grouping of four environmental businesses led to the creation of 
The Environmental Industries Federation, a trade association for the environmental 
industries in the North East, and a subsequent mapping exercise led to recognition by 
One NorthEast that the environmental industries were a significant cluster in the 
region, employing up to 17,80047. However, while it was anticipated that the bottom 
up approach used by the RSC would on occasion reveal such embryonic clusters and 
Roelandt et al. (1999, p. 335) identify starting from the micro level as a third approach 
to identifying clusters, the RSC's primary objective was not to identify and develop 
regionally significant clusters, but was simply to identify and work with groups of 
SMEs who could benefit from clustering. 
7.2.3 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
Cluster identification was akin to the `selection and analysis' stage of my stylised 
cluster development model and, having identified groups of SMEs who wanted to 
work together, the RSC came to realise that there was a difficult process of building 
relationships between the parties. They realised that building consensus and 
developing relationships between the parties was a lengthy and time consuming 
process and that different personalities could be hard to mould together. The RSC 
called this stage `cluster creation' and it is equivalent to my `participant mobilisation, 
cluster animation and relation building' stage. 
Initially the role for the RSC had been envisaged as one of providing information and 
research services to groups of SMEs within given sectors. These would take the form 
of `real services' akin to those provided by ERVET in Emilia Romagna and hence the 
project was initially entitled the Real Service Centre. It was envisaged that the groups 
would work together collectively and would benefit from a central source of research 
and information provided by the RSC. 
47 EIF environmental industries survey, 2000 and 2001. 
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However, the RSC came to recognise that the provision of research and information 
would not be sufficient, because getting the firms `to cluster' to achieve mutual aims. 
once they had come together as a group, required intervention. The RSC had learnt 
that to make the groupings work openness, trust, understanding, common goals and 
respect for others' opinions were required (The Real Service Centre, 1999), but it 
could be difficult to get group members to talk to each other, it was difficult to 
encourage the `what can it do for me' person to work collectively, there could be poor 
inter-company relationships due to a lack of trust and poor information flows between 
companies. The groups often did not work towards their stated aims and it was 
difficult to keep the group mindful of its direction. The RSC felt there was a 
difficulty in getting group members together for frequent meetings and it was 
acknowledged that clustering can be costly in terms of the investment of time required 
and that this might prove too much for small companies in the absence of any 
immediate return. In interviews the need to devote substantial time to the activities of 
the cluster was often raised: 
I changed jobs in the meantime and my job became incredibly time consuming 
and I was working 7 days a week doing that, so I just couldn't fit in any extra 
time to spend with [the cluster] (micro cluster member 1) 
I was spending a hell of a lot of time with it - very little reward really (micro 
cluster member 2) 
We were also spending too much time on [the cluster] and not enough on our 
own companies (micro cluster member 3). 
One way in which the RSC sought to build relationships within the group was to 
create a structure to underpin the working of the group and common documentation 
for the formation of clusters was made available. In the early days of the project a 
very formal structure for the clusters was proposed and part of the learning process 
within the RSC has been the evolution of different types of structure for micro 
clusters. The initial preference for a limited company status for the groups was partly 
because the groups were receiving substantial tranches of European Structural Fund 
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monies and it was felt the formation of a limited company would provide more 
accountability. Other groups found the limited company structure beneficial: 
We needed to have a company structure for us to feel safe (micro cluster 
member 4) 
I think if we'd just joined together as a cluster and said we're all part of the 
same group and this is our name that would have been OK but I think going 
for the limited status and going for VAT registration gives us something, or at 
least gives me a feeling that there is a company there (micro cluster member 5) 
We felt that the limited company would be necessary because we were dealing 
with public funds, which had to be accounted for (micro cluster member 3). 
Other groups did not find the limited company status satisfactory describing it as `a 
huge administrative burden' (micro cluster member 6) and other saw it as unnecessary 
It depends who you are, if you've worked with people for 20 odd years you 
don't need the formal structure quite so much (micro cluster member 7). 
While the formal limited company model is still suggested as one alternative, there 
are also examples including a subscription model (for example, the wedding services 
cluster, Bit of a Do) and also the idea of core members with a wider group of 
associates around that core. The production of standard documentation was partly 
born from a desire to codify the process of working with micro clusters. There was 
also an aspiration to create an RSC franchise with a toolkit of procedures and 
documentation to offer to the public sector business support system in England and 
Wales on a commercial basis. 
It should be noted that the micro clusters are essentially closed groupings with new 
members only included with the agreement of existing members. This has not been 
seen as beneficial by all of those involved: 
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Really I think informal cluster groups are probably more effective, but they 
are not seen to be effective (micro cluster member 7) 
I think if you leave a cluster you are no longer a member of the cluster and 
therefore you are no longer of a group to be talked to, or spoken to, or worked 
with, whereas if we'd never been in the cluster we would have been ex ERS 
and I think that did happen. (ex micro cluster member 1). 
There have been varying attitudes to the inclusion of new members: 
I think it will change in as much as there will come the time when we won't be 
able to do something and we'll have met someone probably in the pub who 
we've thought - hey come in (micro cluster member 8). 
On occasion there were unsuccessful attempts to bring in new members: 
That was the worst part of the entire thing to do with the cluster and it was a 
personality clash rather than anything else. He wanted to own everybody 
basically and I didn't like it, I didn't get on with him at all (micro cluster 
member 9). 
On the whole there was a presumption that only non-competing firms could work in 
such small groups 
That's why we don't really compete and why we can work together because we 
are each doing our own thing (micro cluster member 10) 
One of the strengths that we thought we had was that the companies did 
different things [... ] and that was one of the things that we thought would 
allow the cluster to function because we weren't directly competing with each 
other (micro cluster member 3). 
and there have been examples of tensions where competition issues have arisen 
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[The cluster] needed to be collaborative and they were competitive (micro 
cluster member 3). 
As mentioned above, groups of companies who might work together were identified 
by a variety of means. Once participants had been identified it was necessary, not 
only to decide on a suitable structure for the group, but also to generate consensus and 
build relationships, usually around a commercial opportunity, with the RSC acting as 
a facilitator. The idea was to establish aims for the cluster and to build a relationship 
both between the companies within the cluster and between those companies and the 
RSC. The building of a relationship that would lead to collaboration required trust to 
be built between the companies. The magnitude of this task depended on both the 
level of prior knowledge between the parties involved and the extent to which they 
had previously considered collaborating. It was a much harder task when the RSC 
had brought the individuals together, because in those cases the companies needed to 
be convinced that collaborating would be a good idea. It was an easier task where 
individuals had already worked together previously: 
There was an element of trust, all that kind of stuff, even though we'd not 
worked together we kind of got on well, so we knew each others' background 
(micro cluster member 11). 
The fact that we all get on and like and trust each other had a lot to do with it 
(micro cluster member 9). 
I suppose that is one thing I have developed with [X] and [Y] and [Z] - there 
is a lot of trust there - you can say things knowing that they are not going to 
be taken further. (micro cluster member 10). 
In other cases the lack of prior knowledge was seen as a problem: 
You know we really got this whole thing wrong, because like five or six years 
ago when we started this concept, this cluster or what have you, I think ewe 
should have all put our cards on the table, our CVs, and said `this is who we 
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are and this is what we can do, our strengths and weaknesses and what have 
you' (micro cluster member 12). 
The role of the RSC at this `cluster creation' stage therefore depended on the source 
of the micro cluster. The micro clusters were on occasions `artificially' developed by 
the RSC following a marketing exercise within a particular industry, or there may 
have been one individual within the private sector willing to put the group together 
following a marketing approach from the RSC or a pre-existing group of companies 
came forward for assistance. On the whole the RSC's role has been one of facilitating 
the development of the loose grouping into a more structured group able to achieve 
tangible results from collective working 
Their main role has been as the catalyst that brought us together basically, this 
wouldn't have happened if they hadn't contacted me. We would have still 
been struggling along as individual businesses (Micro cluster member 5). 
Although the source of the micro clusters is only loosely tracked, in most cases it 
appeared that there was already a loose grouping of SMEs introduced to the RSC by 
another business support organisation/enterprise agency or the grouping came directly 
to the RSC as a result of RSC marketing, word of mouth or personal recommendation. 
Only the Bit of a Do series of micro clusters, and to a lesser extent a cluster of 
hospitality businesses known as the `Group Break' micro clusters, were composed of 
SMEs predominantly identified by the RSC. 
The RSC's ability to perform the function of bringing the group together depended on 
the staff within the organisation being able to adopt a role as a facilitator within the 
micro cluster groups. The initial staff developed a particular way of intervening in the 
groups that was non -threatening, because they were young and enthusiastic, and they 
were able to persuade people by the force of their argument in such a way that 
members of the groups did not feel pushed into particular courses of action. This 
accords with the findings of Huggins (2000) who found that the energy, enthusiasm 
and experience of those promoting networks were vital particularly at an early stage. 
That said when the RSC staff were called upon to act as a negotiator/peacemaker it 
was a harder task. In most cases where significant disagreements between members of 
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the group arose, one of the aggrieved parties left the cluster. According to a former 
member of one of the clusters: 
You can't do this without having a strong view, and if you bring together 
people with strong views it either does gel or it doesn't gel (ex micro cluster 
member 1). 
By their very nature people running their own businesses are likely to be determined 
and have fairly strong personalities and the ability of a third party, the RSC, to resolve 
fundamental disagreements remains in doubt. The role as counsellor and provider of 
reassurance was more achievable, if time consuming. 
The ability of the firms to build the trustful relationships that would facilitate the 
clustering process also depended on the way they functioned as a group. The initial 
plan for the RSC had been to take over a new building, subsequently known as The 
Centre for Advanced Industry, for which the Economic Development Staff at North 
Tyneside Council had obtained funding, as a centre for clustering for firms in marine 
design and pipeline engineering (cf. section 8.1.1). Although one of the clusters came 
to be partially based in that building, the main plan did not come to fruition. 
However, other of the micro clusters co-located elsewhere and reported positive 
benefits from that proximity: 
Every day, we talk, we have coffees together, we chat, pass the time of day 
(micro cluster member 13) 
Being in the same building helps us a lot (micro cluster member 3). 
The ability of the micro clusters to achieve benefits from clustering also depended on 
the personalities, not just of the RSC staff, but also of those within the group. 
Although the RSC could perform the role of facilitator, it was necessary to have an 
individual or individuals within the groups, particularly the larger groups, who could 
drive the micro cluster and sustain the relationships within it. In certain cases, where 
the cluster overlapped with the majority of work of one or all of the businesses this 
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was not a problem and there was, on occasion, a natural leader with others filling 
more subsidiary roles: 
He's the lynch pin. We've got fingers in other pots (micro cluster member 9). 
On other occasions there appeared to be a natural division of labour. However, in 
certain cases it was felt this leadership was not there: 
It's very difficult when people are put together and there is no one, dominant 
person who says yes we will do that. I think that is the fundamental flaw of a 
large cluster group (micro cluster member 3) 
You need leadership and you need to make decisions and it doesn't lend itself, 
a cluster group doesn't lend itself to decision-making (micro cluster member 
13). 
Sometimes, where there was not an animator and motivator for the micro cluster, that 
role fell back on to staff within the RSC. Lagendijk (1998), when studying The Real 
Service Centre, raised a concern in this respect and advised that `[w]hat should be 
prevented, however, is that clustering support turns into a style of nurturing' babies' 
(ibid. p. 203). RSC staff were at times too involved in the operation of the micro 
cluster and this was acknowledged by members of the micro clusters: 
[The member of RSC staff] did a bit of everything really, I mean yes, he did 
help us resolve problems, he was also a team leader as well, and he shouldn't 
have [been]. I think he does a fantastic job, but he should have thrown us in at 
the deep end more - that's probably best, whereas he really gave us a bit of a 
comfort factor and he probably gave us too much of a comfort factor (micro 
cluster member 1) 
Although on occasion a member of staff from the RSC could have acted as leader for 
a short time, it was necessary to hand that role on to the micro cluster. 
274 
Funding was also recognised as a method of attracting firms to work together. While 
the RSC had been very successful in accessing European Structural Funds for the 
development of clusters, with over £1 million having been secured by March 1997 
(Ratnatunga, 1997), one of the acknowledged problems had been the time lag between 
applying and accessing funding via this route. Therefore, while the RSC did continue 
to encourage and assist their clients to seek additional/alternative funding where 
appropriate, including from the Innovation Action Fund and Arts Council, the idea of 
a fund held by the RSC and available to businesses wishing to develop clusters was 
proposed. The existence of a Cluster Facilitation Fund that could be directly granted 
by the RSC simplified the process of administering grant funding to clusters. This 
funding could be used to `kick start' the micro clusters and offset the costs incurred in 
building trust between SMEs sceptical of the benefits of working together. It was 
envisaged that this would enable economies of scale in delivering clustering services 
to be achieved because at the time the support was very labour-intensive with the RSC 
only working with eight clusters48 at the end of its first phase. The labour intensive 
nature of the service had arisen both as a result of managing the structural fund 
applications and subsequent projects on behalf of the micro clusters, which would be 
reduced by having a simpler form of funding, but also as a result of offering such 
hands on support without which the micro clusters might not develop successfully. 
The ability to offer funding to groups of SMEs prepared to form micro clusters 
undoubtedly attracted firms to the RSC. There was a risk that the availability of 
funding would attract applicants who were only interested in the funds and had no 
intention of continuing to cluster for mutual benefit in the medium to long term and, 
while RSC staff considered themselves alert to this risk, in certain cases it was 
apparent that the motivation to cluster was solely driven by the availability of funds 
We combine together to get a grant, which is basically what [the micro cluster] 
is there for, as far as we are concerned it's not really a strength (micro cluster 
member 7) 
[1] Argonautics, Pegasus. S. &S group, The Environment Cluster. Sarius, Affinitas, Holistic Health. 
Eurocrafts 
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Notwithstanding the codification of the process, described in section 7.2.1, each 
member of RSC staff had to choose their own way of facilitating each cluster. During 
the first two phases of the RSC, each cluster, however it had arisen, had a relationship 
with one member of RSC staff. There was concern that this reduced objectivity in 
dealing with micro clusters because personal attachment to the grouping could lead to 
a notion of ownership and on occasions, as mentioned above, members of staff from 
the RSC appeared to adopt a leadership role within the micro clusters. This was 
extremely time consuming for the RSC staff and impacted on the ability of the micro 
cluster to be self-sustaining. The RSC tended to find developing an exit strategy from 
providing intensive support to the micro clusters difficult and, although the RSC 
identified a self sustainability phase for the micro cluster, the actions undertaken by 
the RSC during that phase were similar to those in the cluster facilitation phase. One 
dichotomy has been that the RSC wanted to build permanent working relationships 
with the cluster companies, while acknowledging that clusters must be able to 
continue without public sector funding. 
Subsequently it was decided that at least two members of staff would be involved 
with each cluster, and early stage and developing clusters were monitored within team 
meetings and with the RSC manager. This was designed to ensure that objectivity 
was retained and effort was not absorbed with clients unlikely to progress. However, 
the success and benefits that some of the clusters reported often came from the very 
close relationship they had had with a particular member of staff: 
I think from my point of view he was probably the most significant part of it 
rather than anything else (micro cluster member 10) 
The role that the RSC needed to perform was continually under review and various 
attempts were made to reduce the level of support required by the SMEs not only 
once the micro clusters were 'up and running', but also in the earlier stages of 
development. This was largely because of the need for the RSC to meet the targets 
associated with their funding. Both the targets and funding had increased as a result 
of the availability of the Cluster Facilitation Fund. It was noticeable that, in general, 
there was a move away from the extremely resource intensive support that 
characterised the early micro clusters, to support that was very much more private 
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sector led and where ownership of cluster development was held by the collaborating 
SMEs and not with the RSC. It was reasonable to expect more cluster animation from 
within the cluster because, on occasion, the aims and objectives of groups had been 
driven either by the RSC with little ownership from the cluster or had been driven by 
funding considerations. The latter problem may have been compounded because 
there was little vetting of the firms wishing to be part of the clusters. 
The need to reduce the amount of time spent by RSC staff with each micro cluster 
was largely driven by the need to achieve the targets for the project. Micro clusters 
were categorised as early stage (initiation), developing, active or dormant. In 2004 a 
time limit of nine months for progression from initiation to active status was 
introduced to ensure that the necessary targets were achieved. This caused concern 
within the RSC staff that opportunities would fall by the wayside because, as with all 
aspects of the cluster approach, micro clusters do take time to develop and a balance 
was required between achieving short term results for the RSC and allowing micro 
clusters to develop at their own pace and take the required time to build trust and 
collaborative relationships. Attempts to short cut the process could be detrimental 
because, as Huggins (2000), drawing on the work of Storper (1993,1995), suggests, 
`the evolutionary pathway of the relationships that generates untraded 
interdependencies forms a valid and valued collective asset' (Huggins, 2000, p. 131). 
The RSC recognised that the building up of relationships within the groups, the 
participant mobilisation and cluster animation as I have termed it, was a critical stage 
in developing micro clusters. They acknowledged that the process took time and 
required leadership from within the group and, in many cases, required substantial 
facilitation from RSC staff. Funding was seen as a method of speeding up the 
process, but funding alone was insufficient to build relationships and the RSC's role 
as a facilitator of relationships was key. Experience showed that time, and often a 
very long time, was required to build the trustful relationships that would permit 
untraded interdependencies to operate within the micro clusters. However, the short 
term funding regime under which the RSC. like most business support organisations. 
operated militated against taking time to develop relationships. and the target driven 
regime was not compatible with a process that took time. 
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7.2.4 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
The selection of cluster activities and policy initiatives is related to the goals and 
background of policy-makers and their understanding of clusters. Because of their 
interest in the work of Real Service Centres in Emilia Romagna, the RSC had a 
particular interest in the provision of research and information. Because of a 
particular interest in developing small businesses and a perception of problems with 
existing business support the RSC wanted to improve the synergy between the public 
and private sector. Because the RSC perceived that groups of SMEs could undertake 
joint activities beneficial to their performance they wanted to encourage groups of 
SMEs to form and undertake such joint activities. I now want to look at those three 
areas - the undertaking of joint activities by micro clusters, the provision of research 
and information services and the improvement of the synergy between the private 
sector and publicly funded business support. 
Development of micro clusters 
The RSC intended that groups of SMEs would obtain benefits from clustering and 
envisaged that a range of activities could be undertaken to achieve these benefits. 
These potential activities included - research and development, development of joint 
products and services, joint marketing activity, work to improve skills and expertise, 
provision of shared resources, joint projects and contracts, mentoring and learning 
networks and capacity building (Tyneside Real Service Centre, 1998). 
As discussed the RSC came to realise that a large part of their role was to build 
relationships within the micro clusters, in order that the members of the micro clusters 
could undertake joint activities, and therefore a substantial amount of time was spent 
on the previous two stages of the cluster policy process model - identifying groups of 
SMEs who could work together and building relationships between the parties so that 
there was consensus as to a vision for the micro cluster and sufficient involvement 
from the participants to achieve that vision. 
Once the micro clusters had formed the RSC did not dictate which activities should be 
undertaken, but a plan for cluster activities was drawn up with the micro cluster 
members. This was considered by the RSC to be the cluster development sta`e. 
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Cluster Development involved conducting a survey of need, identifying market 
opportunities, developing an action plan, establishing a framework to carry out the 
action plan, developing projects to meet the identified needs of the cluster, and 
gaining assistance in obtaining public funds. The development was supplemented by 
the provision of information services and networking. Notwithstanding the level of 
involvement of the RSC at the outset, it was acknowledged that this input should, and 
could, be reduced once the cluster was operating in its own right. 
As with most processes the stages are not entirely distinct and, just as the way in 
which the group came together impacted upon the amount of work required to build 
trust, so the cluster activities themselves could be used as part of the consensus 
building stage because low risk activities, which achieved a quick win for the 
businesses involved, were one method of building trust between the parties 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999, Ceglie et al., 1999). 
The kinds of clustering activities that were expected to bring benefit to the firms, the 
micro cluster and the wider territory can be divided into three main types. The first 
was the provision of collective or `club' goods, which might be considered as cluster 
assets. The second was the generation of relational assets. The third was related to a 
notion that the micro clusters would give the SMEs `borrowed size' and I want to 
look at each of these aspects. However, I firstly want to discuss the way in which 
these activities were funded. 
By 1998 the RSC had identified that clusters might require financial assistance in the 
initial and developmental stages of development in order to achieve their long-term 
aims. At an early stage it was recognised that the funding of individual cluster 
initiatives by separate public finance applications was inefficient due to the time 
scales imposed, the restrictions applied and the bureaucracy involved. Experience 
with at least two of the clusters had demonstrated that the funding, which had been 
predominantly from European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), was restrictive 
and the administrative burden on the RSC of acting as project manager for the ERDF 
projects had been problematic. It was proposed that the RSC be funded so as to be 
able to give grants of up to £ 10,000 to clusters to enable them to cooperate on a 
focused activity. thus aiding the development of the cluster. Examples of projects 
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likely to be funded included marketing brochures, joint purchase of a useful resource, 
financial consultancy or marketing advice, product development/service development, 
joint project work. 
During phase two of the project the process of applying for this funding appeared to 
subsume other elements of the process. This was partially because one of the major 
targets was to achieve full utilisation of the ERDF funded Cluster Facilitation Fund. 
The main priority therefore appeared to be to get the clusters to write a business plan 
that could form the basis of an application for funding. On occasions it appeared that 
the plans were written by RSC staff with little input from the firms within the cluster 
and an emphasis on building relationships within the micro cluster was, to an extent, 
lost. However, as mentioned above the three benefits the RSC believed clustering 
would bring were club goods, relational assets and borrowed size and I will look at 
these in turn. 
Club Goods. Industrial District literature has theorised that the dynamism of the 
districts is a result of a mixture of cooperation and competition and that the 
cooperation takes two forms - adherence to norms and provision of club goods 
(Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). The clusters working with the RSC also attempted to 
create collective or club goods in many areas including training. A distinction should 
be made between the provision of a club asset available exclusively to members of the 
micro cluster and the provision of a club asset available to a wider community. 
In certain cases the groups came together specifically to provide a collective good. 
One cluster was specifically formed to provide a small batch CMT (cut, make and 
trim) facility for the cluster members and other fashion designers. There was 
undoubtedly a demand for the service and premises were found and fitted out, but 
there were problems with this project that illuminate issues in respect of providing 
collective goods. The time taken to provide the collective good can be detrimental to 
the existing businesses: 
I think this is the problem - instead of focussing on our own businesses and 
how we were going to use the facility, we ended up running the facility itself 
(micro cluster member 4). 
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When the groups attempting to provide the cluster asset are small they also do not 
necessarily have the skills to provide the collective good: 
There was nobody there that had the right knowledge really to deal with that 
manufacturing and you wouldn't just need one person, you would probably 
need maybe at least two, but ideally three or four to share the responsibility of 
getting it off the ground (micro cluster member 1). 
It was subsequently acknowledged that links should have been made with the colleges 
offering fashion design courses, larger textile manufacturers in the region and other 
cluster initiatives being developed at a regional scale, because the micro cluster 
existed at too small a scale to offer the service that should have formed a club asset. 
Although there was an unsuccessful attempt by the Argonautics cluster to provide a 
training facility for the local marine industry, which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 8, the Pegasus Pipeline Cluster were founder members of a very successful 
MSc. Course in Pipeline Engineering at the University of Newcastle. This initiative 
was differentiated from the CMT facility and Argonautics examples because firms 
outside the micro cluster, including larger firms, were involved in a wider grouping 
known as North East Pipeline Group, which had emerged from Pegasus. North East 
Pipeline Group had an independent chairman and obtained funding for various 
initiatives, including the initiative that identified a need for and established the MSc 
course. While members of the Pegasus cluster were heavily involved in the provision 
of the course and continue to teach on the course, the existence of a wider regional 
grouping enabled more resource, both time and human, to be dedicated to the project. 
This reinforces the argument that micro clusters may exist at too small a scale to 
provide collective goods for a wider community than the micro cluster itself. 
The carrying out of the activities even solely for the benefit of the micro cluster could 
be problematic because, as is well recognised, SME owners do not have surplus time, 
yet some of the activities required substantial time commitments. A paid employee 
sometimes provided the human resource required to market the micro clusters. 
Argonautics employed a Business Development Manager. Bit of a Do employed a 
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manager and a marketing manager operated a large craft network supported by the 
RSC. However, where this position required external funding, it was always insecure. 
One question was whether the activity of the cluster was core to the members' 
business interests and how much they valued the collective service provided by a 
shared employee. 
However, micro clusters did successfully provide other club assets at the scale of the 
micro cluster. Cluster members cited examples of shared machinery and joint 
employment of `virtual' administrative staff (a service whereby one individual 
operates a remote telephone handling service on behalf of many clients). During 
interviews with cluster members there was reference to access to each other' s 
facilities. One cluster member mentioned that he could use the manufacturing 
facilities of another member and another cluster member detailed the kinds of 
equipment to which his firm gained access: 
They do have facilities down there which we haven't got, like they have a 
laboratory which has equipment, microscopes and that sort of thing, which we 
don't have, and they have a digital camera for example. So if we want to take 
pictures of things it's a lot easier to go down there and take pictures down 
there (micro cluster member 7). 
Therefore, while the scale and resources of the micro clusters meant that the provision 
of collective goods for a wider community of firms than the micro cluster itself was 
problematic, the micro clusters did provide club goods for members including on 
occasion a dedicated member of staff. 
Relational Assets. I have argued in Chapter 2 that untraded interdependencies, 
described by Storper (1997, p. 5) as taking the form of conventions, informal rules, 
and habits that coordinate economic actors under conditions of uncertainty', and 
social capital, described by Cooke (2000b, p. 2) as an attribute of societies 
from 
which individuals or collectivities may benefit, derived from community-like 
relationships of reciprocity. favor-exchange, trust. dependability, and open 
communication'. are both forms of relational assets. While Storper maintains that the 
region is the locus of untraded interdependencies, it appears that activities within 
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micro clusters facilitated the development of relational assets at a very micro level. 
Through cooperation between the parties in the groups untraded interdependencies 
emerged, including open and honest communication, which in turn facilitated trading 
relations within the cluster, facilitated the transfer of knowledge leading to innovation 
and led to a mentoring network. 
Relational assets are, by their very nature, intangible and cannot be quantified. 
However, many firms involved in micro clusters reported benefits from the relations 
that existed. Many of the benefits were related to overcoming perceptions of isolation 
that can detrimentally affect SMEs (Curran et al., 2000, Morgan, 1996) and clustering 
also encouraged the formation of peer group/self help groupings which should over 
time lessen the reliance on publicly funded business support (Business Link. Tyne and 
Wear 2003): 
It's a very lonely existence when you're on your own (micro cluster member 
4). 
The main function has been as a comfort blanket for us all (micro cluster 
member 13). 
It's a very friendly open system you know, we help each other out as best we 
can, which makes the world go round, so it's quite good in that sense (micro 
cluster member 7). 
You have got two other people who are motivated to get something done and 
it encourages you to get something done (micro cluster member 10). 
The cluster also enabled individuals to take a low risk step into entrepreneurship: 
From my point of view it was the sort of creative outlet. it was the opportunity 
to try out ideas, off my own bat rather than what you have to do for work. I 
think that was my main motivation (micro cluster member 10). 
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The micro clusters, where strong relational assets were developed, provided meeting 
places for firms to come together and exchange information, raise opportunities and 
ask questions in a non-threatening, non-competitive environment. On occasions this 
was achieved through co-location: 
I haven't had to go anywhere and I was able to talk informally about it (micro 
cluster member 3) 
However, on other occasions there was evidence that the micro clusters arranged 
informal meetings. One cluster member talked of meeting in a local North Shields 
pub: 
Our boardroom, if you like, was the big table in the Maggy Bank (micro 
cluster member 5). 
I sat in on another meeting in a pub where busy individuals had got together in a 
relaxed atmosphere and I was struck by the way information was gleaned. `Has 
anyone done business in Chile? ' asked one cluster member; `yes, I have a contact 
there - I'll call you in the morning' came the reply. This way of obtaining business 
information was valued by the businesses. Having small closed networks may not 
have been the best way of generating such flows of knowledge, but it was one 
outcome of clustering that the firms valued. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, innovation is often the result of multidisciplinary 
knowledge and is therefore facilitated by the cooperation of individuals with 
overlapping tacit knowledges (Lawson and Lorenz 1999). The RSC envisaged that 
micro clusters would be a fertile ground for innovation not only because of the 
overlapping knowledges, but also because conducting research within the cluster 
would alleviate some of the financial and time constraints faced by SMES when it 
came to undertaking research and development. It was anticipated that economies of 
scale would be achieved by conducting research within the cluster and that joint 
research and development projects would reduce the risk to individual SMEs by 
spreading risk across the cluster. 
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One micro cluster created a safety enclosure to go in a saloon cab. Although they had 
already come together loosely as a group before the RSC's involvement, they 
maintained that RSC involvement brought coherence and ideas to the group. Other 
micro clusters talked of generating ideas through the cluster and the relations within 
the cluster were seen to be beneficial to innovation: 
We get together, have a meeting and we tend to find - like a brain storming 
session - other ideas or avenues of exploration will come out or it (micro 
cluster member 11) 
I can sort of share ideas, it's good for me, I get feedback (micro cluster 
member 10). 
The cluster group was actually one way of keeping our friends together and a 
source of support if you like, to go and bounce an idea off somebody else 
(micro cluster member 7). 
The relational assets generated within the micro clusters are difficult to identify, let 
alone quantify, but I was often made aware just how much cluster members found it 
beneficial to have a self help peer group to turn to and learn from. The benefits from 
the relational assets were greatest where the relations between the firms were 
strongest and characterised by trust and good channels of communication. 
Borrowed Size. The initial RSC definition of clusters, `groups of similar companies 
develop[ing] cooperative groupings able to access larger contracts', indicates that the 
RSC's intention at an early stage was that contracts would be won by the cluster 
groupings. It was also anticipated that collaboration would lead to economies of 
scope for the cluster, because a wider range of products and services could be offered, 
thereby widening the client base. It was further anticipated that work would be 
passed between cluster companies and that additionally economies of scale could be 
achieved with overheads for marketing initiatives being shared. 
However, in the case of the first two cluster groupings, the nature of the contracts and 
liability issues meant that this was not straightforward: 
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The problem with Pegasus was that it was a shell; it clearly was a shell and 
probably would not be acceptable as a structure [... ] to larger companies. 
(micro cluster member 3) 
Members of the Pegasus cluster did find ways around this issue but came to realise 
that the actual formal structure of the cluster was not necessary for these working 
relations to occur, what was necessary was the relational assets discussed above: 
[A] and [B], who you've spoken to, often work through [X firm] and that's no 
problem and they effectively hide the identity of their company and they work 
through [X firm]. No problem at all. At other times they'll work with [Y 
Firm]. [Z firm] people work with us and they'll work with [Y firm] so there is 
a tacit recognition there that you have to work with the bigger organisations 
but Pegasus itself I think, as I say, will fade away to be honest (micro cluster 
member 3). 
The inability to use the micro cluster identity in certain cases may have been related 
to the nature of the pipeline and marine design industries. Other micro clusters had no 
problems with using the micro cluster identity with clients and used that larger 
identity to their benefit: 
You say well we've got 6 people working for us - it gives a feeling of strength 
and it helps (micro cluster member 8). 
What was also significant for undertaking joint work was the fit between the activities 
undertaken within the cluster. In certain cases the firms had overlapping and 
complementary products and services but on other occasions the firms competencies 
were too divergent for work to be undertaken jointly: 
So really it didn't work because we were too different I think (micro cluster 
member 13). 
I expected from [the cluster] to be able to develop my client base primarily. 
but it really didn't come to fruition. It was more a consultancy type base 
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cluster [... ] I mean I'm not a consultant; I'm a hands-on practical type of guy 
(micro cluster member 2). 
The RSC had anticipated that the borrowed size element of micro cluster development 
would prove the most useful to firms within the clusters. It became evident that this 
aspect was much more problematic than had been envisaged. Not only did the firms 
need to have developed relational assets to facilitate the operation of joint contracts. 
but also the compatibility and fit between the businesses had to be strong and the 
contracting arrangements had to be acceptable in the market in which the firms 
operated. 
Improving relations between publicly provided business support and the private 
sector 
As stated in their mission statement, the second activity envisaged for the RSC had 
been the improvement of the relationship between the private sector and business 
support functions in the public sector, particularly as many SMEs were sceptical 
about the worth of advice from the public sector and the take up of business support 
was low (Curran, 2000). 
Initially the RSC looked to perform the role of a one-stop shop for business support, 
providing a clearer route through the proliferation of support agencies. The RSC were 
active in signposting both Pegasus and Argonautics to other sources of business 
support including, in the case of Argonautics, the DTI and, in the case of Pegasus, the 
Northern Enterprise Fund. However, during phase two of the RSC, possibly because 
the staff at the RSC became more focused on meeting the targets that arose due to 
their funding structure and possibly because the RSC had its own grant funding 
available, there appeared to be fewer linkages made between the micro clusters and 
other business support services. During phase 3 of the project, when the RSC had to 
operate for a time without being able to offer grant funding, micro clusters were again 
directed to other forms of business support. This model of a broker directing 
businesses to specialist types of support forms the basis of the Area Brokerage Model 
proposed for the business support network in the North East. However, the RSC were 
never able to establish their claim to be considered as a broker within that model. 
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The RSC also sought to be perceived in a different light from most business support 
organisations by maintaining a longer lasting relationship with the cluster members. 
In this respect there was always the dichotomy, mentioned above, of the RSC wanting 
to maintain a relationship with the cluster, but needing to be able to apply resources to 
developing new clusters. The perception of the quality of the relationship and the role 
of the RSC did, in any case, vary from cluster to cluster. Micro cluster member 4 
described the benefits of the RSC's role: 
Having a mentor for the business and all the different companies concerned 
and having an impartial agency there to assist 
A member of one of the later micro clusters commented: 
Their main role has been as the catalyst that brought us together (micro cluster 
member 5) 
This may reflect a change in the role performed by the RSC as the support offered 
became less intensive. As the support became less intensive there was a greater need 
for the cluster members to have the drive and leadership to drive the cluster forward. 
Much of the work that the RSC was undertaking was to do with building 
relationships, which are dependent on individual personalities, and it is not surprising 
that opinions differed. Some cluster members spoke highly of the RSC staff and 
others did not: 
An absolutely wonderful guy, really, really, really helpful. And he hasn't told 
me to say that! (micro cluster member 9) 
He was a right pain; he was terrible (micro cluster member 7). 
Some cluster members found the operating procedures of the RSC problematic. 
Micro cluster member 6 saw the RSC as very prescriptive and contrasted them 
unfavourably with the Regional Development Agency, One NorthEast whom they 
saw as more prepared to support 'businesses at the sharp end'. There were also 
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particular problems when the RSC was facing uncertainty as an organisation. That 
uncertainty caused problems for the relationships between the RSC and its clients: 
While they messed around, kept changing the rules, changing conditions, we 
had to keep the submitting [the business plan], it was a real nightmare, I mean 
I don't know what was going on, but it was a complete pain. (micro cluster 
member 13) 
The strength of relationships between the micro cluster members and RSC staff did 
depend on individual personalities, and the RSC's role changed as the organisation 
tried to expand and offer its services to more SMEs. The resource intensive support 
offered at the outset was not sustainable as short-term targets had to be met by the 
organisation. RSC staff had to become more distant form the cluster and the lower 
intensity of the relationship changed the role of the RSC. That changed role placed 
more emphasis on the firms within the micro cluster driving the process but, given 
that the initial rationale for the RSC's involvement was that firms would not come 
together without outside support due to a lack of trust, the cost of building 
relationships and a lack of awareness of the opportunity to work together, it may have 
also reduced the effectiveness of the service provided. 
Research and information provision 
The third element of the service provided by the RSC was the provision of research 
and information. During 1994 and 1995 the majority of research undertaken and 
information provided was for the benefit of the Economic Development section and 
other business support agencies. From early 1996 it was decided that the focus should 
be on providing economic and market intelligence primarily of use to local 
companies, especially the companies within the embryonic clusters. Initiatives were 
undertaken to provide an internet accessible database containing details of 400 firms 
in Tyne and Wear in the marine, pipeline and electronics sectors; a newsletter 
promoting clustering and related activity; an opportunity database holding details of 
business support availability in the area; a summary of information of interest to 
cluster companies gleaned from Internet databases, newspapers and specialist 
publications, and distributed by e-mail: the provision of tender information and sector 
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specific research, including the production of a report into the state of the shipbuilding 
and ship repair sectors. 
At the outset the RSC was able to monitor developments in marine, electronics and 
pipeline sectors, but without that sectoral targeting it is much harder to provide in- 
depth information to a wide range of clusters in a cost-effective way. When asked, 
many cluster members agreed that the general information provided to them by the 
RSC was useful, but felt that any specialist requirements for information that they had 
would be too specific for the RSC to provide. 
7.2.5 Evaluation and Policy Learning 
In Chapter 3I suggested that there were three elements to evaluating economic 
development policy - evaluating the efficiency of policy, evaluating the effectiveness 
of policy and achieving policy learning that feeds back into the policy-making 
process. I also highlighted that, in addition to the usual issues of additionality, 
displacement and substitution and multiplier effects, particular issues arise when 
evaluating the effectiveness of cluster policy including the difficulty in measuring the 
intangible and softer impacts of cluster policy and the difficulty in establishing a 
suitable level for evaluation given that the cluster approach has a triple focus - the 
development of the individual businesses, the development of the cluster, and the 
consequent development of the wider territory. 
Evaluation and policy learning were, from the outset, important to the RSC. In this 
section I want to look at two aspects of evaluation that relate to the RSC initiative. I 
want to look at the way the RSC evaluated its service and learnt from its experiences 
as an organisation, but firstly, I want to show that the RSC recognised that evaluation 
and learning should be an important part of the process of developing each micro 
cluster. 
Evaluation and learning for micro clusters 
Assessment and evaluation were identified as a necessary part of the development of 
each micro cluster. It was planned that for each cluster there would a review meeting 
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held between RSC staff and micro cluster members. Argonautics undertook a 
strategy review in summer 1998 and this led to more action being taken to develop the 
cluster than previously (The Real Service Centre, 1998a). 
Micro clusters were also encouraged to learn from each other's experiences. Events 
have been held to bring together various micro clusters either as a group or meetings 
between two micro clusters. These have proved to be valuable networking events and 
individual clusters have drawn on the experience of other micro clusters to develop 
their own grouping. 
Evaluation and policy learning for the RSC as an organisation 
Policy Efficiency. By 1998 the RSC was working with eight clusters. Many projects 
had been undertaken to support the clusters in the areas of research and development, 
networking, marketing, training and resource sharing. The value for' local' money of 
the RSC was also highlighted. During the period October 1996 to September 1997 it 
had cost the local partners £133,452 to run the project, but £1.06 million of European 
funds had been obtained (Ratnatunga, 1998a). Outside recognition for the project was 
obtained with the RSC being highly commended in the 1998 National Local 
Government's Chronicle awards for Business Partnership of the year. However, 
overall it was felt that `current cluster support is insufficient and inefficient'. 49 The 
support was also very labour-intensive with the RSC only working with eight 
clusters50 at the time. 
It was envisaged that the wider geographical remit of Phase 2 of the project would 
enable economies of scale to be achieved in delivering clustering services and the 
cluster facilitation fund would be available in order to address the time lag between 
applying and accessing funding for small firms identified above. 
49 Notes from an RSC team meeting, 1998. 
50 Argonautics. Pegasus, S. and S group, The Environment Cluster. Sarius, Affinitas, Holistic Health, 
Eurocrafts 
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At an early stage of the organisation the staff appeared to have a clear idea of the 
rationale for their interventions and a strong understanding of their role and this was 
passed on to new members of the team in such a way that it could be argued that there 
was a `community of practice' (cf. Lesser et al., 2000) within the organisation. 
Internally regular team meetings were held and certain longer brainstorming sessions 
tackled issues such as identifying the different elements making up facilitation. The 
precise nature of the service being offered was always a key issue and from April 
1998 onwards there were attempts to analyse and standardise methods of facilitation. 
There was an attempt made to develop a series of 'knowledge books on clustering' 
and, although these never came to fruition, the desire to codify the process 
represented a key issue for the RSC in that much of their role depended on tacit 
knowledge of how to facilitate the process of developing relationships within groups. 
The process was codified into the Cluster Development Programme (see fig. 7.1 
above) and this represented an attempt to transform the knowledge about facilitating 
micro clusters that was embodied in individuals into a physical form, in an attempt to 
stabilise the knowledge base and to provide a vehicle through which to transmit this 
knowledge outside the organisation (Lesser et al., 2000). 
Through dramatic changes of staff, despite the attempts to codify the process, 
substantial amounts of this tacit knowledge was lost and, although the RSC had 
rightly sought to be a learning organisation (Morgan, 1996), it was hindered by the 
loss of elements of knowledge embodied in individuals who left the organisation. 
Problems with staff retention were inherently linked to issues of short-term funding 
and a lack of job security but the rapid turnover of staff impacted on individual 
relationships with micro clusters and led to a loss of understanding about the nature 
and evolution of the organisation and the service it attempted to provide. 
The desire to codify the process of developing clusters came from a recognition that 
the process was based on tacit knowledge embodied in members of staff. However, 
the Cluster Development Process came to be seen as a way to speed up the process in 
order to achieve short-term targets. It appeared, and was recognised by the RSC. that 
they could become too immersed in the `procedures' for clustering. In attempting to 
achieve targets in the short term, there was a risk that the longer-term gains that could 
292 
come from the micro clusters would be lost. While this was recognised by the RSC, it 
was not resolved. 
Policy Effectiveness. The RSC has always been keen to provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of its approach and indeed has been required to do so by its funders. 
Numerical data as to contract and employment figures was obtained from firms on a 
regular basis and recorded in a sophisticated database and RSC staff recorded the 
amount of time they spent with firms. Regular reports were submitted to the 
Government Office for the North East and, as the funding structure of the RSC got 
ever more complex, reports were submitted to the additional funders too. However, 
the collection of numerical data was time-consuming both for the RSC and the firms 
involved, and the validity, veracity and value of the figures obtained was 
questionable, not least because of the difficulty in ascertaining the level of 
additionality achieved. This was particularly true where firms had started at the same 
time as the micro cluster. 
One commonly adopted evaluative measure for economic development initiatives is 
the `cost per job created'. However, this is not only difficult to measure, it is also not 
necessarily appropriate for the RSC because it was anticipated that club goods in 
excess of the benefits to individual SMEs within the micro cluster should arise 
through the clustering process. The RSC was also intended to act as a demonstration 
project, illustrating the benefits of collaborative and self-help behaviour. In a region 
where historically rates of entrepreneurship and business survival have been low this 
aspect should have been valuable, but it is difficult to quantify as any change would 
occur over a very long time period and be difficult to isolate from external factors. 
Rosenfeld (1996b), writing about a similar project in the United States, concludes: 
Incentives are intended not to subsidize collaboration but to demonstrate its 
value so that other firms and services will adopt and internalize the principals 
of collective services and cooperative ventures (ibid. p. 249). 
Job creation was always a goal for the RSC and many firms within clusters have 
increased their head count. The clusters have also proved to be successful incubators 
of new companies providing peer group learning. confidence, mutual support and 
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ready-made networks. One unexpected benefit of the evolving clusters was their 
incubation effect in encouraging new business start-ups. This was ascribed to the 
benefits of peer group learning, greater confidence and ready-made networks. 
By the end of 2000 it was evident that restricting the success criteria of a cluster 
purely to job creation was too narrow and there was a wish to explore 'softer 
indicators'. A more qualitative approach was adopted for the RSC steering group and 
an activity report was produced on a quarterly basis tracking the progress of clusters 
through the micro cluster development process. However, there was an ongoing 
desire to establish a systematic method of measuring the softer impacts of the project, 
particularly as problems with benchmarking the performance of clusters led some, 
internally and externally, to doubt the value of the service provided by the RSC. 
Despite a keen interest from individual staff, the RSC never did develop standardised, 
soft indicators to measure the outcomes of clustering and I would argue that due to the 
highly contextual nature of each micro cluster this may have been an unobtainable 
goal. 
The businesses involved in the clusters did benefit, but business support should not 
just meet business wants but should rather look to move business on to a higher plane 
of performance (Lagendijk, 1998). The RSC were aware of this role but their ability 
to improve the competitiveness of the businesses, or to evaluate their contribution to 
such an improvement, was to be an ongoing question. 
Policy Learning. While the RSC found it difficult to quantify the outcomes of the 
project its approach to evaluation was participatory. The RSC also sought 
participatory evaluation of its service from both its fenders and its clients and sought 
to learn from this feedback. In 2000 a research survey was undertaken to seek client 
opinion on the Business News Update service, which was subsequently relaunched 
(Wilkinson, 2000). Company monitoring surveys were undertaken on a quarterly 
basis in order to obtain numerical data from firms and in 2000 the RSC decided that 
each cluster would be interviewed in turn to assess the advantages and problem areas 
that have arisen for the companies as a result of clustering in order to obtain a more 
qualitative picture. 
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In addition to the public sector steering group, which monitored the performance of 
the RSC, a Private Sector Group was also established during Phase 2 of the project to 
provide feedback from SMEs involved in micro clusters into the strategy of the RSC. 
The first meeting was held in December 2000 and the private sector group 
recommended that all of the clusters should meet regularly to network and discuss 
relevant issues. This resulted in a networking event in September 2001. 
The RSC also sought to learn from outside organisations and numerous contacts have 
been made across Europe and in the USA through attendance at conferences. The 
organisation also participated in research projects including the ADAPT programme 
at the University of Newcastle (Lagendijk, 1999) and the University of Durham 
FoSMED research (Foundation for SME Development, 2001) and indeed, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the RSC was the `industry' partner in my ESRC Collaborative 
Studentship. 
While the RSC did learn from its experiences its impact on policy within the region 
was very limited. The 1999 to 2000 Business Plan stressed the need for a 
coordinating role for Micro clustering strategy. The RSC wanted to share their 
learning process with other local authorities, and the Regional Development Agency, 
but this was not ever successfully achieved. It was not easily possible to share the 
tacit knowledge that had been gained. It might be concluded that the RSC was a 
learning organisation, but other policy-makers did not learn from it. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The Regional Service for Clustering was an unusual and ambitious project. Its service 
was predicated not on developing particular clusters, but on the understanding that 
groups of firms could come together to achieve mutual benefits by clustering. It soon 
became apparent that the relationships required to achieve such benefits took time to 
develop and that there was a particular role to be performed by an outside agency - 
that of facilitating the process of developing what came to be termed micro clusters. 
The ability to develop micro clusters depended on using particular skills to develop 
relationships between firms, to work with the firms so that the firms could undertake 
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suitable clustering activities and to evolve the group into a self-sustaining entity. This 
was a difficult, time-consuming process and, while there were attempts to codify the 
process, the skills were based on the tacit knowledge of those who worked within the 
RSC. The effectiveness of the service was difficult to demonstrate quantitatively and 
the benefits produced were not necessarily those targeted by the funders of the project 
causing difficulties for the RSC in meeting targets. Therefore the service it provided 
came to be altered to meet the targets it was required to meet as a condition of its 
funding. 
Not only was the service offered by the RSC difficult to align with the targets it was 
set, but it also had difficulties as an organisation. From the outset the RSC sought to 
develop its own identity, but its attempts to operate on a regional basis have always 
been hampered by its close association with North Tyneside Council. The 
organisation was not seen as part of the cluster strategy of the Regional Development 
Agency and did not have an obvious position in the Business Support Network of the 
region. By 2005 the organisation was reduced to two members of staff operating 
under the auspices of another enterprise agency in order to complete an outstanding 
ERDF contract. The ambitions of the organisation had not been fulfilled partially due 
to the nature of funding for business support organisations and the inability to find a 
place within the larger regional picture. However, while the organisation has not 
necessarily had a long term impact on policy, the legacy of the organisation remains 
in the micro clusters it developed, and I now want to turn to my final case study, that 
of the marine design cluster, Argonautics, to consider one outcome of the RSC's 
cluster policy initiative. 
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8 The Impact of Cluster Policy on the Marine and Offshore Engineering 
Cluster in North East England: The Regional Service for Clustering and 
Argonautics 
The previous chapter used a cluster policy process model to examine the way in 
which the Regional Service for Clustering project sought to develop micro clusters - 
small groups of SMEs working together for mutual benefit. I have shown that a 
particular understanding of the benefits of clustering influenced the development of 
the project and I have demonstrated that the context in which the project operated 
impacted upon the methods the organisation used to develop micro clusters. I now 
want to look at a particular micro cluster that the RSC worked with, to demonstrate, 
as in the case of the larger marine and offshore cluster that was the subject of Chapter 
7, that existing relationships and activities within a cluster affect, and are affected by, 
particular interpretations of the concept of clusters and cluster policy, and that those 
interpretations lead to different outcomes from cluster policy. Once again the need 
for policy to consider the role of trust and untraded interdependencies in developing 
the perceived advantages of clusters is highlighted, as is the length of time required to 
develop these assets. 
Argonautics, the micro cluster I have used as a case study, encompasses a group of 
predominantly marine design firms that form part of the region's marine and offshore 
cluster. The choice of this case study came about because of my research into the 
development of the RSC. Argonautics was the first micro cluster that the RSC 
worked with and the relationship had continued over a period of ten years. The length 
of time over which the micro cluster has evolved permits a detailed analysis of the 
development of the cluster over time, and its role as part of a wider regional cluster 
permitted an exploration of some of the issues of scale raised in section 2.2.1. 
This chapter uses the cluster policy process model to examine the impact of the RSC 
initiative on the firms. In the first section I provide some background to the RSC's 
involvement with the micro cluster and, using the cluster policy process model once 
more, I outline how the micro cluster developed The second section concludes the 
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chapter by outlining some of the limitations of a clustering approach to policy-making 
revealed by this case study. 
8.1 The Regional Service for Clustering's Approach to Argonautics 
8.1.1 The Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 7, staff at the Economic Development Unit had become 
interested both in the work on clusters undertaken by the Centre for Urban and 
Regional Development Studies at the University of Newcastle and in work that was 
being undertaken in Emilia Romagna to support firms by offering real services. 
Brusco (1990) highlights the difficulty of defining such real services: 
I have tried on many occasions to explain the ideal of real services - the ideal 
of real versus financial, of offering the firm what they need in kind, instead of 
offering them money to buy what they need (ibid. p. 17). 
European Structural Funds were available to support the development of clusters of 
competitive advantage and the Economic Development Unit decided to use a 
particular cluster approach, partially based around the provision of real services, with 
a small group of marine design companies to try and preserve the skills base in marine 
design, which was seen as threatened by the potential closure of the Swan Hunter ship 
yard. It is important to note that the decision to work with this group of companies 
pre-dated the establishment of the Real Service Centre, later to be known as The 
Regional Service for Clustering, and indeed it was partly as a result of the Economic 
Development Unit's experiences with this group of marine design companies that the 
Real Service Centre came into being. 
Although Swan Hunter did not close until 1995, a member of Argonautics described 
how initial moves began much earlier: 
This was 1992,1993, early 1992, at some point, the then MD of Conmarque, 
[... ] had some contact with North Tyneside Council and met a few people. 
This is all just before Swan Hunter went toes up and so I believe the wheels 
started turning slowly even then (Argonautics member 1). 
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The initial mission statement for Argonautics stated that it would be: 
A vehicle to encourage the development of the marine industry in the North 
East, and specifically to work towards growth for the cluster as a whole and 
the constituent individual companies (The Real Service Centre, 1998a). 
The goal of the Economic Development Unit was to retain employment and, more 
specifically, to retain the skills embodied in that employment, but the goals of the 
individual firms were more diverse: 
That was one of our objectives, to get close to businesses who knew what they 
were doing. Other companies within the cluster initially could see a pot of 
gold that they might be able to dip into, that was an incentive and a goal for 
them. And indeed when the pot of gold diminished some of the companies 
fell by the wayside (Argonautics member 2). 
As mentioned above, one of the initial motivations for taking a novel, cluster 
approach was the availability of European Structural Funds. One of the priorities of 
the 1994-1996 Single Programming Document for Objective 2 funding was allocated 
to the development of clusters of competitive advantage and subsequently Regional 
Challenge funding was made available for larger projects. North Tyneside Economic 
Development Unit made a multi million pound bid for funding to construct a building 
in which marine and pipeline businesses could be `clustered'. The bid was successful 
but, following the successful attraction of the Siemens' wafer manufacturing facility, 
the building became known as the Centre for Advanced Industry and the home of the 
North East Microelectronics Institute. The pipeline businesses did not locate there 
because the facilities were too expensive and did not incorporate the workshops that 
had initially been proposed, although a number of the Argonautics companies did 
eventually come to be based there. 
Therefore the decision to take a cluster approach in this case was motivated by a 
desire to retain skills in the locality, inspired by knowledge of academic research and 
experiences in Northern Italy and spurred on by the availability of government 
funding. 
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8.1.2 Identification, Selection and Analysis 
The selection and analysis of the firms took place at a micro level and involved 
identifying a group of firms who might work together. This method of selection 
relates to the RSC's definition of clusters as `groups of similar companies 
develop[ing] cooperative groupings able to access larger contracts' (North Tyneside 
Real Service Centre, 1996). The initial selection of participants for the group 
involved the identification of a number of existing marine design companies based in 
one location, Davy Bank, in Wallsend. Two of the firms, Ken Chapman Associates 
and Conmarque Engineering Limited were, coincidentally, aware of the work on 
clusters being undertaken at CURDS and had already approached the Economic 
Development Unit at North Tyneside. That unit had a particular interest in 
maintaining the skills of the Swan Hunter design team who had been made redundant 
following the receivership at the yard. Ken Chapman had been Group Marketing 
Director at Swan Hunter and formed Ken Chapman Associates. David Hewitt had 
been Head of Design at Swan Hunter and had gone on to form Armstrong Technology 
Associates, which had located on Davy Bank. Indeed the cluster was initially known 
as the Davy Bank Cluster. 
The RSC's role at this time was to bring these firms together, identify the issues that 
they faced and to `sell' the benefits of working collaboratively. Nathan Pellow from 
the Economic Development Unit was seen as pivotal in bringing the firms together: 
It was Nathan's foresight that foresaw that clustering would be a useful tool, 
especially in the climate of shipyard closure, a nexus for change, so we got 
together with Nathan and discussed it and during that period Nathan was 
instrumental in setting up the Service Centre (Argonautics member 3). 
Other members came on board once Argonautics was formed. According to a 
representative from one organisation: 
We didn't get considered for Argonautics when it was first formed because it 
was regarded as a North Tyneside activity and we made moves to join as soon 
as we knew it had been formed (Argonautics member 4). 
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Although it was not the intention of the RSC, it should be noted that Argonautics was 
a `closed' network in that the existing members closely controlled the selection of 
firms for membership. Membership was by invitation, and only with the approval of 
existing members: 
We were invited to join initially by [X], well they first mentioned the cluster 
to us and it was really as a result of the resignation of [Y] who are a 
competitor of ours, and do pretty much the same as we do, and they left the 
cluster and we were invited to fill the vacancy (Argonautics member 5). 
On occasions firms approached Argonautics with a view to joining, but more 
commonly existing members of Argonautics proposed contacts of theirs as potential 
members. I sat in on a meeting where a potential member made a presentation to the 
Argonautics' members and discussions were then held in the absence of the applicant 
to decide if they would be permitted to join. 
In addition to the group being `closed' in this way, the notion also arose that 
Argonautics should be a group of complementary, rather than competing, firms. 
Indeed the name Argonautics was taken from the Greek legend of Jason and the 
Argonauts, because the crew of the Golden Fleece were each the best individual in 
their own discipline. In the same way the cluster was described in its marketing 
literature as being `made up from a group of different companies each excelling in its 
own field of maritime technology providing a spectrum of sophisticated, knowledge 
based skills'. There was an element of overlap in competencies but firms were on the 
whole selected to be complementary. When asked what the nature of competition was 
between firms in the cluster, one member responded: 
Complementary, but there is some. At the beginning there was a company 
which was direct competition for us, but we suffered that. But they left once 
they got their research and development money (Argonautics member 3). 
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Another member commented: 
There's no way that it would work with competitors in there (Argonautics 
member 5). 
Therefore the members were selected at a very micro level, initially by the firms who 
had first approached North Tyneside Council and subsequently by invitation and 
sanction from existing members of the cluster. This had not necessarily been the 
expectation and RSC representative 1 advised me that it had been intended that the 
group should grow to encompass all the marine firms in the region. I will return to 
this aspect, but I now want to concentrate on the initial group of firms that were to 
form the Argonautics micro cluster. 
8.1.3 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
Having identified a group of complementary organisations, the Economic 
Development Unit wanted to bring them together to work more actively as a group. 
The firms on Davy Bank had already to an extent been working together because it 
had seemed the natural thing to do as they were located so close to each other. As one 
firm advised: 
One didn't need to be a marketing genius to say `well here we are, we are a 
little group of marine companies'- never thought of the word cluster - `a little 
group of marine companies and why not, when we are out on the road, help 
each other if we see opportunities' - very informal (Argonautics member 1). 
However, from the outset the involvement of the local authority brought an element of 
formality to the grouping. The same member advised: 
From then on it ran into a different mode which was more formalised - 
meetings, applications for funding, justification. 
Prior knowledge and trust building 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the magnitude of the task of building consensus between 
parties depends partially on the level of prior knowledge between those parties. On 
the whole there seemed to be ample evidence that the members knew each other: 
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Basically I knew them all, I knew Isherwood's very well and North Rivers 
Marine -I knew their first MD very well. So yes, we were all reasonably well 
acquainted (Argonautics member 1) 
In our industry you tend to know pretty well everyone, especially in the local 
area, you know pretty well everyone. You don't necessarily like them, but 
you know them, maybe they don't like you either but that's by the by 
(Argonautics member 3) 
We had been dealing with various member companies over a number of years 
in particular [X] and [Z] 
and 
Yes we knew the names, I didn't know them all particularly well, we hadn't 
done any work with them, but we did know the other organisations there 
(Argonautics member 5) 
I think there's probably a network of people who had all heard of each other, 
even if they hadn't worked with each other (Argonautics member 6) 
Yes well all of us pretty much knew Peter Rossiter anyway. Some of us knew 
people like David Hewitt and some of his team (Argonautics member 4) 
So I think one of the things about the marine industry was that people knew 
generally who was around and working in the marine industry in the area, so 
there was knowledge of the other individuals and organisations - perhaps not a 
great understanding of what they did, but roughly a knowledge of the areas 
they were active in. (Argonautics member 2) 
From a point of view of why we joined Argonautics - we've done some work 
with [Z] (Argonautics member 7). 
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However, a second reading of the excerpts from the interviews shows that the level of 
knowledge was fairly superficial. Although there were examples of good two-way 
relationships within the group where firms had worked together, overall it appears 
that it was more a case of `knowing of rather than `knowing' and the level of trust 
was low at the outset. Trust is considered to be necessary to foster the development of 
untraded interdependencies, from which firms can benefit, and it is noticeable how 
long it took to build up trust, one of the key relational assets, between these firms: 
Companies that had been in existence for even 10,15 years had an established 
way of working, so they were a little bit suspicious of what's this cluster going 
to mean to them, how was it going to effect their existing business [... ] so it 
was trying to squeeze these organisations together into a cluster and the build 
up of trust between the member companies certainly took some time and some 
fairly heated debate at times about `why should we explain what we do to you 
because you might steal our ideas' (Argonautics member 2) 
I think that as far as the frustrations go, I think we've got to keep at it, but 
people, when they get to a cluster, look at the others with suspicion 
(Argonautics member 3). 
Even seven years into the cluster, a cluster member told me that he considered one of 
the other members to be secretive and that information had to be `hauled out' of them 
and another, comparing the cooperative mentality within Argonautics with another 
organisation, concluded that it was better, but revealed a suspicion of other members: 
I think it is [better] in that more information is shared, how much is held back 
I don't know (Argonautics member 5). 
The Real Service Centre emerged as an organisation at the same time as Argonautics 
were forming and they performed a role in terms of organising meetings and 
operating as a secretariat for Argonautics. The RSC were a catalyst in the process of 
forming relationships but, while the RSC could provide opportunities for the firms to 
come together and suggest clustering activities, the building of trust and the strong 
relationships necessary in such a small, closed environment depended largely on the 
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firms and personalities within them. One firm left the micro cluster following a 
conflict so acrimonious that it led to legal proceedings, and another left following a 
disagreement with a fellow member. A further member found itself compelled to 
leave because there was a conflict of interest between its parent company and one of 
the Argonautics member companies. As one member commented: 
They were in a state of constant change over that period [... ] in that various 
people were finding they'd got incompatibilities (Argonautics member 4). 
Because of the small closed network modus operandi of Argonautics it was difficult 
to resolve these issues, which might have been accommodated in a larger grouping. 
Although the closed nature of the group and the non-competitive positions of the 
members enabled the building of trustful relations and ensured a generally amicable 
atmosphere, it also excluded radical ideas because those holding them tended to either 
be pushed out of the network or would comply with the consensus of opinion to 
maintain unity. 
Limited company status 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, one method the RSC used to build the cluster was the 
formation of a limited company. Therefore this loose group of marine design 
engineering companies was constituted as a private limited company in 1995. The 
members of the cluster chose to have the original constitution drawn up by a large 
firm of local solicitors and it was executed so as to cover all eventualities. The board 
of Argonautics incorporates the position of a paid chairman and was initially chaired 
by Marshall Meek. He was chosen due to his pre-eminent status in the marine 
industry as past president of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects and of the North 
East Coast Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders: 
I think there was general consensus that we wanted somebody who had some 
stature in the industry and that would enable doors to be opened to us and give 
the cluster some standing within the marine community (Argonautics member 
? ). 
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The members of Argonautics made the choice of the large firm of solicitors. It 
resulted in a very expensive legal exercise and a constitution that is considered to be 
overly complex and lacking in flexibility. Much time at the early meetings was spent 
in discussing the constitution: 
It was mainly endless discussions about Type A shares, Type B shares, who 
would do this, what would happen if Fred got shot and all that sort of stuff 
(Argonautics member 1). 
The members learnt from the experience: 
One of the mistakes we made was going to a large legal company, who shall 
remain nameless, who set up Argonautics as if it was a multinational. It's just 
horrendous, I really mean that, horrendous, the whole constitution, the whole 
set up is fraught with, it could have been done on a single piece of paper, it 
should have been done on a single piece of paper. (Argonautics member 3) 
We're beginning to see that it wasn't necessarily a good idea to form a 
company (Argonautics member 3). 
Relationships within the cluster 
However, it appears that the formality of the relationship came not only from the legal 
constitution, but also because of the backgrounds and business culture of those 
involved. Members of the RSC team commented on the lack of intimacy within 
Argonautics, comparing it with the Pegasus cluster where the members had worked 
closely for many years prior to forming the cluster, and mentioned that former 
members of Argonautics had found its organisation too `cliquey' and 'old school tie'. 
As I talked to the members of the cluster and observed meetings the formal nature of 
the operations of Argonautics came through. There were quarterly board meetings 
and monthly networking meetings, all with agendas, formally chaired and held around 
the board table of the one of the member firms. This was in stark contrast to other 
clusters where, as mentioned in section 7.2.4, the board table might be a large table in 
a local pub. Therefore it was not just the existence of the very formal constitution that 
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shaped the relationships, it was the very character of some of the firms that made up 
the cluster that led to this air of formality. 
Meetings did take place and relationships did exist between members of the micro 
cluster outside the formal boundaries of Argonautics operations. When the firms 
were based on Davy Bank one firm told me there were `over the garden wall sort of 
meetings all the time' (Argonautics member 1). However, these meetings appeared to 
depend on proximity and he commented on the change once the firms were no longer 
co-located: 
As usual with the distance, although not large, there was a falling off of day- 
to-day contact and the contact then tended to come down to the monthly 
management meetings. 
Other members highlighted the benefits where firms continued to be co-located: 
I think the fact that we're in the same building -I can nip up there and talk to 
them and Allan drops down and talks to me about projects. It's very 
noticeable that with [firm W], who are based in Sunderland there's not that 
opportunity to drop by and I think that particular relationship suffers as a 
result of that (Argonautics member 2). 
These relationships and meetings were not all about proximity though. The likelihood 
of talking to people also depended on both the overlap of business interests and the 
culture within the different firms. One cluster member said the co-located cluster 
members met: 
Only if we've got something to discuss with them. I don't see [firm V] at all 
and 
[Firm X] we can walk in and see hello there, but you tend not to do that with 
[Firm Z] because they're a different sort of company. they are bigger and 
they've got all the security things (Argonautics member 7). 
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The relationships seemed to flourish more where there was geographical proximity 
and therefore it was difficult to disentangle the impact of the cluster from the impact 
of co-location. It was also difficult to disentangle the impact of the cluster from 
relationships that would have existed anyway. Relationships certainly appeared to be 
easier within the cluster for the firms that were co-located and those that were not co- 
located talked of efforts they made to remain involved despite the distance: 
Apart from seeing the person I want to, I usually meet one or two other people 
in whatever organisation I visit and it never does any harm to keep in touch 
(Argonautics member 4) 
For going to meetings and for talking to people it is much easier if you're in 
the same building, it can take me an hour when the roads get busy to get from 
here to North Shields (Argonautics member 5). 
Participant mobilisation and the role of animator 
Involvement with the cluster was about much more than geographical proximity. 
Cooperating with other firms, let alone with a group of other firms, is a time 
consuming business and it requires certain roles to be performed. 
The paid chairman, Marshall Meek, acted as a figurehead for the micro cluster and 
performed the required duties of that role in terms of chairing meetings. He also 
linked Argonautics into a wider environment by using his industry contacts. David 
Bowles, director of Northern Defence Industries, took over following Marshall 
Meek's retirement. His appointment as chairman was seen as giving Argonautics a 
strong link into Northern Defence Industries and his background of working within 
regional development organisations was seen as useful. The downsides to the 
appointment were a further emphasis on defence related industries, which were not of 
interest to all Argonautics members, and the other commitments of the new chairman: 
David is an extremely busy person doing a lot for not only NDI, but a lot of 
other organisations and at times it has been difficult to attract his attention, but 
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that is outweighed by benefits of having David with all his links (Argonautics 
member 2). 
Outside the formal role of chairman, which appeared to be unique to Argonautics 
amongst the micro clusters in that form, there was a role to be played in terms of 
administering the cluster and facilitating the relationships between the firms. At the 
outset much of the administrative and facilitating work was undertaken by the RSC, 
which was still operating very much as a pilot scheme and dealing with very few 
micro clusters. Part of the original funding secured for Argonautics had been used to 
fund a post at the RSC, specifically to administer Argonautics. As the RSC's role 
changed more resource was required from within Argonautics. This was initially 
provided by the wife of the managing director of one of the firms who provided 
substantial input into the cluster. Her role was described as 'a PA role in effect to 
Marshall and [she] did a lot of work in that respect' (Argonautics member 4). 
However, the administrative cost of providing this kind of support to the micro cluster 
was huge and it was realised that too great a sum was being spent on administrative 
costs alone. This could not be borne by a group of small companies and it was 
realised that the cost structure would have to be changed. This, and the need to drive 
the cluster forward, led to the need for more input from the member firms and as I 
interviewed firms, divisions came to the surface: 
Whether people actually put the time in is another question altogether. There 
are certain member companies who will probably not be contributing very 
much now to the organisation compared to others, so it has started to become 
unfair in that way, in that the burden is being taken by fewer people who seem 
to be keen, still keen, on the organisation and others who have lost interest to a 
certain extent. (Argonautics member 5) 
A lot of the directors absorb work you know on behalf of the cluster, [... ] 
attending the meetings, preparing business proposals, the proposals to get 
Steven Knaggs, the business plan that David Hewitt did, the enquiries to the 
solicitors, it's all time input. (Argonautics member 6) 
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But I've noticed that companies like [firm U] have tended, not to drift away. 
but they've not been as present as they might have been in some of the 
Argonautics' meetings (Argonautics member 2) 
The bigger companies really I despair sometimes. You would think [... ] if 
someone can't come to a meeting they would send someone else. 
(Argonautics member 3) 
He doesn't have any time for it and has largely lost interest in the organisation 
(Argonautics member 5). 
Certain members were largely credited with animating and driving the cluster and, 
without their involvement and dedication, it is unlikely that the cluster would have 
survived. However, there was an issue around the leadership of the cluster. The paid 
chairman performed a figurehead role and both individuals who performed that role 
were seeing as having merits and bringing good ideas into the fold. However, 
Argonautics member 2 raised the issue of needing a leadership role of a Chief 
Executive type, as well as a Chairman. In section 7.2.3 I raised the possibility that 
leadership could be provided from within the RSC, and Argonautics member 2 agreed 
that Nathan Pellow from the RSC had provided the initial leadership for Argonautics 
but concluded that the leadership position would have required election and also 
would have raised the issue of compensation for performing the role. 
The role of certain firms in driving the cluster was made difficult not only because of 
the lack of formal leadership, but also because the level of significance of Argonautics 
to the member firms varied and this related both to the purpose that Argonautics 
served for those firms and to their individual circumstances. Several of the firms had 
outside ownership, which influenced their activities, and some members were open 
about the lack of significance Argonautics had for them: 
I would say it is not very significant at all. As I said earlier, if things carry on 
as they are, we won't be there because it is quite a considerable chunk of our 
spend that we have to put into Argonautics each year (Argonautics member 5) 
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[Argonautics is] not that significant to be honest. I mean we have taken the 
membership out so we will see how it goes for a year. we'll review it at the 
end of the year, that's what we've got to do (Argonautics member 7). 
The firms had joined for very different reasons - to access a shared marketing 
resource, to win contracts jointly or to access grant funding, given that by 2000 
Argonautics had received in excess of £300,000 of public funds: 
I get the feeling it was a vehicle to firstly take advantage of grant funding and 
secondly to allow some of the smaller companies to gain access to marketing 
resource which they would have otherwise been unable to pay for. To a 
certain extent the smaller companies still feel that way I believe and even the 
larger ones probably don't share our enthusiasm [... ] to win work as 
Argonautics (Argonautics member 5) 
We joined Argonautics to get the wider brief because certainly [firm V] and 
[firm Z] have got agents scattered around the countryside, worldwide you 
know and also the extra input given the cluster Argonautics should be 
generating its own marketing structure and what have you (Argonautics 
member 4) 
We were looking for an increase in our profile, obviously ultimately an 
increase in sales, that's really it (Argonautics member 5). 
The firms also differed in terms of their activities and on occasion this was seen as a 
problem: 
That has led to perhaps a questioning of whether it was the right thing to bring 
in as a member company an organisation that is involved in [something other] 
than the knowledge industry (Argonautics member 2). 
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In some cases there was suspicion between the members as to why- firms had joined: 
The chaps are all excellent, they really are, but were all different. They all 
have their own, I'd say agendas but that sounds bad, own constraints 
(Argonautics member 3). 
As will be seen in the next section, the lack of consensus as to the purpose of 
Argonautics affected the activities that the cluster undertook and caused unresolved 
tensions within the group. 
8.1.4 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
In section 7.2.4 I suggested that the RSC's policy instruments were of three kinds. 
Firstly, the development of micro clusters able to undertake clustering activities that 
brought benefits of three kinds - borrowed size, relational assets and club goods; 
secondly, the provision of a research and information service and thirdly, attempts to 
improve the synergy between the private sector and the publicly funded business 
support sector. 
I now want to look at the way in which each aspect of the RSC's activities impacted 
on Argonautics. I have already discussed the way in which the cluster had come 
together and I now want to look at the actual clustering activities undertaken by 
Argonautics under the headings of borrowed size, relational assets and club goods. I 
will then turn more briefly to the provision of research and information services and 
the relationships between the micro cluster and the RSC. 
Development of the micro cluster 
When considering the clustering activities undertaken by Argonautics it is important 
to note that the activities were influenced by the substantial amount of money that was 
available to the cluster in the early days of its operation. At the outset Argonautics, 
with the assistance and support of the RSC, applied for and received £265,000 in 
ERDF funding. As mentioned the group of companies located on Davy Bank were 
already informally working together but access to funds was seen as a way of 
developing the group: 
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We were doing bits and pieces of work around the cluster as it was. so that 
was already working. We had some ideas of our own then about forming a 
marine park or marine grouping, but money was tight so the idea of funding 
was a very, very interesting one (Argonautics member 1). 
The proposal was to use the funds for research and development, and marketing and 
publicity, although some of the funding went to the RSC for managing the project and 
substantial amounts were absorbed by financial and legal costs: 
We [... ] for one didn't see a brass penny. Not a penny, it cost us quite a lot of 
money, just attending meetings and being active and that sort of thing. But we 
didn't seem to do anything, there was at least £300,000 of funding of which we 
saw not a penny (Argonautics member 1). 
The RSC's early understanding of the benefits of clustering very much focused on the 
benefits that clustering would bring in terms of economies of scale in marketing and 
the ability to access larger contracts. Members did do work together, usually on a two 
way basis and, while the firms had often worked together before being mutual 
members of the cluster, this work was often attributed to the existence of the cluster: 
We had a phase of doing quite a bit of analysis work with [company Z] and we 
did some in-house training for them, structural analysis, yes it was always 
modest but there was an increase (Argonautics member 1) 
We probably had the relationship with [company Z] and [company X] so that 
we may have done (joint work] anyway without being in the cluster, but 
certainly [we've done] much more since we've been in the cluster 
(Argonautics member 5). 
One member talked of undertaking joint contracts with other firms in Argonautics and 
when I asked whether these contracts would have been undertaken had the cluster not 
existed he replied: 
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Probably not, it may have done, we may have thought of lifting the phone to 
another company but the chances are you can do it now because you are in 
close contact, very close contact (Argonautics member 3). 
A different cluster member, when asked the same question as to whether joint 
contracts would have been undertaken in the absence of the cluster replied: 
Yes probably because of the proximity (Argonautics member 7). 
Therefore it remains difficult to disentangle the impact of the personal relationships 
that existed, partly as a result of proximity, from the impact of the existence of the 
cluster. What was noticeable was that contracts were not won as Argonautics. This 
partially relates to the nature of the industry where liability is an issue and partially to 
the difficult state of the market, but also relates to the members' understanding of the 
purpose of Argonautics: 
I would like to see Argonautics become a contracting organisation in its own 
right. [... ] I don't think my views on Argonautics are maybe shared by the 
other member companies (Argonautics member 5). 
The other areas where the benefits of borrowed size were anticipated to be beneficial 
were in marketing and image. An element of the initial ERDF funding was used 
towards the production of marketing brochures. These were undoubtedly of a high 
quality, but were produced before certain aspects of Argonautics' operation were 
thought out. The initial brochure was an eight page A4 sized document outlining the 
capabilities of the seven founding firms. However, as has been outlined, there were 
substantial changes of membership rendering the initial marketing material obsolete. 
The second attempt was an A4 folder into which loose-leaf sheets on the individual 
companies could be included. Even this version was not without its difficulties - one 
member mentioned that their firm never received updated sheets for the folders. 
However, the problems were more fundamental than that and reflected the fact that 
the member firms did not want to subsume their identity behind that of Argonautics. 
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In the early days of Argonautics: 
Every company would continue doing its own marketing and maybe mention 
Argonautics as an afterthought and it would never work (Argonautics member 
1) 
The name is known, Argonautics is known, and we have, not a desperate 
success rate, but we have used the depth of the bigger companies to help us to 
sell and I think it could be successful if it were applied more properly 
(Argonautics member 3). 
One member maintained that the cluster had been `naive' in their early marketing 
attempts and it appears that the RSC had underestimated the complexity of marketing 
micro clusters. Members did at times find it hard to quantify the benefits: 
[It's] very difficult to quantify. I think it's probably has raised our profile in 
that we've probably been introduced to companies that we would normally not 
have come across (Argonautics member 5). 
As will be seen the marketing was more successful once the micro cluster had a 
shared resource to undertake marketing on behalf of the cluster. There was also 
perceived to be a benefit of being part of a micro cluster, and therefore part of an 
organisation of greater size, in attempting to gain influence with other agencies, and 
one member advised that the cluster was: 
quite keen to keep links going with organisations such as One NorthEast 
where we can, where there is a possibility of making sure the cluster is 
recognised in the infrastructure (Argonautics member 2). 
Research and Development projects were also funded by the initial ERDF funding, 
but it was not a matter of combining the expertise of the firms on joint projects. rather 
the individual companies obtained funding for their individual research interests. It 
could be said that the member firms would not have individually obtained the 
funding, so indirectly they benefited for the cluster's size, but the initial projects were 
315 
far from the interactive model commentators such as Boekholt and Thuriaux (1999) 
and Capello (1999) identify as facilitating innovation, but instead involved individual 
companies working on their own individual research projects. 
Therefore, although in theory the benefits of joint working were clear. in practice 
there were many complications of assuming the borrowed size of the cluster. There 
were also to be complications with the provision of club goods. 
In section 7.2.4 I distinguished between the provision of a club asset available 
exclusively to members of the micro cluster and the provision of a club asset available 
to a wider community. I now want to discuss attempts by Argonautics to provide a 
club asset available to the wider community. 
Argonautics obtained funding through a Skills Challenge Bid in 1995 to establish a 
Skills Centre. The initial project sought to provide training to the employees of the 
members of Argonautics in computer aided design techniques. The idea was also to 
train staff from the firms within Argonautics to be trainers. While there was an 
undercurrent of bad feeling, in that it was felt that the benefits had not been evenly 
distributed, the project was overall a success. The Argonautics Skills Centre was 
renamed the Argonautics Technology Transfer Centre in July 1998 and the remit of 
the project was widened to providing subsidised training to the marine industry on 
Tyneside. It was intended to provide a range of courses including those specific to 
marine technology industry and more general business courses (for example, team 
building and managing teams). A full-time project manager employed by the 
Argonautics companies, with financial support from the RSC, was appointed. All 
research continued to show an extensive and urgent requirement for training in the 
marine industry. However, there was a fundamental reluctance within the industry to 
invest the necessary money on training. The aim of the project was not only 
pecuniary, in that it was intended to become a fee earning business for the cluster, it 
was also more altruistic in that it demonstrated a commitment to maintaining the 
marine skills base of the whole region. However, the Centre failed to secure external 
participation in the courses it scheduled and income fell significantly below levels 
forecast. It was also felt that a number of the companies within Argonautics were not 
that enthusiastic about the project. As a result the RSC withdrew their support and the 
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project was placed in the hands of Tynemouth College. This caused substantial and 
lasting hard feelings towards the RSC from some members of the Argonautics cluster, 
there were strong differences of opinion between the member firms of Argonautics 
and the whole process had absorbed substantial Argonautics resources in the 
preceding 18 months: 
I don't just blame the RSC, I blame the companies, our own companies, 'yes 
we'll take training' and they didn't take any training up, outside companies 
were the same (Argonautics member 3) 
Certain members of Argonautics were very keen on developing the training 
centre for which funds came forward pretty regularly from RSC. We always 
felt that the market for that kind of thing was much more crowded than was 
appreciated either by RSC or by the people who were really calling for it. 
(Argonautics member 4) 
I think the members of Argonautics at that time were so disillusioned by what 
happened that are not very keen to consider approaching it again (Argonautics 
member 5). 
It appears that the project was an ambitious one and again this calls into question 
whether a micro cluster type organisation has the sufficient resource in terms of time 
or expertise to establish a club good available for the wider community. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the Argonautics Technology Transfer Centre, there 
were proposals mooted at the end of my period of research that Argonautics would 
establish a Marine Centre of Excellence. The plan was underdeveloped at the time 
but involved the creation of a physical centre designed to be a focal point of the 
marine industry in the North East and related to the idea, mentioned in section 8.1.2, 
that Argonautics should encompass a much wider range of marine firms in the region. 
The centre was to provide an interface with local universities and significant industry 
players, it was to offer reception services handling and distributing incoming 
commercial enquiries and it was to provide a training suite and to operate outreach 
activities with local schools. However, even Argonautics member companies 
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questioned the goals of the centre and Argonautics' role in it, recognising that 
substantial resource would be required to establish such a centre. It was felt that, in 
any case, with a restructuring exercise having taken place at the parent company of 
one of the significant Argonautics' firms and the demise of the RSC in its previous 
form, the proposal was unlikely to proceed. I would argue once again that, while the 
Argonautics cluster had strong ideas and a good understanding of the initiatives that 
would be valuable in their industry, they did not have sufficient scale of resource to 
introduce and manage those initiatives. 
The members of Argonautics did, however, benefit from club goods that were 
available within the cluster. In this respect the appointment of a Business 
Development Manager was particularly significant. It is a well-known problem that 
SMEs do not have time to market their services and this was reiterated in interviews 
with the Argonautics' member firms: 
We don't have time, time to market (Argonautics member 3) 
One of our big problems is that we can't afford to have anybody dedicated to 
marketing. You know we thought of things like the Offshore and Renewable 
Energy conferences, various other things are of interest to us. We don't want 
to go to them all, we can't afford to go to them all, but somebody going and 
giving us a bit of feedback potentially would be quite useful (Argonautics 
member 7). 
A Business Development Manager was appointed in November 2000 to market the 
services of Argonautics. His role, working three days a week, was heavily subsidised 
by the RSC, who contributed £10,000, and his role was to market Argonautics in its 
totality and then, having generated an interest in the services of the whole, he would 
aim to generate business for the individual firms. He talked through an example with 
me that arose after Argonautics had funded him to go on a trade mission to China: 
I've received an enquiry from China today from Shanghai and they're looking 
for some help out there training people so again by contacting Allan 
[MacDougall]. Dave Hewitt at ATA. and I'll also be contacting Brian Durose 
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at AIMMS and I've spoken to Contract Design, we're looking at possibilities 
to fulfil that enquiry. 
On the whole the appointment of the Business Development Manager was seen as a 
watershed and a success: 
They only really got the marketing going since we got the grant for the 
Business Development Manager and he started (Argonautics member 4) 
Steve Knaggs [the business development manager] who was on the last China 
trip was in effect selling Argonautics and he was extremely good at that as a 
matter of fact, because he skilfully placed Armstrong Technology or whoever 
it was in the right sort of context and customers didn't seem to get too hung up 
on [the structure of the cluster], they got it straight away (Argonautics member 
1). 
However, and in a further illustration of the fragile nature of the relationships within 
Argonautics another member told me: 
Because of the diverse nature of Argonautics [the business development 
manager] has tended to focus in one or two areas, which is fine, but those 
companies whose areas he has not been able to concentrate on feel perhaps a 
little bit neglected which has led to some friction (Argonautics member 2). 
Interaction with other cluster organisations was also a club good that the members of 
Argonautics were able to benefit from. As mentioned in section 6.2 there are a large 
number of cluster organisations that firms in the marine and offshore cluster in the 
North East of England could be involved with, but such involvement, if it is to bear 
fruits, requires time and money to be expended. Argonautics had group membership 
of Northern Defence Industries, saving money for the Argonautics members and also 
time in that the business development manager attended NDI meetings on their 
behalf. There was a similar situation with Northern Offshore Federation 
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You'll find that [Firm Z] are involved with the Federation and we feel that we 
don't need to be a member because one of our main members is a member 
(Argonautics member 3). 
In this way membership of the cluster provided the member companies with links into 
other organisations that they might not otherwise have had. 
Therefore while the micro cluster did not operate at a sufficient scale to provide club 
goods available for a wider community, members of Argonautics did benefit from 
club goods particularly following the appointment of a Business Development 
Manager. However, there were still tensions in the group and the role of Business 
Development Manager was heavily subsidised by the RSC. 
I argued in Chapter 7 that activities within micro clusters could facilitate the 
development of relational assets at this very local level. Through cooperation 
between the parties in the groups untraded interdependencies could emerge, including 
open and honest communication, which in turn would facilitate trading relations 
within the cluster, facilitate the transfer of knowledge leading to innovation and lead 
to a mentoring network. 
I also pointed out that relational assets are, by their very nature, intangible and cannot 
be quantified, but as with many of the other micro clusters facilitated by the RSC, 
many of the member firms of Argonautics reported benefits from the relations that 
existed. Some of the benefits were related to a reduction in feelings of isolation and 
the presence of a self-help peer group: 
In the beginning it just gave, it gave a little bit of confidence in the earlier 
days, that we were part of a, perhaps even before it was called Argonautics. 
but a cluster anyway (Argonautics member 1) 
AIMMS aren't on their own [... ] being part of Argonautics (Argonautics 
member 4) 
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It's enjoyable for a start, forget the rest of it, it's good to talk to your 
colleagues, and they become your colleagues, especially in the small 
companies it's a pretty remote life (Argonautics member 3) 
You get a fair amount of support between each other when you have the 
meetings and if you're on a high, or one of the members is on a high to a 
degree you share that high and if somebody's having a bad spell you help 
them keep their spirits up a bit - if these other people are getting things the 
work is around and all is not lost sort of thing (Argonautics member 4). 
While these benefits may appear intangible, members did attribute some of their 
success directly to the existence of the cluster: 
One of the things which we gained was probably confidence and I mentioned 
earlier about having these other companies, small organisations, who had been 
along this path before and when we had problems we could talk to them and 
get confidence in our own abilities to solve those problems. So I think there 
would have been more of a hesitancy in growing [company Z] and the 
confidence to take on large projects, so I think its those intangible things that 
are probably the biggest benefit (Argonautics member 2) 
Amongst other things the presentation of Argonautics and marketing material 
was so good it meant we had to look the part, definitely no milk bottles on the 
table (or feet), no overalls and that sort of thing. The marketing stuff was so 
lovely that if you went to meetings you had to look like there were 20,000 of 
us back at the Cleveland Tower in Wallsend, so we were forced to 
be 
professional (Argonautics member 1). 
The relationships that were formed did also appear to facilitate joint working and 
trading relationships between the parties because there was a pre-existing 
level of 
trust and knowledge between the parties: 
We [... ] were working in the oil and gas sector on some fairly major projects 
where we need additional resource and we got that through one of the cluster 
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members. And we felt comfortable with that because there was a degree of 
trust had built up - the fact that we were working alongside these companies 
and understanding their strengths and weaknesses gave us sufficient 
confidence to work with them (Argonautics member 2) 
It's much easier to ring up somebody if you've met them and so on 
(Argonautics member 7) 
We've got one lead from [company Z] for a job in India which came about 
from us being members of Argonautics and their guy alone couldn't handle it 
anyway, so they needed to get into bed with somebody and their preference, 
knowing us, was for us and we'd like to work with them anyway (Argonautics 
member 4). 
Argonautics had always operated on a very formal footing with chaired meetings, 
sub-committees and documentation for all eventualities and it was not until 1998 that 
it was decided that there should be an open forum for discussion of opportunities 
where no minutes would be taken. These `networking meetings' offered a valuable 
meeting place for information to be exchanged and their benefits were recognised by 
members: 
With the networking meetings you do at times get some good information, 
good leads from them, it gives people a chance to get together and share the 
information or leads that they have, that they might not otherwise have time to 
do (Argonautics member 5) 
You have the opportunity to talk about [... ] what's going on and some of the 
smaller companies can benefit if the bigger companies are making enquiries 
and there is work available (Argonautics member 6). 
However, the format appeared little different from the formal board meetings and not 
all members were convinced of their use and benefit: 
Interesting but limited use from our point of view (Argonautics member 7) 
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They weren't terribly successful to be honest about it, because there was very 
little difference between a board meeting and a networking meeting. We sat in 
the same room, we sat round the table and we looked at each other and 
somebody said `well I've bid this particular job' and it went round the table 
and in 3 or 4 minutes the conversation dried up (Argonautics member 2). 
It was much later, following a meeting with the much less formal Pegasus pipeline 
cluster, that meetings started to be on occasion held in a local pub: 
It has actually been better since we started having the informal meetings where 
we go after work and go down the pub and people are a little bit more 
amenable to that and it doesn't take away from your normal working day, 
you've finished and you're off down the pub at six o'clock, spend an hour an 
hour and a half in the pub and don't worry about that too much (Argonautics 
member 5). 
It's an atmosphere where you can sit and talk as a group or you can break up 
and individual conversations take place and in my view it's been a tremendous 
success in that people have opened up much more about not just formal 
opportunities but about some of the issues they see - what's happening in the 
industry, what's happening on the river (Argonautics member 2). 
The network meetings were seen as `a key part of the life and soul of the cluster' 
according to one member. They appeared to be the most appropriate atmosphere in 
which open and informal conversations could take place, and these conversations not 
only gave firms access to business opportunities but also strengthened relationships 
between firms. 
The relationships that were fostered were directly useful to the firms because there 
was some evidence that they gave access to the resources of other firms, although it is 
notable that the examples revealed were between co-located firms: 
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[Company Z] have the basic package, now we're not using their package but 
somebody is going to come up and give us a bit of help to get started which is 
often useful (Argonautics member 7) 
[Company Z] are very good to us in many respects in many respects - they'll 
print me a plan, they have all the services (Argonautics member 3). 
It should also be noted that not all the members and former members reported such a 
positive experience. One former member found that the meetings did not generate 
work and were too time-consuming to attend. He considered the meetings to be 'just 
a talking shop' and considered that overall his firm had gained little work from the 
cluster and had therefore resigned its membership. 
Therefore, while not all of those involved benefited from the development of 
relational assets through the cluster, most of the firms were able to identify intangible 
benefits from being part of the cluster. It is hard to disentangle the influence of the 
cluster from the impact of existing relationships and the effect of co-location, and it 
appeared that the benefits of the cluster were most apparent to firms who had existing 
relationships within the cluster and were co-located. What is also interesting is that 
the cluster members were aware that although these relational assets did exist, their 
true value lay in generating business between the companies: 
Where you've got to worry I think is when all we're doing is just networking 
and really acting as individual companies without working together on 
projects (Argonautics member 2). 
Cooke (2003) argues that interdependencies and the use of social capital between 
firms tend to be pecuniary - if businesses go to a trusted `competitor' to help when 
they have a capacity problem, they expect to share the commission. Argonautics 
demonstrates this aspect to an extent. There was a system of commissions for 
introducing business between the firms and joint work was undertaken on a 
commercial basis. However, there were examples of truly untraded 
interdependencies of a 'gift' kind where the provider of a service obtained no 
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pecuniary benefit for doing so as in the case of the printing of plans and assistance 
with software mentioned above. 
In concluding the discussion on the benefits of clustering activities to Argonautics it 
can be said that at least some of the members of the cluster were still intending to 
operate, as the RSC had originally intended, as a group of similar companies 
developing a cooperative grouping able to access larger contracts (North Tyneside 
Real Service Centre, 1996) and some benefits of borrowed size had been obtained. 
The attempts to provide club goods were problematic in so far as the provision of club 
goods for the wider marine community had been concerned, but the provision of club 
goods accessible to cluster members only had been more successful, albeit heavily 
subsidised. The development of relational assets was a long and complicated process 
but most members, particularly amongst the smaller or younger firms, did appear to 
value the relationships that existed within the cluster and be able to achieve business 
benefits from them either in the form of joint work or less directly in the form of 
accessing resources and information. I now want to look at the benefits to 
Argonautics of the other elements of the RSC's service - the provision of research 
and information and the attempt to improve the synergy between the private sector 
and publicly funded business support. 
Research and information 
It was noted in section 7.2.1 that one of the original priorities for the RSC was to 
provide a research and information service for the clusters it facilitated. This element 
of the RSC's service was at its height in the early years of Argonautics and was 
valued by members: 
I would ask them a question on marine statistics, marine market information in 
Europe and they did come up with some very good stuff, so for me that was of 
primary usefulness (Argonautics member 1) 
The RSC opened up the smaller companies' minds to the fact that there was 
funding, there was government help, there was help with exports (Argonautics 
member 6). 
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However, this role changed both as the RSC's support of Argonautics became less 
resource intensive and also as technology made information more freely and cheaply 
accessible to the firms: 
With the Internet in the intervening years it is much better, so it's a bit easier 
now, but then it was a bit tedious (Argonautics member 1) 
The lack of focus on this area also reflects a change in development of the RSC from 
that which was originally intended. As discussed in section 7.2.2 the initial intention 
for the RSC had been sectorally specific support for the marine design, pipeline 
technology and electronics sectors. RSC representative 1 advised that it had been 
envisaged that the Argonautics grouping would grow to encompass the majority of the 
marine firms in the region. Research undertaken by British Maritime Technologies in 
1998 identified 50 marine businesses across the region and it was anticipated that 
Argonautics could work with a large number of these businesses and that the RSC 
would provide real services of the kind provided by Ceramico in Italy (cf. Pellow, 
2005) to around 60 or 70 marine firms enabling specialist knowledge to be developed 
in the RSC. Because Argonautics did not develop in this way the specialist 
knowledge required to provide such detailed research services did not develop either. 
Synergy between public and private sector 
At the outset the RSC had a large role in Argonautics and was indeed the instigator of 
the cluster in its formalised form. In addition to the research services mentioned 
above they provided a large amount of administrative support: 
They also acted as secretariat for the cluster and organised, when we did 
organise any outing, or one or two exhibitions they helped to organise. So for 
me their main function was the secretariat and information. They were very 
helpful, very positive, no complaints (Argonautics member 1). 
The RSC role was also one of facilitation and signposting to other opportunities and 
contacts and one member, in a comment that highlights some of the changes that were 
perceived to occur subsequently, stated: 
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I think they were really useful to be honest because they had a bit more time, 
at the time they didn't have a lot of clusters to look after and they were able to 
come to all of the management meetings and all the board meetings and they- 
certainly kept the group in touch with what was going on a bit more v idely- 
(Argonautics member 6). 
The RSC did continue to provide this observational and motivational role: 
They encourage us, they attend all the networking meetings and come to some 
of the board meetings as well. They're invited; they don't need to come any 
more. They encourage, they point out possibilities (Argonautics member 3). 
I think they're quite useful at keeping us in some ways on the right track. That 
role diminishes as time goes by because the cluster becomes more mature and 
knows what its objectives are and how it's going to achieve those. I think 
there have been times in the past couple of years when we've been having 
mini crises over one aspect of business life or another and the RSC, sitting 
there as a dispassionate observer almost, has been able to input some useful 
thoughts to help us on our way (Argonautics member 2) 
However, certain members felt there had been a deterioration in the relationship 
following staff changes and expansion at the RSC: 
The excellent service we had in the earlier years is not there because they 
became more expansionist, but maybe it's right I don't know, I don't know 
(Argonautics member 3). 
Others believed that the role should in any case change over time as the micro cluster 
developed: 
I think their role is in pump priming and funding when the cluster is very 
young, steering and guiding it, but at some point the cluster has got to 
be 
launched out into the world to get on with its own life (Argonautics member 2) 
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While many of the members expressed the wish to be financially self sufficient from 
the RSC, the fact that the RSC was able to provide funding to Argonautics was clearly 
key: 
We're hoping to be self sufficient as far as the Development Manager [is 
concerned], apportioning the cost between the companies within the next three 
years maybe four years. In the meantime [the RSC] are pump priming 
(Argonautics member 3) 
We've always looked on the RSC as being an extremely friendly organisation 
that did have some funding that enabled Argonautics to keep trickling along 
and pay for some of the administrative, business development type costs 
(Argonautics member 2) 
What became apparent was that the role of the RSC was valued most by those who 
had been involved with Argonautics from the outset. Newer members appeared to 
value the RSC more solely for the grant funding received: 
Well I think without the grants Argonautics gets it wouldn't function. I don't 
think the Regional Service for Clustering actually puts much into Argonautics 
other than the financial inputs and I'm not saying that that is necessarily a bad 
thing. The people in Argonautics are generally coming from that business 
specifically and I don't think that the RSC can really provide that in-depth and 
the day to -day contact (Argonautics member 7). 
This again may have reflected a change in the role of the RSC to all clusters or may 
have reflected that as the cluster developed it needed less external support. 
8.1.5 Evaluation and Learning 
The RSC encouraged all the clusters with which it worked to regularly evaluate the 
performance of the cluster and to learn from experiences. 
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As a condition of receiving funding Argonautics had to keep detailed records of the 
amount of time allocated to the cluster and the amount of joint working undertaken. 
At times members found this aspect onerous: 
From the start the overhead was too high, which isn't helped by the fact that if 
you're an RSC cluster, you've got money from them, but the returns and the 
like that they want, my reckoning is that you've got to add 25% of the time 
that you would put in on the job, 25% of the time to cover the admin costs, or 
the admin time (Argonautics member 3). 
And this aspect of the evaluation of the cluster was very much of an accounting nature 
to ensure that public money was being well spent. The RSC also conducted more 
qualitative reviews with the individual members of the cluster. However, as these 
were confidential, the information could not be given directly to the cluster. 
As a business operation, Argonautics regularly reviewed its financial position and the 
markets in which it operated. Business plans were produced on an almost annual 
basis, often to meet the requirements of applications for funding from the RSC, and 
the RSC provided input and comment on these plans. The marketing strategy was 
regularly updated, particularly as new members joined. The cluster learnt, as any 
business should do, from this kind of review. Budgets were changed, subscriptions 
were amended and new functions, such as the Business Development Manager role, 
were added to the cluster. 
As a legal entity Argonautics also reviewed its legal standing and over time the 
constitution was revised to meet the cluster's requirements. In February 2002 a new 
Memorandum of Understanding was adopted but prior to that the constitution was 
often informally put to one side: 
We've said notwithstanding [the constitution] there is a much simpler way 
we'd like to do it and we agree and there's a board minute produced 
(Argonautics member 2). 
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As well as attending Argonautics meeting to provide input into the discussions and to 
act as a sounding board, the RSC initiated a meeting between the Pegasus and 
Argonautics clusters so that the two clusters could learn from each other's 
experiences. As a result Argonautics did introduce the informal meetings in the pub, 
but overall the operation of Argonautics remained very formal. This formality was 
partly required because of the nature of the work some members wanted the cluster to 
undertake: 
I do believe it needs to be on a fairly formal footing. I don't think a loose 
grouping or an informal structure would work for this, especially as I would 
like to see Argonautics become a contracting organisation in its own right. It 
couldn't do that if it was just a loose collection of companies who were 
cooperating together (Argonautics member 5). 
However, the formality appeared to be an outward sign that relationships between the 
members were still not entirely open and trust based. The formality also added to the 
cost of the operation of the cluster with basic administrative activities still estimated 
at £20,000 for 2000. 
It was also not clear that Argonautics, even after ten years of operation, had been able 
to resolve a lack of consensus as to the purpose of the cluster. Even in 2005 one 
member told me: 
There are different schools of thought - some people think Argonautics should 
only ever be a marketing organisation and never take on any contracts. There 
are others, who maybe regard themselves as more progressive, saying the true 
role for Argonautics is to start winning work as a cluster - start taking on 
contracts - but that gap hasn't been bridged and is still perhaps one of the 
tensions that remains within Argonautics (Argonautics member 2) 
Therefore a lack of consensus and, at times, strained relationships still existed and 
impacted on the operation of the cluster. 
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8.2 Conclusions 
Argonautics was initiated by, and in many ways led to the initiation of, the RSC in 
that both organisations emerged at a similar time. Through the experiences of 
Argonautics the RSC learnt how difficult it was to bring together a group of 
companies to work together for mutually beneficial purposes. 
The case of Argonautics demonstrates the significance of building relational assets 
and shows the value of those assets to the firms involved. However, it is difficult to 
disentangle the way in which those relational assets arose, and they may not have 
always been a direct result of the micro cluster. The existence of the micro cluster did 
appear to offer substantial support to embryonic firms when it, and they, were first 
established. However, the ongoing development of these relations appeared to result 
partly from the geographical proximity of a number of the firms, but more particularly 
from the nature of some of the key individuals within the cluster who appeared to be 
particularly adept at fostering relationships with other firms and organisations. 
The case of Argonautics demonstrates the difficulties in providing `club goods'. 
While the cluster appeared to provide a fertile environment for the generation of ideas 
of club goods that would be of benefit to the wider marine community, including the 
attempt to establish the Argonautics Technology Transfer Centre and the embryonic 
proposal for a Centre of Marine Excellence, the cluster operated at too small a scale to 
offer these club goods. 
Argonautics, and the RSC, appeared at times to be disconnected from the policy- 
making and organisational framework in the region. This was recognised by certain 
members who saw both the difficulty and the importance of being involved with One 
NorthEast's cluster policy. One member talking of the One NorthEast's three-pillar 
strategy, discussed in more detail in 5.2.2, commented: 
It will affect Argonautics as a cluster of companies and if Argonautics has got 
some people in oil and gas but some people in other parts of the marine sector 
how will they be regarded - will they be regarded as all being 
in one group or 
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will they be seen by this new model as being involved in two separate groups 
(Argonautics member 2). 
Other members highlighted that they thought the RSC could have had a role in linking 
Argonautics to other cluster organisations in the region: 
The other one that [the RSC] ought to be feeding us, or to my mind they 
should be feeding us, much more information on than they do is the Tyneside 
Maritime Cluster (Argonautics member 4). 
The case of Argonautics also demonstrates the complex nature of attaining -borrowed 
size' from operating as a micro cluster. There was never any consensus as to 
Argonautics' ability to operate as a contracting organisation, but to sustain the heavy 
administrative cost burden that the cluster operated under, the cluster had to obtain 
additional work for the member firms. Given the inability of the RSC to provide 
ongoing funding, the future of Argonautics is in doubt although, even in this respect, 
there is a lack of consensus: 
Without any funding the Argonautics cluster will rapidly collapse [... ] I don't 
think people will want to stretch that any further for the potential returns that 
are there at the moment (Argonautics member 5). 
The demise [of the RSC] will have an impact on Argonautics - again it's not 
fatal (Argonautics member 2). 
It is ironic that the RSC had attempted to provide real services, but had ended up 
providing money. More than ten years after the formation of the RSC's first cluster, 
the future of that first cluster is in doubt without ongoing financial support and, in a 
further irony, the future of the Swan Hunter shipyard is again in doubt. just as it was 
when the RSC was first initiated. 
Argonautics has brought benefits to its members, but it has been funded to a large 
extent with public support. It has demonstrated that firms can benefit from club 
goods, borrowed size and the generation of relational assets, but it has also 
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demonstrated that this is a process that can absorb substantial financial resources. is 
difficult, time-consuming, operates over a long time scale and, as these two 
concluding quotes illustrate, it requires a lot of input from those involved to gain 
benefits that are largely intangible: 
It's difficult really, people are interested in making a success of their own 
business and if Argonautics isn't going to help with that in real terms then they 
are only going to be putting into it and not getting anything back from it. So it 
really depends how long you mind being in that position (Argonautics member 
6). 
A lot of people are in clustering only for what they can get out of it. You've 
got to put in something. It's not a matter of being altruistic; it's a matter of 
being selfish. The more everyone puts into it, the more everyone will get out 
of it (Argonautics member 3). 
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9 Discussion and Analysis 
In this penultimate chapter I want to compare the two cases of cluster policy 
development in order to consider firstly, what they tell us about the conceptualisation 
of cluster policy and the way in which cluster policy has taken into account theories 
around clusters, and secondly, to highlight practical recommendations arising from 
this research. When analysing the different ways in which these two cluster policies 
developed it is important to note that cluster policies have often developed in a way 
that has been isolated from the ongoing academic debate, and it is useful to recall 
Benneworth's (2003) caution that `[i]t is important not to over intellectualise the 
cluster approach [to policy] into a coherent philosophy, because the ideas have been 
driven by policy-makers and consultants, giving a very pragmatic feel to much of the 
work' (ibid., p. 314). However, although the two policy approaches were not 
particularly developed in accordance with any given theoretical approach, the two 
cases were still inspired by cluster theories, do demonstrate a relevance of 
understanding concepts around clusters, and can add to the conceptualisation of 
cluster policy. 
Chapters 5 and 7 have sought to answer the question of how has the cluster policy 
that impacts upon the North East of England been developed? Chapters 6 and 8 
have sought to answer the question of how has cluster policy impacted on the 
marine and offshore engineering cluster in the North East of England? I now 
want to reflect on this empirical work in the light of the literature reviewed in chapters 
2 and 3. In the first half of the chapter I want to consider the different implications of 
the two approaches throughout the cluster policy-making process. In the second 
half 
of the chapter I want to analyse how the specificity of the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster may have influenced the impact of the policy on the cluster and 
draw out some conceptual implications. 
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9.1 The Cluster Policy-making Process 
9.1.1 The Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
In both cases the context in which the policies were fashioned had a considerable 
impact on the way in which they have developed. Both policies were linked to an 
academic concept of clusters in the first instance - the Industrial Districts model of 
real services in the case of the RSC and a more vague Porterian notion in the case of 
One NorthEast, although it has been noted that the process in the United Kingdom, 
whereby the DTI have `delegated' the delivery of cluster policies to Regional 
Development Agencies, `separates the formulation of policy tools from the 
intellectual process that had identified a cluster strategy as important for UK 
competitiveness' (AIM Management Research Forum and WERU, 2005, p. 25). 
However, both policies came to be largely shaped by factors other than the academic 
concept of clusters. They were shaped firstly by previous policies, particularly in the 
case of One NorthEast where the cluster development programme initially emerged 
from a programme to develop a supply chain of endogenous businesses to embed 
inward investment. A history of promoting sector support organisations was also 
highly influential. Secondly, policies were shaped by the specific context in which 
they were designed, particularly in the case of the RSC where attempts to mitigate the 
impact of large scale plant closures were the precursor of the cluster policy initiative. 
Thirdly, funding considerations and numerical targets were influential in the ongoing 
development of the cluster policies. One NorthEast's regional economic strategies 
were written in the light of European Structural Fund requirements, and the funding 
for the cluster development programme was limited due to the concentration of 
resource on the Strategy for Success programme of Centres of Excellence. The RSC 
was at all times dependent on external funding and therefore subject to the 
requirements and targets of the European Structural Funds and other external funding 
bodies, including One NorthEast. The RSC was beset by the short term nature of its 
funding and this is particularly significant given the wide acceptance of the long time 
scale required to implement cluster policies and the recommendations that a long term 
approach should be adopted (Rosenfeld, 1996b; Lagendijk and Charles, 1999; 
Lagendijk, 2000). Fourthly, policies were influenced by policy from higher 
governance levels - the RSC were influenced by One NorthEast. who in turn were 
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influenced by the DTI, and as mentioned above both the RSC and One NorthEast 
were influenced by the European Union, particularly due to guidance for the awarding 
of Structural Funds. Although policies were influenced by higher governance levels. 
this is not to say that there was coordination between levels, as will be explored 
further below. 
Section 3.5.3 highlighted various rationales for pursuing a cluster based approach 
ranging from the impact of government regulation on particular clusters to a lack of 
self awareness in clusters (Boekholt and Thuriaux, 2000). The RSC's rationale for 
intervention was well understood within the organisation and restricted to one 
particular aspect - that collaborative working amongst SMEs would increase the 
competitiveness of the firms involved, which would be beneficial to the local 
economy, but that such collaboration was likely to be limited without some public 
intervention due to a lack of trust, the cost of building relationships and a lack of 
awareness of the opportunity to work together. One NorthEast's overriding aim was 
to effect a structural change in the region's economy to bring the performance of the 
North East up to the average of the English regions in terms of Gross Value Added 
(GVA) per capita, and clusters per se were seen as a `good thing'. However, the 
specific rationale for One NorthEast's cluster policy is hard to determine. In One 
NorthEast's second Regional Economic Strategy (RES2), Realising Our Potential, the 
rationales were clear and varied in accordance with the type of cluster. For the few 
`truly globally competitive industries' the rationale for intervention was to remove 
barriers to growth and provide suitable framework conditions. For embryonic 
clusters, emerging largely from university research the rationale was to reduce risk, 
which would otherwise lead to under investment, and for the remaining, particularly 
SME, population intervention to encourage `clustering' was recognised as beneficial. 
However, this clarity was not common and on the whole the rationales for One 
NorthEast's intervention were unclear and this impacted on the ability of the agency 
to understand its role and possible policy interventions. 
The goals of the RSC had to be couched in terms of job creation because of the focus 
of ERDF funding, although, particularly at the outset, there was also a concern to 
retain technical expertise to act as the basis for further innovation and 
entrepreneurship. In the case of One North-East the goals changed between Regional 
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Economic Strategies, mirroring changes in emphasis at the DTI, from the 'knowledge 
economy' (RES 1), to `productivity' (RES2) to `sustainability' (RES3). This 
illustrates again how the policies were influenced by context rather than concept, and 
indicates the inconsistency that was to be one of the key problems in obtaining the 
involvement of actors in the policy-making process. 
The different influences on One Northeast's and the RSC's decision to take a cluster 
approach are summarised in Table 9.1 below. Overall, we might conclude that the 
policy context in which the policies were designed was more significant for the 
development of the policy initiatives than any academic concept, and we can concur 
with the suggestion of Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith (2005) that `the influence of 
the cluster concept on the design and delivery of regional economic promotion 
policies is minor compared to that of general institutional and strategic environments 
and pre-existing policy trajectories' (ibid. p. 1255). Porter and the Italian Industrial 
Districts variously served as inspiration for the policies but their development was 
highly context dependent. This conclusion gives rise to concern, because the 
literature emphasises the need for a long term perspective in developing cluster 
approaches, while the short term funding regime for the RSC and the instability in 
approach of One NorthEast gravitated towards `short-termism', which may well have 
impacted on the relatively disappointing outcomes of the approaches. 
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Table 9-1 Aspects of the Decision to Take a Cluster Approach 
Area One NorthEast RSC 
Conceptual Porterian influenced by the DTI Industrial districts (Brusco, 
Background Becattini, Pyke), particularly the 
notion of providing real services 
Policy background Inward investment promotion. Supply Novel approach to mitigate the 
chain development. Support for sector impact of large scale closures 
working groups and sector association 
External DTI, EU Structural funds Availability of EU structural 
Considerations funds. Need to fit into larger 
sub-regional and regional 
framework 
Rationale for Various and unclear. Removing barriers to Limited and narrow. Increasing 
intervention growth and providing framework collaboration amongst SMEs 
conditions; gap filling; commercialisation which would not otherwise 
of R&D occur due to barriers including 
lack of trust, knowledge and 
time 
Goals of Variously `building the knowledge Formation of micro clusters 
intervention economy', productivity, sustainability through which there would be 
an increase in firm 
competitiveness leading to job 
creation. Improvement in 
business support 
Financial framework Financially relatively autonomous. Initially Generously funded but 
specific additional funding from Objective financially lacking in autonomy 
2 Structural Funds for cluster development. and subject to short term 
With move to single pot funding cluster funding. Short term funding 
policies funded from core budget. Budget from a variety of sources 
for Strategy for Success substantial, but including ERDF, ONE, local 
remaining cluster development programme authorities 
low budget in comparison to other RDAs. 
Timescale of Desire for quick results led to instability in Recognition of time taken 
to 
approach approach with implications for participant develop micro clusters 
but 
mobilisation approach hampered 
by targets 
and short term funding 
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9.1.2 Identification, Selection and Analysis 
Identification and selection 
There is much discussion on the methodologies that can be applied to identify 
clusters. These are not entirely objective, value-free processes and Feser and Luger 
(2003) make it clear that the aims of the policy-maker influence the choice of 
methodology. 
In the case of the RSC, the groups of firms that came together were largely self- 
selecting and there was a bottom up approach to identifying clusters. The groups 
came together for self-interest, often motivated initially by the availability of grant 
funding. The groups they formed tended to be formalised, small and closed; although 
on occasions larger organisations emerged with open membership, as in the case of 
the Environmental Industries Federation. The small, closed nature of these micro 
clusters was not necessarily what had been intended by the RSC at the outset, and 
firstly, it limited the wider impact of the initiative, where I would concur with the 
findings of Lagendijk (1999), who studied the same organisation at an earlier stage of 
its development and concluded that such groups do not lead to the modernisation of 
wider clusters, which is only achieved through larger scale cluster associations. 
Secondly, the formal and closed nature of the groupings did not allow for dissent and, 
where disagreements within the micro clusters arose, this usually resulted in the 
departure of one or more members, whereas the role of `no-sayers' could have 
encouraged the exploration of different and potentially more challenging options for 
the group. The formal nature of the micro clusters could therefore be seen as ensuring 
sustainability (Huggins, 2000), but it could also prevent the emergence of radical 
ideas and the expansion of the micro cluster to a scale that could have had a more 
significant impact. 
There was little screening of the groups that came forward for assistance and 
although, at the outset, the RSC had intended to act in a strategic manner, the 
approach became one of assisting any groups that came forward for assistance. Not 
maintaining a focus on specific regional clusters caused problems for the RSC 
because it meant that they found it difficult to operate within the cluster framework of 
One NorthEast, although they did retrospectively try to show a fit between the micro 
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clusters they worked with and the clusters selected for development by One 
NorthEast. By operating predominantly reactively it was difficult to achieve the 
strategic focus that had been intended, but a compensatory factor was that the RSC 
process provided a way for embryonic clusters to emerge and be recognised. Also, in 
an area such as the North East of England, renowned for lacking entrepreneurial spirit 
and taken to be imbued with an employee culture, the demonstration effect and ability 
to publicise success stories was beneficial. 
The adoption of a bottom up approach to micro cluster development was appropriate 
for the RSC because they were looking to identify any groups of SMEs that could 
beneficially work together. However, the approach tended to non-strategic, although 
it offered a mechanism through which embryonic clusters might be recognised. 
In the case of One NorthEast the identification and selection of clusters was 
problematic, and it appears that this was partly as a result of a lack of understanding 
within the organisation as to the nature of clusters, and partly due to the lack of 
obvious candidate clusters in the region. As mentioned above, One NorthEast's 
overriding aim was to effect a structural change in the region's economy in order to 
bring the performance of the North East up to the average of the English regions in 
terms of Gross Value Added (GVA) per capita and the cluster development 
programme was seen as contributing to that aim. Feser and Luger (2003) call for 
transparency in terms of the methodology used to identify clusters, but not only was 
there no transparency in this respect, there was also a continuous change in the 
clusters identified. 
One NorthEast took a `top down' approach to selecting clusters in that it took the 
region as a whole and sought to identify clusters therein. Waits (2000) argues that 
powerful interest groups exert influence on policy-makers' selection of clusters for 
support, but although One NorthEast was considered to have been influenced by such 
groups, it was also in a powerful position to select clusters for support. There was no 
consistency in approach and the clusters selected for support changed numerous 
times. The way in which clusters were selected was never made transparent. although 
it was research by Arthur D Little Consultants (2001) that identified the areas covered 
by the Strategy for Success. There was also no obvious mechanism by which 
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emerging clusters could be recognised within One NorthEast's cluster development 
programme. 
The lack of clusters is an acknowledged problem for peripheral regions attempting to 
undertake a cluster development programme in that they may lack clusters with a 
`critical mass' and the requisite number of actors and level of complexity (AIM 
Management Research Forum and WERU, 2005). This issue is related to the 
quandary of boundaries discussed in section 2.2.2. There is a tendency in policy 
terms to try to identify clusters within a predetermined territory rather than starting 
from a key firm or core of firms and tracing linkages outwards, irrespective of 
administrative boundaries. Given the lack of obvious candidate clusters, One 
NorthEast was faced with an immediate problem. One NorthEast's designated energy 
cluster, of which the marine and offshore industries came to be seen as a part, was 
seen as too disparate to function as a recipient of policy measures. This echoes 
Bathelt et al. 's (2004) assertion that there is both a threshold and a ceiling for inter- 
firm knowledge creation - firms must be sufficiently different for interaction to be 
worthwhile, but not so different that interfirm learning ceases. The energy cluster 
therefore lacked the requisite clear focus and common identity (European 
Commission, 1999a) because it covered too great a range of sectors and industries to 
be coherent. 
The adoption of a top down approach was appropriate for One NorthEast as they were 
taking a strategic approach to cluster development within the region. However, it 
might be concluded that a more open method of identifying and selecting clusters and 
a more nuanced understanding of the nature of linkages within the clusters could have 
assisted One NorthEast in operationalising its cluster policy. It could also be 
suggested that they were hampered by the structure of cluster policy-making in the 
United Kingdom, which tended towards bounding clusters by regional administrative 
borders (cf. section 9.2. ). 
Analysis 
Cluster analysis is seen to serve two purposes in the literature. It is used to obtain a 
detailed understanding of the cluster in order that tailored policy measures can be 
designed (Brown. 2000a). and it can be used as the starting point for discussions with 
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cluster actors and stakeholders on potential policy interventions (Roelandt et al.. 
1999). Because the RSC only acted in a sectorally specific manner for a short time, 
its analysis tended to be restricted to an analysis of the needs of the firms involved in 
the individual micro clusters, which did then determine the activities undertaken by 
the micro cluster. The RSC felt that a coherent information framework for detailed 
analysis and monitoring of key sectors should be provided at a regional level. One 
NorthEast attempted a much more detailed analysis by commissioning the series of 
mapping studies. However, as noted in section 5.2.2, these were of varying standards, 
were not all made publicly available and were only occasionally used as a starting 
point for discussions with cluster actors. 
Therefore in both cases analysis was limited and this was particularly problematic for 
One NorthEast who were trying to develop clusters covering actors and organisations 
across the region, rather than the RSC's micro clusters, which were very small scale. 
The body of literature I have taken to be of use in understanding clusters highlights 
both the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the processes occurring within 
clusters and the context dependent nature of these processes, and suggests that they 
can only be uncovered by detailed analysis using the different `lenses' suggested by 
the cluster literature. Indeed research has suggested, not only the need to study 
clusters through different lenses, but also the need to take into account further nuances 
including different types of local `buzz' (Bathelt et al., 2004) and different innovation 
styles (Spielkamp and Vopel, 1999). It could be concluded that flaws in the analysis 
of clusters left One NorthEast without the detailed understanding of individual 
clusters required to tailor policy instruments to the requirements of each cluster, and 
less able to obtain the participation of cluster actors. 
The contrasting methods of identification, selection and analysis employed by One 
NorthEast and the RSC are tabulated below in Table 9-2. 
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Table 9-2 Aspects of the Identification, Selection and Analysis of Clusters 
Area One NorthEast RSC 
Selection of clusters 
Size of cluster and 
nature of actors 
Geographical 
coverage 
Breadth of sectoral 
coverage 
Analysis 
Top down approach. Attempt to be very 
inclusive at outset. Selection changeable 
and methodology not specified. Partly from 
Arthur D. Little research on university 
research strengths, partly result of 
politicised process. 
Variable according to cluster. Aiming to 
cover all key actors in each cluster 
including - firms, organisations and 
academia 
Regional 
Wide, on occasion leading to fragmentation Narrow, non-specific 
and incoherence 
Letting of small research contracts to 
analyse selected clusters. Variability of 
methodology and the extent to which they 
were participative or used as a springboard 
Initially detailed analysis of 
clusters and environment they 
operated within, but this level of 
research reduced as nature of 
Bottom up approach. Mainly 
reactive, non-strategic, but 
micro clusters screened by RSC 
for suitability for support. 
Usually 3-10 firms 
Local to regional. Partially 
determined by funding regime 
for action. the organisation changed. 
9.1.3 Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
Because a cluster policy approach suggests a move to a demand driven policy design 
with participation from actors within the cluster, it has been noted in section 3.5.5 that 
adopting a cluster approach requires a different role from policy-makers - that of 
`animateur' (Morgan, 1997b) or catalyst (European Commission, 2003). This 
appeared to be a difficult role for One NorthEast to adopt and my research concurs 
with Cooke's (2002) assertion that regional administrative bodies take time to acquire 
the competencies to perform this role. The RSC were much clearer as to their role, 
which was consistently considered to be that of facilitator, but as targets for the 
organisation increased there was pressure to spend less time with each group and this 
appeared to be detrimental. 
In a demonstration of the interlinked nature of the stages of the cluster development 
process, I would argue that One NorthEast had particular difficulty in building 
consensus amongst cluster actors and securing their participation because of the 
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continuous change in the clusters selected for support. There was also an 
acknowledged bias towards strategy and planning within the agency and there 
appeared to be difficulty in switching from analysis to action (Gilsing, 2001). This 
also led to disillusionment at the lack of progress amongst those who had been 
prepared to participate. 
Partly because of the inconsistency in identifying and selecting clusters One 
NorthEast did not appear to be in a position to generate the `talk' and `confidence' 
(Storper, 2002) that could have led to action, and this finding concurs With the 
conclusions of AIM Management Research Forum and WERU (2005) that ` [i]f the 
language and emphasis of DTI and other agencies continues to shift (and shift 
differentially) over time and space, there is unlikely to be widespread 'buy in' to the 
cluster agenda' (ibid. p. 27). In so far as the offshore cluster was concerned, One 
NorthEast, while expressing a desire, particularly at the outset, to be inclusive, did not 
appear to appreciate the steps required to obtain consensus as to a vision and way 
forward for the cluster. 
The RSC was dealing with much smaller groups of firms who, in coming forward to 
the RSC, had already demonstrated their willingness to participate. However, in a 
demonstration of the difficulty of obtaining consensus as to a vision within some 
micro clusters, it has been noted that there were, on occasion, strong disagreements as 
to the way forward in micro clusters. There was also a need for a leadership role 
within the micro cluster to drive it forward and this role was not always fulfilled. 
I have concluded that the RSC recognised that this stage of building up relationships 
within the groups, was a critical stage in developing micro clusters. It was also 
acknowledged that both time and substantial resource were required to build the 
trustful relationships that would permit untraded interdependencies to operate within 
the micro clusters. However, the short term funding and target driven regime under 
which the RSC operated, militated against taking time to develop relationships and 
was not compatible with a process that took time. 
Even where cluster actors participated in the policy initiatives, it might be concluded 
that cluster animation. or the identification of an individual. or in the terms of 
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Andersson et al. (2004) a `clusterpreneur', or organisation that could drive forward 
the cluster and maintain unity, was problematic for both the RSC and One NorthEast. 
The role could potentially be performed, on a short-term basis, by individuals from 
One NorthEast or the RSC, where those individuals had the right attributes (Huggins, 
2000). However, the micro clusters developed by the RSC often suffered from a lack 
of leadership. Within the marine and offshore industries I also came across examples 
of individuals from the private sector and other organisations, who were performing a 
cluster animation role, in terms of being facilitative, and performing a bridging and 
bonding role between other cluster actors, but it was unclear how their role fitted with 
the approach of One NorthEast. 
The contrasting approaches to participant mobilisation, cluster animation and relation 
building of the two policy initiatives are tabulated below in Table 9-3. 
Table 9-3 Aspects of Participant Mobilisation, Cluster Animation and Relation Building 
Area One NorthEast RSC 
Role of policy- Strategic, unclear how to operationalise. 
maker 
Participants No formal membership. Intention to 
include all key actors within cluster 
including firms, organisations and 
academia. In practice difficult to obtain 
ongoing participation 
Methods of Initial involvement of sector associations. 
Participant Large scale meetings. Difficult to identify 
Mobilisation continuing process 
Role of Cluster Recognition of insufficient external 
Animators involvement, but continued tendency to 
draw up strategy within the agency rather 
than identify animators outside the Agency 
Facilitator of small groups of 
collaborating SMEs. Initially 
intensive support to build 
relationships within micro 
clusters, increasingly under 
pressure to achieve quick results 
Within micro clusters - self- 
selection, closed, competitors 
excluded. Sometimes 
subscription based e. g. 
Argonautics 
Attempts to formalise micro 
clusters and to develop projects 
for mutual gain. 
Recognition of difficulty in 
ensuring micro clusters became 
self-sufficient. On occasion 
animation role performed by 
RSC staff. Tendency to lack of 
leadership within micro clusters 
345 
9.1.4 Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
Although there is no specific cluster policy instrument, and cluster policy 
interventions should be tailored to the individual requirements of the clusters as 
established from detailed analysis, policy instruments should relate to the concepts 
that seek to explain the apparent benefits of operating within a cluster. I maintain that 
it is at this stage in the process that an understanding of the theories underlying 
clusters is particularly important and a lack of understanding can impact detrimentally 
on policy delivery and implementation. 
It has been seen in section 3.2.1 that the work of Porter (1990: 1998), while 
contributing to the popularity of the cluster approach to economic development, 
leaves many questions open with regard to policy and it has been suggested that his 
work should be used as a `starting point', rather than as a `manual'(Brown, 2000b). 
There are areas of possible intervention identified in all three areas of literature that I 
have discussed using Storper's `Holy Trinity' of technologies-organisations-territories 
including within the technologies aspect - intervention to provide elements missing 
from an innovation system and measures to improve the operation of linkages within 
that system; within the organisations aspect - policy interventions to resolve market 
failures which would otherwise reduce the benefits of agglomeration and within the 
territories aspect - interventions to improve the interaction logic, collective learning 
dynamic and institutional framework 
Using Boekholt and Thuriaux's (1999,2000) `cluster policy models' it has been seen 
that, whereas One NorthEast's cluster development policy comprised aspects of the 
Industry-Research Link and Regional Development models, the RSC's approach was 
very much an Inter-firm Networking Model. The RSC model was not a complete 
model of cluster development because, as has been highlighted in section 3.7, 
successful clusters cannot be accounted for on the basis of cooperation alone. The 
RSC model was particularly focused on developing relational assets between firms in 
the micro cluster and the provision of cluster assets at the level of the micro cluster. 
It has been seen that relational assets arise in different ways in different 
agglomerations. Silicon Valley is seen as having a particular pattern of networking: 
relationships in the Italian Industrial Districts are seen as a function of culture and 
346 
history, and in the United Kingdom a particular pattern of relationships has been seen 
to occur in Motor Sport Valley because of career moves (Henry and Pinch, 2000). In 
section 3.2.2, I considered the ways in which policy-makers can purposefully develop 
an institutional framework of trust, social capital and untraded interdependencies. 
The RSC approach did take into account aspects of the literature, because the need to 
build relational assets in the form of social capital, trust and untraded 
interdependencies between firms was recognised. The approach the RSC used to 
develop these assets was the facilitation of these small tight knit groups through a 
staged development process. There was not only a recognition of the benefits of trust. 
but also an acknowledgement of the time taken and measured steps required to build 
up such trust and untraded interdependencies between parties. Even with the small 
numbers involved in each group this proved difficult, and the process took time both 
in terms of absorbing resources and operating over a long time scale. 
The activities of the micro clusters were predominantly driven by the self-interest of 
the members, although particularly within the earlier clusters, including Pegasus and 
Argonautics, there was a surprising level of altruism and a desire to provide a wider 
benefit to the region. However, overall there was a recognition that, while the 
clustering promoted by the RSC could be beneficial in increasing interactions at a 
local scale and building and projecting an identity at a small scale, common resources 
available to a wider cluster could not be provided at the scale at which the RSC and 
associated micro clusters were operating. 
The RSC acknowledged the need to vary, particularly the level of, support in 
accordance with the development stage of the cluster, but in practice it proved 
difficult for most of the clusters to become self-sufficient, possibly as the result of 
lack of leadership. The nature of the benefits of clustering also meant that the RSC's 
model appeared particularly appropriate in certain industries. This concurs with the 
assumption of Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith (2005) that different types of cluster 
promotion policy may be beneficial in different sectors. 
It has been noted in section 5.2.4 that the Centres of Excellence arising from One 
NorthEast's Strategy for Success could be considered to be a cluster approach based 
on an Industri'-Research Link Alodel and as such focused on fostering. albeit very 
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narrow, links with universities, the provision of venture capital and incubation 
facilities, and to an extent inward investment promotion and brand building. The 
selection and implementation of policy instruments within the remaining cluster 
development programme, which operated as a Regional Development Model, largely 
appeared unrelated to cluster concepts, but rather offered a generic set of business 
support measures to individual firms within particular sectors. This could be 
accounted for by a number of reasons. The difficulties in gaining participation of 
cluster actors could have limited the ability of the agency to devise tailored solutions. 
There may not have been the skills within the agency to move beyond the provision of 
generic measures. The relatively small budget for cluster development and the 
apparent lack of recognition within the agency of the cross-departmental nature of 
cluster policy may also have had an impact, particularly as other organisations, such 
as the Learning and Skills Council, with responsibility for initiatives that could have 
been used as a cluster development tools, did not, at least initially, take a cluster based 
approach. 
Within the Strategy for Success, which related largely to embryonic rather than 
established clusters, policies were adopted that could be considered appropriate for 
emerging clusters. However, within the remaining cluster development programme 
One NorthEast did not appear to be tailoring policy instruments to the stage of the 
cluster life cycle. Within the `energy cluster', One NorthEast placed an emphasis on 
the need for diversification, given decline in aspects of the marine and offshore 
industries, and it was true that in offshore construction and shipbuilding there may 
have been elements of functional, cognitive and political lock-in (Grabher, 1993b) for 
example, the expectation of future naval contracts influenced the response of the 
residual shipbuilding industry to the need to adapt. However, it was not clear that 
One NorthEast were best equipped to identify alternative markets or opportunities for 
diversification. As will be discussed further in section 9.3, it also appeared difficult 
for One NorthEast to take account of the institutional framework, particularly the 
formal organisations, that had evolved alongside the marine and offshore industries. 
The contrasting approaches to the selection and implementation of policy instruments 
are tabulated below in Table 9-4. 
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Table 9-4 Aspects of the Selection and Implementation of Policy Instruments 
Area One NorthEast RSC 
Range of policy Centres of Excellence Inter-firm Networking 
instruments Academic-industry links (narrow) Tailored facilitation of micro 
Brand building and projecting clusters to obtain 
Inward investment promotion borrowed size 
Incubation facilities and venture capital club goods 
Cluster Development Programme relational assets 
Lack of coherent tailored programmes Research and information 
Some supply chain work provision 
Ad hoc funding of cluster activity 
Sectoral Centres of Excellence model appropriate Networking model worked well in 
applicability for research based clusters 
Tailoring to stage of Embryonic, university research related 
cluster clusters supported through Centres of 
Excellence model. 
Need for diversification in face of decline 
creative and tourism industries 
Acknowledgement that level of 
support would vary depending on 
development stage of micro 
cluster 
recognised. 
9.1.5 Evaluation and Policy Learning 
In section 3.5.7 the various issues around the evaluation of cluster policies were 
rehearsed, including the need to identify an appropriate level of analysis, the inability 
to isolate the impact of policy intervention and the difficulties in measuring the 
intangible benefits of clusters. In many cases evaluation frameworks have not been 
established for cluster policies, partly because many such policies are relatively new 
and experimental, although there are increasing moves to develop appropriate 
evaluation frameworks (Learmonth et al., 2003, Pickernell et al., 2005, Cassidy et al., 
2005). 
In the case of One NorthEast the evaluation of the cluster development programme 
was undertaken as part of the wider evaluation of the Regional Economic Strategies, 
but there was no obvious framework for the evaluation of the progress of individual 
clusters. 
The RSC was also required to undertake evaluation of an `accounting' kind and, as its 
funding regime became ever more complicated as it battled for short term funding, the 
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amount of numerical returns required escalated. Evaluation of micro clusters was 
seen as a key part of their development and this was built into the process in an 
increasingly participative and qualitative manner, rather than just seeking financial 
information to input into the RSC's own returns. In this way the RSC intended that 
the micro clusters should learn from their experiences and latterly there were also 
attempts to enable the micro clusters to learn from each other. 
The RSC was also keen to act as a learning organisation itself and not only sought 
external qualitative evaluation of their policy process, but also regularly conducted 
internal reviews. Whereas One NorthEast were seen by a range of respondents as 
impervious to outside influences, the RSC were open to new ideas. 
Within the RSC as an organisation, at least in the early stage of its development, there 
appeared to be a clear understanding of their rationale for intervention and attempts 
were made to pass on knowledge about their modus operandi to new staff. The 
codification of the understanding of the service they provided into a formal `Cluster 
Development Programme' was a further attempt to embed tacit knowledge into the 
organisation. However, to a large extent this process broke down during a period of 
high staff turnover and uncertainty over future funding. 
In the case of One NorthEast it appeared that the inability to stabilise the 
understanding of the cluster development policy, which may have resulted from rapid 
turnover of staff, substantial corporate restructuring, an (unobtainable) desire for 
quick results and an apparent lack of understanding of the cluster concept, reduced the 
opportunity for organisational learning. These factors appeared to result in 
continuous attempts to `reinvent the wheel' as far as cluster policy was concerned, 
rather than building on previous experiences. 
The contrasting approaches to evaluation and policy learning are tabulated below in 
Table 9-5. 
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Table 9-5 Aspects of Evaluation and Policy Learning 
Area One NorthEast RSC 
Nature of Evaluation Limited measurement against numerical Performance of the organisation 
targets. evaluated against a range of 
numerical targets. External 
Cluster strategy as a whole evaluated as part qualitative evaluation sought. 
of evaluation of Regional Economic 
Strategies by consultants with some Participatory evaluation of 
reference to stakeholders. micro clusters seen as key part 
of process of development and 
built into the process. 
Acknowledged difficulty in 
evaluation impact on the wider 
region 
Level of analysis Evaluation based on performance of the Organisation and micro cluster 
region. 
No in depth evaluation of the cluster 
development programme as a whole. 
No evidence of evaluation of individual 
clusters. 
Policy Learning Internal review. Internal and external review. 
Attempts to codify the process 
Lack of stability in understanding of cluster incorporating learning from 
policy experiences 
9.1.6 Conclusions on the Cluster Policy Process 
Therefore it can be seen that using a cluster policy process model is a useful approach 
to analysing the ways in which the two cluster policy initiatives developed. It has 
been seen that the policies were very different at each stage of the cluster policy 
process and were heavily influenced by the context in which they were designed. 
Indeed the development of both policies was determined more by specific context 
than by particular academic conceptualisations of clusters and cluster policy. 
However, it can be seen that, in comparing the two policies, the RSC's policy 
measures were more in accordance with an understanding of the social and relational 
processes within clusters than those of One NorthEast and it is these aspects that I 
have highlighted as being particularly significant within clusters. 
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I now want to discuss two particular themes that have arisen from the consideration of 
the development of the two policy initiatives, and particularly from the consideration 
of the impact of the policies on firms, organisations and other actors within the marine 
and offshore engineering cluster. The first of these themes is that of scale, and within 
this theme I want to discuss the role of national cluster policy in the United Kingdom, 
coordination of cluster policies at different scales within the North East of England, 
the scales at which clusters exist and the role of non-cluster policy at the national 
scale. The second, interrelated, theme is the role of cluster organisations. 
9.2 Questions of Scale 
Unlike in other countries, such as the Netherlands (Gilsing, 2001), where the need for 
cluster thinking to be applied across government departments has been recognised, in 
the United Kingdom cluster policy has been viewed as a peripheral and discrete 
policy delegated to Regional Development Agencies. This approach has several 
implications that I want to consider in turn. 
9.2.1 Cluster specific not cluster informed 
In section 3.5 1 highlighted that Feser (1998) distinguishes between cluster specific 
policies and cluster informed policies. In the United Kingdom the emphasis has been 
on cluster specific policies at a regional scale and it appears that cluster thinking has 
remained an adjunct to, rather than the core of mainstream policy. In other countries 
(for example, the Netherlands) public procurement is one element of mainstream 
policy that has been used to stimulate cluster development. However, in the United 
Kingdom the interdependency between public procurement and cluster, or wider 
regional, development has been ignored as illustrated by procurement policy for the 
naval shipbuilding programme. 
9.2.2 Duplication 
Although the UK national government did undertake a mapping exercise of regional 
clusters (Department of Trade and Industry, 2001) the approach of delegating the 
identification of clusters to regional authorities appears to have contributed to a 
worrying tendency for all Regional Development Agencies to `select' particularly 
popular clusters. At various times, eight of the nine Regional Development Agencies 
have identified a biotechnology, biosciences or pharmaceuticals cluster within their 
region (Benneworth and Whitehurst, 2002). It is ironic that a policy approach 
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predicated on an understanding of the unique attributes of a region has produced such 
an overlap between Regional Development Agencies in the clusters identified: it is 
incredulous in that `[i]t stretches credibility to believe that the UK could be home to 
half a dozen or more globally successful biotech clusters' (AIM Management 
Research Forum and WERU, 2005, p. 28) and it represents a duplication of effort that 
might have been avoided had there been a central coordinating role from the DTI in 
this respect. 
In the Netherlands the national government has had a role in providing evaluation 
tools for cluster policy in the form of ClusterMonitor (den Hertog and Brouwer, 2001) 
and, given the difficulty in establishing evaluation frameworks for cluster policies, a 
further potential role that could have been fulfilled at a national level in the United 
Kingdom was the provision of an evaluation framework for regional cluster policies. 
9.2.3 Coordination of cluster policies at different scales within the North East of 
England 
As was mentioned in section 5.1.2 there were many cluster policy strategies operating 
at different scales within the North East, but there was no evidence of an attempt to 
coordinate these initiatives. Although Lagendijk (1999) had recommended that the 
RSC should develop closer links with sector oriented centres of expertise in the region 
and should participate in the development of regional cluster strategies, in practice the 
RSC found itself in a weak position in relation to One NorthEast and was unable to 
engage with the regional cluster development programme. The RSC was perceived, 
partly as a result of its own internal difficulties, as performing a marginal business 
support role at a local level, whereas the skills of its staff in facilitating groups of 
businesses to work together might have been utilised by One NorthEast to perform a 
clustering promotion role within a pre-identified sector or cluster. Clustering 
promotion by organisations such as the RSC is certainly not sufficient as a cluster 
policy, but it can form an element within a wider framework for cluster policy 
development. 
However, it was not just relations between the RSC and One NorthEast that were 
problematic. Raines highlights that, where there are several cluster programmes in a 
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territory, there is the need to have a single agency responsible for coordinating the 
programmes and also notes that `the policy structure itself is an important determinant 
of the success of the cluster approach' (2000, p. 33). While One NorthEast provided 
funding to cluster organisations, and indeed to the RSC, there was no evidence of an`- 
attempt to coordinate cluster policy at different scales with cluster policies at local, 
sub-regional, regional and supra-regional operating in a seemingly uncoordinated 
manner. This was despite the fact that in the initial CURDS paper for North Tyneside 
Council, dating back to 1993, there had been an acknowledgement that local 
clustering activity required complimentary activity at a regional level (Tyneside Real 
Service Centre, 1996). The RSC had also acknowledged within eight months of its 
existence that there was a difference between the types of clustering activity that 
could be conducted at a regional and local level (The Real Service Centre, 1996). 
Overall there appeared to be a lack of coordination between the many cluster 
strategies within the region, which may have contributed to the disillusionment and 
confusion surrounding cluster policy, and it appears that One NorthEast could have 
performed a coordinating role in this respect. 
9.2.4 The scale of clusters 
I have argued in section 2.2.1 that clusters are a functional, rather than geographical 
phenomena, and that their boundaries can only be identified by tracing the linkages 
and relationships between firms and other cluster actors. The method of identifying 
regional clusters in the United Kingdom runs contrary to this methodology and the 
enforced nature of the way in which clusters were identified within specific regions 
gave rise to particular problems for the marine and offshore industries. They lacked a 
sufficiently critical mass within the North East of England to merit inclusion as a 
regionally strategic cluster. However, because of the structure of cluster policy- 
making in the United Kingdom, rather than look for complementarities with other 
marine or offshore clusters in the country, One NorthEast subsumed the offshore and 
marine industries into a larger `Energy Cluster' leading to problems because it 
ignored the need, emphasised in section 9.1.2, to identifying clusters that are wide 
enough in industrial scope, but not too wide. The very structure of policy-making in 
the United Kingdom engendered an approach by One NorthEast that both failed to 
account for these insights and ran contrary to the strictures of Fromhold-Eisebith and 
Eisebith (2005) who maintain that `cluster promotion should be delivered by the 
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governance level most closely matched to the geographical extent of the cluster' (ibid. 
p. 1259). 
There are some promising signs that an alternative approach may be beneficial. In 
section 4.5.4, I mentioned research initiated by Durham Business School into the 
subsea technology cluster in the North East. As a result of the project, local 
companies and authorities have recently established a committee representing the 
subsea technology cluster in the North East, 51 a cluster which had not been taken to be 
significant by One NorthEast, even though it was mentioned in the Offshore Cluster 
mapping exercise conducted on their behalf. The activities planned accord with those 
suggested by Raines (2002) as suitable policies for the development of different 
aspects of clusters and are represented in Table 9.6. 
Table 9-6 Proposed Policies for the Embryonic Subsea Cluster in the North East of England 
Aspect of a cluster Objective of policy Proposed Policy Measures 
Interactions amongst cluster Increase interaction by 
actors (firms, trade associations, creating conditions for 
universities) 
Presence of common 
competitive advantages in the 
form of specialised labour 
markets, research expertise, 
specific tacit knowledge 
cooperation and 
Provision of forum for knowledge 
exchange 
Use proposed joint facilities to promote 
increasing or highlighting shared innovation and culture of 
incentives for 
cooperation 
collaboration 
Development of common Work with firms, support institutions 
resources to improve 
competitiveness of the 
cluster 
Collective awareness and Building internal 
understanding of the cluster, and awareness of the cluster 
sense of belonging to the cluster (identity building) and 
projecting the identity of 
the cluster (identity 
projecting) 
and universities to address the dramatic 
shortage of skills and competences 
Develop infrastructures e. g. testing 
centres for deep water technologies 
Use the forum to build a shared 
identity 
Raise the profile in and outside the 
region by `selling' it as a success story 
Encourage interaction and integration 
with national and international 
initiatives 
51 Interview with Frank Siedlok, Durham Business School 
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The project is of interest for many reasons. It involves the emergence of an 
embryonic cluster from the offshore construction industry, which had in turn emerged 
from the shipbuilding tradition in the area. It highlights the weakness of statistical 
data in identifying such emerging clusters. It shows the potential for collaboration 
even when two of the leading players in the cluster are direct competitors and it has 
implications for the existing cluster organisations in the offshore industries. It is far 
too early to evaluate the outcomes of this initiative but I have chosen to mention it at 
this juncture for two reasons. Firstly, it shows the possibility of cluster initiatives 
evolving in a bottom up manner and secondly, illustrates the identification of, and 
policy development for, a regional cluster that is part of a significantnational 
cluster, for which there is a national cluster organisation, Subsea UK. This again 
demonstrates that clusters do not have boundaries that are incorporated within 
regional administrative boundaries. This is recognised in the literature where, as 
discussed in section 2.2.1, Asheim (1999) points to a distinction between national 
clusters concentrated in a particular region; regional branches of a national cluster and 
regional clusters. I would argue that it is important that policy-makers recognise and 
understand the implications of this distinction. 
9.2.5 The role of non-cluster policy at the national scale 
The case of the marine and offshore industries in the North East also demonstrates the 
significance of policy, other than cluster policy, at a national scale. Offshore 
construction was seen to be dependent on rates of exploration for oil and gas in the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf, which were in turn considered to be largely 
dependent on HM Treasury taxation policies. Shipbuilding in the North East was 
seen to be entirely related to the controversial and convoluted process of awarding 
contracts for the new naval shipbuilding programme, controlled by the Ministry of 
Defence, with the guiding hand of the Treasury also being in evidence. Examples of 
national government influence in other areas, including renewable energy and nuclear 
decommissioning, also abounded. Therefore there were many policy drivers within 
the clusters that a Regional Development Agency could not influence. In addition. 
there were clearly many commercial drivers, including not least the oil price, that 
were crucial to the offshore cluster, but completely outside the sphere of influence of 
52 National subsea revenues are estimated at £5 billion per annum (source: Subsea UK/NEKS project) 
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a Regional Development Agency, acting as a reminder that the possibilities for policy 
induced regional cluster development are constrained by economic realities. 
Interestingly there appears to now be a recognition of the need for a national strategy 
for the marine sector and a Marine Sector Technology Plan was produced by the DTI 
in 2005. 
9.3 The Role of Organisations 
One theme that continually arose in my research into the marine and offshore 
engineering cluster was the role of formal organisations. These organisations were 
not always publicly run organisations although, possibly as a result of being in a 
region eligible for European Structural Funds, many of them were in receipt of public 
funding. Not all of these organisations used a cluster `label' but, if we return to the 
five-part typology outlined by Benneworth et al. (2003), and consider the kind of 
activities that these organisations were undertaking, these organisations can be 
considered to be cluster organisations in so far as they organised cluster activities. 
These organisations represented implicit bottom-up cluster initiatives (cf. Fromhold- 
Eisebith and Eisebith, 2005) These organisations (including NDI and NOF) 
contributed to cluster development due to their specialist knowledge, which gave 
them a particular ability to enable member firms to access `global pipelines' (Bathelt 
et al., 2004) and make external linkages, which they could not have otherwise forged. 
These organisations also had the ability to foster `buzz' by providing the necessary 
meeting places (Eklund et al., 2002), permeated with social relations (Huggins, 2000), 
for networking and information exchange to take place. It was organisations such as 
North East Maritime Group, rather than the Regional Development Agency. that 
appeared potentially able to generate `talk' and `confidence' (Storper, 2002) in order 
to help build the `conventions' that lead to successful economic 'coordination'. These 
organisations also had a complicated role in relation to the concept of lock-in. Some 
authors argue that these formal organisations pose a problem because they may not 
represent the cluster community, and recommend the use of `champion' firms or 
institutes instead (Gilsing, 2001). However, my research, although restricted to a 
mature cluster in the North East of England, suggests that, while organisations could 
be part of the problem, as they were part of the structure that could lead to political 
lock-in. they had a potential to be part of the solution as they provided a suitable 
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forum for foresight exercises, could provide targeted support for the exploration of 
new markets and most importantly were part of the local buzz and in a position to 
generate `talk' and 'confidence'. 
The role of the Regional Development Agency in respect of these organisations was 
unclear. My interviews revealed that, although some of the organisations were highly 
thought of and included within One NorthEast's strategy development, others felt 
excluded. There were examples of these organisations becoming very vulnerable to a 
reduction in funding and therefore One NorthEast, as a provider of funding, was in a 
powerful position in relation to many of these organisations. 
It may be because of the policy background of encouraging sector associations and 
the availability of European Structural Funds that there were a particular plethora of 
these organisations in the North East of England, which had arisen from the public, 
private and academic sectors. In addition, the marine and offshore industries had 
reached a mature, in some aspects declining, stage in the life cycle of the cluster and 
the institutional framework for the clusters had developed over many decades. What 
was difficult to determine was whether this structure of organisations represented 
institutional thickness of a `thick and works' variety or `thick and does not work' 
variety (cf. Amin and Thrift, 1995 and section 2.6.4 above). However, it appears that 
the institutional structure in the marine and offshore cluster could demonstrate the 
`strength of weak ties' (Grabher, 1993b) particularly because `linking different 
institutions may uncover potentials for cooperation between firms of different size 
and technological specialization' (ibid. p. 274). 
There was evidence that One NorthEast was latterly coming to appreciate the benefits 
of these organisations and, while my research would not necessarily lead to the 
recommendation made by Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith (2005) that ' [s] imultaneous 
combination of explicit top-down and implicit bottom-up is not recommendable 
[because] this bears the danger of counterproductive rivalry of different cluster 
coordinators, a malcoordination of efforts. and a clash of (private against public) 
cultures that irritate firms' (ibid. p. 1266). I would argue that public policy-makers 
should take note of the existing institutional framework and work with the 
organisations therein. While cluster policy can contribute to institution building 
358 
(Lagendijk, 2000), One NorthEast appeared, at times, at risk of damaging the 
institutional tissue of the marine and offshore engineering cluster. 
These regionally based cluster organisations were also able to overcome some of the 
problems that beset the micro clusters facilitated by the RSC. In the case of 
Argonautics the scale of the operation was too small to enable the provision of club 
goods for the wider regional cluster. However, cluster organisations at a regional 
scale were better resourced to deliver such assets. Also the larger cluster 
organisations were better able to incorporate a range of views without members 
having to resort to `exit' (Hirschman, 1970) as a response to disagreement. However, 
the regional cluster organisations were able to still generate relational assets, which 
One NorthEast found difficult to achieve. 
9.4 Conclusions 
Therefore the examination of the development of two cluster policy initiatives in the 
North East of England demonstrates both that policies can develop in very different 
ways depending on their initial inspiration and that the development of policies is 
heavily influenced by the context in which they are designed. 
Although cluster policy approaches have developed in a pragmatic way away from the 
academic debate surrounding clusters, the need for detailed academically informed 
analysis of clusters, particularly where a top down cluster development programme is 
proposed has been highlighted, as has the need to develop policy instruments in light 
of the academic concepts around clusters. 
My research has also highlighted the weaknesses in the national approach to cluster 
policy in the United Kingdom and leads to a recommendation for much more 
coordination between the scales of cluster policy-making. The complicated issue of 
scale also applies to the clusters and the experience of the `energy cluster' in the 
North East has shown the inappropriateness of achieving a critical mass for a regional 
cluster policy by expanding the industrial scope of the cluster beyond reasonable 
boundaries, whereas the development of the subsea committee in the North East has 
illustrated the bottom up recognition of a regional cluster that is part of a national 
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cluster. Both cases lead me to conclude that policy-makers require a much better 
understanding of scale issues in relation to clusters. 
The experiences of the marine and offshore industries and Argonautics have also 
emphasised the significant role of cluster organisations, certainly in mature clusters. 
This highlights the need for public policy-makers to take into account the existing 
institutional framework and, just as Morgan (1997b) suggests that innovating in the 
periphery may mean `working with what exists, however inauspicious, in an effort to 
break the traditional institutional inertia in the public and private sectors, fostering 
interfirm networks which engage in interactive learning, nurturing trust and voice- 
based mechanisms, which help to lubricate these networks and promoting a cultural 
disposition which sets a premium on finding joint solutions to common problems' 
(1997b, p. 501), so cluster policy, in a peripheral region and with mature industries 
may mean working with existing organisations, even if flawed, to design tailored 
solutions to the specific issues faced by clusters. 
The future for designated cluster policy in the North East of England is uncertain. 
The Regional Service for Clustering, having in any case evolved in a way that did not 
reflect the initial intentions for the organisation, has reduced to a staff of two and will 
cease to operate at the end of March 2006. One NorthEast has reverted to an overtly 
sectoral policy, although I have argued that the `three pillars' of energy and 
environment, processing industries and healthcare and health sciences, is implicitly 
based on the concept of clusters and should be informed by an understanding of 
clusters and the cluster policy process required to support them. However, even in the 
absence of a dedicated cluster development policy, policy from all levels of 
government will continue to impact upon what clusters there are in the region. 
Cluster organisations ranging from Argonautics to Northern Defence Industries 
continue to foster cluster activities, as do other actors, including the region's 
universities. 
The concept of clusters as a policy tool, at least in the North East of England, appears 
to be falling from favour. I would suggest that this is as a result of dissatisfaction 
with the outcomes, which may have been relatively disappointing as a result of 
failings in the cluster policy process. I would also suggest that academic concepts of 
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clusters still offer significant insights into the operation of economies and can still be 
usefully employed in policy circles. 
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10 Conclusions 
In this thesis I set out to analyse the development of two policies taking a cluster- 
based approach to economic development in the North East of England and to 
consider their impact on firms and organisations, particularly those within the marine 
and offshore engineering industries in the region. 
From a review of cluster theory literature in Chapter 2, I concluded that we need 
language and tools to describe and explain specialised concentrations of economic 
activity, which we might term `clusters', and which might be defined as comprising a 
pronounced and recognisable mass of firms and associated support organisations and 
research and education establishments, who, by their interactions, create cluster 
specific assets available for exploitation by actors within the cluster, depending on the 
actors' capabilities and strategies. I went on to argue that, given the context 
dependent individuality of clusters, a multi-layered approach to clusters, akin to 
Storper's (1997) holy trinity, was required in order that the explanatory strands 
(including proximity, relational assets, processes of learning and knowledge transfer, 
notions of systemness) can be separated and evaluated. I therefore concluded that the 
explanations of clusters will be specific to the territory, and cluster, involved and can 
only be uncovered by detailed empirical work. 
From a review of the cluster policy literature in Chapter 3, I highlighted that there has 
been a burgeoning interest in cluster concepts in policy circles since the 1990s. I 
demonstrated that the application of cluster concepts has ranged from simple 
renaming of existing policies at one end of the spectrum, to a more academically 
informed approach to policy-making at the other end of the spectrum. I concluded 
that it was appropriate to consider a cluster approach as a process including 
overlapping and continuous stages: firstly deciding to take a cluster approach; 
secondly identification, selection and analysis of clusters; thirdly the mobilisation of 
participants, cluster animation and relationship building: fourthly design and 
implementation of policy interventions; and finally evaluation and policy learning, 
with the overall aim of the process being to stimulate and facilitate the kinds of 
processes believed to be occurring within successful clusters, in order to generate 
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cluster specific assets for the benefit of the cluster. I concluded that, while not a 
policy panacea, there is an identifiable cluster approach to policy, which can be 
beneficial if properly applied. 
Chapter 5 examined the development of One NorthEast's cluster development 
programmes and concluded that there have been continual difficulties in the cluster 
policy-making process within One NorthEast, particularly due to problems in 
identifying, selecting and analysing clusters within the region, which appeared to lead 
to an inability to stabilise a cluster development policy and an associated inability to 
demonstrate progress in cluster development. These factors contributed to the 
decision by One NorthEast to move away from the explicit use of the term `cluster'. 
Chapter 7 examined the development of an alternative cluster policy, that of the 
Regional Service for Clustering. The Regional Service for Clustering was an unusual 
and ambitious project. Its service was predicated not on developing particular 
clusters, but on the understanding that groups of firms could come together to achieve 
mutual benefits by clustering. The effectiveness of the service was difficult to 
demonstrate quantitatively and the benefits produced were not necessarily those 
targeted by the funders of the project causing difficulties for the RSC in meeting 
targets. As a result, by 2005, the organisation was reduced to two members of staff 
operating under the auspices of another enterprise agency in order to complete an 
outstanding ERDF contract. However, while the organisation has not necessarily had 
a long term impact on policy, the legacy of the organisation remains in the micro 
clusters it developed and it remains a model of cluster policy that appears to have 
potential benefits. 
As well as examining the development of the two policy initiatives, I wanted to 
examine the impact that the policies had on firms, organisations and other actors in 
the marine and offshore engineering cluster in the North East of England. In Chapter 
6, I concluded that One NorthEast's process of developing a cluster policy for a 
cluster incorporating the marine and offshore industries was highly flawed. Some of 
the issues that arose were those highlighted in chapter 5 as generic and applying 
across the cluster development programme. However, there was a particular lack of 
understanding of the marine and offshore industries and the composition of any 
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cluster of which they could be considered a part. I concluded that some of the issues 
originated from within the marine and offshore engineering cluster, particularly given 
the cyclical downturn in some of the key components of the cluster at the time cluster 
policy was being introduced in the North East, the fragmented nature of the industry 
within the region, and the extent to which the industries were highly influenced by 
events, and policy, at a national and international scale. I did however identify that 
sub-clusters, such as the firms involved in subsea technology, seeing an upturn in 
work driven by a high oil price and changes in oil and gas extraction technology, had 
potential to feature within a cluster strategy, but were not recognised by One 
NorthEast. 53 
In Chapter 8I examined the development of a micro cluster, Argonautics, which 
encompasses a group of predominantly marine design firms that form part of the 
region's marine and offshore cluster. The case study of Argonautics demonstrated that 
firms can benefit from the club goods, borrowed size and generation of relational 
assets that arose from operating as a micro cluster facilitated by the Regional Service 
for Clustering, but it also demonstrated that this is a process that can absorb 
substantial financial resources, is difficult, time-consuming, operates over a long time 
scale and requires a lot of input from those involved to gain benefits that are largely 
intangible. 
To conclude the thesis, I now want to consider the implications of my research for 
cluster theory and the conceptualisation of cluster policy. I will then reflect on the 
research process and discuss further areas of research before drawing out some 
practical lessons for policy-making. 
10.1 Implications for Cluster Theory 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a theoretical and methodological divide between, 
on the one hand, those who see the concept of clusters as ambiguous, chaotic and 
incapable of being rigorously tested (Martin and Sunley, 2003) and, on the other hand. 
those who see value in the cluster approach because it permits that there are many 
5' This was finally rectified in 2006 
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strands of explanation for individual clusters, each of which can be scrutinised 
separately, establishing a rich understanding of that particular cluster and, in doing so, 
adding to our understanding of `clusters' (Benneworth and Henry, 2004, Chapman et 
al. 2004). 
My research supports the adoption of the latter approach and has particular 
implications for three areas of the current theoretical debate around clusters. These 
areas, which are intertwined, are boundaries and scale, terminology, and the role of 
individual cluster actors, and I will look at each area in turn. 
10.1.1 Boundaries and Scale 
My research points to the conclusion that, no matter which methodology is chosen to 
identify clusters, clusters can not be expected to have clear boundaries either in 
geographical or industrial terms. For Martin and Sunley (2003) this is problematic. 
However, from my understanding of clusters as a locus of interactions through which 
cluster specific assets (for example, tailored infrastructure, specialised support 
organisations and untraded interdependencies) are generated, I would suggest that any 
boundary that might be drawn would inevitably be both blurred and only arrived at by 
detailed empirical examination. The boundary will be blurred because the intensity of 
interactions, and particularly the intensity of interactions that include a social element, 
which I have highlighted as being significant in understanding clusters, tends to 
gradually decline with a reduction in proximity. 54 Given the context dependent nature 
of clusters, I would suggest that such a creative process to establish boundaries is 
acceptable. I would also conclude that my research supports Malmberg's (2003) 
assertion that geographical proximity should be considered to be a variable attribute 
of a cluster rather than part of its definition. 
My research suggests that clusters exist at a range of spatial scales from the local to at 
least the national. Martin and Sunley (2003) suggest that to use the same term to refer 
to phenomena at any spatial scale is to assume that clustering processes are scale- 
54 1 am predominantly referring to geographical proximity, but this thesis has demonstrated that 
proximity in other senses is also significant (see also, Boschma, 2005). 
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independent. While I conclude that clusters exist at different geographic scales, and 
that boundaries can only be drawn around clusters following detailed empirical 
investigations, I would argue that, at each scale, the nature of the relationships and 
`clustering processes' are distinct. At a national level, the processes of interest are 
those that link the cluster to the overall macroeconomic picture (Feser, 1998). At a 
sub-national level, the processes of interest may be around a value adding production 
chain or linkages into a territorial innovation system (Roelandt and den Hertog, 1999). 
At a local level, the processes of interest may be those within networks of tightly 
linked firms. At each geographical scale what is of interest is the way in which actors 
interact within clusters and how those clusters relate to their wider environment. 
However, different processes operate at different scales and there are links running 
between the scales, with actors operating and events occurring simultaneously across 
different scales (Bunnell and Coe, 2001). I would suggest that local clusters are 
embedded in sub-national clusters and sub-national clusters are embedded in national 
clusters and therefore, not only is there a need to understand the different processes at 
different scales, but also, if we wish to understand clusters, it is inadequate to 
concentrate on processes occurring at one scale alone and a move away from a 
tendency to consider clusters as regional phenomena is required. If we do take an 
approach that examines clusters at a range of scales, it may be possible to avoid 
abstracting `clusters from the rest of the economic landscape, so that they often appear 
as isolated and self-contained entities' (Martin and Sunley, 2003, p. 17). 
10.1.2 Terminology: Unpacking the Clusters Concept 
In order to theorise clusters at any geographical scale in a meaningful way I conclude 
that we need to be much clearer about the terminology that we use to analyse clusters, 
processes within clusters and cluster policy. In section 3.3 I outlined Benneworth et 
al. 's (2003) five-part typology, which breaks down the cluster concept into five 
theoretical elements: the cluster, clustering, cluster activities, cluster organisations and 
cluster policy. My research has shown that the ability to break down the concept in 
this way reduces the ambiguity that rightly causes concern amongst critics. such as 
Martin and Sunley (2003). The distinction between clusters and clustering is 
particularly significant for our conceptualisation of clusters and my research leads me 
to conclude that we can progress the theorisation of clustering further. Benneworth et 
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al. (2002) define clustering as `[t]he general behaviour of firms who are collaborating 
in innovation' (ibid., p. 513). Clustering is a process, a verb, and does not solely take 
place within agglomerations. I would suggest that clustering describes the process of 
fostering and maintaining relationships, which are more than arm's length 
associations, between actors. It is through these relationships that untraded 
interdependencies and social capital in the form of conventions, understandings, 
reciprocity, dependability, and open communication can form. Trust appears 
particularly significant and it has been theorised that it can evolve to such an extent 
that shared trust exists and firms can experience trustful relations, without investing in 
individual relationships (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). These relationships, and the 
assets that develop from them, have many benefits: they may facilitate innovation; 
they may lead to the establishment of specialist support organisations; they provide a 
level of self-help between firms and they may facilitate traded relations. Therefore 
these relationships can be considered as a collective asset for that group of actors. 
Actors have the ability to benefit from this collective relational asset, depending on 
their individual capabilities and motivations. 
I would make two additional observations - while it is not possible to have a cluster 
without clustering, clustering is neither exclusive to clusters, nor is it sufficient to 
account for clusters. Taking the first observation, I would simply suggest that, given 
that clustering can occur outside agglomerations, clarity of terminology might be 
improved by identifying a different verb to describe the process of relational asset 
building that I have outlined. Turning to the second observation, it is important to 
theorise the non-collaborative processes occurring within clusters, for example, 
treacherous learning, and transfer of knowledge through labour mobility. 
There are other relations between the different elements of Benneworth et al's (2003) 
typology. I have stressed the importance of the soft institutions that are developed by 
clustering, but my research has led me to conclude that formal cluster organisations 
are also important within clusters and that they have a role in the development of the 
soft institutions (Cooke et al., 1998). Similarly. cluster activity may lead to 
clustering, but may also result from clustering. A particularly interesting area in my 
research was the relation between cluster organisations and policy and this will be 
examined in section 10.2.2. 
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10.1.3 Individual Cluster Actors 
My research has continually highlighted the importance of key individuals within 
clusters. This is also an area of growing interest in the literature and, as outlined in 
section 3.5.5, Eklund et al. (2002) discuss the role of the cluster `animator' and 
Andersson et al. (2004) discuss the role of the `clusterpreneur'. A similar concept is 
found much earlier in the literature in the form of Camagni's (1991) `collective 
agent'. Although Eklund et al. posit that an organisation might perform the role of 
cluster animator, I would suggest that it is the role of particular individuals within 
firms and organisations that is significant. The cluster animators I identified in my 
research were able to draw together divergent individuals and interests around a 
common cause or vision. They were able to maintain unity and drive the group 
forward. This kind of individual appears rare, but I found examples in private firms. 
cluster organisations and policy-making bodies. 
While not wanting to over-extend Benneworth et al. 's (2003) typology, I would 
propose that the concept of `cluster animator' is sufficiently significant to be 
considered as a sixth distinct theoretical element of the cluster concept. I use Eklund 
et al. 's (2002) term of `cluster animator', as opposed to Andersson et al. 's (2004) 
term, `clusterpreneur', to signify that the role is not necessarily performed from within 
a private sector firm. 
10.2 Implications for the Conceptualisation of Cluster Policy 
Having considered the implications of my conclusions regarding scale and 
boundaries, terminology and individuals for our conceptualisation of clusters, I now 
want to consider the implications of my findings for our theorisation of cluster policy. 
The main implication of my research is that I maintain that cluster policy should be 
conceptualised, not as a discrete policy instrument, but rather as a process including 
overlapping and continuous stages: firstly deciding to take a cluster approach; 
secondly identification, selection and analysis of clusters; thirdly the mobilisation of 
participants, cluster animation and relationship building; fourthly design and 
implementation of policy interventions, and finally evaluation and policy learning, 
with the overall aim of the process being to stimulate and facilitate the kinds of 
processes believed to be occurring within successful clusters, in order to generate 
cluster specific assets for the benefit of the cluster. This particular conceptualisation 
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of the cluster policy making process has permeated the whole thesis and I consider it 
to be a valuable contribution to cluster policy research. However my research has 
further implications for cluster policy theorising. The literature discussed in Chapter 
3 indicates the wide range of policy approaches that are implicitly or explicitly based 
on clusters. I have highlighted that many of these policies are pragmatic responses by 
policy-makers to the perceived needs of their territories. However, the performance 
of cluster policy in practice may be hindered by an inadequate theorisation of cluster 
concepts and consequent inadequate theorisation of cluster policy. Therefore I want 
to consider the implications of my conclusions regarding scale and boundaries and 
terminology, as before, and also to consider the implications for cluster policy of 
seeing clusters as context dependent, multi-layered phenomena. 
10.2.1 Boundaries and Scales 
Recognising that clusters have fluid boundaries, and that there are different scales at 
which clusters exist, has considerable implications for our conceptualisation of cluster 
policy. Despite theoretical guidance to the contrary, cluster policy is usually 
implemented with the assumption that clusters are bounded in accordance with 
administrative territories. My research has shown that cluster boundaries do not 
accord with territorial boundaries. Therefore a cluster policy approach should be 
applied not only at a range of geographical scales, but also in accordance with the 
spatial coverage of the cluster, rather than in accordance with administrative 
boundaries. If this is not done, the `policy defined' cluster may be incoherent to 
actors within it, as it will not incorporate all the key cluster relationships that would 
have been identified by an approach that sought to identify the `real' cluster and was 
sensitive to the need to consider clusters as functional entities, rather than complying 
with a set administrative boundary. 
Given that clusters are also seen to exist at different spatial scales and the processes 
within them vary with scale, we can theorise that cluster policy should be different at 
different spatial scales (Roelandt and den Hertog, 1999). This is acknowledged in 
Boekholt and Thuriaux's (1999,2000) typology of cluster policy models outlined in 
section 3.5.3 and particularly in the work of Lagendijk (1999) outlined in section 
2.2.1. If policy is implemented for clusters at a national level. the main interest is in 
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the relationship between the national cluster and framework conditions at a national 
level and therefore policy can be conceptualised as removing barriers to cluster 
development. If policy is implemented at a sub-national scale, relationships within 
the cluster are more significant and tailored policy initiatives can be used to develop 
or maintain cluster specific assets including relationships between cluster actors, a 
cluster identity or brand, an infrastructure of support organisations, shared facilities 
and a specialised workforce. If policy is implemented at a small, local scale it can 
focus on encouraging interactive learning processes between firms and facilitating 
network formation. Therefore the nature of cluster policy should vary according to 
scale and, given that relationships exist across scales and actors operate 
simultaneously at different scales (Bunnell and Coe, 2001), we can conclude that 
there should be coordination between the different scales at which policy is developed 
and implemented. 
In addition to concluding that the nature of cluster policy should vary with scale, there 
are also implications from my conclusion that clusters should be viewed through 
different lenses in order to build up multi-layered explanations for their existence and 
evolution. If there are multiple explanations for clusters, there are multiple roles for 
policy-makers. The way in which policy is conceptualised should vary therefore, not 
only in accordance with the scale at which the cluster is viewed, but also in 
accordance with other cluster specificities, including the stage of the cluster within a 
cluster life cycle (Pouder and St. John, 1996; Chapman et al., 2004) and the 
innovation style of the cluster (Roelandt et al. 1999). 
10.2.2 Terminology: Unpacking the Clusters Concept 
In section 10.1.2 1 concluded that unpacking the clusters concept into five distinct 
theoretical elements (Benneworth et al. 2003) was useful theoretically and that such 
an approach was supported by my research. I now want to consider the implications 
for cluster policy theory of unpacking the concept in this way. Once again the 
distinction between clusters and clustering is significant. We can conclude that a 
policy to promote a cluster or `clusters' will look very different from a policy to 
promote clustering. Because I have argued that we cannot envisage a cluster without 
clustering, I would suggest that a policy to promote clusters needs to give 
due 
consideration to clustering. I have suggested that clustering involves fostering and 
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maintaining relationships between actors and it is a process that is most likely to occur 
where there is some proximity. This has implications for how we conceptualise 
cluster policy, particularly at the sub-national and lower scales, which are the scales at 
which clustering, or `relational asset building', is most intensive. Encouraging 
clustering is essentially a relation building and trust building activity and, while 
policymakers can introduce particular initiatives in order to introduce proximity 
between firms (for example, provision of incubation units), the very process of trying 
to build trust and untraded interdependencies is a valuable outcome, but one that is 
difficult to achieve quickly or measure quantitatively. 
I have suggested that cluster organisations may be significant in generating `buzz', 
providing cluster specific knowledge, offering opportunities for collective learning 
and providing the meeting places and networking opportunities required to generate 
`talk' and `confidence', and that they may have the necessary connections and 
specialist knowledge to plug firms into global pipelines (Storper, 2002; Andersson et 
al. 2004, Bathelt et al., 2004). However, the relationship between these organisations 
and cluster policy is problematic. These organisations can be seen as contributing to a 
lock-in of the cluster and hampering adaptation, or as contributing to an institutional 
framework with the necessary `redundancy' and loosely coupled networks to enable 
adaptation to occur (Grabher, 2003b). Both policy makers and cluster organisation 
may have a role in cluster development (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith, 2005). but 
the relationship between the two is not yet clear. 
10.3 Reflections on the Research Process and Areas for Future Research 
The understanding of clusters as highly context dependent phenomena, incorporating 
many intangible factors, and the variations in cluster policy approaches, pose 
substantial methodological challenges. In attempting to meet those challenges, I have 
focused on trying to gain a rich understanding of only two policy initiatives, within 
one region, and their impact within one particular cluster. The conclusions I am able 
to draw reflect the limited coverage of these case studies. but I would suggest that the 
benefits of obtaining a rich understanding outweigh the limitations. 
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10.3.1 Further Empirical Research Possibilities 
The focus on the marine and offshore engineering cluster has opened many interesting 
avenues for exploration, particularly around the role of cluster organisations. The 
focus on a mature cluster also adds to moves, particularly by Chapman et al. (2004) 
and Tödtling and Trippl (2004), to redress the balance away from studies of 
successful clusters based on new technologies. However, my research has focused on 
a cluster where there is a considerable impact from exogenous forces (particularly the 
price of oil) and from policies at a national level. I have highlighted that national 
taxation policy, national energy policy and the operation of North Sea exploration 
licences have a strong effect on the offshore engineering industry. The shipbuilding 
industry in the North East is almost entirely reliant on government procurement 
policies and even areas that have been identified by One NorthEast as offering 
opportunities for diversification - nuclear decommissioning; wind, wave and tidal 
energy; and naval decommissioning - are heavily regulated. This has impacted on my 
research as it reduces the likelihood that policy at a sub-national level can 
significantly influence the cluster. Research into a less regulated, less exogenously 
influenced cluster may have yielded very different results. 
There are many ways in which the empirical work from this thesis could be extended. 
Within the North East, further work could be undertaken on analysing the marine and 
offshore engineering cluster itself. Work on adaptation in the Aberdeen oil complex 
has been conducted by Chapman et al. (2004) and while they concluded that firms' 
attitude to change are influenced by existing institutional conditions and note a 
significant role for social networks in the process of adjustment, there are fewer 
cluster organisations in operation in the Aberdeen oil complex than in the North East 
Marine and Offshore Cluster and it would be particularly interesting to further 
consider the role of organisations in the process of adaptation (or possibly in 
hindering adaptation) in this mature cluster. 
Detailed research could also be undertaken to consider whether it was peculiarities 
in 
the marine and offshore industries that made it so difficult to develop a cluster 
development policy, or whether there are problems within cluster policy per se, 
problems with cluster policy as delivered by English Regional Development 
Agencies 
or problems specific to One NorthEast. I would argue that the success or otherwise of 
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cluster policy, and particularly the causality of that success or otherwise, can only be 
determined by a detailed investigation of each cluster and the development of policy 
for that cluster and that it will often be a combination of issues in policy development 
and the specific cluster that cause problems. Indeed, Chapman (2005) highlights this 
combination in his work on the Teesside chemical industry in the North East of 
England. However, in addition to the concerns raised with regard to One NorthEast's 
cluster policy during interviews with their own staff and other actors in the region, 
and the concerns highlighted in the evaluation reports of REST and RES2 (SQW 
Limited, 2002: Frontline Consultants 2005), my research did lead me to talk to 
individuals who had been involved in the food and drink cluster and the creative 
industries cluster in the North East and they also identified problems with the way in 
which One NorthEast developed cluster policy. 
Were these issues peculiar to One NorthEast or did other English regional 
development agencies have similar problems? Further research could consider 
whether other regional development agencies in the United Kingdom were more 
successful in introducing cluster policy. A review of the agencies' own 
documentation and literature suggest there are mixed results. While Yorkshire 
Forward, the regional development agency for Yorkshire and the Humber still 
emphasises its cluster strategy, 55 the East of England Development Agency56 and the 
North West Development Agency57 appear, like One NorthEast, to have reverted to an 
overtly sectoral, rather than cluster based, approach to providing segmented and 
focused business policy. In a report for emda, the regional development agency for 
the East Midlands region of England, DTZ Pieda Consulting (2005) highlighted 
significant problems in cluster development policy, including a failure to identify and 
support potential high growth areas in the region. Where there has been success, they 
attribute it to well run networking organisations and the role of key individuals. 
adding strength to my conclusion that organisations and cluster animators are 
significant. DTZ Pieda also conclude, as I do, that there is a need for an evaluation 
Sj 
<http: //NN-xN, ýN,. yorkshire-forvvard. com/ýN, wýN'. vieNN-. asp? content_id=113&parent_id=37> accessed 
18.8-06 
56 <http: //wNN-, N. eeda. org. uk/press_pub_366. asp> accessed 18.8.06 
57 <http: //wwwww . nwda. co. uk/ReIatedContent. aspx? 
&area=86&subarea=133&item=20028061004717181> accessed 
18.8.06 
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process that is sensitive to the long timescale required to produce results from cluster 
policy and the `soft' nature of some of the outputs. 
Tully & Berkeley (2004) highlight difficulties in the cluster policy of Advantage West 
Midlands, the regional development agency for the West Midlands region of England. 
again noting a difficulty, shared by One NorthEast, in defining clusters. However, in 
an evaluation of Advantage West Midlands' key delivery mechanisms, GHK (2006), 
while noting that there had been significant difficulties in establishing those clusters 
that were not already established, identified that most of these difficulties had either 
been overcome or were in course of being overcome. GHK also used a qualitative 
approach to identify how partners and key stakeholders rated the strategic value added 
by clusters and, while there were differences between clusters, they noted that firms 
identified benefits from the clusters in terms of marketing opportunities, inter-firm 
networking and, to a lesser extent, collaborative working. 
Therefore there is evidence that, while there are significant difficulties to be 
overcome, regional development agencies in England can develop effective cluster 
strategies. Interestingly one of the clusters that is highlighted as particularly 
successful is the motorsports cluster, the policy for which has been developed by a 
number of regional development agencies. This supports my conclusion that cluster 
policy is most effective where the boundaries of the cluster are drawn in such a way 
as to reflect the true functional cluster, rather than to reflect a `policy' cluster 
determined by administrative boundaries. 
The cluster policy within the English regional development agencies could be 
compared with other regional policy-making bodies internationally, particularly to 
examine the apparently problematic issue of coordination between cluster policies. 
organisations and activities. Chapter 3 outlined how cluster policies are used 
internationally. Tödtling and Trippl (2004) demonstrate that cluster policy has been 
effective in the automotive cluster in Styria, Austria, but again they stress the 
influence of the institutional background to the cluster and the role of a cluster 
organisation in implementing cluster policy. They also note that the metal cluster has 
been less successful. partly because of its complexity and heterogeneity, features it 
shares with the marine and offshore cluster in the North East of England. 
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It would be particularly interesting to compare cluster policy in the North East with 
that of other regions or territories with marine related clusters in the United Kingdom, 
or with that of other nations, with marine and offshore construction related clusters. 
such as Norway or Germany, to investigate whether more could have been achieved 
for a marine cluster in the North East of England. Certainly the South West Regional 
Development Agency (SWRDA) has provided £4M over three years to create and 
fund Marine South West. 58 Its strategy includes skills, training, education and life 
long leaning; development of networks of clusters/supply chains; provision of a 
`voice' for the South West marine industry; accessing best practice: marketing 
(including for recruitment) and it has also created four local marine networks. The 
South East Regional Development Agency (SEEDA) also has a sector group covering 
marine industries (including marine leisure services). Policies include the provision 
of a full time co-ordinator and taskforces on best practice, cluster development and 
cost-effective training. SEEDA also led the Campaign for South Coast Shipbuilding 
to champion marine businesses in the region and ensure Vosper Thorneycroft, a local 
firm, played a key role in naval construction projects. The North West Regional 
Development Agency commissioned an analysis of maritime companies in the north 
west in December 2002 and the ensuing strategy now revolves around initiatives 
accessible through a portal59 including Sail NW, Seafood NW and Mersey Maritime, 
a private sector led organisation drawing together a cluster of around 930 maritime 
businesses to act as a catalyst for business growth and investment. Within the North 
West there is also a campaign to ensure naval contracts are awarded in the North 
West. The 'Keeping our Future Afloat Campaign' is a consortium of trade union. 
local authority and local community interests in the North West of England. 
60 While 
formal evaluation of these policies has not been made available, it would be 
interesting to contrast these strategies with those of One NorthEast. 
Looking at marine cluster policy internationally. Hassink (2005) notes that, while 
regional industrial policy in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany largely related to 
providing huge financial subsidies to the shipyards of the former East Germany. there 
58 w-www. marine-south-west. co. uk> 
59 
<www. maritimenw. com> 
60 <N, ýe . navalshipbuilding. co. uk> 
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were also projects (e. g. Maritime Alliance) which did support innovative small 
companies in the marine sector. Karlsen (2005) highlights the role of path 
dependency, as does Hassink in the case of Mecklenburg-Vompommern. in the 
diverging development trajectories of two marine clusters in Norway, but found that 
regional policy instigated in the North Norwegian maritime cluster to encourage 
diversification into offshore markets was unsuccessful. Santisteban (2006) notes the 
importance of cluster organisations and mentions the ADIMDE-Foro Maritimo Vasco 
(Basque Maritime Forum of ship building and related industries) as an example of a 
cluster association which has emerged from the Basque Country's policy of 
supporting `self-organizing cluster-associations' to link business actors and provide 
assistance to public policy makers in developing policy. Therefore nationally and 
internationally there are examples of strategies being developed, at a regional level, 
for marine clusters and the international cases above confirm my conclusions that the 
institutional environment, both in terms of formal organisations and conventions, 
habits and routines are key to the development trajectories of clusters. 
10.3.2 Further Theoretical Research Possibilities 
My research has suggested that our understanding of clusters and the implementation 
of cluster development policy might be enhanced by an examination of the role of the 
particular types of individuals in the cluster process. As mentioned above, recently 
emphasis has been placed on individuals who can animate clusters (Eklund et al., 
2002, Andersson et al., 2004), but there may be other roles that are significant. For 
example, insights from management studies into the operation of different roles 
within teams61 could represent an interesting avenue of exploration. The roles of 
individuals could be considered alongside the cluster life cycle models to investigate 
whether, and how, the required roles within clusters might change with the stage of 
the cluster and consider the implications for policy, given that the participatory nature 
of the cluster policy process suggests new roles for the public and private sector in the 
design and delivery of policy. I have suggested that an understanding of clusters can 
only be obtained using qualitative methods and this area in particular would require 
61 Belbin lists eight roles that are needed for a fully effective group in Belbin, R. M. (1981) 
Management Teams, Heinemann. 
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the use of intensive research methods and an ethnographic approach might be 
appropnate. 
My research has highlighted the need for policy-makers to have an understanding of 
cluster concepts. The need for organisational learning amongst policy-makers 
appears to be particularly significant when adopting a cluster approach because the 
timescale over which cluster policies are likely to achieve an effect far exceeds a 
normal policy cycle. Therefore an examination of the processes by which 
organisations absorb academic concepts and transmit them throughout the 
organisation, including to new members of staff, would be an interesting area of 
research. 
10.4 Policy Lessons 
A cluster-based approach to economic development has had great appeal to policy- 
makers, but it appears that cluster concepts have been used, and misused, in cluster 
policy-making. While the precise causality of the difficulties in developing cluster 
policy for the marine and offshore industries in the North East of England may be 
difficult to determine, the case studies in this thesis and comparator examples do 
suggest lessons for policy making. 
The need for different policies at different scales should be recognised, as should the 
need for coordination between policies at different scales. An associated point is that 
the boundaries of clusters for policy measures must be drawn in accordance with the 
`real' cluster, not in accordance with administrative convenience. Clusters will not 
necessarily map on to a region. The challenge for regional policy makers is firstly. to 
identify key concentrations of economic activity contained within their region, 
possibly at a sub-regional level, that they can work with and secondly, where there are 
concentrations of economic activity that cross over their boundaries, to work with 
other regional authorities to develop cluster policy. 
Having identified the `real' cluster, policy makers must recognise the specificities of 
clusters. These specificities include those dimensions to clusters identified by Enright 
(2000) and set out in Table 2-1 above, including scope, density. breadth, depth, 
activity base, growth potential, innovative capacity. industrial organisation. and co- 
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ordination mechanisms. Policy makers also need to be aware of the historical 
development and institutional framework of the cluster, given that these aspects have 
been identified as key to future developmental trajectories. I would also therefore 
recommend that policy makers work with existing organisations, even if these 
organisations appear `inauspicious' (Morgan, 1997a), and would suggest that they 
should look to foster links between organisations. Where possible, key individuals 
should be identified by policy makers to take on the role of `cluster animator', 
although considerations of equity and power relations should be taken into account to 
ensure that all voices within the cluster are heard. 
Above all policy makers should view the cluster policy as a process and give adequate 
weight to each stage of the process. They should not expect a neat programme of 
quickly implementable fixes. Cluster development and the facilitation of clustering 
take time and shortcuts will not lead to relation building. A related issue is that 
cluster policy should be evaluated over a long time scale and cluster policies should 
not be evaluated using only quantifiable measures. The process should be valued and 
evaluated and softer measures should be considered, as well as purely quantifiable 
outcomes. 
10.5 Final Conclusions 
In the United Kingdom clusters remain on the policy agenda, but their value as a 
policy approach is contested. From the evidence of my research I would draw the 
conclusion that cluster concepts do have the potential to add value in policy terms, but 
that a misuse, or lack of understanding, of the concepts around clusters has impacted 
both on the development of cluster policy and its outcomes. Through this thesis I 
have tried to contribute to the theory of clusters and cluster policy by demonstrating 
that it is only if we have a deep understanding of clusters and the scale dependent 
nature of processes within them that we can conceptualise what cluster policy might 
be. If we cannot adequately conceptualise a cluster-based approach to policy-making, 
it is unlikely to realise its potential. Cluster policy-making has certainly 
been 
fashionable. However, a combination of adequately conceptualised theories of 
clusters and cluster policy, and practical lessons for policy-making are required. 
Otherwise, the fate that Martin and Sunley (2003) anticipate for cluster concepts 
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appears likely to come to fruition - `fashionable ideas tend to share one thing in 
common: they all eventually become unfashionable' (ibid. p. 30). 
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
Name Organisation Date of 
Interview 
Case study 
used for 
Ratnatunga, Sanjee North Tyneside Council February-01 lb 
Gartside, Howard Small Business Service September-01 lb 
Thomas, Jean Small Business Service September-01 1b 
Howells, Phillip HPR Media Limited Micro Cluster October-01 1b 
Palmer, Slim HPR Media Limited Micro Cluster October-01 lb 
Halcrow, Terry Pegasus Pipeline Micro Cluster October-01 1b 
Corbridge, Angela Eurocrafts Micro Cluster October-01 1b 
Knaggs, Steve Argonautics Micro Cluster October-01 2b 
McDougall, Allan Argonautics Micro Cluster October-01 1 b, 2a 
Smith, Trevor Pegasus Pipeline Micro Cluster October-01 lb 
Diggory, lan Pegasus Pipeline Micro Cluster December-01 1b 
Hewitt, David Argonautics Micro Cluster December-01 
/June-05 
1 b, 2a, 2b 
Roxborough, Ann Eurocrafts Micro Cluster December-01 1b 
Rossiter, Linda Argonautics Micro Cluster January-02 2b 
Durose, Brian Argonautics Micro Cluster January-02 2 
Wagstaff, Dave Flooring by Design Micro Cluster January-02 1b 
Lutz, Fiona Ministry of Design Micro Cluster January-02 1 
Gaunt, Lynne Ministry of Design Micro Cluster February-02 1b 
Thompson, Andy Pegasus Pipeline Micro Cluster February-02 1b 
Herron, Don Flooring by Design Micro Cluster February-02 lb 
Greig, Martyn Pegasus Pipeline Micro Cluster March-02 lb 
Carr, Carole Ministry of Design Micro Cluster March-02 1b 
Byrne, David Argonautics Micro Cluster April-02 2b 
Douglass, Peter Argonautics Micro Cluster April-02 2b 
Carr, Paul Ministry of Design Micro Cluster April-02 lb 
Muir, Ian Flooring by Design Micro Cluster April-02 1b 
Allan, Peter Argonautics Micro Cluster 
April-02 2a, 2b 
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Name Organisation Date of 
Interview 
Case study 
used for 
Jose, Pam* Environmental Industries 
Federation 
April-02 la. 1; 
Rutherford, Phil Probe Industries Limited April-02 1b 
Wayman, Malcolm Advanced Engineering Solutions 
Limited 
April-02 lb 
Williams, John NEMI-CAI January-03 la, lb 
Dersley, John University of Newcastle 
Tyne 
upon November-03 la 
Bridge, John One NorthEast December-03 1a 
Reed, Bruce EEDS Limited December-03 la 
Goddard, John University of Newcastle 
Tyne 
upon January-04 la 
Pittis, Janice* University Of Essex February-04 la 
Athey, Dale Orla Proteins Limited February-04 la 
Shakeshaft, Phil One NorthEast February-04 1a 
Jamieson, Ron Resource Centre for Innovation & 
Design 
February-04 la 
Pywell, Chris One NorthEast March-04 la, 2a 
Turnbull, Alec One NorthEast March-04 la, lb 
Morris, Keith Centre for Excellence in 
Sciences 
Life March-04 la 
Robson, Ian Centre for Excellence in 
Sciences 
Life March-04 la 
French, Chris University of Newcastle 
NaREC 
and March-04 la, 2a 
Hills, Bill Engineering Design Centre March-04 la, 2a 
Armstrong, John April-04 1a 
Interviewed by telephone 
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Name Organisation Date of 
Interview 
Case study 
used for 
Beresford, Bob Jobs on the Riverside May-04 2a 
Steele, Bob Jobs on the Riverside May-04 2a 
Pearson, Mark One NorthEast May-04 la, 2a 
Rodgers, Alastair Northern Offshore Federation May-04 2a 
Kroese, Japp Swan Hunter (Tyneside) Limited May-04 2a 
Alderman, Lesley One NorthEast May-04 la, 2a 
Bowles, David Northern Defence Industries June-04 la, 2a 
Brown, Paul Regional Service for Clustering July-04 1b 
Austin, Allan Regional Service for Clustering July-04 1b, 2b 
Dinsmore, Sandy Regional Service for Clustering July-04 lb 
Shevels, Alex Regional Service for Clustering July-04 1b 
Briggs, Peter Regional Service for Clustering July-04 lb 
Syme, Avril Regional Service for Clustering July-04 1b, 2b 
Kirkbride, Neil British Engines Limited August-04 2a 
Elton, Liz Newcastle City Council October-04 2a 
Taylor, Kevin Imtech Marine and Offshore UK 
Limited 
October-04 2a, 2b 
Shepherd, Bruce Shepherd Offshore Services Plc October-04 2a 
Brennan, Tom GMB Union October-04 2a 
Goodwin, Paul Newcastle City Council October-04 2a 
Richardson, Barry Newcastle City Council October-04 2a 
Hanwell, Jack Nor-them Offshore Federation March-05 2a 
Rowan, Kevin Trades Union Congress (TUC) March-05 la, 2a 
Vaughan, Roger University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
May-05 2a 
Brannigan, Ian One NorthEast May-05 1a 
Bruce, George University of Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
May-05 2a 
Williamson, Andy One NorthEast June-05 la, 21 
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Name Organisation Date of 
Interview 
Case study 
used for 
Stables, Dave DUCO Limited June-05 2 
Pellow, Nathan Enabling Concepts Limited October-05 1b, 2 
Campbell, David Regional Service for Clustering Various 1 
Garrett, Angus Regional Service for Clustering Various 1 
Haddon, Andy Regional Service for Clustering Various 1 
Siedlok, Frank Durham University Business 
School 
Various 1 a, 2 
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